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ABSTRACT
SEARCH FOR AN ETHNO-SECULAR DELIMITATION OF TURKISH 
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE KEMALIST ERA (1924-1938) WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ETHNICIST CONCEPTION OF
KEMALIST NATIONALISM
Ahmet Yıldız
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assoc. Dr. Ayşe Kadıoğlu
May 1998
This study deals with the search for the creation of an ethno- 
secular Turkish national identity with particular reference to the ethnicist 
conception of Kemalist nationalism espoused by a group of bureaucratic- 
intellectual elites over three distinct periods in the years between 1919- 
1938 with an historical perspective.
In the period of 1919-1924, nationality was defined by religion, and 
hence, Turkish national identity had a predominantly religious character. 
As a reflection of this state of "forced" pluralism, official political 
discourse considered ethnic diversity as a given social condition.
In the second period (1924-1929), a radical rupture from the 
religious definition occurred with the adoption of Republicanism
IV
consisting of legal and political components. The legal component of the 
republican definition was overwhelmed by its political component, 
however. The motto of this definition was the "unity in language, culture 
and ideal"
The third period (1929-1938) of the delimitation of Turkish 
national identity in the Kemalist era was characterised by the efforts of a 
group of bureaucratic-intellectual elites who adopted the ethnicist 
conception of Kemalist nationalism to articulate racial motives, which 
defined national community at the basis of Turkish ethnie  and 
structured around the sense of common origin, into the republican 
definition. The symbolic reflection of this articulation was the motto of 
the "unity in language, culture and blood"
The emergent definition of "ethno-secular Turkish man" within 
the evolution of the parameters of Turkish national identity during the 
Kemalist era(1924-1938) was that the complete, genuine, or pure Turk 
was the one who embraced the cause of the Republican ideal, devoted to 
Westernised Turkish culture, spoke Turkish and descended from Turkish 
origin. Those who lacked any of the said parameters had to be 
compensated for. Aloofness to religiosity, the adoption of Turkish not 
only as official language but also as the mother-tongue, devotion to the 
monolithically defined Westernised Turkish culture intermixed with the 
political ideal preached by the new Republic, and the attainment of purity 
and strength of race were the suggested "compensators."
Ethnicism and Turkification policies were the two natural 
corollaries of the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism. Being 
constituted as such, the "other" of this nationalism involved religious 
Turks, non-Turkish Muslim ethnies, and non-Muslim minorities.
v
Keywords: Ethnic Nationalism, Nationalism, National Identity, 
Kemalism, Secularism.
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ÖZET
KEMALİST DÖNEMDE (1924-1938) TÜRK ULUSAL KİMLİĞİ İÇİN 
ETNO-SEKÜLER BİR TANIM ARAYIŞI VE KEMALİST 
ULUSÇULUĞUN ETNİSİST KAVRANIŞI
Ahmet Yıldız
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ayşe Kadıoğlu
Mayıs 1998
Bu çalışmada, Türk ulusal kimliğinin etno-seküler bir temelde 
inşasını hedefleyen bir arayış, Kemalist ulusçuluğun etnisist kavrayışını 
benimseyen bir grup bürokrat-entellektüele atıfla, tarihsel bir yaklaşımla 
ele alınmış ve 1919-1938 yıllarını kaplayan üç ayrı dönem içinde 
incelenmiştir.
1919-1924 döneminde Türk ulusal kimliği, baskın bir dinî karak­
tere sahip olmuş, milliyet Müslümanlıkla tanımlanmış, reelpolitiğin bir 
yansıması olarak, resmî politik söylem etnik çoğulculuğu veri olarak al­
mıştır.
1924-1929 döneminde dinî tanımdan radikal bir kopuş gerçekleşti­
rilmiş, çoğulcu söylem terkedilmiş, Türk ulusal kimliğinin Cumhuriyetçi 
karakteri temel tanımlayıcı olmuştur. Dinin hem siyasi hem de sosyal 
görünürlüğünün yok edilerek bir "mabed dini” halini almasını öngören
vıı
militan bir sekülarizm, Cumhuriyetçi tanıma asıl rengini vermiştir. Bu 
tanımın şiarı, "dilde, kültürde ve ülküde birlik"ti.
Hukukî-siyasî bir mahiyet arzeden Cumhuriyetçi tanımın politik 
muhtevası hukukî muhtevasına kıyasla çok daha belirleyici bir öneme 
sahip olmuştur. Bu tanıma göre, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olan ve 
Türkçe konuşan, Türk kültürüyle yetişmiş ve Cumhuriyet ülküsüne sa­
dık herkes, Türk olarak kabul edilmekteydi.
Türk ulusal kimliğinin Kemalist dönemdeki inşa sürecinde 
üçüncü safhayı (1929-1938), ulusal topluluğu etniklik ekseninde 
tanımlayan ve ortak köken duygusunu temel alan etnik-ırkî motiflerin 
Cumhuriyetçi tanıma eklemlenmesi çabaları oluşturmuştur. Bunun 
sembolik düzeydeki yansıması, "dilde, ekim (kültür)de, kanda birlik"in 
yeni ulusal şiarı oluşturmasıdır. Cumhuriyet ülküsünün cezbedici bir 
ideal olarak zayıflığı, ortak köken duygusunu ortak payda olarak alan, 
mitik ve sözde-bilimsel bir söyleme dayalı ırkî süreklilik tezinin Türk 
ulusal kimliği içinde yapısal bir değer kazanmasına yol açmıştır.
Kemalist dönemde(1924-1938), Türklüğün söz konusu edilen sınır­
larının gelişim sürecinde ortaya çıkan bütüncül tanım şu olmuştur: 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olup Cumhuriyet ülküsünü 
benimsemiş, Batıklaştırılmış Türk kültürüne bağlı, Türkçe konuşan ve 
köken itibariyle Türk olan herkes, kamil, hakiki ya da öz Türk'tür. Bu 
parametreleri tam karşılamayanlar, ırkî bakımdan güçlenmek ve arılık 
kazanmak, Türkçeyi ana dili olarak sahiplenmek, yekpare bir karaktere 
sahip Batıklaştırılmış Türk kültürünü Cumhuriyet ülküsü ile birlikte 
benimsemek ve dinî değerlerden arınmış olmak gibi telafi edici araçlara 
başvurmak zorundadırlar.
Türk ulusal kimliğinin etno-seküler karakteri, etnisizmin ve 
Türkleştirme politikalarının ulusal bütünleşmenin temel araçları olarak 
kullanılmasına yol açmıştır.. Son tahlilde, dindar Türkler, ana dili Türkçe 
olmayan Müslüman unsurlar ve gayr-ı Müslim azınlıklar bu 
etnoseküler ulusçuluğun "diğer" tanımı içinde yer almışlardır.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
This study is an attempt at clarification of the constitutive 
components of the Kemalist endeavor for the creation of Turkish 
national identity, with particular reference to the ethnic-genealogical 
conception of Kemalist nationalism developed by a group of state elites in 
the close circle of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the Kemalist era1. It 
adopts an historical perspective, and accordingly, rejects the commonly- 
held meta-historical narrations of Kemalist nationalism. Its fundamental 
assumption is that the so-called Kemalist national project did not have 
the vision of a purely political, ethnic-free national identity.
Hence, in this study, I will distinguish three constitutive pillars of 
the Kemalist endeavor for the creation of a Turkish national identity: 
legal, political(secular) and ethnic-genealogical. The conjunctural 
interactions between these three pillars determined the dominant face of 
this identity. Legal Turkishness, that is, citizenship was necessarily 
accompanied and complemented by ethno-secular Turkishness. 
Therefore, despite its equal citizenship approach premised on 
assimilation to Turkish identity (assimilationist equality), Kemalist
!The ideological bases of Kemalism were laid down during the 
National Struggle and evolved over the following years. It achieved a 
radical rupture in political and ideological terms in 1924 and well 
crystallised in the 1930s. Therefore, Kemalist nationalism will be analysed 
with an historical perspective over three distinc periods, the last two of 
which form the Kemalist era: 1) 1919-1924: The Period of the National 
Struggle; 2) 1924-1929: the dominance of the Republican definition; 3)1929: 
1938: the dominance of ethnic/genealogical definition.
1
nationalism2 has failed to eradicate ethnic and linguistic demands from 
non-assimilating ethnic groups. Due to the failure of striking a proper 
balance between what is private and what is public, coupled with the 
mobilisational weakness of Kemalist political ideal, i.e., the ideal of 
ethno-secular Turkish Republic, at the popular level, the Kemalist 
definition of citizenship as the locus of political identity could not absorb 
dissident sub-identities.
Citizenship in the ethnicist conception of Kemalist practice has 
been expressed and realised around the ethno-secular identity of the 
largest ethnic group (Turks) founding the Republic and hence was/is 
something more than a contractual/legal relationship between the 
individual and the state. Just as Chinese and Indian nationalisms are no 
different from Han and Hindu nationalisms respectively, so Turkish
2The Republican People's Party(RPP) called its basic principles as 
"Kemalist principles" during the Presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
The 1935 programme of the RPP states that "The main lines of our 
projects (tasarı) covering not only the next few years but the future are 
written down here as a whole. All these fundamentals the Party follows 
are the principles of Kemalism." See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı 
(Programme of the Republican People's Party) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 
1935). Drawing upon this definition, it becomes evident that Kemalism is 
an indicative programme of action and an ideology involving the six 
arrows (altı ok). Nevertheless, Kemalism was not defined in an overt, 
officially sanctified way. The principles of Kemalism and their 
interrelations were not defined conclusively in the life of Atatürk.
Atatürk had no objection as to the appellation of "Kemalism" 
adopted by his party, RPP. Conversely, he played an active role in the 
determination of the content of the "six arrows" Therefore, Kemalism 
during the life span of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was no different from 
Atatürkism, and hence any study dealing with Kemalism has to take 
into consideration His Speeches and Statements, as was done in the 
present study. The appellation "Kemalist nationalism", in this regard, is 
related with this description of Kemalism. Ethnicist conception of 
Kemalist rationalism, as is used in this study, refers to the views 
developed by a group of bureaucratic-intellectual elites during the 
Kemalist era, particularly in the 1930s.
2
nationalism, as defined by ethnicist Kemalists, was in fact the 
nationalism of the larger ethnic group (Turks) excluding the other(s).
Nevertheless, contrary to those who argue that Kemalist 
nationalism is racist, this study argues that the Kemalist definition of 
Turkish identity is essentially not racist but overtly ethnicist, i.e., it 
discriminates against those who insist to remain different in ethno- 
secular terms. As such, Kemalist nationalism noticed the ethnic 
divisions within society, but it preferred to assume their non-existence 
and refused to recognise them. It tried to establish the legitimacy of the 
state without any regard to ethno-cultural differences and the resulting 
claims. The success of this model was bound to the achievement of the 
national homogenisation through a massive layout of political 
engineering. That is why ethnic management strategies (assimilation, 
deportation and the like) have functioned as the driving force of the 
process of Kemalist national integration.
To define national community as an ethnic community, i.e., the 
equation of nation with ethnie is basic to the ethnicist understanding of 
Kemalist nationalism. Therefore the present study rejects the thesis that 
authoritarian-racial tendencies in Kemalist nationalism reflect the 
impact of the conjuncture only.
The usage of the term "racial" in this study is informed by Van den
Berghe's definition of a "racial" group as
a human group that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups 
as different from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable 
characteristics. These physical characteristics are in turn believed to 
be intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other non­
physical attributes or abilities.3
3Pierre L. Van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative 
Perspective (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), 9.
3
For him, race is "a group that is socially defined but on the basis of 
■physical criteria,"4 which refers to the culturalisation of racism, such as 
"lazy Negroes" or "savage Kurds". The biological/physical elements in 
this usage are mostly fictive and need not be real. It serves as the 
necessary foundation for discriminative stereotypes targeting "damned", 
"unwanted social groups, in this case, ethnies. Accordingly, in the 
present study, I will distinguish the term "racial" from racism in that the 
first refers to social determination of racial features and their 
culturalisation. The latter, however, in its pristine sense, expresses the 
determination of socio-political organisation on the basis of biological 
criteria. In this regard I will put forward that racialism is an essential 
attribute of Kemalist nationalism while racism as a state policy had a 
sporadic relevance only.
Because Kemalist nationalism tried to substitute secular 
nationalism in place of Islam as the new civic religion of country and 
cement of society, and as a corollary of the integrating and mobilising 
mission ascribed to secular Turkishness, it did not permit those ethnic 
groups other than the main one (unsur-u asli) to express themselves in 
socio-cultural and political terms. Kemalist nationalism was 
homogenising, standardising and Unitarian.
The vacuum created by the disestablishment of Islam from state 
and social life was attempted to be filled through nationalism that has 
been sacralized, which led to the exclusionary policies toward non- 
Muslim minorities and non-assimilating Muslim ethnies the result of 
which being a perpetual crisis of national integration"
4Ibid.
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In the present study, Walker Connor's conception of national 
identity, which sees "nation as a self-aware ethnic group"5 and regards the 
national identity as a modern manifestation of a phenomenon that has 
existed throughout history and across the world, i.e., the phenomenon of 
ethnicity, will be taken as a founding stone of the analytical framework. 
But more importantly, Anthony D. Smith's understanding of national 
identity would constitute the main analytical tools. According to Smith, 
national identity comprises both civic, i.e., conceiving nations as 
modern political entities, and ethnic, i.e., conceiving nations as 
communities bound by ethnocultural solidarity, elements. In other 
words, "the nation has come to blend two sets of dimensions, the one 
civic and territorial, the other ethnic and geneaological in varying 
degrees and proportions in particular cases."6 The multidimensionality of 
national identity acknowledges both ethnicity, the consciousness of 
sharing, and nationhood, implying political demands legitimated by the 
doctrine of nationalism which declares that "cultural and political 
boundaries should be congruent."7
To be sure, the civic and ethnic boundaries of the national identity 
are not fixed; they are intermixed and overlaps, and therefore subject to 
change. What I will deal with here is the crystallisation of these two sets 
of national identity with particular emphasis on ethnic boundary within 
a specific period of time (1924-1938) characterised by a revolutionary
5Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation is a State is an Ethnic 
Group Is a...," in Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest For 
Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 89-118.
6Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991),
14-15.
7Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell,
1992), 1.
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ideology, Kemalist nationalism. I will try to identify ethnic-genealogical 
parameters of Turkishness às developed by a group of state elites who 
considered themselves as Kemalist with the view of finding a 
meaningful answer to the question "What does it mean to be Turkish" as 
well as the corresponding implications of the inclusivity and/or 
exclusivity of the ethnic-racial parameters of Turkishness within the 
specified historical context. The cultural boundary of Turkishness is very 
much diffused and does not need separate treatment. Therefore I will 
consider it as the accompaniment of both civic-political and ethnic-racial 
parameters of Turkishness.
The ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism which defines 
allegiance to Turkish nation as allegiance to Turkish ethnie is 
considerably different from both the imperial nationalism of the 
Hamidian period as well as Gokalp's cultural nationalism. These 
differences are apparent in the outer manifestations of the would-be 
Kemalist nationalism as a world view, particularly in official 
publications and the speeches and statements of the leading 
political/state elites who saw themselves as Kemalist. In probing the 
nature of Turkish ethno-secular nationalism, the speeches of Kemalist 
elites, particularly the speeches and statements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
conceived by Kemalists as a constitutive principle of Turkish 
nationalism, and the pamphlets, and other documents of 
ethnonationalist character are fruitful sources to be used given that the 
period under study is a one leader-one party period.8
8Mete Tunçay, "Atatürk'e Nasil Bakmak"(How to Consider 
Atatürk), Toplum ve Bilim, 4(Winter 1978), 86.
In this period, no autonomous organisation was allowed to 
function. The press was under severe censorship thanks to the newly 
legislated Press Law. No private economic initiative was possible unless 
The Department of Planning of the Ministry of Industry permitted. All
6
The study of the institutions of the Kemalist era, de jure and de 
facto working of legal-political process and important laws, policies and 
reforms form other sources of reference in delineating the ethno-secular 
character of the Kemalist nationalism. In this regard, the speeches and 
statements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and other leading Kemalists, the 
legislation, the minutes of RPP's party conventions, the Registers of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly and memoirs of the leading figures of 
Kemalist nationalism are among the primary sources used in this study. 
The establishment of a nation state and the ensuing structure of political 
power, i.e., the politico-historical background, formed another aspect of 
the study. Under the light of this historical and partly textual analysis, 
questions that What kind of a regime may an ideology like Kemalism 
lead to ?" or "What kind of an ideology may such a regime reflect ?" 9 
may be tackled with a better insight.
In this study, I dwelt upon the crystallisation of the Kemalist 
process of the formation of the ethno-secular Turkish national identity 
and tried to delineate various aspects of that identity with an historical 
perspective. I took up this process of identity construction in its temporal
bills in the National Assembly were approved unanimously without any 
debate whatsoever. See Mahmut Goloğlu, Tek Partili Cumhuriyet 
(Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1974), 77. The government was the executive 
organ of the party policies. As Recep Peker aptly described in 1935: 
"Turkish republic is a party state." Ibid., 189. Atatürk was the immutable 
chief of both the state and the party. The Programmes of the Republican 
People's party were like the programme of the state order rather than a 
party programme, a kind of second constitution, more binding than the 
formal one. With the merger of the state with the party in 1936, the 
Republic turned into no-political party system. From that time on, for 
Atatürk, only the title of "chief" was used. For the general highlights of 
the one party period, see Goloğlu, ibid., 189-220.
9Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynaklan: 
Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku (The Official Sources 
of Political Culture in Turkey: Kemalist One Party Ideology and the Six 
Arrows of RPP), vol. 3 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 9.
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context, starting from the war of independence (1919-1922) to the Kemalist 
era (1924-1938).
Chapter I deals with definitional clarification around such concepts 
as nation, nationalism, typologies of nationalism, ethnonationalism, 
ethnicity and their interrelations and aspects of divergence as well as 
convergence. The common tendency of the use of concepts in a rather 
loose and imprecise fashion, even in the academic vocabulary, is one of 
the most pressing questions. Thus people, including academics, in Turkey 
may say that Kemalist nationalism is racist while referring to its ethnic 
core. Likewise, many Turkish academics describe Kemalist nationalism 
as a cultural nationalism in order to argue that it is not an ethnic 
nationalism. Conversely, some equate cultural nationalism with ethnic 
nationalism.
Therefore, the question of appellation and imprecision in the use 
of vocabulary of nation and nationalism emerge as the major 
determinants in the endurance of the ambiguity surrounding 
nationalism. Lack of an holistic insight to the phenomenon of 
nationalism and failing to admit that nationalism is a "phenomenon 
that can rationally be inquired but not explained" due to its intangible 
character put "symptoms" in place of "causes" and disrupt our 
understanding. Hence, distinguishing this set of concepts from one 
another presents an urgent task, which is held in this chapter.
Chapter II deals with the historical background of Kemalist 
nationalism in terms of the introduction and evolution of the idea of 
nation and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.
In the classical Ottoman system of social stratification(f/ie millet 
system ) based on hierarchical differentiation rather than assimilationist 
equality, all non-Muslim communities such as Orthodox Christians,
8
Armenians and the Jews, were considered a millet each. Muslims were 
considered as only one millet regardless of ethnolinguistic differences. 
The secularisation of the term millet transcending religious affiliation 
came only in the second half of the nineteenth century; yet it remained 
only in the journalistic vocabulary with no extension in the popular 
thinking.
Tanzimat introduced the notion of Ottomanism prescribing 
Muslim-non-Muslim equality (müsavat), which ended the supremacy of 
the Muslim millet (millet-i hâkime) The aim of Ottomanism was to 
unite various ethnolinguistic communities and to create a feeling of 
common belonging, that is a "policy of diversity within unity" 
Nevertheless, the inability of Ottoman Empire to nativise and reconcile 
the nationalist principle was partly responsible for its ultimate 
disintegration. This was because the official nationalism, i.e., Ottomanism 
could not succeed in creating social cohesion and loyalty to the state vis a 
vis the attractiveness of ethnolinguistic nationalism emphasising loyalty 
to the community one belongs rather than loyalty to the state.
Ottoman intellectuals engineered several projects to meet the 
challenges of nation-state. This politico-engineering projects formed a 
trio: first the policy of ittihad-ı Osmanî (Ottomanism), then ittihad-i 
Islam (pan-Islamism), and finally ittihad-i Etrak (pan-Turkism). The first 
articulation of these "Three Ways of Policy" (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset) was by 
Yusuf Akçura, the first thinker spelling Turkism as a political project and 
a prominent figure of pan-Turkism, a political movement aiming at 
uniting Turkish peoples of Russia and China under Ottoman umbrella.
As an extension of the historical background of Kemalist 
nationalism, Chapter III tackles with the position of İttihat ve Terakki 
C em iyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) vis a vis the
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unfolding of "three ways of policy", i.e., Ottomanism, Islamism and 
Turkism.
The period of post-1908 Revolution exhibited the same problematic 
which dominated the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire: the 
question of the immortality of state. All parties, societies, thinkers and 
men of politics locked their efforts and programme of actions to the 
question of "saving the staté" Three ways of allegiance were all starting 
from this question and represented different claims caused by internal 
social dynamism and varying attitudes towards the western-originated 
formulas.
The CUP cherished the ideals of Turkish unity and lent its support 
to Turkism through the efforts for the development of a national 
economy based on solidarism and the spread of Turkish education. Yet, 
due to the continuous state of war from 1911 to 1918 accompanied by 
ongoing internal revolts, and the necessity of maintaining the ideological 
postures of Ottomanism as well as Islamism, the CUP could not 
transform Turkism into a comprehensive programme of action as the 
founders of the Turkish Republic did.
The main problematic of the last decade of the Empire (1908-1918), 
apart from the question of political survival, was the formulation of a 
new identity in view of changing socio-political conditions, the direction 
of which was toward a culture-based national state instead of a multi­
cultural, religiously-legitimated Empire. Against this nationalist 
challenge, Ziya Gokalp, the chief theoretician of the CUP, suggested a 
new matrix of identity with three faces: Turkism, Islamism and 
Modernism. He offered a new synthesis between Turkish national 
culture, Islam and modernisation where each of them came together to 
form an aspect of the new Turkish identity.
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Kemalist nationalism inherited Gökalp's ideal of a homogeneous 
Turkish nation through seclusion of non-Muslim minorities by keeping 
them within the social fabric as a non-harmful element and applying a 
fierce assimilation to the non-assimilating Muslim ethnies other than 
Turks, particularly Kurdish- speaking people.
Chapter IV takes up the political backdrop of the Kemalist 
nationalism and examines the process of the breakdown of the Ottoman 
politico-religious mind. A revolutionary transformation took shape 
during the period of the National Struggle (1919-1922) and after, which 
shifted the locus of the political allegiance from the sultan-caliph to the 
Republic and from the Muslim umma to the nation as a well-defined 
territorial vision.
In the political discourse prevailing during the years of National 
Struggle, the phrases of Turkishness and Turkish identity were not 
overtly emphasised. The national community was defined in such 
traditional criteria as being Ottoman and Muslim. Moreover, this 
national community was not conceived of as a monolithic block, but as 
composed of various ethnic brands. The uniting bond among these 
ethnies were expressed as "pure fraternity," "mutual respect and feeling 
of sacrifice," "complete partnership both in happiness and calamity," and 
the willingness of "sharing the same destiny." The documents like the 
Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the National Pact, 
stated that "racial and social rights" of the ethnic elements and their 
"environmental conditions" would be respected, though with vague 
indication of the content of "racial and social rights" 10
10For the Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses see 
Mahmut Goloğlu, Erzurum Kongresi (Erzurum Congress) (Ankara: 
Goloğlu Yayınları, 1968), 109-111; and Mahmut Goloğlu, Sivas Kongresi 
(Sivas Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınlan, 1969), Appendix 1, 219-226.
11
The substitution of national sovereignty for dynastic one implied a 
momentous change. Yet the emergence of the modem Turkish state and 
Kemalist nationalism cannot be properly analysed and explained without 
duly taking into account the elements of continuity. This does not negate 
the fact that Kemalism represents a radical break from the past, which 
transformed Turkey from a military-religious empire into a modern 
nation-state in which the nationalist doctrine replaced Islam as the 
cultural foundation and overall ideology of the polity. In the last 
analysis, Kemalism must be considered as the last response to the age-old 
question of the Ottoman-Turkish elites: how can this state be saved?
Against this historical and political background, Chapter V dwells 
upon the crystallisation of the secular aspect of the new Turkish national 
identity in making. Kemalist westernising reforms which opted for the 
total secularisation of polity by cleansing every aspects of life, private as 
well as public, from "the dictates of religion" were, according to Mardin, 
based on the following "social findings": 1) Passing to a new conception 
of national honour based on rules and laws rather than ascription and 
personal authority as was the case in the ancient regime; 2)Transition 
from Islamic transcendentalism to the materialism of positive sciences 
in the comprehension of the human existence and the universal order; 3) 
Transition from a communitarian social organisation composed of the 
high (havas ) and the low (avam) to an homogenous society of a demotic 
ethnie; 4) Transition from a religious community to a national society 
and state. 11
11Şerif Mardin, "Yenileşme Dinamiğinin Temelleri ^ve Atatürk" 
(The Foundations of the Dynamics of Renovation and Atatürk), in 
Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk (İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 
1983), 24. The spring of the dynamics of Kemalist nationalism was this 
understanding of the new collectivity founded on the conception of the 
"new honour."
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Anything Ottoman/Islamic represented the ancient regime for the 
Kemalists. All the Kemalist reforms attempted to provide the new 
Turkish man with a new world view freed from Islam and Islamic 
culture. Kemalism created a new Turkish nationalism located within the 
western international, a reflection of the equation of civilisationism with 
westemism and civilisation with the west.
The parameters of Turkish national identity evolved over three 
distinct periods from predominantly religious toward a predominantly 
ethnic definition. The first definition, which dominated the period 
between the years 1919 and 1924, was predominantly determined by the 
Islamic boundary of Turkishness suggesting that "the Muslim peoples of 
Anatolia and Thrace are Turk".12 Following the promulgation of the 
Republic(1923), the political definition of Turkishness, which considered 
everybody being citizen of Turkish Republic and embracing Turkish 
language, culture and the Kemalist national creed as Turk became more 
pronounced. Toward the end of the 1920s, the ethnic-genealogical 
boundary became increasingly dominant in the Kemalist definition of 
national identity, based on the claim of racial continuity among peoples 
inhabiting the Anatolian peninsula throughout history (1929-1938).
Chapter VI studies the delimitation of the ethnic-genealogical 
aspect of the formation of Turkish national identity by a particular group 
of state elites in the close circle of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who espoused a 
racial/ethnic understanding of nation, which defined Turkishness as 
having common Turkish ancestry or "blood", and as a matter of culture,
12See the Regulation of Anatolian and Rumelian Society for the 
Defence of Rights in Mazhar Müfit Kansu, Erzurum'dan Ölümüne 
Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber (Together with Atatürk from Erzurum to his 
Death) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1966), 221-230.
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i.e., values or life style to which one adheres, defined on the basis of 
Turkish ethnicity.
The ethnic-genealogical boundary of this ethnicist interpretation of 
Kemalist nationalism, composed of Turkic legends, symbols, myths, 
heroes, and sacred places, was derived from the pre-Islamic Turkish 
golden past. It was qualified by a strict territorialism structured on the 
rejection of pan-Turkist leanings of politico-territorial visions, however. 
Its main premises can be summarised as follows: The Turkish race is the 
superior race and the father of the present European civilisation. All 
civilisations in history are formed either directly or indirectly by Turkish 
race, or the races who lived under Turkish domination and benefited 
from the supreme attributes *of Turks. Language is the most vital feature 
of Turkish race. A genuine Turk necessarily speaks Turkish. The most 
distinguished example of the genuine Turkish race is Atatürk himself.
The racial character of this conception of Kemalist nationalism are 
discerned through the observations of its leading ideologues, namely 
Recep Peker, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Afet inan and Vasfi Raşid Seviğ. 
These four political-academic people here would be taken as contributors 
to the formation of a racial/ethnic view of Kemalist nationalism.
Chapter VII describes the manifestations of the ethnicist practices of 
the Kemalist making of "unity in people" i.e., its handling with the two 
essential questions of fundamental importance challenging its ethno- 
secular credentials of national identity, the resolution of the question of 
the so-called "Şark"(East) and Turkification of minorities.
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CHAPTER I
CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN ETHNONATIONALISM
1.1. Introduction
Post-World War II political literature was dominated by the 
suggested optimism of a relatively older version of Fukuyama’s 
messianic "end of history" thesis12 regarding ethnonationalism as a 
political determinant. Political development theory, the dominant 
paradigm of the day, led to scholarly indifference to ethnonationalism 
and the questions posed by the ethnic heterogeneity of the socio-political 
make-up of the so-called "nation-states" The result was an increasingly 
widening gap between the dominant conceptual framework provided by 
"nation-building" theory and the actual reality. This was because the self- 
proclaimed axiomatic certitude of the theory could not have predicted the 
upsurge of ethnonationalism as a global phenomenon, and failed to 
diagnose its manifestations.1
In nation- building theory, ethnicity was conceived of as something 
of the past and irrelevant of the present. Among the reasons contributing 
to the fallacious description of and indifference to ethnonationalism, and 
problems arising from ethnic heterogeneity were the equation of
!This state of affairs can best be exemplified by the total neglect of 
the term ethnicity and nationalism in the works of the major theoretician 
of the political development school, Gabriel Almond. See Gabriel 
Almond, "The Development of Political Development,"in Myron 
Wiener and Samuel Huntington, eds. U nderstanding  P olitical 
Development (Boston, 1987), 437-490.
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nationalism with patriotism ( loyalty to the state); failure to appreciate the 
ethnic geist of nationalism due to the reduction of ethnonationalism to 
its tangible aspects, namely language, religion and customs; the acceptance 
of material drives as the main determinants of human behaviour, and 
therefore viewing ethnicity as the epiphenomenon of economic 
inequalities which stemmed from the convergence of industrialised 
societies; the improvements in the fields of communication, 
transportation and standardisation of the patterns of production and 
consumption expected to eradicate ethnic affiliations and create a uni­
directional, irreversible process of assimilation purporting to end up 
with homogeneous nation states; taking up the process of assimilation 
thoroughly from the perspective of socio-political engineering; the 
portraying of the Western Europe as consisting of wholly integrated 
nation states; believing that the "rest" would follow the "West" as the 
exemplar; and upon all these, the generalisations derived from particular 
western cases.2
Dismissal and misunderstanding of nationalism as something that 
will wither away in the progressive process of modernisation, coupled 
with the indifferent attitude of the academic community, were put aside 
by the mid-1970s when the study of ethnonationalism and related issues 
had won the day owing to the apparent falsification of developmentalist 
assumptions with the revival of the ethnic bond and upsurge of ethnic 
movements all over the World, including "developed" western 
countries. Thus ethnicity was relinked with politics and became the 
subject of thousands of scholarly articles, books and doctoral dissertations,
2Walker Connor cites a long though not exhaustive list accounting 
for the reasons for the discrepancy between theory (nation building) and 
practice. See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest For 
Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 69-71.
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apart from conferences, panels and symposiums held by professional 
organisations. Some journals wholly dedicated themselves to the issue, 
such as Ethnic and Racial Studies 3 and Nations and Nationalism. * 4This 
quantitative upsurge in the literature of ethnonationalism has 
contributed much to the theory of nationalism. It did not, however, 
amount to the level of a universal theory of nationalism. There is no 
unified theory that may guide empirical research. 5 What we see instead 
is a variety of competing perspectives and partial theories that intend to 
explain the origin and nature of ethnonationalism and means for the 
accommodation of ethnic heterogeneity. Connor attests this marked lack 
of consensus in the literature of ethnonationalism to the way the 
phenomenon itself grasped:
In this Alice-in Wonderland world in which nation usually means 
state, in which nation-state usually means multination-state, in 
which nationalism means loyalty to the state, and in which 
ethnicity, primordialism, pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, 
communalism, parochialism and subnationalism usually mean 
loyalty to the nation, it should come as no surprise that the nature 
of nationalism remains essentially unprobed.6
The question of appellation and imprecision in the use of
vocabulary of nation and nationalism emerge as the major determinants
in the endurance of the ambiguity surrounding nationalism. Lack of an
3The journal Ethnic and Racial Studies is being published since 
1978. It has become quarterly, since 1992 . It deals with issues pertaining to 
race relations and ethnic groups.
4A quarterly journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity 
and Nationalism(ASEN). Its editor in chief is Anthony D. Smith.
5Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," in Ethnonationalism: The
Quest For Understanding, 72; and Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinowitz, 
"The Study of Ethnic Politics in the Middle East," in Ethnicity, Pluralism 
and the State in the Middle East, eds., Milton J. Esman and Itamar 
Rabinovich ( Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press, 1988), 12.
6Connor, "Ethnonationalism," 73.
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holistic insight to the phenomenon of nationalism and failing to admit 
that nationalism is a "phenomenon that can rationally be inquired but 
not explained" due to its intangible character put "symptoms" in place of 
"causes" and disrupted our understanding.7 According to Connor, the fact 
that "the national bond is subconscious and emotional rather than 
conscious and rational"8 must be acknowledged. Recognition of the 
phenomenon as such is the essential prerequisite to a greater 
understanding of nationalism.9 Donald Horowitz,10 Anthony D. Smith11 
and Pierre Van den Berghe12 are among the scholars who describe the 
ethnonation as a kinship group, and hence distinguish national 
consciousness from nonkinship identities, e.g., religious or class-based 
identities, and pay greater attention to the emotional, nonrational
7Connor points to the intellectuals' discomfort with the non- 
rational, and their search for quantifiable, and hence tangible 
explanations and their ignorance of the distinction between fact and 
perception of fact, i.e., what is and what people believe is. See Connor, 
"Ethnonationalism," 74. In the definition of nation as an ancestrally 
related group of people, common ancestry need not be a fact. It is a 
subjectively held belief with-behavioural consequences.
8Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the
Ethnonational Bond," in Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest 
For Understanding 204.
9Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic 
Group, Is a...," in Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding 113.
10Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985).
11Anthony D. Smith, Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford:Blackwell,
1989).
12 Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective," 401-
411.
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dimension of nationalism that other types of human groupings do not 
enjoy. 13
Today we live in a political environment in which ethnicity has 
become legitimate in many polities, particularly the "western" ones. 
Ethnic identity has gained publicity without being officially banned. This 
is often the case when ethnic identity is viewed as the search for roots 
only. When it functioned as a springboard for the restructuring of the 
public realm, the conflict occurs. Modern nation state is essentially 
unitarist and therefore its basis of legitimacy is strictly national, i.e., 
assumes the overlapping of the political domain only with the claims of 
one nation, however diverse it be. Ethnies aspiring to be nation within a 
nation state is conceived as a challenge to the national sovereignty and 
integrity. Therefore ethnic claims are relegated to the private sphere at 
best or heavily suppressed at worst. As Hall aptly maintain, ethnic 
conflict is basically a political conflict in the context of territorial state in 
terms of coexistence among two or more ethnic groups themselves and 
the state.14
The fact that there is no general theory of nationalism does not 
necessitate the treatment of national histories as the unit of analysis. 
Middle range theories based on various ideal types of nationalism can be 
discerned, which does not rule out the suggestion of a unitary definition 
of nation and nationalism.15
13 Connor, "Ethnonationalism," 74.
14John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained," in 
Notions o f Nationalism, ed., Sukuwar Periwal (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 1995), 8.
15Ibid., 9.
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The novelty of nations, the widening of nationalism through the 
diffusion of the nationalist ideology which first became dominant in 
Western Europe and later reached to other regions the importance of 
factors other than structural (material) ones in the explanation of 
national identity are widely held points of consensus in the present state 
of the theory of nationalism, which shows that the developmental 
model, that is, the examination of nations and nationalism as historical 
processes still constitutes the dominant theoretical model. 16
What follows is an attempt at definitional clarification around such 
concepts as nation, nationalism, ethnonationalism and ethnicity. Before 
trying to discern the predominantly ethno-secular character of Kemalist 
nationalism, which borrows much from what Hayes calls "integral" 
nationalisms attesting to nation an absolute value, such a conceptual 
clarification is essential.
1. 2. N ation : Fseudo-Gemeinschaft of M od ern ity
The Latin-rooted word nation is derived from the past participle of 
the verb nasci, meaning '"to be born." The Latin noun n ation em  
connotes breed or race. In this pristine sense the idea of nation conveyed 
the idea of common blood ties. Due to the literary license however, the 
pristine meaning of nation lost its sight. In the medieval universities, a 
student's nationem was the sector of the country from where he came. 
But in the late thirteenth century usage of the word, nationem 
reassumed its pristine meaning in English, which referred to a blood
16For a general consideration of the points of consensus and 
dissensus in the literature on nations and nationalism see John 
Armstrong, "Towards A Theory of Nationalism," in Notions o f  
N ationalism , ed., Sukuwar Periwal (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 1995), 34-43.
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related group. By the early seventeenth century however, nation was also 
being used to describe the inhabitants of a country, regardless of its 
ethnonational make-up. In this sense, it became a substitute for less 
specific human categories such as the people or the citizenry. 17 The 
present usage still holds multiple layers of meaning. Moreover, there is a 
wide propensity to employ the term nation as a substitute for the state, a 
tendency dating back to the late seventeenth century when the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty in its Lockean formulation gained rapid spread.18 
Therefore, to draw up a demarcation line between nation and its pseudo 
substitutes, namely people, citizenry and state is necessary. 19
According to Hugh Seton-Watson, one of the leading scholars of 
modern nationalism, the members of a nation must feel that they are 
bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture and a national 
consciousness. For Seton-Watson, a nation exists if "a significant number
17National identity, which is social and psychological, and 
citizenship, which is politico-legal, should be differentiated. The 
regulations in this regard exhibits a diverse practice. In Great Britain, the 
rights of British subjects and of the citizens of the United Kingdom differ. 
Having the status of British subject does not confer the right to settle in 
the United Kingdom. In the United States not all "nationals" are citizens. 
See Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations Without States," Foreign Affairs, 3 (May- 
June 1994), 109-110. In fact, the crucial distinction between the notion of 
jus soli (the principle of defining citizenship by the place of birth, as in 
France)) and jus sanguinis ( operating on the principle that nationality is 
a matter of inheritance and refusing to distinguish nationality from 
citizenship, as in Germany) needs to be emphasised due to the 
importance of its practical impact because the French-born North 
Africans can reside anywhere in Europe but German-born Turks cannot. 
See Myron Weiner, "Peoples and States in a New Ethnic Order?'T/nrd 
World Quarterly, 13:2 (1992), 329.
18For the Locke's conception of popular sovereignty, see George H. 
Sabine &Thomas L. Thorson, A History o f Political Theory, 4th ed. 
(Tokyo: Dryden Press, 1981), 483-498.
19Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic 
Group, Is a...," 94-95.
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of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or 
behave as if they formed one." 20 He does not spell out what the 
significant number is for a nation to be viable, however. Also, he is of the 
opinion that a precise scientific definition of the nation is not possible.21
Until recent times, the mainstream definitional tendency has 
avoided explicitly to confess that the notion of the shared blood is a 
defining component of the term nation. To conceive of nation as a 
kinship group was refused on the ground that there is no pure nation in 
genetical terms.This is simply irrelevant. The so-called objective 
characteristics of nation were deemed scientific because they were 
amenable to quantification. This positivistic inclination barred many 
scholars to perceive the fact that what matters in socio-political terms is 
not what is (fact) but what people believe is (perception of fact).
What scholars ignored was fully apprehended by politicians, 
however. With hardly any exception, we may find references of 
politicians to the glorious past and noble blood of the nation. Belief in the 
separate origin and nationhood and in the existence of exclusively 
national Adams and Eves is basic to the popular conception of national 
psychology. The national man identifies himself not only with present 
co-nationals but with all co-nationals and their glory throughout time.22
As referred to above, as a self-defined group, it is not important for 
a nation to be composed of various genetic brands. To take an example, 
despite the fact that the Anatolian peninsula has been on the way of
20Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Inquiry into the 
Origins o f Nations and the Politics o f Nationalism (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1977), 5.
21Ibid.
22Walker Connor, "The Nation and its Myth," in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism , ed., Anthony D. Smith (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 48-49.
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major migration routes in history, present-day Turks would believe that 
they are evolved from a single origin23 and have remained unadulterated 
so far. As it is evident, this belief cannot be justified on factual grounds; it 
is only a matter of intuition and attitude. The national psychology based 
on such intuitive convictions portrays nation as an extended family. 24
In line with Connor’s kinship-based definition that "nation is a 
group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related,"25 Dunn 
defines nation as a ; group of people who belong together by birth 
genetically and through familially inherited language and culture. 
According to Dunn, nation is both a community of birth and choice. 26 
Smith also considers commonly held ethnic markers such as 
genealogical legends, collective historical memory, and the sense of 
distinction as the sine qua non of nationhood.27 Kellas’ definition 
reflects the mainstream tendency combining objective and subjective 
dimensions. To him, nation is a group of people who feel themselves to 
be a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common 
ancestry. Nations may have objective characteristics which may include a
23There are many legends that attests to the origin of Turks, 
namely, The Ergenekon and Oguz Kagan Legends. A legendary figure, 
Bozkurt, —the grey wolf— was used as the national rigging in the early 
republican period.
24Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation...," 93-94.
25Connor, "Man is a National Animal," in Walker Connor, 
Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding 202.
26The familial discourse of father, mother, brother, sister and 
children characterises all nationalist symbolisms. See John Dunn, 
"Introduction: The Çrisis of the Nation-State?" in John Dunn, ed., 
Contemporary Crisis o f the Nation-State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 1.
27Anthony D. Smith, Milli Kimlik (National Identity), trans. 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1994), 115.
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territory, a language, or a religion, and subjective characteristics i.e., 
national awareness and the supreme loyalty felt to the nation, the 
ultimate appearance of which may be readiness to die for the national 
cause. 28
As a matter of fact, the defining feature of nation, its essence, is its 
"intangible, subconscious, nonrational" subjective dimension, which 
constitutes the sense of uniqueness. "Tangible and rational," objective 
markers of cultural distinctiveness make sense to the extent that they 
contribute to this sense of uniqueness. The fact that a culturally fully 
assimilated Irish or Kurd still may feel that he is an Irish or Kurd 
evidences that cultural markers of nation do not have primary existence 
but complimentary to the subjective aspect of nationhood. Conversely, 
feeling loyalty to a single nation may transcend the divisions caused by 
differentiation in cultural terms, as is the case with the multilingual 
Switzerland and Germany transcending its Lutheran-Catholic divide. 
Hence, what is crucial in determining the vitality of a nation is not the 
tangible characteristics, but rather is the self-view of the national self. 
Changes in tangible markers such as language, religion or economic 
status do not cause the national allegiance to appear. Due to the 
emotional, non-rational character of the intangible-subjective side of 
nationhood, the national man tends to express his identity through 
identifiable attributes, that is, tangible symbols.29 In fact, the
28James J. Kellas, The Politics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity 
(Houndsmill: Macmillan, 1991), 2.
29Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," in 
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding 43- 
44.
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distinguishing line between the nation and the ethnic group is that the 
former is self-defined while the latter is other-defined. 30
1. 3. Nationalism: The Modem Janus
Nationalism is one of the most ambiguous concepts in the political 
vocabulary. The programme of an insurgent movement in the Balkans in 
the nineteenth century or in Africa in the twentieth century can be 
classified under the category of nationalism as may the oppression of one 
people by another. 31 It has been part of both imperialist and anti­
imperialist discourses. It can be associated with movement of 
emancipation and independence as well as with those whose goal is 
oppression. 32
The term nationalism, whose earliest mention can be found in the 
1774 work of German philosopher Johann Gotfried Herder ,33 entered 
into the general linguistic usage in the mid-nineteenth century. Today, 
there is no generally agreed upon definition of nationalism. In essence 
the range of definitions that have been offered merely reflect the
30Ibid., 44.
31Peter Alter, Nationalism, trans. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 
4. For definitional problems regarding nationalism, also see Alexander J. 
Motyl, "The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation-States 
in the Contemporary World,” Journal Of International Affairs, 45:2 
(Winter 1992), 307-323.
32Alter, Nationalism, 5.
33According to Herder, humanity is composed of nations, the 
natural creations of God’s hand. Language is the distinguishing marker 
of this grouping, and the main criterion for deserving the right to possess 
a state. For Herder's views, see Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 56-57; For its Turkish translation, see Elie 
Kedourie, Avrupa'da Milliyetçilik, trans. (Ankara: Devlet Kitapları, 1971), 
55-57.
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multiformity that nationalism has assumed in historical and political 
reality since the late eighteenth century. Nevertheless, we may discern a 
common base observed in all the definitions with varying degrees of 
emphasis on the elements of national uniqueness.
As a convenient justification for such a complexity, nationalism 
conceals within itself opposites and contradictions. It is a repository of 
both "dangers" and "opportunities" Janus-faced nationalism has so many 
different forms and variations that it is difficult to accommodate this 
diversity under one umbrella. Only with reference to a concrete historical 
context that the term assumes its intended meaning. Despite these 
variations, still we may speak of commonalities of all nationalisms, 
however. 34
A comprehensive definition must embrace all the forms of 
nationalism, both the nationalisms of nations with a state, and nations 
without a state. Peter Alter, therefore, defines nationalism both as an 
ideology and a political movement, which holds the nation and the 
sovereign nation-state to be crucial in dwelling values and managing to 
mobilise the political will of a people or a large section of a population. It 
is a dynamic principle capable of engendering hopes, emotions and 
action; it is a vehicle for activating human beings and creating political 
solidarity among them for the purposes of achieving a common goal.35
34Alter, Nationalism, 6.
35Ibid., 8-9. Proposing the same definition, Kellas asserts that the 
ideology of nationalism builds on the awareness of the members of a 
nation to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action. These may be 
cultural, economic or political. In all cases, national self-determination is 
the least common denominator. Also as a form of political behaviour, 
nationalism is based on the feeling of belonging to a community which is 
the nation. Those who do not belong to the nation are seen as different, 
foreigners or aliens, with loyalties to their own nations. See Kellas, The 
Politics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity, 3-4.
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Nationalism is the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, real or 
constructed; which tend to move from cultural to political forms and to 
entail popular mobilisation.’36
Conceiving nationalism as a doctrine, Kedourie distinguishes three 
basic premises: 1) humanity is divided into separate nations; 2) these 
nations have the right to establish their own sovereign states; 3) members 
of a nation could attain freedom and fulfilment by developing the 
qualities of their nations by merging their personality into the greater 
whole of the nation. 37 In relation to this core doctrine of nationalism, 
Smith asserts that nationalism is essentially an ideology about nation, not 
state. The idea that prescribes each nation a state cannot necessarily be 
justified by drawing on the core doctrine of nationalism. As a political 
ideology based on cultural uniqueness, nationalism purports for a nation 
to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity.38
36John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained," in 
Notions o f  Nationalism, ed., Sukumar Periwal, 9. For a similar 
definition of nationalism from the same vantage point, see Jack Snyder, 
"Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," Survival, 
35:l(Spring 1993), 5-26.
37Kedourie, Nationalism, 67 and Avrupa’da Milliyetçilik, 65. In a 
sense, Smith reexpresses Kedourie in his formulation of the core 
doctrine of nationalism. To Smith, the core doctrine of nationalism 
consists of the following premises:
1) The world is divided into nations each of which having its own 
uniqueness, history and fate.
2) Nation is the source of all political power, and national 
allegiance is above all other foci of loyalties.
3) It is necessary for those who want to be free and achieve self- 
actualisation to identify with a nation.
4) If there will be peace and justice in the world, nations should be 
free and secure. See Smith, Milli Kimlik, 121.
38Smith, ibid., 121-122.
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2. 3. 1 . Nationalism vs Ethnonationalism
Connor's contribution in terms of the relationship between 
nationalism and ethnonationalism is most striking. To him, in their 
pure sense, there is no difference between nationalism and 
ethnonatioralism. Nation in its pristine sense connotes a group of people 
who believe they are ancestrally related. Nationalism connotes 
identification with and loyalty to one's nation as just defined. In view of 
this, it is clear that the word "ethno" in the term ethnonationalism is 
redundant.39 That is, all nationalisms are, in varying degrees, inherently 
ethnic. 40
1.4. C lassifying N ationalism s
Many typologies have been suggested for classifying nationalisms, 
beginning with Carlton Hayes' categories of humanitarian, Jacobean, 
aristocratic, cultural, democratic, integral and economic nationalism. 
Similarly, Hans Kohn differentiated between Western associational and 
Eastern organic types. These "founding fathers" evaluated nations and 
nationalist movements using such value-laden terms as "optimistic" 
and "paranoiac" based on the declared slogans of the movements.
In line with the historical approach of the two "founding fathers", 
Kedourie identifies two varieties of nationalist doctrine: the first 
(republican), deriving from Kant and associated with political 
nationalism, which conceives of the political community as a body of
39Walker Connor, "Introduction," in Ethnonationalism: The
Quest For Understanding, xi.
40Eriksen holds the same view: "Nationalism and ethnicity are 
kindred concepts, and the majority of nationalisms are ethnic in 
character." See Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: 
Anthropological Perspective ( London: Pluto Press, 1993), 118.
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individuals who have signified their will regarding the manner of 
government; and the second (organic), deriving from Herder, that 
perceives the nation as a natural solidarity endowed with unique cultural 
characteristics. In their practical manifestations, however, he argues the 
convergence of the two conceptions. 41 German and French ideal typical 
variations of nationalism correspond essentially to the same 
dichotomy.42 Below I am going to take up the most widely acknowledged 
typologies of nationalism whose premises differ essentially in nominal 
terms.
1.5.4.1 Ethnic vs Territorial Nationalism
Espousing a dichotomous approach, Smith distinguishes between 
ethnic and territorial nationalisms as ideal types. According to him, 
nationality may be defined either by ethnic (birth-based) or civic- 
territorial (choice-based) criteria. Ethnic nationality is based on the 
consciousness of a shared identity within a group, rooted in a shared 
culture and a belief in common ancestry. By contrast, civic-territorial 
nationality is inclusive within a territory. Membership in the national 
group is generally open to everyone who is bom or permanently resident 
within the national territory, irrespective of language, culture or 
ancestry.43
41Kedourie, Nationalism , 65-67.
42For a comparative treatment of the German and French 
nationalisms, see Pierre Birnbaum, "Nationalism: A Comparison 
Between France and Germany," International Social Science Journal, 
133(1992), 375-384.
43Smith, Ethnic Origins o f Nations , 21-46.
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1. 4. 1.1. Ethnic Nationalism
Smith defines ethnic nationalism as an ideological movement on 
behalf of the autonomy, unity and identity of a human population 
conceived by its members as an actual or potential nation, which is 
defined in terms of a myth of common ancestry and historic culture. 
Ethnic nationalisms define the unity of aspirations less in terms of a 
territory or polity than by reference to the myths, memories and symbols 
that comprise an existing or putative ethnic culture, i.e., a culture of 
ascribed descent. 44 *
Smith identifies the following elements in ethnic nationalisms:
a) Common D escent: It is the defining feature of ethnic 
nationalism. Nation is conceived of in genealogical terms as a putative 
"higher family." Through identifying a national Adam and Eve, nation 
as an historical continuity is expressed through familial symbolism.
b) Demotic Aspect: People is the object of nationalist aspirations 
and the final recourse of rhetoric. Acts and actions of nationalist 
leadership are justified only by recourse to the popular will, which 
transcends "divisive" subgroupings through ethnic imagination.
c) Native Culture: Native culture, namely language and customs, 
plays the role of law in territorial model. This is why grammarians and 
linguists have had played a very central role in the early phases of 
nationalisms in Eastern Europe and Asia. Through crystallisation of 
myths and historical and linguistic traditions, their works proved 
extremely functional in arousing the popular national consciousness.
44A. D. Smith, "Ethnic Nationalism," in Blackwell Encyclopedia o f
Political Institutions, ed. Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford:Blackwell, 1987), 208.
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Genealogy, putative ties of descent and mobilisation of people 
reflects the route of national formation based on the ethnic conception of 
nation evolved in Eastern Europe and Asia. 45
The aims of ethnonational movements, according to Smith, are the 
formation of an high culture, the creation of a homogenous, organic 
nation in cultural terms, the provision of a homeland and preferably an 
independent state for the people, and the transformation of the passive 
ethnie into an active ethnopolitical community, thereby making the 
ethnie the "subject of history." 46
1. 4.1. 2. Territorial Nationalism
Territorial type of nationalism conceives nation as a territorial 
patrie. It involves the following elements:
a) Historical Land: Nations must possess their own historical land, 
which they could identify. The land as the place of the historical memory 
and its associations, is a place where saints, scholars, and heroes lived, 
worked, prayed and fought, which makes it unique. It is a sacred 
geography with its seas, rivers, lakes, mountains, and cities. Only those 
who possess national consciousness could conceive of the inner meaning 
of the land. The policy of autarchy and the protection of national 
economy are the extension of this notion.47
b) Legal-Political Community: The second element of territorial 
nationalism is the patrie, i.e., a community possessing a common will
«Smith, Milli Kimlik , 28-31.
«Ibid., 195-196.
47Ibid., 25-26.
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formed through laws and institutions, and expressed around centralised, 
Unitarian institutions going beyond local identities. 48
c) Citizenship (Legal-Political Equality of Members of Nation): The 
notion of legal equality expresses types of citizenship including civil- 
legal, socio-economic and political rights and duties
d) Common Politico-Civic Culture: Legal equality assumes the 
existence of common values and traditions among members of the same 
nation. Nations must possess a common understanding, hopes, emotions 
and ideas comprising a common creed and culture, which serves to hold 
members of the nation together. This provision of a common public and 
mass culture assumed by popular mobilisation refers basically to the 
public education and mass media.49 In this model of nationalism, 
members of nation are tied to one another through common historical 
memories , myths, symbols and traditions but not homogeneous cultural 
groupings. 50
All nationalisms involve, in various degrees and different forms, 
civil and ethnic constitutive elements. In some, territorial elements 
dominate the ethnic ones, and vice versa. French nationalism in the 
Jacobean period was essentially civil-territorial; it devised the fraternity 
of all French citizens and unity of republican patriots within a politico- 
legal community. At the same time there was a linguistic nationalism 
reflecting the proud of the purity of the hegemonic French culture and its 
civilising mission. 51 Even if these two conceptions clash with each other,
48Ibid., 26-27.
49Ibid., 27.
50For the elaboration of the constitutive elements of territorial 
nationalism see ibid., 182-185.
51Ibid., 30.
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still they have a common national discourse uniting them. Both 
republicans and monarchists upheld the view of the French "natural and 
historical lands." Likewise, they agreed to teach national ideals and 
history, excluding its Catholic dimension, through mass public 
education. The loyalty felt to the French language was also a general point 
of agreement. While they shared the uniqueness of the French and 
France, the historical content and the lessons to be drawn from this 
uniqueness were subject of dispute. 52
National identity takes different forms in different social 
circumstances. Civic-territorial nationalism normally appears in well 
institutionalised democracies. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, appears 
spontaneously when an institutional vacuum occurs. By its nature, 
nationalism based on equal and universal citizenship rights within a 
territory depends on a supporting framework of laws to guarantee these 
rights, as well as effective institutions to allow citizens to give voice to 
their views. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, depends not on institutions 
but on ethnically defined culture. Therefore ethnic nationalism is the 
default option: it predominates when institutions collapse, when existing 
institutions are not fulfilling people's basic needs and when satisfactory 
alternative structures are not readily available. This is the reason, 
according to Gellner, that ethnic nationalism has been so prominent in 
the wake of the collapse of post-Soviet state. 53
In pre-independence periods, territorial nationalisms are basically 
anti-imperialist; they aim to dispose the alien rulers and to establish a 
state-nation. Post-independence territorial nationalisms are integrative.
52Ibid., 31.
53Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," 12.
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They try to integrate ethnically diverse population within a new political 
community and to form a new territorial nation.
Pre-independence ethnic nationalisms are either secessionist or 
work for the founding of a new political ethnonation. These are 
secessionist and Diaspora nationalisms. Post-independence ethnonational 
movements are irredentist and pan nationalisms. 54
This typology is not conclusive; it ignores protectionist economic 
and fascist-racist nationalisms. However, while it ensures more general 
accounts of nationalisms, it makes possible the comparison of 
nationalisms within each category and location of them within similar 
contexts.
2. 4. 2. Political vs Cultural Nationalism
The distinction between cultural nation (ku ltu rn ation ) and 
political nation (staatsnation) is one of the most famous contributions to 
inquiries into the nation and nationalism. The two terms gained 
acceptance in the scholarly field thanks to the German historian Friedrich 
Meinecke. 55
1.4.2.1. Political Nationalism
In this way of "nation-building", the political nation is structured 
on the idea of individual and collective self-determination and derives 
from the individual free will and subjective commitment to the nation. 
E. Renan’s notion that the "nation is a daily plebiscite" reflects the
54Smith, Milli Kimlik, 133-135.
55Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State 
(Princeton, 1970). The original German edition appeared in 1907.
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political/subjective definition of nation centred on the will of the 
individual. 56
The concept of political nation has its concrete historical referents 
in France, England and the United states. In these three states, a process of 
domestic political transformation generated the nation as a community of 
politically aware citizens equal before the law irrespective of their social 
and economic status , ethnic origin and religious beliefs. 57
The objective of political nationalism is to achieve an autonomous 
state based on common citizenship that will enable the community to 
participate as equals in the modem world. Political nationalists tend to 
organise on legal-rational lines, forming nationalised apparatuses that 
pose as a centre-state to the existing state and seek to mobilise the 
different interests of the nation to a unitary end. 58
2.4.2.2. Cultural Nationalism
In this route, the cultural nation is founded upon seemingly 
objective criteria such as common historical heritage and language, a 
distinct area of settlement, religion, customs and history, and does not 
need to be mediated by a national state or other political form. 
Consciousness of unity, the sense of belonging together develop 
independent of the state. The pre-political cultural nation can overarch 
existing particularistic state forms, such as in early nineteenth century 
Germany and Italy. It leaves individuals little scope to choose to which
56Alter, Nationalism, 14.
57Ibid., 15.
58John Hutchinson, "Moral Innovators and the Politics of 
Regeneration: The Distinctive Role of Cultural Nationalists in Nation- 
Building," in Ethnicity and Nationalism , ed., A. D. Smith, 101.
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nation they belong. It was hence quite logical that movements for 
national unity, which began to emerge in the nineteenth century, 
regarded the nation as an entity preceding the state and resting upon 
common historical or cultural values or social ties. The first step towards 
transition to a political nation are taken when a cultural nation is 
politicised , and statist ideas take root within it. 59
The cultural nation principle , which emphasises common heritage 
and language, is the characteristic of the emergence of nations in Central 
Europe, Italy and, with certain qualifications, East-Central Europe.60
The aim of the cultural nationalists is the moral regeneration of 
the "way of life" of a unique historical community. Nation as a 
spontaneous social order cannot be constructed like a state from above. It 
can only be revitalised from the bottom up in a manner that pays respect 
to the natural diversities (regional, occupational, religious and so forth) 
within the nation. They are above all educational movements seeking to 
rebind the different constituents to a presumed common essence, 
forming decentralised clusters of historical and language societies, 
dramatic groups, publishing centres and political parties in order to do so. 
Among the techniques by which a national identity is constructed are 
evoking the name of the nation, organising collective "pilgrimages" to 
sacred national sites and engaging in invidious comparison with the 
culture of other. 61 Cultural nationalism tends to develop from cultural 
to a political movement, but its goals and techniques differ from those of 
political nationalism. 62
59Alter, Nationalism, 14.
60Ibid., 15.
61Hutchinson, "Moral Innovators," 104-105.
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In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between cultural and 
political nationalists, for both put forward what, since the eighteenth 
century, has been in many contexts a revolutionary doctrine: that 
sovereignty is located ultimately in the people , and that the world is 
divided into distinct nations each with unique homelands.
In conclusion, the political concept of nation cannot simply be 
reserved for Western Europe, and its cultural counterpart for East-Central 
and South-East Europe. In fact, political and cultural nationalisms are 
intermixed. The strong convergence between them is resulted from the 
fact that there is always cultural elements underlying the concept of 
political nation, just as all cultural nationalist movements tend to 
assume a political character. 62 3
1.5. Understanding Ethnicity
Typologies of nationalism based on a combination of moral, 
geographical and class categories, which will be considered more 
thoroughly in the next chapter, leave too many exceptions and are in any 
case too subjective to be valid. Irish nationalism was more akin to the
62Hutchinson tries to refute the three widespread "fallacies" in the 
general literature on nationalism as regards to the importance of cultural 
nationalism in the formation of modem nations:
1) it can be conflated with political nationalism.
2) It is a regressive response to modernisation.
3) Ii- is a transient phenomenon bound to fade with full 
modernisation.
Hutchinson argues that cultural nationalism deserves attention as 
a separate movement, distinct from political nationalism, with its own 
aims and politics. In his words "Although it is backward-looking, it is not 
regressive; rather it evokes a golden age as a critique of the present, with 
the hope of propelling the community to ever higher stages of 
development. Indeed cultural nationalists act as moral innovators and 
are a recurring force, regularly crystallising at times of crisis generated by 
the modernisation process with the aim of providing alternative models 
of progress." See Hutchinson, "Moral Innovators," 101.
63Alter, Nationalism, 16-18.
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eastern-cultural than the western European-political variety; Czech 
nationalism , which were rational and pragmatic, broke from the East 
European model. 64
Nationalism can be treated as an undifferentiated whole with its 
ideology, core doctrine and symbolism. Nevertheless, nationalist 
movements show obvious diversities in terms of their aims. The depth 
and extent of this diversity may evoke the tendency to refrain from 
theorising about nationalism.
Nationalism is chameleonous; it takes its colour from its context. 
To talk of nationalism in general is to avoid accounting for the 
nationalist ideas and feelings within their unique context. To treat 
nationalism only within its particular context, which what most 
historians do, on the other hand, is to reject to locate it within a general 
comparative perspective of which it is a part. Contextualist approach 
tends to ignore the typologies of nationalist ideologies/movements. 
These typologies, however, provide us with the opportunity of making 
general comparisons without sacrificing the importance of the contextual 
differences. Typologies conceive of nationalism as unities within 
diversities. 65
2. 5.2. Ethnicity and Ethnic Group
As a political concept, ethnicity seems to be a new term. Its first 
usage is attributed to the American sociologist David Riesman in 1953. As 
a controversial concept sparking intense debate among social scientists, 
ethnicity (identity with one's ethnic group) is derived from ethnos , the
64Hedva Ben-Israel, "Nationalism in Historical Perspective,"
Journal o f International Affairs, 45: 2(Winter 1992), 386-387.
65Smith, M illi K imlik, 129-131.
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Greek word for nation in the latter's original sense of a group 
characterised by common descent. 66 None of the founding fathers of 
sociology and social anthropology —with the partial exception of 
Weber— granted ethnicity much attention. Since the 1960s, the words 
ethnic group and ethnicity gained wide currency in the Anglophone 
world. But with this came the rather arbitrary usage of the term, which 
has contributed very much to the present conceptual confusion.
Consonant with the etymological derivation, there developed a 
general agreement that an ethnic group referred to a basic human 
category, not a subgroup. The use of ethnic group in the sense of "a group 
with a common cultural tradition and a sense of identity which exists as a 
subgroup of a larger society", particularly by American sociologists, 
equates it with minority. 67 As a matter of fact, majorities and dominant 
peoples are no less "ethnic" than minorities. An ethnic group need not 
be a subordinate group of a larger polity but may be the dominant 
element within a state, e.g., Turks in Turkey or Germans in Germany. Yet 
the indiscriminate application of the ethnic group to a variety of group 
types obscures vital distinctions between different forms of identity, 
which exerts a damaging influence on the study of nationalism. 
Employing ethnic group in relationship to several types of identities blur 
the relationship between the ethnic group and the nation. 68
It is necessary therefore to provide a minimum working definition 
of ethnic group, because the term is used rather loosely in the literature, 
and there is no general consensus regarding it. Dyke defines ethnic group
66Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation...," 100-101.
67Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism , 3-4.
68Connor,"A Nation Is a Nation...," 102-103.
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as "a group of persons, predominantly of common descent, who think of 
themselves as collectively possessing a separate identity based on race or 
on shared cultural characteristics, usually language or religion."69 Such a 
definition raises more questions than it answers, however. Ethnic groups 
so defined may also be considered as peoples, nations, nationalities, 
minorities, tribes or communities according to different contexts and 
circumstances.
Smith emphasises in his description of the ethnie that what is 
important is the belief or myth of common ancestry, not genetic heritage. 
The important thing is not the "reality" of physical descent but the belief 
in itself. Ethnicity is not about blood or genes as such, but about myths 
and common origins. Appeal to common blood and metaphors of family 
are common currency for ethnic nationalists. For them, the ethnie is a 
"super-family", extended in space and time to distant relatives over many 
generations, including yet unborn. 70
According to Horowitz, "ethnicity is connected to birth and blood, 
but not absolutely so."71 Due to its ascriptive character, ethnic identity 
hardly changes.72 Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, 
which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.73 Kinship and 
notion of distinctiveness, including selection by God, appear as key
69Vernon Van Dyke, "The Individual, The State, and Ethnic 
Communities in Political Theory," World Politics, 29 :3 (1977), 344.
70A. D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival, 
35:1 (Spring 1993), 50.
71Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 51.
72Ibid., 52.
73Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "Onuncu Yil Nutku" (Tenth Year Speech)
(1933) is a graphic example of this theme in relation to the attributes
ascribed to Turkish nation.
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determinants of ethnicity. Unlike kinship, ethnic membership transcends 
face to face relations, however. As conceived by Horowitz, ethnicity 
embraces groups that are differentiated by colour, language and religion; it 
covers tribes, races, nationalities and castes alike.74 Taken as a variable 
rather than a constant, ethnicity is a complex phenomenon that often 
consists of many components including language, religion and common 
histories. It can rarely be reduced to a single factor.75
In conclusion, the notion of ethnicity eludes a clear definition 
partly because a wide variety of attributes are invoked to describe it. It is 
therefore necessary to specify the essential features of ethnicity because it 
is so much conflated with nationality by many social scientists.
1. 5. 2. Distinguishing Ethnicity
How can we differentiate ethnic groups from other human 
groupings, namely nation, cultural groups and race? Why is it that social 
classes or the members of a science-fiction association are not considered 
ethnic groups while the Pashtuns, the Kurds, or the Germans are?
1. 5.2.1.Ethnicity vs Natmiality
Many scholars distinguish nationality from ethnicity with the 
coextensiveness of territory'and culturè. T. K. Oommen suggests that a 
nation is the homeland of a people who shares a common culture. In 
cases of the dissociation of culture from territory, there exists ethnicity. 
Hence the content of both ethnicity and nationality cannot be defined in 
terms of cultural markers. In order to avoid the conflation of these two
74Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 53.
75Anthony D. Smith, Theories o f  Nationalism  (London: 
Duckworth, 1983), 181.
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collectivities, we need to recognise their specificity. "If the nation is a 
cultural collectivity with its legitimate claim over a territory, an ethnie is 
a cultural collectivity existing away from its ancestral homeland."76 This 
definition views the ethnic groups as nations without states. The 
distinguishing element is the territory/state. This is an highly inadequate 
and partial understanding restricted to the modern dimension of 
chronological time.
Smith agrees with Connor who sees the ethnic group as an other- 
defined group, unconscious of its uniqueness and distinctiveness. In 
Smith's definition of nation,77 which combines ethnic and civic 
dements, the main divide between the nation and the ethnie(ethnic 
group) is that the ethnie’s claim to territory may have only a symbolic 
relevance while that of the nation is real and physical, though the 
territorial element is heavily blended with common myths and 
memories. At this point, the nation and the ethnie collide with each 
other. Nevertheless, ethnies are deprived of many features of nations. 
They may not reside in their homeland or do not have a common 
division of labour and economic union as well as common legal codes.78 
Without an ethnic origin however, the process of nation formation 
would remain incomplete, because those nations which do not possess a 
common ethnic root try to forge an ethnic origin through the use of
76T. K. Oommen, "Race, Ethnicity and Class: An Analysis of 
Interrelations," International Social Science Journal 139(February 1994), 
89-90.
77According to Smith, nation is "a named human community 
with a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and standardised 
mass culture, which possesses a single territory , division of labour and 
legal rights for all members." See Smith, Milli Kimlik, 70.
78Ibid., 71.
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mythology and national symbolism as a precondition for the national 
unity and survival. 79
1. 5. 2. 2. Ethnic Groups vs Cultural Groups
The widely held position that equates ethnic groups with "cultural 
groups" is difficult to justify. The sharing of cultural traits (language, 
religion, customs, etc.) frequently crosses group boundaries. The fact is 
that people do not always share all their cultural traits with the same 
group of people. An ethnic Kurd, for example, may feel himself closer to 
ethnic Turks than to the members of his co-ethnies. Conversely, a 
culturally fully assimilated Kurd into Turkishness still may feel himself 
as being Kurd.
Cultural boundaries are not clear-cut, nor do they necessarily 
correspond to ethnic boundaries. As Eugene Roosens remarks: "Theré is 
more chance that the Flemish in Brussels, who always have to speak 
French, will become more "consciously" Flemish than their ethnic 
brothers and sisters in the rather isolated rural areas of West Flanders or 
Limburg?"80 Thus, if a setting is wholly mono-ethnic, there is effectively 
no ethnicity, since there is nobody to communicate cultural difference. 81
The constitutive elements of ethnicity , therefore, are not constant. 
To state that ethnic groups are marked by shared cultural traits makes 
hardly any sense.There is no agreement among anthropologists regarding 
the markers maintaining the boundaries between ethnic groups and 
other "non-ethnic" groups, e.g., economic classes. Definitions which
79Ibid., 73.
80Eugene Roosens, Creating Ethnicity:The Process o f Ethnogenesis 
(London: Sage Publications, 1982), 12.
81Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism , 34.
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denote a number of so-called objective, tangible criteria for ethnicity have 
been radically challenged. Contrary to a widespread common view, 
cultural differences among human groupings are not the decisive feature 
of ethnicity. In contrast to the assertion that ethnicity is the character or 
quality of an ethnic group, some culturally similar groups may not have 
stable inter-ethnic relations between them. The bloody confrontation 
between Serbs and Croats, a two culturally highly similar group, 
following the break-up of Yugoslavia is a case in point. Only in so far as 
cultural differences are perceived as being important, and are made 
socially relevant, do social relationships have an ethnic element.82 Other 
than its relational dimension, ethnicity can also be defined as a social 
identity (based on contrast vis a vis others) characterised by metaphoric, 
or fictive kinship. Notion of shared descent is a universal element in 
ethnic ideologies. 83All ethnic groups favour endogamy with varying 
degrees of practical importance.
The application of systematic distinctions between Us and Them is 
an essential aspect of ethnicity. If no such principle exists there can be no 
ethnicity, since ethnicity presupposes an institutionalised relationship 
between delineated categories whose members consider each other to be 
culturally distinctive. 84 It would be misleading, therefore, to state simply 
that ethnic groups are identical with cultural groups, and that shared 
culture is the basis of ethnicity. It follows that ethnic groups must be 
defined from within, from the perspective of their members. Instead of 
listing traits of "objective culture" which members often share with non­
82Ibid., 12.
83Ibid., 68.
^Ibid., 18.
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members anyway, ethnicity may be seen as categorical inscriptions which 
classify individuals in terms of their core identity.
In the last analysis, Connor proves right: an ethnic group is an 
other- defined community having self or perceived common origin. 85 
Some ethnic groups use notions of "race" or "blood" while some others 
may use criteria of cultural competence. Nevertheless, ethnic identities 
are not totally created by historical circumstances. In a series of books on 
nationalism, A. D. Smith 86 argues that modern ethnic ideologies, 
notably nationalisms, have identifiable "objective" cultural roots. He 
claims that although nations and ethnic movements are modern 
creations, they use ethno-cultural elements of the past.87 Yet, it would be 
misleading to suggest that there is an unbroken continuity from the pre­
modern communities to the national ones. Popular customs and other 
national symbols take on very different meanings in the modern context 
from their original being, as the Norwegian example shows. 88
1. 5.2.3. Ethnicity vs Racism
Science-based racism arose in the late eighteenth century, largely as 
a response to calls for the abolition of slavery. Darwin's theories of 
"natural selection" and "survival of the fittest" provided the pseudo­
scientific justification for the racist ideology. Although most scientists 
had abandoned the concept of race by the 1920s, cultural notions of race 
continue to exist in popular imagery. Personality traits and cultural
85 Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," 42.
86See particularly his -book, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989).
87Smith, "Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 51-52.
88Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 107.
45
distinctiveness are in many societies still attributed to people on the basis 
of race and it is in this way that races may become ethnic categories. The 
physical appearance of a person may in this sort of society serve as a 
convenient shorthand way of telling other members of the society what 
kind of person he is. In fact, such categorisations and their accompanying 
stereotypes are no more natural than the ethnic distinctions 
differentiating, for example, Finns from Swedes.89
Unlike race (an unsound biological category) and racism (claim to 
racial superiority), the content of ethnicity is essentially the 
communication of cultural distinctiveness in relational context, and this 
does not necessarily imply superiority or inferiority. Nevertheless, it is 
not unusual for certain etnies to define themselves as superior and 
perceive the distinctions of others as inferior. This state of affairs can be 
described as ethnicism, i.e., discrimination based on ethnic markers. 90 In 
contrast to the positive associations of ethnicity viewed as an identity 
marker and a search for roots, ethnicism is a wholly negative 
conceptualisation in relation to ethnic groups.
The matching of certain cultural characteristics with a certain race 
is the racism in disguise of culture, or rather the culturalisation o f 
racism .91 The racial stereotypes of the blacks as uncivilised, barbarian, 
ugly, dirty and stupid has been partly replaced by cultural beliefs 
portraying them as lazy and aggressive. The shift of racism from
89Ibid., 52.
90The term "ethnicism" is used by A. Bacal in his Ethnicity in the
Social Sciences (Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations- 
University of Warwick, 1991).
91S. Steinberg, The Ethnic M yth  (Boston-M assachusetts: Beacon
Press, 1981).
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biological to cultural rationalisations has been named, particularly in the 
American context, ethnicity.
Presently, the term race has no scientific content. Modern genetics 
does not accept such a category due to the interbreeding between human 
population, which has made meaningless to talk of fixed boundaries 
between races. Also, the distribution of hereditary physical traits does not 
follow clear boundaries. In other words, there is often great variation 
within a racial group than there is systematic variation between two 
groups.
The question is not however, if the term race has any scientific 
justification, because the concept of race exists as a power informing 
people’s actions. Racism builds on the assumption that personality is 
somehow linked with hereditary characteristics which differ 
systematically between races, and in this way race may assume 
sociological importance even it has no "objective" existence.92
Ideas of race may or may not form part of ethnic ideologies, and 
their presence or absence does not seem to be a decisive factor in inter 
ethnic relations. However, ethnicity may assume many forms, and since 
ethnic ideologies tend to stress common descent among their members, 
the distinctions between race and ethnicity is a problematic one. 
Discrimination on ethnic grounds is spoken of as "racism" in one 
context, and "communalism" in another context. But the forms of 
imputed discrimination can be nearly identical. For groups different from 
the dominating one(s), it can be difficult to escape from their ethnic 
identity if they wish so. This is so for minority groups with an inadequate
92Oommen, "Race, -Ethnicity and Class: An Analysis of 
Interrelations," 84.
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command of the dominant language. In such cases, the ethnic identity 
becomes an ascribed status hardly escapable. 93
To cut it short, race is distinguished from nation and ethnie mainly 
because races are discussed in predominantly biological terms, with 
particular emphasis on "phenotypical" distinctions such as cephalic 
index, texture of hair, blood groups, skin colour, stature etc., and 
presumed genetic distinctions. Racism matches nationalism as an 
ideology and type of behaviour, and is related to race rather than to 
nation or ethnie. 94
1.6. A pproaches to Ethnicity: Prim ordialism  vs In stru m en talism
One of the main controversies around ethnicity or the nature of 
ethnic bond in current theoretical debate is between "primordialists" and 
"instrumentalists." Primordialism puts emphasis on the psychological 
and cultural dimensions in order to understand the emotional intensity 
that the ethnic attachment breeds. The affective dimension of ethnic 
behaviour cannot be explained by the instrumental use of ethnicity for 
the attainment of other goals. The primordial root of ethnicity "derives 
from a cultural interpretation of descent."95 The primordialists 96 argue 
that ethnicity is a primordial bond between the members of a "natural"
93Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 5-6.
94Kellas, The Politics o f Nationalism and Ethnicity, 5.
95Charles F. Keyes, ed., Ethnic Change (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1981), 5; quoted by Crawford Young, "The Dialectics of
Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality," in The Rising Tide o f Cultural 
Pluralism: The Nation State at Bay? ed., Crawford Young (USA: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 23.
96Clifford Geerz and Edward Shills are among the leading
adherents of primordialism.
48
community which precedes modern nation-states and deeply rooted in 
historical experience. They preach that the loyalty ethnicity evokes and 
the social structures it causes should be regarded as stable permanent 
realities. Ethnic identity is a permanent feature of group life, though at 
times , it may be repressed or exists latently. The aim and function of 
ethnic movements is to awaken "the sleeping beauty"(the ethnie) and 
build up collective awareness about it, thereby, to paraphrase Marx, to 
transform an "ethnie-by-itself" into an "ethnie-for-itself." 97
In its extreme version, primordialism grows into socio-biology, 
which holds that ethnic consciousness is imprinted in the genetic code, as 
a product of thousands of years of prehistorical existence, which 
necessitated the kindred affinity for survival, an idea based thoroughly 
on the Darwinian notion of mutational change. For the primordialists, 
ethnic bond represents historical continuity and should be considered an 
objective "given" for the purposes of socio-political analysis. They see 
ethnie and nations as permanent if not perennial.
Ethnic cultures in their view are durable repositories of human 
experience and memory. Many ethnies hold this approach. The Basques, 
Tamils, Kurds and many others would certainly maintain that their 
ethnic identity existed prior to, and transcends, the current conflicts in 
which they are involved.
As to the instrumentalists, 98 they see political functioning as the 
sole raison d'etre of ethnicity. To them, ethnicity needs no historical or
97Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts and Their Impact on 
International Society," International Social Science Journal, 127(February
1991), 123.
98Among the prominent representatives of instrumentalism are
Crawford Young, Cynthia H. Enloe, Joseph Rothschild and Nathan
Glazer.
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cultural explanation. Ethnicity arises entirely from social conditions. They 
regard ethnies and nations as political means to be created, used, 
manipulated or discarded according to political expediency. Ethnic 
perception and national sentiment are contingent or situational; the 
boundaries of belonging and opposition vary with the situation of the 
perceiver. The task of analysis is to identify political factors that might 
activate ethnic affinity, to discover the architects of its doctrinal and 
instrumental exploiters." Ethnic identity is an instrument for mobilising 
group emotions on behalf of causes used by political elites in their 
competition for power and wealth. Ethnic ties can be adjusted to meet the 
material, security and status needs of their members. When other 
collective identities (e.g., class, occupation) better serve practical needs, 
the ethnic bond may disappear. The identity of Palestinians, the Sikhs, the 
Eritreans, the Saharans and many other groups around the World who 
appeal to ethnic identity in order to declare their political messages can all 
be considered fairly recent phenomena. Many instrumentalists see 
nations and nationalism as products of a secular, industrial modernity of 
bourgeois capitalism. * 100 Structural-functionalists, neo-Marxists and the 
rational choice theorists all embrace instrumentalist framework.
The distinction between primordialist and instrumentalist 
conceptions of ethnicity can be useful chiefly because it highlights a 
crucial duality in ethnicity. Primordialism in a sense completes 
instrumentalism by explaining the force of "affective tie" through which
"Young, "The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and 
Reality," 22.
loopor a general consideration of the primordialist-instrumentalist 
debate see A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations 9-13; Eriksen, 
Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives , 54-58; Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts," 123-124; and Milton Esman and Itamar 
Rabinowitz,"The Study of Ethnic Politics," 12-13.
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’ rational" interest is instrumentally pursued. Without making any 
generalisation, it is likely that most ethnic conflicts today contain a 
mixture of both ingredients: ethnic identity probably has its historical 
roots in the popular consciousness, but it is also used intentionally by 
militant elites to mobilise support for political action. Criticising both 
approaches, Smith asserts that there are difficulties with both views 
because as an ideological movement nationalism is clearly dates from the 
eighteenth century, but ethnie appear frequently in ancient sources. He 
links modern phenomenon of ethnonationalism with the much older 
phenomenon of the ethnie. 101
1.7.T heories of Ethnic C onflict
At the theoretical level, ethnic conflicts are not the focus of studies 
in the usual analytical models of conflict studies or the sociology of 
change and development. For decades, the so-called modernisation 
paradigm dominated thinking in the social sciences, prescribing the 
direction of change as from the traditional to the modern, from the 
simple to the complex. In this framework, ethnic issues are thought to 
pertain to the pre-modern world that will be swept aside by the 
modernisation process. If they do arise, they are seen as obstacles to 
change or as stemming from incomplete modernisation. In line with this 
view, theories of nation-building emphasise the comprehensive nature 
of the transformation of subnational units and loyalties into a wider 
polity. In this context, ethnic issues become stumbling blocks in a more 
general process of change.
101See, among others, his "Nationalism and the Historians," in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism , ed., Anthony D. Smith (Leiden:E. J. Brill,
1992), 73-75.
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Class-based analysis relates ethnic conflicts to economic interests in 
which the group actors tend to be social classes defined in terms of their 
position in the system of production. Needless to say, in the class-based 
characterisation of power relationships in intra and inter state system, 
ethnic issues appear in secondary importance.
A third approach which Horowitz calls theory of cultural pluralism 
sees ethnic conflicts as cultural conflicts claiming that cultural differences 
are the main divide between ethnic groups. 102
Generally speaking, modernisation-based (liberal-functionalist) and 
Marxist approaches to conflict and development, which would be 
discussed separately in the next chapter, have neglected the importance of 
ethnic issues and conflicts. Consequently there are few helpful theoretical 
models available to guide research in the study of ethnic conflicts.
It is apparent that theories used to explain ethnic conflict are 
premised on opposite assumptions. Where the theory of cultural 
pluralism conceives of ethni.c conflict as the clash of incompatible values, 
modernisation and economic interest theories conceive of conflict as the 
struggle for resources and opportunities that are valued in common. 
Where the theory of cultural pluralism stresses the separation and 
isolation of the groups, and hence divergence and dissensus, 
modernisation and economic interest theories stress contact and 
competition , and hence convergence and consensus.
Theories with such different premises also focus on different 
features of ethnic conflict. Modernisation and economic interest 
perspectives are useful in highlighting the role of elites in conflict. 
Cultural pluralists neglect the role of elites, particularly elites with 
convergent goals and aspirations. On the other hand, modernisation and
102Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 135.
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materialist theories encounter difficulty in explaining why non-elites take 
part in the conflict at all.
All these theories imply that ethnic conflict will be persistent and 
difficult to manage. For the modernisers and materialists, this is because 
people are becoming more alike and tangible interests are increasingly in 
conflict. For the pluralists, it is because nation-states are inherently 
vulnerable to dissolution or to the domination of one group. None of the 
theories however, addresses the significance of symbolic issues in ethnic 
conflict. None deals with the important role of ethnic group anxiety and 
apprehension. None treats the intensity and violent character of ethnic 
conflict as specially worthy of explanation. Horowitz suggests that 
attention needs to be paid to developing theory that links elite and mass 
concerns and answers the causes underlying the mass ethnic appeal. The 
role of apprehension and group psychology needs specification, as does 
the importance of symbolic controversies in ethnic conflict. Because "a 
bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory." 103
1. 8. Ethnic M anagem ent Strategies
All the elements generally associated with ethnic conflict are 
present to a greater or lesser degree in majority of cases. Needless to say, 
not all elements are present in all cases: e.g., the problem of the unequal 
distribution of economic and political power; the issue of control over 
land and territory (the discourse of the"real owners of the country"); the 
conflict over language; the religious identification of the parties; the 
question of collective identity and self-esteem; the problem of boundary 
maintenance; the stereotyping of the adversary; the anxiety and fear of
103Ibid., 140.
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the 'other' generated by different perceptions of the issues at stake; the use 
and role of mobilising myths and symbols etc.
This tangible characterisation of ethnic conflict predicated upon 
language, religion, customs, economic inequity etc. is in fact too often 
superficial. What is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is the 
divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the "us-them" 
syndrome. The ultimate answer to the question if a person is one of us or 
one of them, is seldom related to adherence to overt cultural 
elements.104
The state can be regarded either as the neutral manager of public 
affairs, as in American pluralist doctrine, or as the instrument of a 
dominant group, as in Marxist and structuralist paradigm. In pluralistic 
theory, ethnic groups, like other organised interests, have access to 
government to promote their demands. Governments attempt to force 
the rules of the polity impartially and to accommodate competing 
demands from society. Because they enjoy access, ethnic groups are likely 
to use political means to impress their needs on the agencies of 
government;government, in turn, emphasises measures of 
accommodation, employing coercive measures only as a last resort.
104This issue has been at the core of the Israeli governments' 
ongoing attempt to define a Jew. In politico-legal terms, the government 
may demand adherence to one of the denominations of Judaism as a test 
of Jewishness. But there are many self-proclaimed agnostics, atheists and 
converts to other faiths who are Jewish. Likewise, there are practising 
members of the Judaic faith who are not ethnically Jewish. Judaism has 
been an important element of Jewish nationalism, as Catholicism and 
Irish nationalism are related. But an individual stripped of the overt 
cultural attributes ascribed to his ethnic group still can maintain his 
fundamental identity as a member of that nation. "Cultural assimilation 
need not mean psychological assimilation". See Connor, "Nation- 
Building or Nation-Destroying?" 46.
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When the state represents and acts in the interests of a hegemonic 
(dominant) ethnic group, it may employ a set of policies ranging from 
assimilation involving nonrecognition or discrimination against 
subordinate groups to patterns of exclusion against minorities, denying 
their members equal access to economic opportunities and public services 
and consigning them to inferior social, cultural and political status. Such 
atrocious measures as enslavement, genocide and expulsion have been 
practised by governments against subordinate ethnic groups. States that 
enforce hegemonial control on behalf of one ethnic group are inclined to 
employ repressive measures against challenges to the ethnic status quo 
or to specific practices.
A review of some contemporary deeply divided societies shows a 
great diversity of modes of conflict regulation consisting of variations of 
partition, violence, domination and accommodation. 105 This wide range 
of alternatives suggest that unilateral or violent management of ethnic 
conflicts is not inescapable.
Coakley considers the range of possible ethnic management 
strategies within the context of mechanisms for procuring conformity 
between state boundaries and ethnic minorities. Drawing upon and 
qualifying the Rokkan-Urwin model which sees the tension between the 
hegemonic state dominated by an ethnic group and an ethnic minority
105For example, Smooha and Hanf qualify the case of Turkey as a 
case of "stable domination" where Turkish numerical and political 
domination was consolidated through partial expulsion and mass killing 
of Armenian minority during the World War I. They argue that present- 
day Turkey has non-assimilating minorities, namely Kurds, Alavites and 
the Syrian Christians subject to pressures to assimilate. See Sammy 
Smooha and Theodof Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict in Deeply 
Divided Societies," in Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed., Anthony D. Smith, 
29. Of course, this observation ignores other types of ethnic management 
strategies that are applied, to a great extent, successfully in the republican 
period.
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within the framework of the centre-periphery relations, he classifies 
strategies for ethnic conflict resolution in terms of the following four 
dimensions: I. P h y sica l: conflict between the dominant and minority 
ethnie for physical survival; I I .T e r r i t o r i a l :  conflict between state 
boundaries and the frontiers of ethnic minority; III . C u ltu ra l: conflict 
between the culture (and especially language) institutions and symbols of 
the state and those of the ethnic minority; IV . P olitical: conflict between 
the objectives of the state and the ethnic group in terms of the overall 
programme for ethnic conflict resolution. The usefulness of this 
approach lies not in its capacity to explain but rather in its function of 
seeking to simplify and to identify uniformities in this complexity. 106
Coakley suggests eight ways and means of "ethnic management":
I. I n d ig e n e z a t io n : It refers to involuntary state policies of 
cultivation of ethnic minorities in general. Most instances of this policy 
are to be found where multinational states are faced with serious 
problems of ethnic unrest, with certain groups demanding autonomy or 
independence. In these circumstances, the state may yield to more 
extreme demands by offering a degree of autonomy, but the consequences 
of such autonomy are undermined by the simultaneous imposition of 
autonomy on certain other groups where the demand for it is weak or 
non-existent. The régionalisation of Spain in post-Franco period where 
autonomy is conferred not only to the ethnically "sensitive" regions of 
the Basque Province or Catalonia but to seventeen regions countrywide, 
well exemplifies indigenezation approach.
II . A c c o m m o d a tio n : In this strategy, the political centre may 
responds to the demands from the ethnic minority by changing its own
106John Coakley, "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a
Typology," International Political Science Review, 13:4(1992), 344-345.
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structure to provide formal recognition of the ethnic diversity of the state. 
The location of power (the extent to which power remains concentrated 
in the centre rather than being devolved to the ethnic minority ) and the 
domain in which concessions are made, political or cultural, are the 
determining factors, which produces the following not mutually 
exclusive or exhaustive typology:
Domain
Political_______________ Cultural
L ocation  Centralised Consociation Group rights
of Power Decentralised Federalism_______ Cultural Autonomy
A T ypology of A ccom m odationist Ethnic M anagem en t S tra te g ie s .107
III. A ssim ilation : This is the best-known and most widely practised 
of all ethnic management strategies. Expressions such as "one state, one 
nation, one language" is the motto of this strategy. In many parts of 
Europe there has been a ' powerful momentum towards the forced 
assimilation of ethnic minorities, typically by denying them access to 
political and cultural self-expression and by limiting the availability of 
educational facilities. The examples are abound. The strongly assimilative 
policies have been followed in many different contexts in France, 
Bulgaria and Romania in recent times.
The language in which assimilationist strategies are cloaked may 
sometimes appear particularly benevolent. Its advocates may argue that 
the withholding of recognition from groups within society is in the 
name of the principle of individual human equality, and it is true that
107For the elaboration of the each of the four accomodationist
strategy, see ibid., 347-349.
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classic formulation of individual human rights of the eighteenth 
century, as embodied in many contemporary state constitutions, do not 
include the right to education through the medium of one's own 
language. But the refusal of the category of "group rights" in classical 
liberal theory in the name of universal individual rights is a major pitfall 
given the present state of the socio-political landscape, and there are 
serious theorising in order to meet this challenge. 108 "Non-recognition 
of ethnicity" may be included within the strategy of assimilation. 109
IV . A c c u l tu r a t io n : Acculturation is a process of steady
disappearance of cultural distinctiveness as a consequence of unforced 
assimilation. In many cases, this is the terminal stage of a process that in 
earlier stages had an explicitly assimilative form. In Ireland, for example, 
the Irish language continues to disappear despite a strong supportive 
official attitude, as it is the case with speakers of Gaelic and Welsh. 110
V. Pop u lation  T ran sfers: It is a sharper way of ensuring conformity 
between the boundaries of ethnic communities and states than waiting 
for assimilation to take its slow effect. There are several approaches to the 
redrawn of the ethnic frontier for its matching with the state boundary, 
all of them involving some kind of population transfer:
a) E xp u lsio n : The expulsion of millions of Germans from various 
Central and East European states immediately after World War II is a case 
in point. The departure of some three million Germans from 
Czechoslovakia and of much larger number from Poland transformed the
lOSDyke, "The Individual, The State, and Ethnic Communities in 
Political Theory," 343-363.
109Coakley, "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a
Typology," 349.
110Ibid., 350.
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ethnic structure of these countries and greatly reinforced the cultural 
supremacy of the dominant ethnic groups.
b) Exchange: In this variant, two or more states agree to "exchange" 
populations in such a way that each is rendered more ethnically 
homogeneous. Among examples of this involuntary process from the 
vantage point of the minorities in question, the Balkan states feature 
prominently, most notably in the 1920s when Greece, Turkey and 
Bulgaria engaged in population exchanges.
c) Settlement Policy: Especially in traditional states, rulers have 
been prepared to move populations from one area to another or to invite 
colonists from outside with a view to changing the ethnic balance by 
means of some kind of settlement policy. For example, the deliberate 
settlement of Russians in various non-Russian Republics of the former 
Soviet Union (most notably Estonia and Lithuania) caused fundamental 
changes in their ethnic structure.
d) Repatriation: It is a process that in many ways the reverse of the 
expulsion in that the ethnic minority moves allegedly not because it is 
unwelcome in its old home but because it is welcome in its new one. 
The mass migration of the Jews to Israel after 1948 is a case in point.111
VI. Frontier Adjustment: In some cases an ethnic minority may be 
sufficiently strong or its external allies may be sufficiently powerful to 
secure the redrawing of state frontiers to provide either for the birth of a 
new sate or for the transfer of the dissident ethnic minority to an adjacent 
state. There are many examples of successful separatist nationalism. The 
transfer of South Tyrol from Australia to Italy, or of Transylvania from 
Hungary tc Romanic* after the First World War are two cases in point. 112
m Ibid., 351-352
112Ibid., 351.
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VII. Genocide: This is the most brutal of all ethnic management 
devices. The most notorious example is the extermination of millions of 
Jews during the Second World War, a policy that left a permanent mark 
on the ethnic structure of Poland, Lithuania and other states.
VIII. Ethnic Suicide: This option is fundamentally irrational and 
has been retained by Coakley only to maintain logical consistency.113
In regard to the circumstances associated with the adoption of 
particular ethnic management strategies, Coakley distinguishes between 
characteristics of the subordinate ethnic community itself and certain 
characteristics of the state. The most significant features of the 
subordinate ethnic group appears to be: 1) the type of group in terms of 
the factors that distinguish it from the dominant group, the nature of 
differentiation being racial, linguistic, religious or cultural, and the depth 
of this differentiation; 2) the demographic characteristics of the group, 
including its relative and absolute size, its growth rate, and its settlement 
pattern; and 3)the group’s location in any cultural division of labour. To 
these may be added two characteristics of the political system: 1) the state 
tradition in terms of the relationship between individual and group 
rights; and 2) the state's autonomy in the interstate system.114
113Ibid. Regarding the conflict eliminating or reducing strategies in 
ethnically divided societies, also see Vojislav Stanovic, "Problems and 
Options in Institutionalising Ethnic Relations," International Political 
Science Review , 13:4 (1992), 359-379; for the structural techniques and 
distributive policies regarding conflict regulation in ethnically divided 
societies see Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 563-680.
114Coakley, "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a 
Typology," 352-354.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTRODUCTION 
AND EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF NATION AND 
NATIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN STATE
2.1. C ontours of O ttom an Polity: Socio-Political O rganisation
2.1.1. Introduction
Unlike modem "national" societies predominantly characterised by 
secular socio-economic identities, the contours of socio-political 
organisation in the Middle ages were moulded by ethnoreligious identity. 
An ontological approach to socio-political identification was basic to the 
organisation of polities as religious communities centred on the absolute 
loyalty to ruling dynasties conceived, in popular imagination, as the 
possessor of the whole populace. Ottoman polity was no exception to this 
general socio-political condition.
As a "traditional" polity, Ottoman Empire was modelled on the so- 
called "oriental maxim" prevailed in the near eastern state conception to 
which justice is the key According to this concept of statecraft, "to 
control the state requires a large army. To support the troops require great 
wealth. To obtain this wealth, the people must be prosperous. For the 
people to be prosperous, the laws must be just. If any one of these is 
neglected, the state will collapse."1 As the cornerstone of this state
1Hahl inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, 
trans. (Great Britain: George Weidenfield and Nicholson Ltd, 1973), 66.
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understanding was to establish and maintain the power and authority of 
the sovereign, justice defined as the protection of subjects from abuses of 
the representatives of state, most important of which being illegal 
taxation, was the foundation of state. Ottoman ghazi tradition was a 
typical reflection of this.2 Islamisation of this near-eastern state tradition 
did not cause any change in practical grounds. But in the official rhetoric, 
authority and power ceased to be an end in itself and were replaced by the 
realisation of the ideals that şeriat (the Islamic law) teaches.
Ottoman polity was vertically divided into two classes in Weberian 
sense in accordance with the near-eastern state conception: First, the 
askerî (ruling) class composed of ilm iyye (the learned), kalem iyye  
(bureaucrats) and seyfiyye (army), who did not pay any taxes. Second, 
reaya (flock) class, subdivided into farmers, merchants and artisans, was 
producers and hence tax-payers. The askeri class held political power and 
owed their very existence directly to the person of the sultan. To protect 
this division of the ruler and the ruled was the basis of nizam (order and 
balance).
This hierarchically arranged and pyramidally stratified polity of 
"orders" were characterised by non-equality and differentiation according 
to ethnoreligious identifications and politico-economical functions 
sanctified by the divine authority and held together by the temporal ruler 
and his administrative, military and judicial staff.3 Alongside the 
differentiation by economic functions as the askeri and reaya classes, 
there was another cross-cutting ethnoreligious line of social division 
predicated on the ontological approaches of human groupings before
2Ibid.
3Niyazi Berkes, D evelopm ent o f  Secularism  in Turkey  (Canada:
McGill University Press, 1964), 10.
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Allah. This division too was dichotomical: Muslims conceived as a 
monolithic and amorphous community without any regard to ethnic 
differences and non-Muslims with a variety of ethnic and 
denominational differences were called millets.
The conclusion to be drawn from these two different lines of 
division—one was basically politico-economic and the other religious— 
is that Ottoman polity had a unique structure "designed" to attain the 
ideal of "devlet-i ebed mtiddet"—(eternal state) on the basis of justice and 
order which was nothing but to keep the ruler and the ruled as they are 
without any merger and articulation between and among them. As 
Berkes succinctly notes, traditionalism, i.e., the preservation of the 
established order as it was (nizam), prevention of any change or shift that 
may affect the balance among various communities and hence keeping 
them apart, the discouraging of vertical social mobility, the use of kul 
(slave) staff, who have no root in native society, for the sovereign's 
service, and thus putting a demarcation line between the ruler and the 
ruled, and the maintenance of order and the distribution of rights 
according to values preached by moral and religious inventions were all 
the ruling principles underlying Ottoman view of polity.4
The main distinguishing mark of Ottoman polity from secular 
Turkey was that it was not a national but religious community. There 
were no distinct individual identities. All collective identifications were 
religious. There were Muslims, Jews, Christians, heretics and the like. 
Ethnic identities were never politicised and therefore were taken for 
granted. The ostensibly ethnic terms like Turk, Rum or Franc all had 
religious connotations: Turk meant "infidel" in the Christian European 
usage. Rum denoted Greek Orthodox Christians and Franc Latin, or
4Ibid., 11-13.
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Western European Christians. Thus there were only two communities in 
the Ottoman polity: Muslims and non-Muslims.5
As Benedict Anderson aptly clarifies, there are two foci of loyalty in 
traditional societies: One is dynastic and the other religious. In the 
Ottoman polity the first and basic focus of loyalty was religious and 
oriented toward the Muslim community called ümmet In fact, the basic 
unit of political organisation was the religious community. The next and 
more comprehensive allegiance was political and directed toward the 
ruling dynasty. The House of Osman, the ruling dynasty, throughout the 
centuries has firmly established its right to the legitimate rule and 
enjoyed the loyalties of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike.6 In their 
efforts to consolidate the Muslim community, the Ottomans always 
stressed religious instead of kinship ties. This instrumental use of Islam 
aimed at the legitimisation of the temporal rule of the sultans.7
According to Karpat, the Ottoman religious-based socio-political 
system took its visible shape during the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481) 
and evolved over a long period of time in three distinct phases. 8During 
the period from 1413 to 1839, Ottomans "made the principles of 
ethnoreligious identity and community the foundation of the political 
organisation and the constitutional foundation for a state political 
system" which was a unique one. This socio-political system was called
5Ibid., 9.
6Bernard Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London:Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 324.
7Kemal Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the 
Middle East," in Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East,
eds., Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988), 39.
8Ibid., 36.
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the millet system. In the period from 1839 to 1865, the millet system, 
under various pressures both structural-conjunctural and internal as well 
as external, underwent a reorganisation. And in the final phase Ottoman 
state was transformed along territorial lines and was replaced by a 
national-secular state, Turkey.9 Thus the millet system ceased to exist. In 
order to better understand all these, we turn to a pre-modern form of 
socio-political organisation, that is, the millet system and its evolution 
over time.
2.1. 2. The Millet System: A General Overview
Social integration is an inevitable prerequisite of life in social sense, 
which is an inherent quality of human existence. Unlike from national 
societies integrated through basically either assimilation or plurality of 
cultural behavioural "codes", Ottoman policy of integration in pre- 
Tanzimat period reflected a "tacit social contract"10 between the ruler(s) 
and the ruled and was geographico-political in the sense that it involved 
unconditional loyalty to the ruling dynasty and the overall control of 
politico-religious groups by the state. It was not assimilationist in that it 
did not force the whole population to speak the same language, receive 
standardised and centralised education and follow the same way of life. 
On the contrary, hierarchical differentiation instead of assim ilationist 
equality was basic to socio-political stratification. The unique institutional 
expression of this way of socio-political integration was the Ottoman 
millet system.11
9Ibid., 36-37.
10See Şerif Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," in State, 
Democracy and the Military:Turkey in the 1980s, eds., Metin Heper and 
Ahmet Evin (Berlin-New York: Walter de Guyter, 1988), 26-27.
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The way the Ottoman state governed the communities under its 
sovereignty along the religious or denominational lines is called the 
millet system. This system is a direct consequence of the organisation of 
communities on the basis of religious affiliations corresponding at the 
same time to civil laws. The Ottomans drew on both Islamic and 
Byzantine legacies as well as local traditions in developing the millet 
system as the main mechanism for regulating the relationship between 
the state and the governed communities, Muslims as well as non- 
Muslims.
As a Muslim state, successor to the tradition of the great Muslim 
empires, e.g., Abbasids and Seljukis, in the Ottoman Empire> membership 
to the ruling class was open to Sunni Muslims who possessed the 
"Ottoman way" called âdâb, i.e. the Ottoman elite culture. The large non- 
Muslim groups—Greek Orthodoxes, Armenian Christians and Jews were 
organised in formal millets. This offered a considerable degree of 
autonomy, which compensated for the absence of political rights and 
equal status. Other groups such as heterodox Muslims, were not formally 
recognised as millets but in practice lived under similar conditions.
In the Ottoman polity characterised by religious affiliation and 
solidarity, ethnic identities played a very marginal role.1 2 An Ottoman 
subject conceived of himself and also conceived by his neighbours first as
11 See Bilal Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi (Istanbul: 
Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1992), 75-76. For the difference between the Ottoman 
millet system and the socio-political organisation obtained in the West at 
the time, see Arnold Toynbee, Türkiye: Bir Devletin Yeniden Doğuşu 
(The Re-emergence of a State), trans. (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1971), 
43-48.
12Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, "The Study of Ethnic 
Politics in the Middle East," in Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the 
Middle East, eds., Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 5.
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a Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Jew, Catholic or Protestant before he was a 
Turk, an A-ab or a Greek or a Bulgar. This religious affiliation can not be 
preceded by the allegiance to Ottoman ruling dynasty, or sense of 
Ottoman citizenship. Accordingly, until the late nineteenth century, the 
terms "Arab" and "Turk" designated in most cases "Bedouin or 
Turkoman" as opposed to the sedentary population. Only at the turn of 
the last century, ethnic affiliation and solidarity became an important 
factor in the political life of Ottoman empire when nationalism— 
Turkish, Arab and various non-Muslim nationalisms—, appeared on the 
political scene.
The governing of such a heterogeneous empire as the Ottoman 
state in a time when religion was the identifying mark of personal and 
social existence was facilitated by the fact that each major religious group 
was also a community in civil laws. All Muslims defined as "millet-i 
hâkime" (the (ruling nation) as members of the same ümmet regardless 
of ethnic or denominational differences were subject to the Islamic law, 
şeriat. The non-Muslims were organised along various millets, which 
owned their own civil laws regulating personal status—marriage, divorce 
and property inheritance. This non-Muslim millets—basically various 
Christian sects and Jews—enjoyed a partial autonomy through which the 
clergymen which governed the millets, supervised not only religious and 
educational affairs of their community but also regulated the matters of 
personal status and even collected certain taxes to be sent to the central 
government. The millet chiefs as the civil head of their communities 
were directly responsible to the central authority in Istanbul. The subjects 
of the millets could establish contact with the central administration only 
through the millet organisation to which he/she is a member. The 
personal rather than territorial character of civil laws was extremely
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functional in the creation of such a mosaic pattern as the millet system in 
which people from different religious affiliations lived side by side in the 
same state under the same sovereign.
A more focused description of the millet system requires a close 
look at the ethnic and religious composition of the Ottoman Empire. In 
the sixteenth century, there were Hungarians, Serbs, Croats, Romanians, 
Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks and Turks in the European part of the 
Empire. In the Asian and African parts, there were Turks, Greeks, Lazes, 
Armenians, Kurds, Circassians, Arabs and Berbers, apart from other 
smaller groups. The empire exhibited a wide variety of languages and 
religious sects. When all Muslims considered together, they were in 
majority. The largest Christian church was Greek Orthodox followed by 
the Armenian Patriarchate. Jews were much less numerous and more 
scattered.13
Under the Ottoman sovereignty, there were the following millets: 
Greek Orthodox, Armenian Christians, Catholics, Jews and Protestants. In 
1870, the Bulgars left the Greek Orthodox Church and established a 
separate Bulgarian Church recognised as a distinct millet. The same status 
had been applied to the Armenians converted into Catholic faith under 
the French influence in 1831. The reason Armenians were recognised as 
an independent millet was that they had a separate church and different 
religious faith in contrast to the Ortodoxes and Catholics. Finally, under 
the pressure of British and Prussian ambassadors to Istanbul, Protestants 
which numbered only fifty thousand was granted the millet status in 
1850.14
13Roderick H. Davison, "The Turks in History" in Roderic H. 
Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923 (USA: 
University of Texas Press, 1990), 11.
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The Ottoman millet system was based on the Islamic categorisation 
of human groupings as Muslims and non-Muslims.14 5 Christian and 
Jewish non-Muslims were classified as "the peoples of the Book" Non- 
Muslims who are permanent residents in a Muslim state were considered 
as people under the protection of Muslims (ehl-i zimmet) and called 
"reaya" in the Ottoman Empire. Although the term "reaya" had been 
used as a designation for all the subjects of the empire regardless of their 
religious affiliations, it referred to only non-Muslims later on.16
As a political and legal tie between state and persons,17 all Ottoman 
subjects were considered citizens who have different rights and 
obligations on the basis of their religious standing. This was because 
Muslims had the status of "host" and the non-Muslims that of "guest" 
Hence, their rights and obligations differed accordingly.
Unlike Muslims, non-Muslims did not have compulsory military 
obligation. They had their own laws and courts in relation to such private 
matters as family, marriage, divorce and property inheritance. Their life 
and properties are protected and guaranteed by the state. Except for some
14Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi, 46-47.
15For detailed description of this categorisation see Ahmet Özel, 
Islam Hukukunda Ülke Kavramı: Dar'ill Islam, Dar'ül Harp ( The  
Concept of Territory in the Islamic Law: The Dominion of Islam and 
The Dominion of War) (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1988). Also for the 
status of non-Muslims in the Islamic law (şeriat) see Mümtaz'er Türküne, 
Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları. 
1992), 62-63.
16Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi, 14.
17In the Ottoman-Muslim context, we can mention "individual" 
only in the sense of "person" The "individual" of the Englightenment is 
thoroughly alien to the Ottoman-Muslim thought. Also, one must 
remember that the classical Islamic law does not recognise "the concept of 
"legal entity", an abstraction stemming from the mechanical 
conceptualisation of social relations developed by the Enlightenment 
thought.
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offices of highest importance e.g., Grand Vizirate and chief of army, non- 
Muslims could take administrative responsibility, even become minister. 
They are autonomous in their communal affairs and educational 
organisation, and had complete religious freedom.
In return to these rights, non-Muslims had to pay a security tax 
called cizye (capitation tax). This is a kind of tax levied in exchange for the 
exemption of military service. The equivalent of Muslim öşr in zhimmis 
was a tax called haraç (poll-tax).
In regard to the way of clothing, non-Muslims could wear anything 
provided that they do not resemble the Muslims. They had to be different 
and had some restrictions in this regard. To some, this was not a requisite 
any more.
In addition to these obligations, they were obliged to obey the 
Muslim laws not contradicting their faith and to respect them. They were 
not prohibited from eating pork and drinking alcohol if their religion 
permits so.18
Given all this system of rights and obligations, a question puts itself: 
Were the Muslims the ruling and hence oppressive party with exclusive 
control of power in the Ottoman state? According to Karpat, this 
contention is thoroughly fictitious "deriving in part from Western 
ignorance of the Ottoman government system and in even greater part 
from Christian misrepresentations designed to excite the sympathy of the 
Europeans."19 It is true that the Ottoman state took its legitimacy from 
Islam and enforced the Islamic law partially, but it did not identify itself 
in direct way with Islam until the nineteenth century. The power ranks 
held exclusively by Muslims who committed themselves to a code of
18Eryilmaz, Millet Sistemi, 15-18.
19Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 44.
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behaviour and way of life that the Anatolian Turkoman peasants called 
Osmanli. The ruling class was not closer to Muslims than to non- 
Muslims. The rulers were Muslim, but the Muslim reaya had little power 
in state apparatus. The identification of Ottoman state with Islam came 
only in the nineteenth century under the pressure of Western imperial 
intrusion.20
2.1. 3. Historical Evolution of the Millet System
2.1.3.1. A Note On The Concept o f Millet
The Arabic word m illet is used in the Quran in the sense of 
religion. It refers to the religions of Jews and Christians (Quran; 2:120) as 
well as the true religion (2:128; 2:135). It never used to denote an ethnic or 
linguistic grouping. Rather, it expressed a religious community.21
In the Ottoman Empire, all non-Muslim communities such as 
Orthodox Christians, Armenians and the Jews, were considered a millet 
each. Plural form of millet (milel) was applied only to non-Muslims. 
Muslims regardless of ethnolinguistic differences were considered as only 
one millet. The secularisation of the term millet transcending religious 
affiliation came only in the second half of the nineteenth century; yet it 
remained only in the journalistic vocabulary without any extension in 
popular thinking.22
The first use of the millet in the sense of the western concept of 
"nation" was by Ibrahim §inasi (1824-71), a secular writer and journalist 
from the Young Ottoman generation.23
20Ibid., 45.
21Eryilmaz, Millet Sistemi, 11.
22Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 329.
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In the Ottoman Turkish many words could be found that can be 
equivalent of the word nation: Among these were cins, kawim, ümmet, 
millet and ahali. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and Kanipashazâde Rıfat Bey 
translated nation into Ottoman Turkish as kawim, while Ali Suavi 
translated the article of nation from Webster's Dictionary as ümmet. It 
reads as following: "a people gathered through being under the 
administration of his sovereign or government or being resident in a 
country. This people, composed of various kinds (ecnas-ı muhtelife) is an 
ümmet." The purpose of Suavi by adopting such a definition was to call 
the Ottoman people a nation. "In political terms, the residents of the 
known country is called ümmet-i Osmaniye."23 4 From this time on, the 
word ummet has taken root as the equivalent of nation.
According to Namık Kemal, the most outstanding figure of the 
Young Ottomans, millet "is a word referring to the state of a people with 
regard to the political allegiances",25 while the term ümmet is used to 
express "the whole of the civilised community".26 It seems that a 
confusion prevails regarding the usage of millet and ümmet. Yet, it is the
23Şinasi was also made up the Ottoman-Turkish equivalents for 
such concepts as citizen's rights, freedom of expression, public opinion, 
liberal ideas, national consciousness, constitutional government, liberty 
and natural rights of the people. See Berkes, Development o f Secularism 
in Turkey 197- 198.
24Ali Suavi, "Türk,"Muhbir, 38 (12 June 1868); quoted by Türküne, 
İslamcılığın Doğuşu, 258.
25Namık Kemal, "Herkesin Maksudu Bir Amma Rivayet 
Muhtelif" (The Purpose of All is the Same But Narratives are Different), 
İbret, (3 July, 1872); quoted by Türküne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu , 260.
26Namık Kemal, "Bazı Mülahaza-i Devlet ve Millet" (A Thought 
on State and Nation), İbret, (7 Şaban 1289) (13 October 1872); quoted by 
Türküne, ibid., 261. See also İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni 
Osmanlılar" (Tanzimat and the New Ottomans), in T an zim at  
(Istanbul:Maarif Vekaleti, 1940), 847, footnote no: 103.
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word ümmet preferred to meet the sense of nation. Millet is used as a 
word denoting the religious community. The purpose of the Ottoman 
intellectuals, however, was to meet nation with millet. According to 
them, the main basis homogenising a community and providing it with 
the feeling of common interest and common past is the religious 
allegiance. The prestigious word in the vocabulary of these intellectuals 
was also the word millet. For these reasons, Ottoman intellectuals 
expressed the qualities homogeneising a community with the word 
millet. Ümmet is used as a secondary word used for the common political 
ties that are to be created. The transformation of the concept of the 
"Islamic millet" into "Turkish millet" in the late nineteenth century can 
be seen as a change in content, not in the focus of loyalty that the concept 
refers to.27
The most important dictionary of the Ottoman Turkish, Kamus-i 
Türkî, uses the words din and millet interchangeably and emphasises 
that the terms millet and ümmet are two different concepts. According to 
the article of millet in the Kamus-ı Türkî, it is wrong to use millet as the 
equivalent of cins (race) or kaioim  (ethnicity). Millet is the common 
name representing various races and ethnolinguistic groups belonging to 
the same religion, e.g., Islamic millet.28 Unlike millet, ümmet is used to 
express different communities which may or may not embrace the same 
religion, and hence corresponding to the western concept of "nation", 
e.g., Turkish ümmet.29 Another point of importance according to the
27Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu , 261.
28Şemseddin Sami, Kamus-ı Türkî, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Tercüman,
1986), 881-882.
29Ibid., 1420. Likewise, Ali Suavi, one of the leading members of
the Young Ottomans, translates the word nation into Turkish as üm m et.
See Türköne, Ibid., 258.
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Kamus-ı Türkî is that the concept of the Islamic millet should be used 
instead of Islamic millets (milel-i îslâmiye) and Islamic iimmets in place 
of the Islamic ümmet.
As a consequence of the secularising efforts following the Tanzimat 
period (1839-1876), the concept of millet was secularised and replaced the 
word ümmet while keeping its meaning whereby the word millet took 
currency in the sense of ümmet and hence nation.
There is no equivalent of the Ottoman "millet" in western 
languages. Communities covered by the word millet lived in various 
parts of the empire and spoke different languages. The only point of 
convergence among them was their common religious and 
denominational affiliations.
Likewise, the concept of millet differs from the Church which 
denotes a separate identity apart from state, because Ottoman millets were 
part of the Ottoman politico-administrative structure and internal to it. 
The millet leaders were also state officials.30
2.1.3. 2. The Establishment and Institutionalisatioji o f the Millet 
System
The main pillar of the Ottoman statecraft was the importance 
attached to the realisation of justice. The mind behind this was the 
classical Islamic notion expressed by such administrators and wise men as 
Nizam-ülmülk and Yusuf Has Hacip that "government based on kufr 
(infidelity) can continue but government based on zulm (oppression) 
cannot."31 The practical manifestations of this ruling principle of the
30Eryilmaz, Millet Sistemi, 13.
31See Nizamülmülk, Siyasetnam e (Political Letter) (Istanbul: 
Dergah Yayınları, 1981), 32.
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Ottoman statecraft was extremely attractive to non-Muslims under 
religious oppression in the Balkan peninsula and led to the adoption of 
Ottoman rule by these communities without much hesitation and 
resistance as exemplified by the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in 1466.
Emerged as a ghazi state32, "intended not to destroy but to subdue 
the infidel world/'33 the Ottomans treated non-Muslims in the frame of 
traditional Islamic practice in regard to the status of non-Muslims, but at 
the outset did not institutionalise them in the hierarchical structure of 
the administrative body of the state.
The structurisation of non-Muslims in the form of millets within 
the administrative hierarchy took place during the rule of the Mehmet II, 
the conqueror of Constantinople. After the conquest of Constantinople 
—the capital city of Byzantine Empire— in 1453, Mehmed II declared 
himself as the protector of his non-Muslim peoples and gave the people 
living in Galata a written pact, ahdname. The pact stated that they would 
enjoy full freedom of religipn, not to be forced to become Muslim, their 
properties, children, women, slaves and ships be inviolable, have 
freedom of travel and commercial transactions, go on paying customs 
duties according to their old customary way, and elect someone from 
among themselves as their kethuda (chief of their communal affairs).34
Mehmed II gave a fresh life to the waning Orthodox Church by 
having a new Patriarch elected in accord with the traditions of Orthodox 
Church and issued an imperial edict regulating its rights. According to
32Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 3.
33Ibid., 7.
34Eryilmaz, Millet Sistemi, 19-20.
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the edict, the Orthodox Christians would be autonomous in matters of 
private law. The Patriarch assumed the title of "chief of the Orthodox 
millet", thus merged the religious and temporal authority in his office. 
The Patriarch considered as the official of the state and was given the title 
of "Ottoman pasha" whereby he was exalted in the bureaucratic ranks of 
the state. As the religious and administrative leader of all the Orthodoxes 
in the Empire, he had a say in the Ottoman Divan-i Hiimayun. Thus 
Mehmet II introduced a new dimension to the Muslim zhimmi law by 
incorporating the regulation of state-non-Muslim relations into the 
administrative structure through millet organisations.
The rights conferred to the Orthodox Christians were generalised to 
Armenians and Jews as well. These two communities were organised as 
autonomous millet organisations chiefs of which being responsible 
before the central administration in any of the matters regarding these 
communities.35
2.1.33. Tanzimat Period: Breakdown o f the Traditional Order
The nineteenth century was a century of continuos "reform" and 
pursuance of "balance politics" for the Ottoman Empire. The traditional 
Ottoman political system based on the groupings of ethnoreligious 
identifications through millet organisations under the central authority 
had undergone drastic changes. The most important dynamics of change 
was the introduction of the idea of nationalism into the Ottoman Empire 
and the adoption of this idea by the non-Muslim millets aspiring to be 
nations.
Apart from the short-lived weakening of the central authority and 
the move toward de facto decentralisation dictated by the local magnates
35Ibid., 20-24.
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(a’yan) to the new Sultan Mahmut II, which was epitomised in a written 
document called the Sened-i İttifak (Deed of Alliance)(1808), the 
transformation of the Ottoman domestic market into an open market for 
European goods and as a consequence of that, the breakdown of Ottoman 
handicraft industry, the rise of a new merchant and intellectual class 
among non-Muslims, and on top of these, the Western economic, 
political and military supremacy over the Ottoman state caused a drastic 
transformation in the identity of non-Muslims, particularly Christians. 
Especially, the 1821 Greek uprising, which broke the unity of the Ortodox 
millet and undermined the authority of the Patriarch, became a turning 
point both for the Ottoman government and the millet system itself 
While Ottoman government from that time on held suspicions over the 
loyalty of its Christian subjects toward the state, the Christians were 
indoctrinated by the premises of the newly-born nationalist ideology.36
As a matter of fact, the changes in the Ottoman socio-political 
system in the nineteenth century can be followed in the light of two 
developments: 1) Reform efforts initiated in the late eighteenth century 
and accelerated in the nineteenth century broke down the traditional 
foundations of Ottoman polity based on the notion of "balanced and just 
order" Under Mahmut II (1808-1837), the concepts of şeriat (Islamic law), 
kanun (law) and adalet (justice), three pillars of the traditional order, 
underwent transformation. The introduction of the policy of Muslim- 
non-Muslim equality and the recognition of a new source of legislation 
apart from Allah and the sultan, i.e., the newly established institutions 
like the Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye, required a new conception of society.37 
Such measures and policies adopted for restructurisations as the
36Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 46.
37Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey, 94-95.
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introduction of new bureaucratic institutions and legal codes as well as 
the emergence of the idea of an Ottoman state composed of diverse 
nationalities and religions together with the idea of the sultan not as the 
defender of the Muslims but as the temporal ruler of all Ottomans 
predicated on the concept of citizenship in the reform period initiated by 
Mahmut II became aborted due to the emergence of nationalism among 
the millet communities coming under the protection of the foreign 
pow ers.38 The secular orientation of reform measures diluted the 
determining Islamic colour of the Ottoman polity and provoked the 
reaction of Muslims. 2) Another important development in this century 
was the colonisation of Muslim lands by the western powers, leading to 
the demands of help by the representatives of these colonised peoples 
from Istanbul, which formed a starting point for the development of the 
idea of Muslim unity, i.e., ittihad-i Islam.39
1839 is a turning point in the history of Ottoman State. Political 
developments in the three decades preceding that date had created a 
pessimistic atmosphere for the future. In this hopeless situation, the 
promulgation of the Tanzimat Edict in 3 November, 1839 represented an 
effort toward "saving the country" In the Tanzimat period, the state and 
social life for the first time were opened to the Western influence 
through official policies.
In the main, men of Tanzimat followed two basic policies for 
"saving the country": the first was to develop reform programs in the 
military, administrative, legal, political, financial and educational fields. 
The second was to find a secure place within the European power balance
38Ibid., 95.
39For an evaluation of these two developments, see Türköne,
İslam cılığın  D oğuşu, 50-51.
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as a check against the imminent Russian threat, which the Empire alone 
could not face. The inevitable price for providing the Ottoman state a 
place in the European inter-state system was the European intervention 
in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state by assuming the role of the 
protectors of the Christian subjects of the Empire. This overlapping of 
"reform" and balance politics" policies led to a situation where the 
reform policies were imposed and dictated by the logic of "balance 
politics" instead of the inner and self-determined policy priorities of the 
Empire itself.40
Besides the requirements of "reform" and "balance" policies, men 
of Tanzimat had two aims: 'terakki (progress) along the European lines 
and a focus of loyalty which would create socio-political cohesion out of 
ethno-national diversity, i.e., ittihad (union). Tanpinar, an eminent poet 
and writer of the new Turkish literature notes that the main ideological 
crystallisation in the Tanzimat period took place around the concept of 
medeniyyet (civilisation),41 summary expression of which being "union 
and progress" These two aims corresponded to the two main concerns of 
Ottoman statesmen: to progress , at whatever cost, and catch up with the 
standards of European civilisation and to meet the challenges of the 
national imperative in evolution in Europe. The demands of national 
self-determination preached by the doctrine of nationalism, which in 
Hans Kohn’s terms, made the nineteenth century the "age of 
nationalism" The states composed of diverse ethno-linguistic groups 
were under the challenge or rather the threat of disintegration due to the
40Ibid., 52.
41Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, 19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi (The 
19th Century History of Turkish Literature) (Istanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 
1988), 152.
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demands of certain ethnic groups to statehood. Greece and Serbia had 
already left the Empire. Hence, there was a pressing need for a new social 
cement which would renew the solidarity among the Empire's Muslim 
and non-Muslim ethnolinguistic groups. The Ottomanism of Tanzimat 
was developed as an urgent response to fill the vacuum emerged with 
the process of the disestablishment of the traditional millet system.42
Tanzimat brought the notion of Muslim-non-Muslim equality 
(müsavat). It substituted the equality of "ehl-i Islam and milel-i saire" 
(Muslim peoples and the others) instead of the millet system based on the 
ontological/religious stratification of peoples. The supremacy of the 
Muslim millet (millet-i hâkime) was ended.43
Tanzimat in a sense was a new interpretation of the millet system. 
The traditional fabric of the millet system began to change with 
Tanzimat. Tanzimat developed the doctrine of O s m a n li l ik  
(Ottomanness) in order to unite various ethnolinguistic communities 
and to create a feeling of common belonging, that is a "policy of diversity 
within unity" The doctrine of Ottomanism became the official policy of
42Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu, 52.
43Fuat Pasha, one of the ruling trio of the Tanzimat period states 
that the Ottoman State was built on the four pillars: The Islamic millet, 
Turkish state, Ottoman Sultanate and the capital city of İstanbul. Now, 
with the end of the principle of Muslim supremacy, a radical rupture was 
achieved from the traditional Ottoman order, which the Ottoman 
chroniclers referred to as "kanun-u kadim" (old order). See Eryilmaz, 
Millet Sistemi, 67. In fact, with the ending of Islam as the mainstay of 
Ottoman sovereignty, the new regime prescribed by the Tanzimat reform 
created a vacuum of genuine social substratum for sovereignty .The new 
locus of the Ottoman sovereignty was not one sustained by a Turkish 
"nation" or by a social class. Thus the relocation of sovereignty became 
one of the major problem of the Tanzimat reformists and was finalised by 
the creation of a limited constitutional regime, which was the 
institutional embodiment of the politico-cultural doctrine of 
Ottomanism. See Berkes, Development o f secularism in Turkey, 201-202.
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the Empire sanctified by the legal texts and remained in force until the 
beginning of the First World War.44
Islahat Fermani, the Reform Edict of 1856, was the second major 
move under the foreign pressure toward the achievement of Muslim- 
non-Muslim equality. This edict, prepared by a commission composed of 
the representatives of England, France, Austria and Ottoman state was in 
the main, covered the issues regarding the rights of non-Muslims. The 
edict was a kind of manifesto of the demands of non-Muslim peoples of 
the Empire for the national independence and the beginning of their 
constitutional development. It laid down the equality in law which 
meant also equality in duties.
With the new order of rights prescribed by the edict, Muslims and 
non-Muslims became equal in several fields of law. One of the 
requirements of the policy of equality was the conscription of the non- 
Muslims for the military service like Muslims. The obligation of military 
service could be done either through active service or by paying an 
exemption fee. In 1857 a traditional tax, cizye was abolished and instead a 
new tax called bedel-i askeri (a tax of exemption from the military service) 
was imposed. The requirement of the military service for non-Muslims 
caused various problems as to how to incorporate them into the structure 
of a thoroughly Muslim army. In practical terms, the active military 
service for non-Muslims was never realised though the bedel-i askeri 
later was removed and military service was made compulsory regardless
44For example, in his opening speech of the first Ottoman 
Parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan, Abdulhamid II, defines the Ottomanism 
as such: "From now on, the whole of our subject, as the children of the 
fatherland all of whom living under the same laws would be named by 
the name of our reigning dynasty (Osmanli), which has been the little of 
our dynasty for 600 years and has recorded in the pages of history by the 
brilliant and glorious works" See Eryilmaz, Millet Sistemi, 76.
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of religious and denominational differences following the promulgation 
of the Second Meşrutiyet.
The Reform edict after emphasising that the rights conferred to 
non-Muslims since the time of Mehmet II stressed the reorganisation of 
these rights in view of changing needs. For this purpose, all millets 
would establish commissions to propose new legislation to the Bab-i Ali 
(Sublime Porte). With the appoval of the Sublime Port, new regulations 
for the non-Muslim communities would come into force.
These regulations were a kind of. constitution for the non-Muslim 
communities. Many of the authorities held by the millet leaders until 
that time were transferred to the newly-formed councils. The millet 
leaders could no longer make decisions on their own. In this regard, the 
new regulations had a decentralising view of organising internal affairs 
of the communities.45
2.1.3.4. Policy o f Equality
Apart from reform measures, the period of Tanzimat was a period 
characterised by the question of e q u a lity . The establishment of equality 
between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire was vital for 
the preservation of the integrity of the state basically for two reasons: in 
the first place, the banner of the newly emerged separatist "nationalist" 
movements in the Empire was the absence of equality between the 
subjects of the Empire affiliated with different religions. For Tanzimat 
statesmen, to adopt a policy of equality so as to prevent the separatist 
tendencies and keep the integrity of the imperial ethnolinguistic mosaic 
intact was an "inevitable imperative", which did not reflect a readily
45For the new order of rights and duties brought about by the 
Reform Edict of 1856, see Eryilmaz, ibid., 62-82.
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chosen policy option On the other hand, as referred to above, Ottoman 
state had to balance the imminent Russian threat by securing for itself a 
place within European power balance. Yet there was a price charged for 
this: intervention of the European powers into the internal affairs of the 
Empire in such a way that all non-Muslim communities came under the 
protection of one of the European states. This was because the rising 
European power was considered to be the rising of Christian civilisation 
visa vis the "backward and regressive" Islamic civilisation. To put it 
shortly, the civilising (read colonising) mission was "white man's 
burden", to use Kipling's famous phrase. Once the Ottoman Empire had 
to obtain its security through the help of European Christian states, it 
could no longer sustain the status of its Christian subjects as "Millet-i 
Mahkume" This had to be changed.46 Thus, the preservation of the unity 
of Empire required the European security umbrella which involved the 
reorganisation of the Ottoman socio-political formation, which in turn 
dictated its imperatives on the direction of the reform measures aiming 
at "modernisation", that is to say, given the contextual conditions of the 
time, "westernisation"
The contextually inherent incompatibility between the ideals of 
"progress" and "union" resulting from the fact that the securing of the 
imperial union was bound to the European security umbrella caused 
deviations in the line of reforms, which was external to the native 
frame of Ottoman socio-political fabric. This "deviated frame of progress", 
led the Tanzimat statesmen to transgress the limits of Şeriat as
46The inescapable reasons leading the Tanzimat statesmen to adopt 
the policy of equality are elaborated in Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu , 60- 
62; See also R.H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian- 
Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," in Roderick H. Davison, 
Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923 (USA: University of 
Texas Press, 1990), 113-114.
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understood at the time, which prescribed Muslim and non-Muslim 
differentiation in terms of rights and duties. The application of the 
policy of Muslim-non-Muslim equality was a clear reflection of this 
incompatibility. Thus secularisation came as a consequence of the 
practical imperatives rather than deliberately engineered reform 
programs. Therefore, we can say that the secular policies of Tanzimat was 
a direct corollary of the "question of equality"
The transformation of the penalty of death for the apostasy into the 
penalty of exile, the abolition of taxes of cizye and haraç, the consideration 
of the non-Muslims as deficient for witnessing, the denial of access for 
non-Muslims to the state offices and compartmentalisation of education 
according to religions were all abolished by the Reform Edict of 1856.47 
The translation of this edict in the popular imagery found its expression 
in the saying "Artık, gavura gavur denmeyecek" (infidels would no 
longer be called infidel)48 and created a strong popular conservative 
reaction, the intellectual echo of which being found in the writings of 
New Ottomans and the codification of the muamelat (a subcategory of 
Islamic lav/) epitomised in the Mecelle prepared by a commission of 
Muslim jurists headed by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha.49
Despite the secularising spirit of the Tanzimat's reforms, all the 
secularising policies still were tried to be legitimised through delils 
(justifications) taken from the Islamic law. With the impacts of 
secularising reforms, the' socio-political divisions overlapping with 
religious divisions in the old system (kanun-ı kadim) were gradually
47Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 114.
48Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi, Tarih Musahabeleri (H isto ry  
Conversations) (Ankara, 1985), 59.
49Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu, 64-65.
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replaced by the political identity of Ottomanism as the common bondage 
of citizenship at least on official level, though in practice the ideal of 
Ottoman citizenship could not be achieved.50
The policy of equality as the official doctrine of the Ottoman Empire 
throughout the nineteenth century became the cornerstone of "saving" 
the empire through a new egalitarian notion of citizenship based on 
Ottomanism (Osmanlilik) .involving patriotism (watan) equated to 
fatherland by shifting its native meaning from "home" or "native place" 
to patrie. With the declaration of Ottoman citizenship in the 1876 
constitution, religious affiliations were relegated to the secondary 
position and political loyalty to the state and to the ruling dynasty became 
the main allegiance. Henceforth, there were only "imperial subjects", 
"subjects of the sultanate" or "subjects of the Exalted State" conveying 
Ottoman citizenship defined individually regardless of ethno-linguistic 
and religious boundaries. Transition from the ethno-religious to the 
territorial concept of citizenship put a major blow to the demarcation 
lines among the traditional millets.51
According to Davison, despite the vehement efforts of Tanzimat 
statesmen, the policy of equality could not be successful and in the end, 
instead of the equality of Christians and Muslims within a heterogeneous 
empire based on "fusion" and "brotherhood", "there emerged (...) the 
corporate equality of competing national sovereign states"52 due to the 
Ottoman-Turkish mind conditioned for the Muslim dominance over 
centuries and hence not ready to accept the notion of equality and the
50For the secularising effects of the policy of equality see Türköne, 
Ibid., 71-72.
51Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 118.
52Ibid., 128.
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attitude of Christians in search of autonomy and sovereignty rather than 
equality.53
As mentioned above, the changes introduced by the Reform Edict 
of 1856 brought about a reorganisation of the original three millets. The 
newly established councils of the Orthodox and Armenian millets now 
included a number of merchants and craftsmen elected by the respective 
communities and became functioning as the ruling councils, and the 
Patriarchs' authority was basically confined to the religious affairs. 
Because of the same identification of the Jews, the laymen and the Rabbi 
alike, the Jewish millet was not affected much by the new changes. While 
the number of millets recognised reached nine, the term millet now 
expressed narrowly defined confessional groups with ethnic overtones 
rather than broad ethnoreligious communities. Despite the increase in 
the number of millets in the second half of the nineteenth century, still 
the classical three millets, the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the 
Jewish millets were the main ones.54
1876 Constitution was a major move toward redefinition of the 
millet system. The establishment of a representative council, M eclis-i 
Umumi, the determination of deputies through election rather than 
appointment, the definition of electoral districts of individual members 
as Ottoman-wide and the proportional representation of Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike as underscored in the new Constitution which called 
all Ottoman subjects "Osmanli" and prescribed to be equal before law and 
equally admissible to public offices and hence almost lifting the millet 
distinctions were the forerunners of the transition in the representation
53Ibid., 127.
54Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy,"46-47.
86
style from a corporate (millet) to a personal base.55 The following 
provisions in the 1876 Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) were clear indications 
of change in the traditional conception of "citizenship" "All individuals 
under Ottoman rule of whatever religion or sect without any distinction 
are called "Osmanli" (Article 8). "All Ottomans posses individual 
freedoms and are obliged not to transgress the rights of others" (Article 9). 
"All Ottomans except for religious and sectarian matters are equal in 
terms of their rights and duties (Article 17). The validity of these 
individual rights is inclusive of all Ottomans. The Ottoman peoples are 
considered equal in terms of political rights and therefore we can say that 
with these provisions the concept of "Osmanli" took conclusively the 
place of the dichotomy of "millet-i hakime" and "millet-i mahkume" 
(ruling and ruled millets). As the ultimate document of Ottomanism on 
official level, the Constitution reflected the aspirations and ideals of 
Tanzimat statesmen as the response to Western-originated challenge of 
nationalist wave of separatism.
Interestingly enough, the Treaty o f Lausanne (24 July, 1923) did not 
abolish the millet system in a conclusive way. Instead it narrowed its 
comprehensiveness. The Treaty uses the term ekalliyet (minorities) 
instead of non-Muslim millets and excludes Muslims of whatever ethnic 
origin from ekalliyet. Ottoman millet system was based oh the religious 
stratification, recognised religio-cultural differences, and ultimately based 
on the authority sanctified by Allah and Sultan. Although non-Muslims 
were in subordinated position vis a vis Muslims, the state was not 
heavily involved in daily life. Therefore, there was a large space of liberty
55Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of 
Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," in Roderic 
H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923 (USA: 
University of Texas Press, 1990), 106.
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in the circulation of values characterising daily life. The term ekalliyet 
however, denoted to a national frame of reference, whose basis of 
authority was people, and due to the homogenising-standardising 
nationalist teachings , those ethnoreligious groups that do not share the 
culture of the dominant nation were put into a subordinated position by 
the centralised, interfering state. In case of ethnicisation of culture, the 
position of subordination tends to be fixed. In the nationalist frame of 
reference, the demarcation line of social stratification is not religion but 
culture, which is secular at least in its origin This change from millet to 
ekalliyet brought about by the Lausanne Treaty was of more contextual 
than content-based in that the content of the more or less secular concept 
of ekalliyet was still characterised by the elements of religion and sect.56
As Kedourie succinctly notes, the introduction of the principle of 
nationality in the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
caused the destruction of the millet system and finally the transformation 
of millets into minorities in the Muslim polities, which cannot be 
considered to be an improvement in the standards of human 
condition.57
The millet system was a non-assimilating system due to its 
character perpetuating the separate existences of different communities 
and therefore was instrumental in the arousal of nationalist feelings and 
aspirations in the non-Muslim millets. Almost all of these millets had 
established foreign political relations against the Ottoman state and were
56Bilal Eryilmaz, "Osmanli Millet Sistemi" (Ottoman Millet 
System), Bilgi ve Hikmet 5(Winter 1994), 97.
57Elie Kedourie, "Ethnicity, Majority and Minority in the Middle 
East," in Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East, eds., 
Milton J. Esman and Itamar. Rabinovich. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1988), 26-27.
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involved in constant struggle and rivalry among themselves. This state 
of affairs led the nationalist reformers to conclude that the millet system 
should be abolished and created feelings of animosity toward it. 
Inheriting this animosity, the Kemalist nationalist movement saw the 
abolishment of the millet system essential for securing the unity of the 
people of Anatolian peninsula and as a consequence of this nationalist 
aspiration, the nationalists insistently demanded its abolishment. They 
succeeded in doing so at least in formal terms.58
2. 2. N ationalism  and the O ttom an Em pire
2.2.1. The Nationalist Challenge
The nationalist imperative in the nineteenth century created an 
enormous challenge to the dynastic political systems in that it proposed a 
new source of sovereignty and legitimacy for socio-political organisation. 
With its liberal-in the nineteenth century sense of the word-, secular 
character and popular basis of legitimacy, nationalism both as a doctrine 
and a political movement forced the restructuration of dynastically-ruled 
ethno-communal systems. Ottoman Empire, one of those states forced to 
meet the challenge of nationalism, in view of the imperatives of 
territoriality and ethnonationalism, adopted what is variously called 
"western, territorial nationalism" prescribing loyalty to fatherland and 
state in the form of Ottomanism based on the equality of its citizens 
regardless of ethno-religious differences on official level and incorporated 
this understanding into its first constitution dated 1876.
Yet, the inability of Ottoman Empire to accept and reconcile the 
nationalist principle was partly responsible for its ultimate disintegration.
58For the abolishment of the millet system, see Toynbee, B ir
D evletin Yeniden Doğuşu  , 170-171.
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This was because the official nationalism, i.e., Ottomanism could not 
succeed in creating social cohesion and loyalty to the state vis a vis the 
attractiveness of ethnolinguistic nationalism emphasising loyalty to the 
community one belongs rather than loyalty to the state. The nationalist 
temptation seemed irresistible, particularly for the non-Muslim subjects 
of the Empire that first felt the pull of national existence and urged for 
ethnic separatism by their European protectors.
The relatively easy adoption of ethnolinguistic nationalism by non- 
Muslim subjects of the empire was due to the fact that the basic unit of 
the millet system was ethno-religious community defined in larger, more 
universal terms. Ethnic nationalism corresponded to the communal basis 
of the millet system although it radically narrowed down the borders of 
ethno-religious community along the newly defined objective as well as 
subjective criteria of nationality paralleling such instinctive and non- 
rational criteria of the past polities as faith and kinship.59
Interestingly enough, one of the consequences of the intrusion of 
the nationalism into the Ottoman Empire as Kedourie strongly 
emphasised was the transformation of millets into minorities over time, 
due to the change in the basis of authority which prescribed popular 
rather than divine sovereignty.60 In the case of Ottomans, nationalist 
ideology first spread among the non-Muslim millets and later to the 
ruling Muslim groups. As the Rum millet turned into the Greek nation, 
Ottomans too began to look at themselves as Turks, although not at mass 
but elite level. The ethnic mobilisation of Greeks, Serbians, Armenians 
and the Kurds nourished the separatist tendencies and in the end led to
59Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 338.
60Kedourie, "Ethnicity, Majority and Minority, "26-27.
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the down fall of the Empire.61 There was no effective breakwater against 
the waves of the nationalist imperative.
2.2.2. Ethnic Nationalism and Ottoman Intellectuals: Search for a 
"National Society"
Nations are created through artificial constructions more than 
through the discovery of hidden and unknown greatness of the so-called 
"eternal national past" Both intellectuals and professionals are very 
influential in the formulation and dissemination of nationalist ideas and 
consciousness. This was so in the case of Ottoman intellectuals when 
they met with the idea of nation and nationalist movements in Europe. 
When assumed the mission of forming a nation, Ottoman intellectuals 
did so by way of both "invention" and "discovery" The nation ready for 
discovery was the "Islamic nation" and the nation to be created as the 
contextual imperative was the "Ottoman nation".62 The idea of Turkish 
nation would appear on the political scene in much later dates when the 
native forms of nationhood developed in Ottoman polity were 
articulated with the Western/modem idea of "nation" The question o f 
reconciliation o f Islam and Turkism which have affected in various tones 
the idea of Turkish nationalism up until now stems from the idea of the 
Islamic nation and one of the essential component of the present 
Turkish nationalism, love o f the country, is again the remnant of the 
efforts to build up an Ottoman nation.
The efforts of Ottoman intellectuals to form a "nation" in the first 
place emanated from their need to acquire a firm foundation for 
democratic ideas they propounded. Beginning with the Young Ottomans,
61Ibid., 30.
62Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu, 252.
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Ottoman intellectuals advocated national sovereignty against absolute 
monarchy. The following quotation from one of the dailies of the time 
makes clear their position which suggests national will instead of 
dynastic authority. "The happiness of humanity comes from the rights 
this age confer on him. The reason for this is that a person cannot change 
and transform the state of a nation according to his arbitrary will. The 
time when countries were considered the patrimony of the sovereigns 
has become part of the past; countries nowadays are considered to be the 
properties (mülk) of the nation. The age in which we live has reduced the 
highly exalted status of sovereigns to. the level of the servants of the 
nation".63 In other words, moral loyalty to nation replaced loyalty to the 
sovereign. This was a direct corollary of the principle of national self- 
determination substituted for communal and dynastic allegiances by the 
rising tide of nationalism in Europe.
The spread of nationalism, particularly ethnic nationalism became 
an imminent threat for multi-ethnic imperial states, such Russia, 
Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire. The transition from dynastic to 
national allegiance removed the basis of political legitimacy in this highly 
heterogeneous, multi-ethnic empires. Therefore, in order to cope with 
the increasing danger of nationalism, the imperial states resorted to the 
military measures on the one hand and tried instinctively to develop an 
imperial ideology, on the other. Thus, in Russia, Austria-Hungary and 
Ottoman states, ideologies to hold different ethno-linguistic communities 
together were formulated. The striking point in this development was 
that the efforts of forming imperial ideologies were gone hand in hand 
with the nationalism of the ruling ethnic group. Such nationalisms were
63M. Kaya Bilgegil, Yakınçağ Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatı Üzerine 
Araştırmalar I: Yeni OsmanlIlar (Studies on the Recent Turkish Culture 
and Literature I: New Ottomans) (Ankara, 1976), 112.
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at times intermixed with religious elements. Russia depended on the 
Orthodox Church in proposing Slav nationalism while Austrians got 
refuge in Catholic Church against German nationalism. With similar 
motives, Ottoman intellectuals while trying to create an imperial 
ideology (Ottomanism) did so with parallel efforts of formulating 
Islamism addressing the core ruling group(s).64
Ottoman intellectual and bureaucratic elites were in need of both 
establishing a base for their democratic demands like popular 
sovereignty, constitutionalism, elections, and parliamentarism 
(hakimiyet-i milliye, meşrutiyet, biat and şura) and creating an ideal of 
nation by way of forming a nationalist ideology. The things looked for 
was to keep diverse ethnic communities of the Empire together from the 
viewpoint of "political fraternity" (uhuvvet-i siyasiyye). As a result of 
this pressing need, Ottoman intellectuals turned the policies of ethnic 
groups living in harmony (imtizac-ı akvam) and unity (ittihad-i anasır), 
devised at political level by the Tanzimat bureaucrat-politicians, into a 
nationalist ideology. Nevertheless, the idea of creating an Ottoman 
nation required difficult and distressing efforts. Against this, the ideal of 
Islamic fraternity (uhuvvet-i İslamiyye), which assured the political 
fraternity at the past, had a challenging appeal for the Ottoman 
intellectuals. Therefore, when they tried to develop the idea of nation 
and an ideology of nationalism, they tried to do both.
Before dwelling upon the way the Ottoman and Islamic 
nationalisms were developed, it must be noted that Ottoman intellectuals 
refused the ethnic nationalism of the nineteenth century Europe in a
64Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu , 254.
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radical way and considered this type of nationalism, which was based on 
race, language or culture in various ways, unsuitable for their polity.65
2. 3. Search for a N ation alist R eorganisation  o f the O ttom an Em pire
2.3.1.ittihad-i Osmam: Ottoman Patriotism vs Ethnic Nationalism
Ottomanism was a political and ideological movement aiming at 
preventing various secessionist independence movements from the 
empire wnich had become the major preoccupation of Ottoman 
statesmen particularly after the arrival of the impacts of the French 
Revolution in the empire in the form of nationalism through the 
creation of the notion of Ottomanness as an umbrella concept 
superseding variety of ethnic nationalisms.
As discussed before, two main factors created major difficulties in 
the maintenance of the millet system: In the first place, spread of 
nationalism in the Balkan peninsula of the Empire led to the successful
65For example, Namık Kemal refuses ethnic nationalism (cins 
ittihadı) by erecting Islam against it. "The Fatherland does not consist of 
imaginary lines drawn on a map by the sword of conqueror or the pen of 
a scribe. It is a sacred idea, sprung from the union of many lefty 
sentiments, such as nation, freedom, welfare, brotherhood, property, 
sovereignty, respect for ancestors, love of family, memory of youth...” 
Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 332. In the same way, Ali Suavi 
rejects ethnic nationalism from the Islamic point of view. According to 
him, Europeans are mistaken in their comparison of the East (Şark) with 
the West (Garb):
"It must be known that there is big difference between the East and 
the West regarding this issue. In Europe, there is a cause of ethnicity 
(cinslik davası). For instance, a French cannot be a minister in British 
government. Likewise, ah Algerian Arab cannot acquire French 
citizenship. Now, in the East, there is no cause of ethnicity." The 
evidences are Ottoman viziers of Croat, French or Albanian origins. Thus 
adds Suavi, "A Turkish nation emerged but not paying homage to the 
cause of ethnicity It took into its service those who fit for office without 
any regard to their ethnic origin", and concludes: "Yet, there is the cause 
of unity instead of the cause of ethnicity in the East. That is, what prevails 
is not Turkishness but Islam." See Ali Suavi, "Türk," Muhbir , 38(12 June 
1868); quoted by Türköne, ibid., 267.
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Greek revolt (1821-1829) and secession which triggered and inspired other 
ethnic nationalisms. Secondly, the centralising measures of Tanzimat 
administrations caused great troubles and led some of the ethno- 
communal groups accustomed to the regime of partial autonomy and 
non-intervention by the state to enter into opposition against the 
Ottoman centre.66 Added to this was the general Ottoman weakness and 
inability to cope with external as well as internal challenges.
It was in this context that Ottomanism as a supra-national identity 
aiming at transformation of ethnonational identities into citizenship 
came into existence. The underlying motives of the "project" of 
Ottomanism was to create an Ottoman individual (Osmanlı ferdi). The 
most solid remedy prescribed for the coexistence of diverse nationalities 
within the same polity was "reconciliation."
As a project of political engineering, Ottomanism was among one 
of the first political doctrines. It had two premises. One was loyalty to the 
sultan, which founded its tidy formulation in Ahmed Mithat's, one of 
the important writers of the late nineteenth century, book Üss-i İnkilap 
(Basis of Transformation). This understanding considers Ottomanism as 
political fraternity.67 The second and more mobilising constitutive 
element of Ottomanism was the ideal of watan (patriotism). The word 
"watan" is a term put into Turkish political vocabulary exclusively by 
Ottomanism.
Essentially, Ottomanism was built on the ideal of watan. The 
following lines from one of the dailies of the New Ottomans, Ittihad,
66See Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Osmanlıcılık" (Ottomanism)Tanzimattan 
Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 5 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1985), 1390 and Türküne, ibid., 263.
67Tanpmar, 19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi, 153.
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clearly exemplify this "Every person inside this community, whatever 
his religion be, is obliged to love and protect his country."68 Along the 
same lines, inkılap, another Young Ottoman paper, describes the idea of 
Ottoman nation as follows: "This watan is a bloody inheritance from our 
ancestors to us. And its every piece has been watered with their blood. It 
is this country that is our manifest property and whoever resident in this 
land and fulfil his duties is our compatriots, brothers".69 The aim is to 
establish the unity of diverse nationalities. Thus, the notion of being the 
children of the fatherland is defined as a tie making Muslims and 
Christians brother. As Lewis notes, the Ottomanist idea of watan 
resembles the territorial nationalisms prevailing in Britain and France 
which refers to the residence of the common lands ruled by the common 
sovereign.70 With its new meaning, the word watan corresponded to the 
French word patrie. i.e., fatherland. Inspired by the French patriotism, 
Ottoman ideal of watan is an accultural element received from the west. 
In the Ottoman-Muslim tradition, there was no usage of watan in the 
sense of patrie. In the classical Arab-Ottoman usage watan meant the 
place of birth or residence. It might refer to a country, a province, a town 
or a village without having any political significance.71 In its old usage, it
68Quoted by Bilgegil,Yakın Çağ Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatı Üzerine 
Araştırmalar I, 121.
69Ibid., 190.
70Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 328.
71Ibid., 329. For the birth of the concept of watan and the shifts in its 
meaning and the present usage of it as a detailed coverage of the history 
of the word watan in the Muslim and Western worlds see Bernard Lewis, 
"Watan," in The Impact' o f  Western Nationalisms eds., Jehuda 
Reinharz and George L. Mosse (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 169- 
179.
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essentially meant home. With its new usage however, it came to mean 
the whole of political geography, that is fatherland.
By the mid-nineteenth century, watan in this new sense was in 
common use in the Turkish press. Of course, given the intermix of 
Ottomanism and Islamism in the Young Ottoman thought, the borders of 
watan was defined in Islamic terms.72
Ironically, the most comprehensive and authoritative embodiment 
of the policy of Ottomanism is developed by the radical critics of the 
Tanzimat regime, the initiator of the policy, the so-called Young 
Ottomans. The Young Ottoman movement emerged as a spontaneous 
opposition to the indifferent and somewhat arbitrary rule of the sultan 
Abdulaziz (1861-1876) and had as its aim the general reformation of the 
socio-political system along representative, constitutionalist, patriotic and 
Islamic lines. Funded by the Egyptian prince Mustafa Fazil Pasha, they 
demanded the acceptance of the constitutional monarchy. The 
distribution of a pamphlet authored by Pasha and its appearance on the 
newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar which requested the promulgation of the 
constitutional monarchy in an highly respectful mode of presentation led 
the leading figures of the Young Ottoman thought, Ziya Pasha and 
Namık Kemal to flee Paris in 17 May, 1867. With the joining of Ali Suavi 
to this group of thinkers, they published first the newspaper Muhbir in 
London and later Hürriyet on behalf of the Young Ottoman Society. 
Young Ottomans in Europe were called Young Turks.73
72For example, for Namık Kemal's views on watan see Bernard 
Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 330-331.
73Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, inkılap Tarihimiz ve Jön Tiirkler (Our 
Renovation History and Young Turks) (IstanbuLTan Matbaası,1945), 10- 
12. With regard to the appellation "Young Turk", Ihsan Sungu notes the 
following: "It is understood that the title Jeune-Turk has been adopted 
through the imitation of the titles of certain secret societies formed by
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Young Ottoman movement is the first revolutionary-democratic 
intellectual movement of the history of the Ottoman reformation. The 
roots of many argumentations characterising the present-day political 
scene go back to the Young Ottomans. Yet, Young Ottoman thought is far 
from being homogeneous and coherent. The inexperiences of Young 
Ottomans, political intrigues in which they involved and. the fact that 
they were first in advocating those ideas explain, to a certain extent, the 
incoherences and contradictions found in the Young Ottoman thought.74 
This is why various brands of thought can be discerned in the persons of 
Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi or Kâni Paşazade Rıfat Bey.
Despite this, we can identify certain common characteristics which 
make the appellation Young Ottoman thought correct. Advocacy of 
representative government75 and freedom is the primary one. The 
second characteristic is the development of Ottoman-Islamic patriotism. 
The main question of Young Ottomans was the same with that of 
Tanzimat statesmen: how to save the Ottoman state? Reforms and the 
creation of a horizontal allegiance devoted to the sovereign and state 
based on the principle of political fraternity and equality were their 
common denominators. Nevertheles, they radically differed in terms of 
what will constitute the basis of political fraternity. Instead of monarchy 
which the bureaucrats of the Sublime Port espoused, Young Ottomans
some extremists in politics and literature such as Jeune-Franc in France, 
Jeune-Italie in Italy and Jeune-Allemagne in Germany" See İhsanSungu, 
"Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar" (Tanzimat and the New Ottomans), in 
Tanzimat (IstanbubMaarif Vekaleti, 1940), 777.
74Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu , 97-99.
75They supported the doctrine of popular sovereignty and national 
assembly (Meclis-i Şura-i Ümmet). See Davison, "The Advent of the 
Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," 
105.
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proposed the ideas of Ottoman and Islamic nations as the foci of new 
popular allegiance. The reason for the advocacy of both Ottomanism and 
Islamism was to make use of the solidifying power of the nationalist 
movements epitomised in the successful national unification processes 
in Italy and Germany. Thus apart from the idea of popular sovereignty, 
Young Ottomans put special emphasis on this co-operative spirit 
generated by the nationalist zeal.76
Ottoman constitutionalism aimed at preventing secessions from 
the empire on the basis of absolute equality among the Ottoman subjects 
within a parliamentary structure rather than the representation of people 
and the limitation of governmental power. Yet the outcomes of the 
policy of equality was a matter of argumentation among intellectuals: 
Could the policy of equality, become successful in regaining the allegiance 
of the Ottoman subjects holding separatist tendencies or provide a better 
environment for such tendencies?
In fact, in the final analysis, only the dominant ethnic group, Turks, 
adopted Ottomanism and postponed their nationalism(s) for the 
salvation of the state. The Constitution of 1876 is the peak of the Ottoman 
nationalism. From 1878 on, however, Ottomanism was relegated to a 
secondary position by the Sultan Abdulhamid II( 1876-1909)'s policy of 
ittihad-i Islam (Union of Muslim Peoples)). Ottomanism was the 
mainstay of Young Turk opposition against Abdulhamid II rule at home 
and abroad. Nevertheless, the Christian subjects opted for separation 
rather than citizenship under the impact of ethnic nationalism. 
Ottomanism as a supra-national identity remained only a political myth 
for them. They considered it as a misleading effort by the state against 
their ethno-national identity. In contrast to Islam, Ottomanism was not a
76Ibid., 97.
99
very meaningful bond for non-Turk Muslim subjects. The end result was 
only a story of failure. Therefore, Ottoman patriotism was easily defeated 
by ethnic nationalism.77
2.3.2. İttihad-ı İslam: The Ottoman-Muslim Nation
As an expression of gaining the old supremacy of Muslims in the 
past order, Islamism or the policy of Islamic unity (ittihad-i Islam) 
emerged as a reaction to the Ottomanism's policy of equality toward the 
end of 1860s. Yet, because of the practical political necessities backing and 
justifying Ottomanism, it was not an easy thing to challenge it. The 
appeal of an "imaginary" force uniting 250 million Muslim people to the 
Ottoman state however, was irresistible for the Ottoman intellectuals. 
The dilemma was this: Ottomanism was inevitable for the preservation 
of the political status quo while Islamism meant "new horizons". Thus a 
dual discourse imposed itself on the thinking of Ottoman intellectuals 
and caused the transformation of Ottomanism along the Islamic precepts, 
i.e., the Islamic justification of Ottomanism.78
Ottoman intellectuals looked at the Islamic community as a 
modern nation. Islam for them was the starting point both for the 
justification of their democratising demands and as a national ideal for 
the restructurisation of the Ottoman state. While nationalism developed 
as a secular ideology in the West, religion (Islam) was turned into a 
nationalist ideology by the Ottoman intellectuals, a process which can be 
explained by the fact that Ottoman polity did not experience a radical 
philosophical rupture from the old weltanschuung like the 
Enlightenment thought in Europe. The early period of Islam, i.e., the
77Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 333.
78Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu , 238-240.
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period of the Prophet and the four caliphs functioned as the underlying 
point of reference in reception of western institutions considered as 
things that can be separated from their original socio-political contexts 
and re-erected in a new "sçil" without much difficulty. In this process, 
western secular institutions, by reference to not historical but original 
Islam, could be easily justified, which compensated for the lack of the 
tradition of philosophical thinking in the Ottoman Empire. Thus 
Ottoman intellectuals found in Islam the social basis they looked for and 
took the advantage of the Islamic solidarity which deeply rooted in 
Ottoman polity.79 Therefore, western type of nationalism was not suitable 
for the Young Ottomans because they needed a more comprehensive 
ideology than Ottomanism, which was Islam. At least in the 
Durkheimian sense of forming social cohesion, Islamic imperative was 
accepted. When they were in Europe, the Young Ottomans faced with 
nationalist and liberal democratic movements and were in contact with 
republicans, liberal-nationalists and socialists. Out of this ideological 
circle, they only selected two elements: the ideas of democracy and 
progress.80 Apart from being the justifying source for the question of 
social identity and ideal of liberty, Islam was the only force of social 
cohesion which had a popular basis. The remaining task was to elaborate 
a theory of political struggle founded on ittihad-i Islam.
The first article using the term "ittihad-ı İslam" was appeared in the 
newspaper Hürriyet, in 10 May, 1869. According to this article, 1) the only 
way to prevent the foreign domination over Muslims is unity (ittihad). 
The centre of this unity is the Ottoman state; 2) This unity could be 
achieved through a popular movement as Italians did in their build-up
79Ibid., 267-269.
80 Ibid., 89.
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of national unity; 3) The precondition for such a unity to come into 
existence is the dissolution of the autocratic rule and the establishment of 
constitutionalism based on popular sovereignty. Only then, the Ottoman 
state could become the centre of unity.81
The turning point in the idea of ittihad-i Islam is the article by 
Ahmed Mithat published in Basiret, 9 April 1872 (29 Muharrem 1289) 
titled "Devlet-i Aliyye ve Avusturya" (Ottoman State and Austria). A 
vivid debate around the idea of ittihad-i Islam followed this article 
between İbret, Hakaik'ül Vekayi, Hadika, Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis, 
Devir and Bedir newspapers. Mithat sees a balancing power in the idea of 
ittihad-i Islam against pan-slavism of Russia, hence a security valve for 
the Ottoman Empire against this "eternal" threat. The article had an 
important drawback, the naive idea that Europe as a whole would 
support such a project. The author's view of European landscape was 
limited to Russia and Austria ignoring France, Holland and Britain.82
Ittihad-i Islam was immediately turned into a cause of Muslim 
enlightenment for progress and received a warm welcome and a very 
strong support from Muslim public opinion and hence gained a 
mobilising mission for reaching modernity. In Namık Kemal, the leading 
spokesman of the Young Ottomans, the political and educational causes 
were merged and constitutionalism as well as educational mobilisation 
were brought together as the two sides of the same coin.83
The use of Islam to develop a culturally homogeneous Muslim 
community having a religious identity superseding ethno-linguistic
81Ibid., 199-207.
82Ibid., 214-217.
83Ibid., 220-225.
102
loyalties turned the Ottoman state into a predominantly Muslim state 
given the mass migrations to the Ottoman state and the formation of 
new nations in the Balkan peninsula in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. The new Ottoman Muslim state was a territorial state 
characterised by the bonds of Islamic solidarity.
The shift of individual allegiance from the sultan to the impersonal 
national Muslim state and the deep Islamic revival experienced 
following the activities of revitalised Sufi orders in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, more particularly Nak§ibendis, were coupled with 
the redefinition of the position of the non-Muslims. The autonomous 
millet communities now had become minority groups (ekalliyet). 84The 
extent of secularisation was getting increasingly enlarged.
Accordingly, the adoption of the policy of ittihad-i Islam as a 
political ideal under Abdulhamid II reflected itself in the official policies 
in education, administration and finance. The Caliphate assumed a new 
political vitality and the new Ottoman Muslim state became the 
ideological focus of recourse for Muslims in terms of socio-political 
power vis a vis the Christian Europe.
This political undertaking precipitated by the European world 
domination resulted in the European counterpart of nation-state in 
formal terms. While Turkish became the official language of the new 
state in politico-cultural sense, Islam underlined the main contours of 
state policies inside as well as outside.85
^Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 48-49.
85Ibid., 50-51.
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2. 3. 3. Turkish Nation: An Artificial Construct
Ottoman intellectuals engineered several projects to meet the 
challenges of the new socio-political organisation in making imposed by 
the inner dynamics of industrial society, that is nation-state. This politico­
engineering projects formed a trio: first the policy of ittihad-i Osmam, 
then ittihad-t Islarn, and finally ittihad-i Etrak or Turkish nationalism. 
The delay in Turkish nationalism in official terms was due to the fact that 
Turks were the core element of the Empire and felt responsibility for the 
preservation of the integrity of the Empire. When Turkish nationalism 
received official recognition not only policywise but also in overt 
political rhetoric, Ottoman state had lost almost all its "foreign" 
possessions including the Arabian peninsula. This does not mean that 
the Turkish nationalism imposed itself just as a political inevitability. 
Rather it was a consciously made political choice which in fact played a 
role in the arousal of Arab nationalism and the Arab nationalist uprising 
that occurred in 1916 during the World War I. The persecution of Arab 
people in Syria-Palestine region by the famous Cemal Pasha of İttihat and 
Terakki is a case in point. 86
The spread of nationalism from Europe to the Ottoman Empire 
found a ready acceptance in the non-Muslim communities but did not 
remain limited to them. Muslim communities too produced their 
nationalist elites and nationalist movements asserted their demands in 
socio-political terms. Albanian, Arab and Turkish nationalisms took 
different directions, all in the final analysis detrimental for the existence
86The local Arab people called Cemal Pasha "Cemal-i Haccac", by 
forging a parallel between him and the famous Umeyyed governor 
"Haccac-ı zalim" (the oppressor Haccac). For the oppressive measures of 
SUP in Arab provinces during the First World War , see Hüseyin Kazım 
Kadri, Ziya Gökalp'in Tenkidi (The Criticism of Ziya Gökalp) (İstanbul: 
Dergah Yayınlan, 1989), 85.
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of the Ottoman state. Although Turkish nationalism came later due to 
the fact that Turks—meaning Turkish political elites—were the main 
founding element of the state, it expressed itself as an alternative to the 
Ottoman and Islamic nationalism.
Turkish nationalism found its eloquent and systematic expression, 
especially in the period following the promulgation of the Second 
Meşrutiyet (1908), in Turkism.87 Before going into the constitution of 
Ottoman-Turkish identity, a note on the concepts of "Turk" 
and "Turkey" would be useful.
The first use of the word "Turk" can be found in the O rhun  
inscriptions near lake Baykal. But, it was not yet clear whether the word 
referred to one tribe or a group of tribes. When the Muslim Arabs came 
into contact with this tribal groups, they called them "Turks" The 
desperation of the word Turk as a collective name can be brought back to 
the eighth century A.D.. This designation, of course, was primarily 
linguistic.88
In the Ottoman times, the word Turk was used only as a tribal name 
and term of contempt. It referred to the nomads or peasants of Anatolia
87Hanioğlu, "Türkçülük" (Turkism), inTanzimattan Cumhuriyete 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. 5 (Istanbuldletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1394.
88 Davison, "The Turks in History," 1. It is well-known that the 
famous Arab thinker el-Cahiz wrote a book titled "Fazailü'1-Etrak" 
(Virtues of Turks) in the 9th century. Lewis too agrees with the view that 
the generalised use of the word Turk as a collective name for a whole 
group was born with Islam. This is why the term Turk never applied to 
non-Muslim Turks like Christian Gagawuz or the Christian and Jewish 
citizens of the present-day Turkey. See Lewis, Emergence o f Modern 
Turkey, 8. Another interesting indication of the Islamicity of the name 
Turk is its interchangeable use with the word Islam particularly in the 
Balkan Peninsula and in the pre-Enlightenment European usage. For 
instance, Serbs still consider Bosnian Muslims as "Turk" See Erol 
Güngör, Islamtn Bugünkü Meseleleri (Current Problems of Islam) 
(Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1983), 182-183 and 243.
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and had the connotation of "rude and ignorant" A dialogue in the novel 
Yaban exhibits the tribal sense of the Turk in popular usage even during 
the Turkish War o f Independence (1919-1922). The enemy aircrafts are 
flying over a village near the city of Eskişehir. The villagers are against 
Mustafa Kemal and his supporters in the war with the enemy. The main 
character of the novel, Ahmet Celal, talks to Bekir Çavuş before the
enemy forces came to the village:
Bekir Çavuş:
— I know my sir (bey), you are also from them(supporters of
Mustafa Kemal)but...
— Who are they?
— Those sided with Mustafa Kemal...
— How can one simultaneously be a Turk and not side with
Mustafa Kemal?
— My sir, we are not Turk.
— Well, who are you?
— Thanks to Allah, we are Muslim... Those whom you talk about
live in Haymana. 89
Those who lived in Haymana were Yürüks (Turcomans).
The first use of the word Turk as a national designation was by the 
nationalist poet Mehmet Emin in his Türkçe Şiirler (Turkish Poems) 
published during the Greco-Ottoman war of 1897. The poet proudly
89Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Yaban (The Stranger), 25th ed. 
(Istanbul-.İletişim Yayınları,1989), 181. The popular perception of "Turk" 
as a pejorative word can be identified in the following dialogue between 
an Ottoman commander (Şevket Süreyya himself) and his soldiers 
during the World War I in the Caucusian front: The commander, in one 
of his lectures to the soldiers composed of Anatolian peasants asked 
them: "To which nation do we belong?" Every body voiced a different 
opinion. Then the commander tried to confirm: "Are we all not Turk?" 
The soldiers immediately replied: "God forbid!" This peasant-soldiers, 
according to Aydemir, considered Turkishness as being a person of loose 
morals and therefore rejected it. See Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Suyu 
Arayan Adam (The Man Looking for Water) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 
1979), 103-104. Ottoman historiographies too refers to those tribes called 
Turk as "Etrak-i nâpâk” (Filthy Turks) and " Etrak-ı bî idrak" (Dull-witted 
Turks). To an Ottoman elite a Turk was "an uneducated, rather boorish 
and peasant-like fellow who spoke common Turkish and was 
illiterate." See Davison, "The Turks in History," 15.
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declare himself a Turk: "Ben bir Türküm, dinim cinsim uludur" (I am a 
Turk, my faith and my race are mighty). Thus, Turkishness was 
considered as a source of pride and adopted by Turkists as a collective 
national designation for Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims.90
As to the name Turkey, it has been given by the Europeans to 
Turkish-speaking Anatolia since its conquest in the eleventh century by 
the Seljuks.91 In the Ottoman writings however, it is not used until the 
middle of the nineteenth century, The name "Turkey" is a sheer 
European term used by European Christians to describe Turkish speaking 
Anatolia which the Ottomans called Diyar-i Rum (the land of Rum). The 
Young Ottomans coined the word Turkistan—a Persian word meaning 
the "land of Turks" But because this term was appropriated for the 
Central Asia before, it was replaced by Tiirkiye,— the adaptation of the 
European name Turkey— which in 1923 gained official recognition.92 In 
fact, 1921 Constitution already called the new state "Turkey" for the first 
time. As a result, before the promulgation of the Republic, the name 
Turkey received official recognition.
Having identified the historical evolution of the terms Turk and 
Turkey, now we may attempt to acquire an insight into the formation of 
the Ottoman-Turkish identity.
The changes brought about by the introduction of Turks into Islam 
was profound. The whole communal imagery was up side-down. Almost 
every aspect of social life changed while personal identities totally turned 
into religio-communal identity. The fusion of Turkish tribal identity
90Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 337.
91Ibid., 1.
92Ibid., 326-327.
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with Islam had no parallel even in the case of Muslim Arabs. Though the 
pre-Islamic traditions and legends were preserved among villagers and 
tribesmen, Ottoman high (palace) culture after the second half of the 
fifteenth century were almost freed from the pre-Islamic ethnic 
memories due to the newly assumed imperial missions and the cause of 
religious Gazha.
Before the conquest of Constantinople, Ottoman state was not an 
empire and as a cognate of this, it was predominantly an "ethnic Turkish 
entity".93 With the inclusion of diverse religious groups in the second 
half of the fifteenth century, the millet system emerged which took the 
religious community as the unit of administrative organisation reflected 
in the establishment of the Christian Orthodox, the Armenian and the 
Jewish millets. The fact that the religious community was conferred legal 
status as the main unit of socio-political organisation marked the 
transition from the predominantly ethnic Turkish entity "into an 
imperial state".94 Over time under the imperial and Islamic traditions 
prescribing struggle against the Christian world and religious heresy, the 
proto-national sense of Turkishness was effaced and transformed. Lewis 
describes the replacement of nascent feeling of Turkishness by Islam to 
the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the rise of Shiite-Turkic Safavid 
dynasty in Iran and the assumption of the Caliphate after the inclusion of 
Syria and Egypt into the Ottoman state, which led to the inheritance of 
the imperial mission from the Byzantine Empire, the cut of relations 
with the eastern Turkish world and the leadership of the Muslim World, 
respectively.95
93Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 39.
94Ibid., 40.
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The transformation of ethno-communities based on the notion of 
lineage, which was extremely important in the Turkish ethnic 
identification, into a supratribal identity was the heritage of the Mongol 
Empire demanding personal loyalty to the central political rule to the 
Ottomans. It was not so difficult to turn this sense of ethnicity 
maintained by weak genealogical traditions into a larger religious 
community forming the basic unit of Ottoman polity.95 6
The Ottoman historiography and customs tariffs are clear-cut 
examples of the merger of Turkishness with Islam. Ottoman 
historiography starts with the rise of Islam and the period extending to 
the end of the first four Caliph, then jumps to the House of Osman and 
the Ottoman state. These two starting points were linked to each other 
through Seljukian states first in Persia, then in Anatolia. History of non- 
Muslim groups under the Öttoman rule is covered as far as it relates to 
the Ottoman history. The pro-Islamic past of Turks are totally ignored. 
What makes sense was only the Islamic times for the Ottoman historians 
and hence sultans.97 The variability of rates of customs tariffs according to 
the classical Islamic classification of the believer community, the hostile 
infidel community, (harbis) and the subject infidel community {zhtmmi), 
the highest being for the harbis and the lowest for the Muslims, is 
another indication of the fact that only religious differences mattered to 
the Ottomans. Ethnic and other social categories had no political bearings 
whatsoever.98
95Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 326.
96Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 37-39.
97Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, "Tanzimattan Meşrutiyete Kadar Bizde 
Tarihçilik" (Our Historiography from Tanzimat to M eşrutiyet), in 
Tanzimat (Istanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1940), 585.
98Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 323-324.
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Despite the Islamicity of Ottoman ethnic construction, the 
emergence of Mongol threat under the leadership of Timur, the new 
ruler of Central Asia, which challenged the legitimacy of the rule of the 
House of Osman on the basis of noble genealogical lines claiming an 
inferior status for the Ottoman dynasty led for a short period of time to a 
Turkic revival in the first half of the fifteenth century epitomised in the 
emphasis laid down on the pre-Islamic Turkish history, Central Asian 
Turkish legends, the famous of which being Ergenekon legend presenting 
the House of Osman as descending from the legendary hero Oguz Khan 
in the Ottoman official historiography", and in the tendency to use a 
more purified, simple Turkish. Yet, return to Turkish roots were stopped 
and ended under the imperatives of the newly-assumed imperial 
mission and the Islamic tradition during the reign of Mehmed II, though 
the Oguz legend continued to be part of the official history until the end 
of the Empire.* 100To interpret these elements of proto-nationalism is an 
indication of sheer anachronism, to carry a thoroughly modern 
formations with historical roots back, which what many nationalist 
historians do. 101
2.4. "T h ree W ays of P olicy"
In connection to these three projects of political engineering 
proposed as the solution only for saving the country, the newspaper
"T h e History of Rashid al-Din is the first among its kind written 
during the reign of Murad II.
100Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 325-26.
101For such an anachronistic approach which talks about Turkish 
nationalism in the Kök-Türk state of the sixth century , see Aydın Taneri, 
Türk Kavramının Gelişmesi (The Development of the Concept of Turk) 
(Ankara: Ocak Yayınları, 1993).
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Turk - appeared in Cairo-, published a number of articles discussing these 
projects of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. The first articulation of 
"the three ways of policy" was by Yusuf Akçura, a prominent figure of 
pan-Turkism.
2.4.1. Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)
Yusuf Akçura, the author of Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Ways of 
Policy), a nationalist manifesto for Turkist movement in the Ottoman 
Empire,102 is the first thinker spelling Turkism as a political project. 
Akçura was a Kazan Tatar from Russia. Turks in Russia in the late 
nineteenth century were subject to the policy of Russification and as a 
reaction developed a national resistance against forced assimilation, and 
hence were able to create national consciousness. This Tatar nationalism 
and later Young Turk "libertarianism" formed two main ideological 
drives framing Akçura's youthful thought.
As Francois Georgeon clarifies, the impact of Tatar reformism 
(cedidism) on the political socialisation of Akçura was decisive. In order 
to protect their "national" existence against the policy of Russification 
and Pan-Slavism, Tatars first introduced new sciences (fiinun-i cedide) 
into their madrases, and tried to remove the discrepancy between written 
and oral form of their language. Against Russian threat of capturing 
central Asian "markets", Tartar bourgeois class assumed a pioneering role
102According to Charles Warren Hostler, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset played a 
similar role in Turkist movement to that of 1848 Communist Manifesto 
in Marxist movement. See Charles Warren Hostler, Turkism and the 
Soviets ((London, 1957), 45; cited by Ercüment Kuran, "Yusuf Akçura'nın 
Tarihçiliği" (The Historianship of Yusuf Akçura), in Ölümünün Ellinci 
Yılında Yusuf Akçura Sempozyumu; Ankara, 11-12 Mart 1985 (Ankara: 
Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınlan, 1987), 46.
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and propagated the tenets of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism among 
Russian Muslims.103
Under the impact of the reconciliation developed in Tatar 
modernism between Islam and the dictates of "progress", Akçura rejected 
all reform initiatives excluding religious institutions, particularly 
madrases. This attitude radically changed during the Kemalist period.
Cultural Turkism limited to the areas of language and history was 
instrumental in Akçura's appropriation of Turkism.104 His interest in 
the way the old Turkish traditions (töre) articulated with Şeriat was 
inspired by the works of cultural Turkists. Akçura put forward the idea 
that history have been evolving along the lines of nationalism and 
democracy. Given this irresistible march of history, his task was to unite 
Turkish history with the great movements of the universal history. The 
universalisation of history through its nationalisation was a striking 
paradox and would be adopted by the Kemalist history thesis. In the 
deterministic evolution of history, Islam was no different from other 
actualities and to adapt itself by becoming secularised.105
Unlike Gökalp who sought the origins of Turkism in the Oriental 
studies of Turcology,106 Akçura did not accept the diffusionist thesis. 
Instead he saw Turkism in its "pan" form and attested its origin to the 
socio-economic changes in the areas inhabited by Turks, a result of which
103Francois Georgeqn, Türk M illiyetçiliğinin Kökenleri-Yusuf 
Akçura (1876-1935) (The Origins of Turkish Nationalism-Yusuf Akçura, 
1876-1935), trans. (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986), 16.
104Yusuf Akçura, Türk Yılı 1928 (Turkish Yearbook 1928) (Istanbul: 
Yeni Matbaa, 1928), 396.
105Georgeon, Yusuf Akçura, 66.
106Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları (The Principles of Turkism) 
(Istanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1990), 1-11.
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was the emergence of nationalism. According to Akçura, the emergence 
of bourgeoisie aspiring to protect the national markets against the 
European domination ended up with the rise of nationalist bourgeoisie. 
This was especially so in the case of Tatar bourgeoisie.107 As to the 
Ottoman Empire, the breakdown of Ottoman economy and its 
transformation into an open market for European goods put the 
Levantines in a privileged position, which in turn strengthened the 
nationalist sentiment.
Akçura was of the opinion that Turkishness emerged as an 
ethnopolitical concept must correspond to a new conception of history 
Ottoman imperial-religious vision of history must be replaced by a 
national perspective. The geography of this history would consist of 
Central Asia, North European plains, Caucusia, and Anatolian and 
Balkan peninsulas. He offered a new périodisation of Turkish history, 
which was thoroughly secular: 1) Old Era: Ancient Turkish civilisations 
until Mongol invasion; 2) Middle Era: The unification of Turkish peoples 
under the rule of Jenghiz Khan and his successors. 3) New Era: The sates 
emerged after the dissolution of Jenghiz Empire. 4) Modern Era: The 
historical awakening of Turks in the modern era. The turning point in 
this périodisation was not the acceptance of Islam by Turkish peoples but 
the rise of Jenghiz Khan in history. This was because Akçura accepted 
Leon Cahun's view that Jenghiz Khan had the "national" mission of 
unifying all Turkish and Mongol peoples.108 Ottoman imperial vision 
was totally neglected in Akçura's sketch of Turkish history. Turkism 
preceded both Islam and Ottoman dynasty in his thinking.
107Georgeon, Yusuf Akçura, 67. Akçura categorically emphasises
socio-economic instead of politico-religious factors in his speculations.
108Ibid., 68-70.
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The social Darwinist thesis of "struggle for life" was key to the 
A kkra's history and he considered the opposition of Russian Turks to 
Russification and the revolts of Ottoman minorities as the manifestation 
of this inner urge for survival, which was a natural law like the law of 
gravitation. The theme of "power and progress" was a corollary of social 
Darwinism. In this regard, nationalism was the political system which 
could provide Turks with the power to resist against European hegemony 
and therefore the prevailing force in inter-human relations was not and 
must not be ethical considerations but sheer power.109
Akgura adopts the conception of "existing" (actual) nation (millet-i 
vaki) rather than that of "voluntary" nation (millet-i iradi). His nation 
was not a planned but an actual one. Taking the actual state of affairs as 
the point of departure he defines nation as follows: "People inhabiting a 
country and forming a society, which united in their origin, language, 
body structure, feelings, interests and the common laws they are 
subject."110
Akgura is the real pioneer of the idea of Pan-Turkism,111 a political 
movement aiming at uniting Turkish peoples of Russia and China under
109Ibid., 31-32.
110Yusuf Akçura, Muasır Avrupa'da Siyasi ve İçtimai Fikir 
Cereyanları (Political and Social Currents of Ideas in contemporary 
Europe) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1926); quoted by Hilmi Ziya Ülken, 
Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (The History of Modern Thought in 
Turkey) vol.2 (İstanbul: Selçuk Yayınları, 1966), 648.
m Although he was an ardent supporter of pan-Turkism, Akçura 
never turned to Turanism like other immigrant nationalist thinkers 
from Russia. He approached Turanism, the political movement 
advocating the unity of Ural-Altay and Finnish-Magyar peoples 
developed in Hungary as a reaction to Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism 
not from an ethnic viewpoint but from a political perspective suggesting 
the formation of the alliance of Turks and Magyars vis a vis the Pan- 
Slavist threat. His approach was rational rather than being emotional.
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Ottoman umbrella. According to this political scheme, the Ottoman 
Empire would assume the role Japan performed in the realm of "yellow 
race" and hence would rule the Turkish world. The adoption of Pan- 
Turkism in the Ottoman Empire as an official policy however, would 
lead to a series of land and population losses. These losses could be 
compensated for, according to Akçura, through assimilation of some 
ethnic groups which did not experience a national revival such as Kurds, 
Lazes, Circassians, etc., into Turkishness.112 Later he gave up his 
suggestion of assimilation and put forward that the era of assimilation 
has passed and thus Turkification is a vain effort.113 Instead, Akçura 
insistently supported the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a 
political federation of nationalities. He wrote in 1914: "It is one of 
essential ideas of Turkish nationalism not to attempt to hinder the 
natural evolution of those ethnic groups which could form a nationality 
provided that this is not contrary to the unity of the Ottoman Empire."114
See Georgeon, Yusuf Akçura, 45. Among the champions of Turanist 
vision were Ziya Gökalp, Tekin Alp, Ömer Seyfeddin and Hüseyinzade 
Ali. After Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset appeared in the newspaper Türk in 1904, 
Hüseyinzade wrote a letter to Akçura revealing his ideas upon the article 
and expressed his Turanist feelings in poetic fashion, some couplets of 
which were as follows:
"Sizlersiniz ey kavm-i Macar bizlere ihvan 
Ecdadımızın müştereken menşei Turan...
Bir dindeyiz biz hepimiz hakperestân 
Mümkün mü ayırsın bizi İncil ile Kuran?
Cengizleri titretti şu afâkı serâser,
Timurları hükmetti şehenşahlara yekser
Fatihlerine geçti bütün kişve-i Kayser." See Yusuf Akçura, 
Türkçülük (Turkism) (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını, 1978), 183.
112Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Ways of Policy) (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayını, 1987), 28.
113Yusuf Akçura, "îttihad-ı Anasır Meselesi" (The Question of the
Unification of Elements), Sırat-ı Müstakim, 5:121(January 1911), 280-83; 
cited by Georgeon, Yusuf Akçura, 44.
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He believed that the centrifugal tendencies of ethnic minorities could be 
neutralised and Ottoman unity be preserved only through an ethno­
political decentralisation.
This stance was the axis of his ideological opposition to the CUP's 
official policy of Ottomanism. Following the Balkan Wars however, the 
CUP increased its ties with Turkist circles around the journal of Türk 
Yurdu and the association of Türk Ocakları, founded in 1913 and adopted 
the Turkist thesis of "national economy" and a reformed Islam in the 
service of Turkishness. After this rapprochement , Akçura relieved its 
opposition to the CUP but did not become a member of it despite 
persistent invitations from the CUP. That is why unlike Ziya Gökalp, 
who was the member of the CUP's Central Committee, Kemalists would 
embrace him without hesitation .14 15
After the Bolshevik revolution, Akçura left the Pan-Turkist ideals 
and narrowed down the borders of his nationalism by making a 
differentiation between democratic and imperialist Turkism and focusing 
on Ottoman Turks.116
In the Kemalist period, Akçura’s theses regarding the importance of 
Central Asian Turkish history, the nature of Turkish nationalism and 
secular conception of history inspired Mustafa Kemal's reform efforts. In 
1931, he was appointed as the head of the Association of the Study of 
Turkish History (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti). He lent full support to
114"1329 Türk Dünyası" (1329 Turkish World), Türk Yurdu, 
6:5(1914), 2168; cited by Georgeon, ibid., 45.
115Ibid., 55-57.
116 See Yusuf Akçura, "Cihan Harbine İştirakimiz ve İstikbalimiz" 
(Our Participation to the World War and Our Future), Siyaset ve İktisat 
Hakkında Birkaç Hitabe ve Makale, 16 Eylül 1335-23 Nisan 1340 (İstanbul, 
1924), 15-18; Georgeon, 107.*
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the Mustafa Kemal’s thesis of Turkish history.117 In the final analysis 
however, Kemalist revolution did not exactly correspond to the Akçura's 
longing because he thought that the development of Turkish culture and 
language were bound to the strengthening of Turkish economy, which 
required in the first place a land reform. This was not possible for Mustafa 
Kemal because he relied on the political support of landlords and 
therefore did not dare such a reform. Akçura's nationalism had a clear, 
non-Marxian socialistic tendencies.118
2.4. 2 Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset
The innovative side of his nationalist manifesto Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset 
was the classification it developed for the first time by identifying "three 
ways of politics" in the Ottoman Empire to follow: Ottomanism, the 
purpose of which was to build an Ottoman nation; Islamism, aiming at a 
state based on Islam; and Turkism, aiming to create a Turkish nation 
based on race.
Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset is a utilitarian text discussing the merits and 
demerits of these three political programme, by using the criteria of 
usefulness and applicability as reflected in the political vocabulary he 
used: interest, profit, danger, loss, damage, eases, difficulties, etc. Dwelling 
upon the advantages and disadvantages of each policy, he speculates on 
which way is most feasible and therefore advisable to follow.
117Kuran, "Yusuf Akçura'nın Tarihçiliği," 49.
118Samet Ağaoğlu, Babamın Arkadaşları (Friends of My Father) 
(Istanbul, 1969), 69. Akçura's socialistic leanings and conception of
history are the main reasons of his neglect by the intellectuals of present- 
day Turkist movement. See Kuran , "Yusuf Akçura'nın Tarihçiliği," 48- 
49.
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According to Ak$ura, starting during the reign of Mahmud II, 
Ottomanism was a kind of liberal nationalism formed around the 
concept of common fatherland aiming to prevent the dissolution of the 
empire and protect its political boundaries. Yet it could not cope with the 
racist understanding of nationalism which became dominant in Europe 
in the wake of 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war while admitting that 
Ottomanism is a useful policy. Nevertheless the author sees its 
realisation as impossible due to the following reasons: Protection of the 
boundaries is not an adequate goal: the formation of an Ottoman nation 
would cause the assimilation of ethnic Turks. Besides, the Ottoman 
ethno-religious communities would not be full of will to integrate with 
one another. Russia because of sectarian reasons and a part of Europe due 
to religious causes would oppose such a policy. The concluding remark is: 
"In my opinion, to struggle for the creation of an Ottoman nation is a 
useless wariness."119
As to Islamism, the author considers it as a great project. Like 
Ottomanism, this project too is of European origin according to him. 
Gaining strength especially in social life, education, foreign policy during 
the reign of Abdulhamid II, the drawbacks of Islamism are as follows: the 
abolition of Muslim-non-Muslim equality could arouse enmities among 
Ottoman subjects, and increase even among Turks themselves religious 
quarrels. Other big Muslim states may want to prevent this policy.120 Yet, 
this policy would provide for a centre of Muslim unity around the 
Ottoman Caliphate. Besides, the unity of religion and state in Islam, the 
consideration of Qur'an in the Muslim world as the fundamental law, 
the use of Arabic both in religious and scientific language were factors
119Akgura, Ug Tarz-i Siyaset , 31.
120Ibid., 21-23.
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enhancing the implementation of Islamist policy. However, the fact that 
all this requires a long time to be realised, Akçura denies priority to the 
Islamic school of politics.121'
The last part of the treatise deals with Turkism or as Akçura puts it 
Tevhid-i Etrak (the unity of Turks) or Türk Milliyet-i Siyasiyesi (Turkish 
political nationality). According to this school of politics, the inculcation 
of national consciousness to Turks and Turkified peoples would be 
finalised through the political unity of all Turks all over the world.122
Akçura suggests a political Turkish nationalism based on irk. The 
word irk is Arabic and means origin. Today in common usage it expresses 
the purity of blood and descent. With the preference of the word irk 
instead of kavim or cins, which were used to differentiate ethnic 
elements from each other in the Ottoman millet system, Akçura tried to 
define an ethnic totality of .Turks without resort to the definitive value 
Islam held for it. Thus, while cins or kavim defined Turks within the 
unity of Islamic ümmet, the word irk referred to an independent 
existence. In this sense, his irk corresponded more to the word ethnos 
(budun or uruk in ancient Turkish) referring human collectivities united 
in ethnic descent, language and cultural heritage independent of political 
conditions they live in123 than to the word race which expressed human 
collectivities with the same physical features. This usage shows that 
Akçura's nationalism is purely secular. In fact, one of the striking 
features of Akçura's argumentation was that it did not justify its thesis on 
the ground of Şeriat. Rather, it preferred secular-rational reasoning.
121Ibid., 31-33.
122Ibid., 23.
123Şemseddin Sami, Kamus-ı Türkî, vol. 3 (Istanbul, Tercüman 
Yayınları, 1986). See also Kuran, "Yusuf Akçura’nın Tarihçiliği," 47.
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Unlike Turkists like Ziya Gokalp and Ahmed Agayef who resorted 
to the Islamic justification of nationalism, Akgura was of the opinion 
that Islam has to accept nationalism and internalise i t , because this was 
an historical necessity. The same has happened to Christianity and Islam 
was no exception. Moreover, Islam should enter into the service of 
"irks."124 Pan-Turkism should make use of the ties of unity and solidarity 
provided by the Islamic brotherhood. In this way nationalism would 
revive Muslim peoples facing European imperialism. 125
The author concludes his speculations on "three ways of policy" as 
follows:
The creation of Ottoman nation which embraces some benefits is 
impossible. The policies inclined to Muslim or Turkish unity have 
the same advantages and disadvantages for the Ottoman state. This 
is so in terms of their practical applicability as well. In such a 
situation, which policies among from Islamism and Turkism 
should be carried out?126
The treatise ends up with this unanswered question. From a general 
reading of the article and the author's later preoccupation with Turkism 
however, we can safely conclude that Akgura's preference is Turkism.
In the same newspaper Ali Kemal and Ahmet Ferit rejoined the 
ideas suggested by Akgura. In the article carrying the title of "Mektup", 
Ahmet Ferit criticised the view that Ottomanism is bound to fail while 
Islamism and Turkism based on race, though both have various 
drawbacks, could be tried. According to Ferit, because Ottomanism would 
perform a unifying function though limited, it would be a real mistake to
124Akçura, Üç Tarz-i Siyaset, 30. "Freedom of the conscious is 
taking the place of the unity of religion in societies. Religions (...) turn 
into a personal relationship between God and man Therefore, religions 
could keep their social and political importance only through uniting 
with and being helper, even server, of races (irks)." Ibid., 34.
125Gtorgeon, Yusuf Akçura, 42-43.
126Ibid., 35-36.
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follow a different policy other than that. This view has been shared by 
most of the Ottoman intellectuals on the ground that the idea of Turkish 
nationalism was too radical and provocative for other nationalisms 
which would enhance the dissolution of the empire.
The opponents of Ab.dulhamid II advocated the view that if the 
representation of Ottoman subjects was secured, the problem of politico- 
social integration could be resolved. When the constitutional 
government re-established in 1908 and the national assembly was 
reopened, the idea of Ottomanism gained a new vitality for a very short 
time around the ideals of equality, liberty and fraternity. In reality, 
however, non-Muslim groups used the parliamentary ground for their 
ethnonationalisms.
The failure of Ottomanism to preempt and then to prevent non- 
Muslim nationalisms provoked Turkish nationalism. Although in the 
beginning, the programme of the Society of Union and Progress provided 
for Ottomanism, following the Japanese victory of 1904 over a presumed 
European power, Tsarist Russia, which destructed the widely held 
pseudo-scientific racist myth relegating the Asian communities to the 
bottom ladder of humanity, the Unionists (İttihatçılar) made their 
ideological choice decisively on behalf of ethnic Turkish nationalism.127 
With the loss of Balkan wars (1912-1913), which ended up with the 
secession of all non-Muslim communities of the Empire, the Young Turk 
government adopted policy of Turkism officially under the impact of his 
nationalist ideologue, Ziya Gökalp. Although Ottomanism appealed to 
the Muslim groups of the Empire, later nationalism triumphed over 
them too and first Albanians (1911), then Arabs (1916) seceded. During the
127Ahmet Riza, a leading figure of the unionists, was already 
insistingly using the term Turk instead of Osmanli
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First World War, the ideal of Ottomanism was totally given up and 
Turkish nationalism took the upper hand together with the limited and 
pragmatic use of Islamism.128
128For the more detailed account of the evolution of the policy of 
Ottomanism, see Hanioğlu, "Osmanlıcılık," 1391-1393.
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CHAPTER III
COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS (CUP) AND "ÜÇ
TARZ-I SİY A SE T '
3 .1 .  U nfolding of CU P's Ideological Trio
3.1.1. Introduction
The dissolution of the traditional m illet system during the 
nineteenth century created a perpetual political crisis, perceived by the 
Ottoman ruling class as the question of securing the "immortality of the 
state." For centuries, the key underlying Ottoman socio-political system 
had been the understanding of the so-called "paternal state" (baba devlet). 
The emergence of ethnic-based decentralising movements accompanied 
by the absence of a supranational political identity produced different 
ideological postures. All of these postures, however, dwelt upon the same 
question which reflected the main concern of traditional Ottoman 
statecraft considering state building as the most creative political activity: 
how to save the state?
This crisis of the immortality of the state was the starting drive for 
the first organised opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire, the 
Young Ottomans and later Young Turks as well as the ruling political 
cadres. It was this question which might explain, to an important extent, 
why Ottoman reformist intellectuals including those studied in Europe 
did not embrace ideologies like ethnic nationalism or Marxism, despite 
the fact that they had found the opportunity to develop close ties with the
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intellectual circles involved in those ideologies. Particularly, the Young 
Turks abroad had direct personal contacts with the "vanguard elites" of 
both revolutionary Marxism and minority secessionist groups. But 
unlike patriotism and non-ethnic political nationalism, these ideological 
positions were not fitting to the communal collectivism of the Ottoman 
socio-economic fabric, which was the framing background of the Young 
Turks in their receptions from the Western "collections of ideologies" .1
In this context, we can mention only two founding principles 
which accounts for the theoretical poverty of the Young Turk's political 
programme. One is the collectivism absorbing any kind of individuality 
and the other is political centralism prescribing the control over the 
whole polity in political- terms.2 Since there was no tradition of 
philosophical speculation in the Ottoman Empire, as Mardin aptly 
observed, the Young Turks had no interest in theoretical speculation. The 
beginning and end of their whole concern and purpose was to "save" the 
state.3 Everything has to be evaluated from the point of view of the "high 
interests of the state" Instead of neatly woven theoretical speculations, 
short-run and pragmatic prescriptions had always precedence. They had a 
"magical" solution for salvation: the replacement of the oppressive rule 
of the Abdulhamit II with the enlightened despotism —of course, this is 
unspelled— of constitutional monarchy. In this regard, their programme 
of action was more ideological than utopian in the Mannheimian
îŞerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (The 
Political Ideas of Young Turks, 1895-1908) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1983), 307-308.
2Feroz Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914 (Union and Progress 
1908-1914) trans. ( Istanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1971), 233.
3Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 14-15.
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sense.4Therefore the Young Turk's thought was conservative rather than 
change-oriented. Only Abdullah Cevdet, a radically westernist Young 
Turk, objected to this position and pointed to the fact that they had to 
elaborate a programme of action instead of constantly repeating the need 
to remove the sultan and confining their efforts to that "negative" aim.5
A short review of the Young Turk movement may reveal the 
evolution of their thoughts and programme the cornerstones of which 
were social Darwinism (popular elitism), political centralism, 
instrumental use of Islam and Turkish nationalism.6 All this centred 
around one purpose connoting the famous motto of Italian fascism: 
"Everything for the state; nothing against the state; nothing outside the 
state".7
3.1.2. Evolution of the Young Turks' Ideological Posture (1876-1908) 
The Hamidian period (1876-1909) was a period of severe political 
censorship.8 Political oppression went hand in hand with modernisation
4Mannheim calls the works aiming at preserving the status of 
those who hold key positions in social stratification and hence, the 
existing status quo providing for such a stratification, ideology. He calls 
the theories instrumental for those who do not hold these key positions 
but want to capture those strategic positions in society, utopia. See Karl 
Mannheim , Ideology and Utopia (London, 1960).
5Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 304.
6See Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (Ottoman Society of Union and Profress 
as a Political Organisation and Young Turkism) (Istanbuhîletişim 
Yayınlan, 1986), 613-619.
7George H. Sabine&Thomas L. Thorson, A History o f Political 
Theory , 4th ed. (Tokyo: Dryden Press, 1981), 818.
8This censorship was particularly directed to the press. The 
following anecdote may give a clue about its extent. A French journalist 
working in Istanbul finally goes to the censor director Rifat Bey upon
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efforts in education system and bureaucracy. Islamism, or the unity of 
world Muslims, emerged as the new political base for the sultan, side by 
side with official policy of- Ottomanism. The sultan was successful in 
slowing down the dissolution of the Empire. During this period, 
Turkism entered into the Ottoman intellectual agenda although in 
cultural terms. The works of orientalists in Turkish history and 
language9 were the main source of inspiration in the discussions of 
cultural Turkism. The language and history discussions soon turned into 
an outlet for political partiality formed around the question of "right 
identity" The identities of "Turk", "Muslim" and "Ottoman" had already
continuos censorship of his articles. Rifat Bey replies to the French 
journalist's question "what would we talk about?" as "We can talk about 
whatever subject you want!"
"On every subject?"
"Yes. On every subject, that is, except for princess, foreign 
governments, nihilism, socialism, revolution, strikes, anarchy, liberty, 
human rights, foreign policy, home affairs, religion, churches, mosques, 
Mohammed, Jesus, Moses, prophets, irreligion, free thinking, state 
officials, woman rights, harem , motherland, nation, nationalism, 
republic, senate members, deputies, coups, bombs, Mithat Pasha, Kemal 
Bey, Sultan Murat, the crescent, the cross, Macedonia, Armenia, reforms, 
locusts, August, and subjects related to all this.
"Oh, my God, what is left?"
"What is left? Everything. Rain, good weather provided that you 
do not talk about rain or moonlight in August. As far as you do not 
suggest their annihilation, you can mention street dogs as well. Likewise, 
you may praise our excellency (Sultan Abdulhamid). In short, you may 
talk on whatever you deem appropriate." See Comte Am. de Persignac, 
"Les Gaites de la Censure en Turquie", La Revue LXVIII (April 1907), 
390; quoted by Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jön Tiirkler ve 1908 İhtilali (Young 
Turks and the 1908 Revolution) trans. (Istanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1982), 
123-124.
9The prominents of these works were Arthur Lumley Davids' 
Grammar o f  the Turkish Language (1832), Leon Cahun's th e  
Introduction al'histoire de VAsie (1896) and most important of all, the 
works of the Hungarian Turcologist Arminius Vambery(1832-1913). See 
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 340-342.
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come into existence, and the controversy was over the place of any one of 
these in the new trio of collective identity.10
Against the oppressive character of the political regime, a 
constitutionalist opposition had begun in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Although waned in the 1870s, it took a new 
momentum in the 1880s and in 1889 Society of the Union of Ottomans 
(İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti) was established by the five students of the 
Academy of Military Medicine, namely Ibrahim Temo, Ishak Sukutî, 
Abdullah Cevdet, Mehmet Reşit and Hikmet Emin.11 Among the 
founders, Temo was Albànian, Sukûtî and Cevdet Kurdish, Reşit 
Circassian and Hikmet Emin Turkish. These ethnic plurality could come 
together for the salvation of the country only around the purpose of 
removing Sultan Abdulhamid II from power.12 They had no alternative 
political model to the absolutism of Abdulhamid as well as no sincere 
respect to parliamentarism. On the contrary, under the impact of 
positivism and social Darwinism, they believed in political elitism and 
the creation of a national elite through education. Yet, because they 
inherited the opposition to the Sultan under the banner of "freedom and 
constitution" they had to pay lip service to these ideals. As stated before,
10David Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908 
(London: Frank Cass, 1977), *61-62.
n Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah 
Cevdet ve Dönemi (Dr. Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Thinker and His 
Period) (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 5.
According to Hanioğlu, the reason why such a formation was 
achieved by military medical students stemmed from the fact that these 
students were indoctrinated by patriotism, populism and biological 
materialism prescribing for the replacement of religion by science in 
order to progress. See ibid., 5-26.
12"See Abdülhamid Ölüyor! Declaration published by Comité 
Ottoman d'Union et Progress (Paris, 1906); cited by Hanioğlu, ibid., 195.
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the main concern of Young Turks was not liberty or the recommencing of 
the parliament but to stop the disintegration of the empire, i.e., the 
securing of the immortality of the state.13
According to Mardin, Young Turks were prompted by factors 
deeper than material-based i.e., structural causes. One of these factors was 
the value conflict between the ideal society they envisaged and the society 
present during the reign of Abdulhamid. Yet, this conflict was due to the 
difference between the personalist character of society (present one) and 
the mechanical, blocked, impersonal society which was brought about not 
by the ideas borrowed but by the new daily life values accompanied by 
the new institutions adopted from the West. The proto-nationalism of 
Young Turks, according to Mardin, could only emerge in an 
environment where all provincial administration was reorganised and 
new communication channels develop. Mardin lay emphasis on the 
importance of structural changes rather than the "power of ideas," for 
example, the impacts of such thinkers as Mazzini or Fichte as the main 
prompter of the Young Turk opposition.14 Unlike Mardin however, 
Hanioğlu, confesses the importance of this structural shift from 
community to society but drives our attention to the impact of the 
doctrine of biological materialism on the social imagination of the Young 
Turks, who conceived themselves as "the social doctor" and saw human 
society as a natural society subject to the same laws, and hence could be 
planned and programmed.15 A linear, static understanding of change was
13Şükrü Hanioğlu, Interview by Şahin Alpay, Milliyet , 31 July, 
1995, 18. For the motives of Young Turks opposition, see also Şükrü 
Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 401.
14See Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 17-18.
15Ahmet Rıza, one of the leading figures of Young Turks, state this 
position in a concise fashion: " Society is a corporate body subject to
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basic to this conception of society. Thus came the motto of "union and 
progress" (ittihat ve Terakki). According to August Comte, the process of 
development could be triggered only after the establishment of the order 
providing for such a process. This was to him the starting point in 
evaluating the performance of a government. In fact, progress is the 
development of order because every society is founded on the unity in 
thought of its members. Therefore, the existence of differing views 
within a society is detrimental to a coherent social union the result of 
which is social chaos. Conceiving the history of mankind as the history of 
universal intellect in constant evolution toward positive society results 
necessarily in the history of mankind as the history of one people. This 
evolution is historically determined, though Comte ascribes to human 
action a catalysing function in the process of the development of social 
facts the certitude of which is the same with that of natural facts. 16
The name of Society of the Union of Ottomans (Ittihad-i Osmani 
Cemiyeti) was changed into the Ottoman Society of Union and Progress 
(Osmanlı ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in 1895 after the correspondences
natural laws. This body has some circular illnesses. In order to diagnose 
the illness, we have patient spoken, and make known the problems, 
needs, and state of health of people to the doctors of nation. Without 
knowing poison, one cannot find antidote...," cited by Hanioğlu, Osmanlı 
İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük 604.
16See Raymond Aron, Sosyolojik Düşüncenin Evreleri (The Stages 
of Sociological Thought) trans. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları, 1986), 77-140. The tolerance of positivism towards religion 
because it considered human progress as the sum total of various peoples 
and beliefs, and hence its rejection of discriminatory appellations of the 
eastern countries including the Ottoman Empire by the industrialised 
western imperialist powers , its authoritarian political elitism despite its 
rhetoric of "progressive people" and its universalism disliking all sorts 
of local movements including ethno-national ones were decisive in the 
embracing of positivism by the leading members of the Society of Union 
and Progress, e.g., Ahmet Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet. See Mardin, Jön 
Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 183-185 and 218-219.
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between the Istanbul centre and the Paris branch headed by Ahmed Rıza. 
After arriving in Paris (1889), Ahmet Rıza joined the lessons of Pierre 
Lafitte, the head of French positivists and adhered to positivism. The 
motto of positivism was "order and progress" (intizam ve terakki). Under 
the inculcation of Ahmet Rıza, this motto was partly adopted and 
"progress" (terakki) was united with "union" (ittihad). The neglect of 
"order" referred to the refusal of revolutionary means in the road to 
political power while the adoption of "union" referred to the policy of 
Ottomanism (ittihad-ı anasır).17 From their insistence on "union", one 
can easily draw the conclusion that the main purpose in the 
establishment of the Society of the Union and Progress (CUP) was the 
prevention of the dissolution of the Empire rather than preserving 
"liberty".18
17Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki (Young Turks and 
Union and Progress) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987), 23-24. The journal 
Meşveret together with the positivist periodical Order and Progress was 
issued in French by Ahmet Rıza in Paris, beginning from 1895. It used 
positivist calendar and ignored the lunar one altogether. The positivist 
motto appeared in Meşveret dated 27 Frederick 107 was as follows: "Our 
motto is order and progress, we are horrified by the privileges obtained 
through violence." The starting year of the positivist calendar was 1 
January 1789. See Ramsaur, Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali, 40.
18Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 74. In the political 
programme of the Society of Union and Progress, the connection between 
"Union" and "Progress" are explained as follows: "Union and progress 
are the necessary corollaries of each other. If we want to progress, we 
should unite; if we unite, we can progress. Not to side with union and 
progress is not to love the country. Union and progress is that state of 
affairs described in the first article of our fundamental law, which is the 
spirit of the state." See "İttihat ve Terakkinin Siyasî Programı" (The 
Political Programme of the Union and Progress), Şura-yı Ümmet 
140(1324), 2-3; cited by Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler , 
1859-1952 (Political Parties in Turkey, 1859-1952) (Istanbul, 1952), 175, 
footnote 2.
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The opposition period of the Young Turk movement (1889-1908) is 
particularly important in that the ideological matrix which dominated 
the CUP's years in power (1908-1918) and the early period of the Republic 
was crystallised in this period. Political elitism which treated people as 
ineligible for governance and hence justifying the rule of a vanguard 
party and substitution of the role of religion in society with science were 
reminiscent of this ideological crystallisation.
With the aim of forming a common opposition front, all 
opponents of the Abdulhamid regime including representatives of such 
ethnic groups as Armenians, Albanians, Arabs, Greeks and Kurds held a 
congress in Paris in 1902. All the leading figures of the Young Turk 
movements were present: Ahmet Rıza, Prince Sabahattin, Ismail Kemal, 
Ibrahim Temo, and so on. The question of foreign intervention divided 
the participants into two groups: the first group, which was in majority, 
advocated the foreign intervention, if necessary, in order to bring back the 
constitutional regime. The second group, which was in minority, strongly 
opposed to the idea of intervention.19 The common point of allegiance 
was the support given to the ideal of Ottomanism expressed as follows: 
"We aim to bring about a unity among various peoples of the Empire 
which would secure the equal application of rights and duties guaranteed 
by the imperial decrees and interstate treaties. Through this unity, all 
peoples would participate in the rule of the country, assume equal rights 
and duties. Feeling of allegiance to the Ottoman dynasty, the unique 
common denominator of this unity, would be aroused."20
The Congress was held with the purpose of arriving a common 
"libertarian" platform, but* the conclusion was the division into two
19Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 44-46.
20 Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 44.
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opposing groups. The first group, which advocated the in te r v e n t io n  
th esis, was led by Prince Sabahattin. According to the proponents of this 
thesis, in order to dethrone Sultan Abdulhamid , if need be, the help of 
the great European powers should be searched out. Sabahattin was 
influenced by the French sociologist Le Play and Edmond Demolins from 
Le Play school of sociological thought. Taking the Anglo-Saxon model of 
progress as a universally applicable route of modernisation, Sabahattin 
did not limit the "question" with the re-establishment of a constitutional 
regime. According to him, Hamidian despotism was just a reflection of 
conditions prevailing in the society at large. In order to eradicate 
despotism, measures ensuring administrative decentralisation at the 
political level and individual initiative at the personal level had to be 
taken. Needles to say, the view of administrative decentralisation was 
welcomed by ethnic minorities and received their support. In a 
conjuncture where wave of ethnic separatism was powerful, Sabahattin 
saw administrative decentralisation as a check against secessions though 
this approach might embody just the opposite option.21 The followers of 
the Prince founded the Society for Individual Initiative and 
Decentralisation (Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti) in 
1906. The internal division in the Young Turk movement was thus 
ossified.
The second group, which was opposing the foreign intervention 
thesis, was led by Ahmet Rıza.22 Although they remained in minority in
21For Prince Sabahattin's views see Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiye'de
Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (History of Modern Thought in Turkey), vol. 2 
(İstanbul: Selçuk Yayınları, 1966), 544-560; and Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah 
Cevdet ve Dönemi, 201.
22For Ahmet Rıza, see Ramsaur, Jön Türkler ve 1908 İh t i la l i , 39-
40; and Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 31-33.
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the Congress, in fact they acted as if their views were in ascendancy 
because they had the "power of majority" in terms of their sphere of 
influence. This group was an extension of the Society of Union and 
Progress. The group had a firm belief in political centralisation. Its 
ultimate goal was to transform the Empire into a nation-state based on 
Turkish ethnie.23 This could be possible only through the suppression of 
anti-central, local forces, which had an ethnic character at the same time. 
The means for this aim were technological improvements and education. 
In the absence of technological capability, which was the case in the 
Empire, the means at hand was ideology, as seen in 1917 Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia. Pan-Islamism was such an ideology used by 
Abdulhamid II. Ahmet Rıza and his friends would try to do the same 
through an enthusiastic Turkish in guise of Ottoman nationalism.24 This 
adherence to Ottoman nationalism, at least in rhetoric, continued until 
the Balkan wars. The programme published in the first issue of their new 
daily, Şura-yı Ümmet, openly emphasised to elevate Ottomans to the 
level of contemporary civilised nations and preserve the rule of the 
Ottoman dynasty which was necessary for the integrity of the country.25
23Anthony D. Smith prefers using the French word ethnie in the 
sense of ethnic community to the loose and ambiguous term "people" 
and its derivatives. According to Smith, the word ethnie "unites an 
emphasis upon cultural differences with the sense of an historical 
community. It is this sense of history and the perception of cultural 
uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each 
other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both 
in their own eyes and in those of outsiders." See Anthony D. Smith, The 
Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 21-22.
24Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 200.
25Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 186-7; and Akşin, Jön  
Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 55.
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In the meantime, two important events deeply influenced the 
Young Turks and the Ottoman public opinion. These were the Russian- 
Japanese war (1904) and the promulgation of constitutional monarchy in 
Russia (1905). The Japanese victory over Russian armies aroused great 
interest in the Ottoman and Asian public opinions. In the first place, it 
was an Asian country which defeated a European power. This was 
enough to destroy the European myth produced by the orientalist image 
of the East that the fate of non-Europeans was to be colonised by 
Europeans. The Japanese victory proved that the non-Aryan, non- 
European peoples too are capable of progress while keeping their 
traditional values, which reassured collective self-confidence of the non- 
European peoples. The confirmation of the idea that change and 
continuity could go hand in hand26 created a great interest towards Japan 
and it was considered as a model state to be imitated in the road to 
modernisation by Asian countries including the Ottoman Empire.27
The Russian defeat resulted in the transition to the constitutional 
regime in Russia in 30 October, 1905. No absolutist state remained in 
Europe. In Iran too constitutional regime was declared in 5 August, 1906. 
Japan already had a constitutional regime. These two developments 
greatly strengthened the national self-confidence of the Young Turks and 
gave them sufficient energy to fuel their efforts for a national Turkish 
state.
Under the impact of the Russian revolution of 1905 and transition 
to constitutional monarchy in Iran (1906), new opposition formations
26This was expressed by Tanpmar as "Temadi ederek değişmek, 
değişirken temadi etmek." See Ahmet Hamdi Tanpmar, 19. Asır Türk
Edebiyatı Tarihi (İstanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1988).
27Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 51-52.
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crystallised in Rumelia, the European part of the Ottoman Empire. A new 
society called Ottoman Freedom Society (Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti) was 
formed in Salonica with the participation of both civil and military 
figures in 1906. These peoples were young, belonged to the ruling class, 
educated and bourgeois-minded.28 They were all Turk and full of 
national spirit. Organised along the Masonic ways, the society quickly 
spread among the second and third armies of the Empire. Such leading 
military figures as ismet (I'nönü) and Kazım (Karabekir) were among 
members.
In 1907, the Society of Progress and Union joined the Ottoman 
Freedom Society after the resistance of Ahmet Rıza against the use of 
violence as a legitimate means was broken down.29 Ahmed Rıza was a 
sincere positivist. According to the positivist teaching, progress and 
development occur within an historically determined organic balance. 
The use of all kinds of violent means could disturb that balance. 
Therefore, revolutionary uprisings were not among legitimate means in 
order to assume political power.30 Thus, Rıza made a concession from his 
positivist creed by accepting the use of violence as a legitimate means.
This fusion turned the new Society of Progress and Union(SPU) 
into a nationalist-revolutionary society and renewed it both in terms of 
cadre and ideology in a radical way. In the process, the Turkish character 
of SPU would become increasingly manifest vis a vis its Islamist and
28Akşin, ibid., 60-61 and 78-80.
29 Ramsaur, Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali, 140-143. The new society 
continued to publish Şura-yı Ümmet (in Turkish) and M eşveret (in 
French).
30Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 200-201.
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Ottomans faces, and it took the name of Society of Union and Progress 
once again.
The decisions taken in the second Young Turk Congress (1907) in 
Paris were in line with the new orientation of the society. The Congress 
was widely participated by two factions of the Young Turks and some 
Armenian revolutionary groups. The only concrete result of the Congress 
was the decision to topple the Ottoman government by use of every 
means, if necessary through violence and within the possible shortest 
time.31 The Congress achieved a superficial unity among Young Turk 
factions and minority nationalist groups. It showed that the intellectuals 
like Ahmed Riza, who was against revolutionary means, was no longer 
influential in the society. Instead people with revolutionary inclinations, 
like Bahattin §akir and Dr. Nazim, had the upperhand.32
An important point to be noted while studying the process of the 
formation of the Society of Union and Progress is that there was no 
ideological continuation between it and the Society of Ottoman Union 
(Ittihad-i Osmaniye Cemiyeti) which took the name of Ottoman Society 
of Union and Progress in 1895. This ideological rupture became manifest 
especially after 1906. The Society of Ottoman Union was a student 
organisation influenced from biological materialism and the idea of 
patriotism while the new Society of Union and Progress was totally a
31Ramsaur, Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali, 144-146.
32îbrahim Temo, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Teşekkülü ve 
Hidemat-ı Vataniye ve İnkılab-ı Milliye Dair Hatıratım (My Memoirs 
About the Formation of the Society of Union and Progress, Patriotic 
Services and the National Revolution) (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987) 
(First edition, 1939), 171-72; and Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve 
Dönemi, 58-59.
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political organisation lacking a philosophical dimension.33 This can be 
seen in its treatment of the first founders of the movement.34
Following the 1908 revolution, the end result of which was the 
reproclamation of 1876 constitution, every ethnic group organised along 
"clubs" and published their political programmes openly. In this 
conjunction, the Society of the Union and Progress emerged as the sole 
party of "Turks" due to the failure of other parties, basically the Ahrar 
(Liberal) Party  representing the views of Prince Sabahattin, in 
parliamentary elections of 1908. The CUP presented itself as the saver of 
the country (müncî-i vataij.) and hence accused its opponents with 
treason. Patriotism, the idea of progress and constitution were as if under 
its monopoly It has emerged as a"holy society" It was conservative, 
liberal, radical, democrat, socialist, in short, everything.35
3. 1.3. CUP’s Congresses and Its Political Programme 
We can best follow the unfolding of the ideological position of the 
CUP through its programmes declared in its successive Congresses. 
Tunaya, in his memorial work Political Parties in Turkey (Tiirkiye'de 
Siyasi Partiler), observes that the evolution of the society took place over
33Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 26-27.
34The number one founder of the Society of Ottoman Union, 
Ibrahim Temo describes his disappointment when SUP came into power 
as follows: (Temo congratulates the leading figures of the SUP in a 
friendly talk including Cemal Pasha and Mithat Şükrü): "While I was 
talking about the achievement of our society with enthusiasm, Cemal 
Bey asked me: Mr. Doctor, which society are you talking about? Our 
society is not your society you worked for abroad. This society is the 
product of Manastır and Salónica." See Ibrahim Temo, Hatıratım, 185.
35Şerif Pasha, Bir Muhalifin Hatıraları: İttihat ve Terakkiye 
Muhalefet (The Memoirs of an Opponent: Opposition to the Union and 
Progress)(Istanbul: Nehir Yayınlan, 1990), 23 and 30.
137
three lines: 1) Transition from an illegal society to a state of political party. 
2) Preference of a one-party system instead of multiparty politics. 3) The 
transformation of the Ottomanist doctrine and programme based on the 
policy of ittihad-i anasir (union of ethnies) into a nationalist-Turkist and 
secular character, particularly after 1327 (the Congress of 1911). These 
main lines became increasingly more apparent from that time onwards.36
The first political programme of the CUP was published in §ura-yt 
Ùmmet in 6 October, 1908. The programme emphasised that the official 
language would remain as Turkish and that all official correspondence 
would be done in Turkish (Art. 7). It confirmed the equality of Muslims 
and non-Muslims in terms of both their rights and duties. Turkish would 
be compulsory in primary education and state schools would be open to 
all ethnic groups (Art. 17). The programme was severely against 
administrative decentralisation while it accepted devolution. Its aim was 
to strengthen the principle of national sovereignty and to fortify the 
national union.37
The political programme of 1908 was modified in 1909. According 
to these modifications, which are more Ottomanist in nature, in primary 
schools every ethnic minority could use their own language as the 
language of instruction but the teaching of Turkish would be 
compulsory. In secondary and high schools, Turkish would be the 
language of instruction. Local languages, however, would be thought.38
36Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler , 189.
37For the 1908 political programme of the SUP, see Hüseyin Cahit 
Yalçın, Siyasal Antlar (Political Memoirs)(Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası 
Kültür Yayınları, 1976), 50; "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Siyasi Programı
(1908)"(The Political Programme of the Union and Progress), Şura-yı 
Ümmet, 23 September 1324 (6 October 1908), cited by Tunaya, Türkiye'de 
Siyasi Partiler, 181, and Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 103-105.
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The 1911 Congress confirmed the official adherence of the CUP to 
Ottomanism and refused the religious, denominational and ethnic 
interests to supersede the general interests of Ottoman society.38 9
The 1912 Congress could not be held due to war conditions.
The 1913 Congress accepted a programme which introduced new 
measures of fiscal and administrative decentralisation.40 The programme 
provided for the use of local languages as the means of instruction in 
secondary as well as primary schools while keeping the clause of the 
teaching of Turkish as a lingua franca compulsory.41
With the loss of Balkan peninsula (Rumelia) following the Balkan 
wars (1912-13), Ottoman state turned predominantly into a Turkish-Arab 
Empire. As a matter of fact, there were serious speculations regarding the 
establishment of such an Empire.42 Yet, the most concrete result of the
38Tanin, 30 May, 1325(1909); cited in Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 211-12.
39Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 212-13. It is interesting to note that despite 
this official adherence to Ottomanism, Turkist face of the SUP began to be 
more pronounced during and after the Balkan wars. For instance, the first 
official use of the word milli (literally means national) came with the 
establishment of the Society for National Defence (Müdafaa-i Milliye 
Cem iyeti) at the start of the Balkan wars. This society aimed at the 
replacement of the old concepts of Ottomanness and Islamdom with the 
word millet (nation) though this word still did not mean "Turk" See 
Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki, 239.
40For the programme accepted in 1913 SUP Congress, see Tunaya, 
Siyasi Partiler, 217-18.
41See Masami Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği (Turkish 
Nationalism in the Young Turk Period) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1994), 78 and Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 256.
42For speculations of an Turco-Arab Empire similar to that of 
Austria-Hungary in the desperate political climate following the Balkan 
Wars see Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, 208. For Gökalp's suggestion of the 
establishment of a bi-national state (Turco-Arab State) under the 
caliphatic rule of Ottoman dynasty see Uriel Heyd, The Foundations o f  
Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings o f Ziya Gökalp (London, 
1950), 131; and Ziya Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak
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war in the official policies of the CUP was a shift toward the policy of 
Islamization in order to appease the nationalist aspirations of the Arab 
nationalists given that Muslims now were in great majority in the 
Ottoman lands. Among measures of Islamization were the appearance of 
İslam Mecmuası (Islamic Review) in 1914 and the formation of a 
reformed Islamist line supported by the establishment of state-financed 
and state-supervised madrases. These measures seems to be measures 
aiming at secularisation - through reforming Islam. But such an 
interpretation disregards the fact that these measures did not contradict 
the "orthodox" (kitabi) understanding of Islam and hence could be 
considered as measures refining the worldly dimension of de facto 
Islam.43
In 1916, after two years following the entrance of the Ottoman state 
into the general w ar, the CUP Congress was held again. At that time, the 
CUP was the only political power in the country. Its doctrine and program 
at last have revealed its real colour and shifted from Ottomanism to 
Turkism neglecting Islamism due to the ongoing Arab revolt (1916).44 
The CUP felt itself no longer bounded with Şeriat, and did not refrain 
openly from transgressing the limits introduced by it. The attachment of 
religious courts to the Ministry of Justice instead of to the office of Şeyhül
(Turkification, Islamization, Modernisation) (IstanbukTürk Kültür 
Yayım, 1977), 68-69.
43See Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği, 141-42.
44For the programme changes introduced in the 1916 Congress, see 
Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 225-26. For a detailed analysis of these new 
measures and the minutes of the Congress see İttihat ve Terakki'nin Son 
Yılları: 1910 Kongresi Zabıtları (Last Years of the Union and Progress: The 
Minutes of 1916 Congress)(Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992). This book is 
compiled from the articles published in Tanin, which was considered as 
the unofficial gazette of the SUP, dated 26 September , 1916; 7 October , 
1916; 10 October, 1916; 11 October, 1916; 12 October, 1912 and 14 October, 
1916.
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İslam was such a radical move.45 The dictatorship of the CUP against all 
indications of opposition became increasingly overt: the Islamist weekly 
Sebilürreşat, in publication since the Hamidian period was closed down 
for two years. Days and months of Roman calendar (Rumi)  was 
identified with the Gregorian calendar (Miladi), beginning from 1 March, 
1917. Failed efforts to introduce the Latin alphabet,46 the active 
participation of women to public life due to the necessities of war and 
their public appearance without veil were all indications of religious 
heedlessness in these years.
Thus far, the national self-confidence obtained after the Russo- 
Japanese war of 1904, the merger of the CUP with Ottoman Freedom 
Society, the emergence of the CUP as the sole party of Turks following the 
Second Meşrutiyet, the loss of non-Muslim minorities with the exception 
of a small number of Armenians and Greeks following the Balkan wars , 
and the CUP's 1913 Congress all contributed to the CUP's Turkist face to 
come out in the open. But, the most important development which 
caused the Turkist identity of the CUP to reveal itself was the withdrawal 
of Russia from the war due to the Bolshevik Revolution (1917). The
45Ali Fuat Türkgeldi (The Chief Private Secretary of the Sultan 
Mehmed V) in his memoirs tells us that in an unofficial meeting of the 
Council of Ministers which occurred in Çit Köşkü due to the medical 
operation made to the Sultan, Enver Pasha said to the Şeyhülislam (Chief 
Mufti) that instead of engaging in judicial matters, his office should 
confine its preoccupation to the glorification of Islam. Upon this 
consideration, the Şeyhülislam Hayri Efendi angrily responded to the 
Pasha: "This idea is all the consequence of the instigations of Turkists." 
See Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Görüp İşittiklerim, 3rd ed. ( Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Yayım, 1984), 118-119.
46When Talat Pasha- offered him to join the new Council of 
Ministers after the "resignation" of the cabinet of the grand vizier Said 
Halim Pasha as Minister of Education, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) accepted 
this offer provided that the Latin alphabet would be introduced. Of 
course, Talat Pasha could not dare that. See Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, 242.
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temporary independence of "Turkic" peoples of Russia following the 
revolution brought new and hopeful horizons for Pan-Turkist 
aspirations.47 Yet, when the Ottoman Empire had to sign the Mondros 
Armistice (30 October 1918), the Ottoman public opinion felt a great 
disappointment. The CUP leaders escaped from Turkey. A new, anti-CUP 
government was established. The post-armistice period witnessed a hunt 
of CUP members while ethnic minority groups like Kurds, Armenians 
and Arabs were after their separate state. The Empire was in a state of 
dissolution. The government formed by the members of the Party of 
Freedom and Conciliation (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi)48 was under the 
influence of English interests and saw the independence movement in 
the making in Anatolia as the extension of the CUP's reorganisation 
activities and hence vehemently opposed it. But gradually, the Anatolian 
resistance movement became the major force in Anatolia and forced the 
occupying forces to withdraw. This was a full stop for separatist 
tendencies. A nationalist era was at the threshold.
3 .2 .  T hree Foci of Identity: D iscursive vs A ctual R eality
As referred to above, the period of post-1908 Revolution exhibited 
the same problematic which dominated the last two centuries of the 
Ottoman Empire: the question of the immortality of state. All parties, 
societies, thinkers and men of politics locked their efforts and programme 
of actions to the question of "saving the state" Three ways of allegiance 
which crystallised as Ottomanism (legal-political), Islamism (religious) 
and Turkism (national) were all starting from the same question and
47 Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 304.
48For this party, see Ali Birinci, Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (The Party 
of Liberty and Reconciliation)(Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990).
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represented different claims caused by internal social dynamism and 
varying attitudes towards the western-originated formulas. Overall, both 
the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements had essentially a 
bourgeois character observed in the development of capitalist mode of 
production. Despite the lip service they paid to Ottomanism and 
Islamism, in actuality, they adhered to the cause of Turkish nationalism, 
which was essentially a bourgeois ideology but in the absence of a 
bourgeois class, represented by intellectuals and civil-military 
bureaucrats.
In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman intellectuals 
embraced three different foci of loyalty. In the words of an Ikdam (A 
Turkist daily) writer, "by religion (diyanet) we are Muslims, by social 
order (heyet-i içtimaiye) we are Ottomans, by nationality (kavmiyet) we 
are Turks".49 The overlappings and tensions between these three loyalties 
impelled the CUP to exploit the potentials provided for the maintenance 
of the integrity of state by each brand of thought based on these loyalties. 
Thus, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, expressed by Akçura as 
"Three ways of policy" emerged as the CUP's policies in varying intervals 
of the 1908-1918 period.
Ottomanism was the official policy of state since Tanzimat period 
and was opposed openly by no one. Yet, because it had just a legal- 
political character and remained deprived of an emotional, poetic and 
hence motivating dimension, its overall embracement was nominal and 
remained on paper. The CUP, from the time of its establishment as a 
secret society in Salonica, attributed importance to the idea of 
Ottomanism. Known as ittihad-i anastr (union of ethnies), Ottomanism
49"Terbiye"(Education), ikdam, 727(27 July, 1896); quoted by 
Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 25.
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aimed at preventing the separatist tendencies within the Empire. From 
the first days of the Second Constitutional period however, Greek, Bulgar, 
Armenian and even Albanian ethnic nationalisms came to the fore as 
more powerful movements. In the 1908 elections, ethnic minorities 
conducted nationalist political campaigns and issued their separate 
election platforms, a development which provoked the reaction of 
Turkish nationalist circles.50 The policy of the union of all Ottomans 
remained as the dominant official policy until the Balkan wars of 1912- 
1913. Despite all the unifying frames formulated by the CUP, ethnic 
separatist tendencies got strengthened. The Turkist character of the CUP 
asserted itself overtly for the first time during the Balkan wars and 
Ottomanism was buried into the pages of history while keeping its 
existence at legal level.
A second focus of allegiance was Islamism, which got official 
recognition during the reign of Abdulhamit II. The assuming of the title 
of the Caliphate by Abdulhamit provided a legitimate ideological ground 
for setting Islamic ties against the imperialist policies of England as a 
barrier. The alliance of the CUP leaders with Germany during the first 
general war brought the German support to the CUP's policy of pan- 
Islamism in terms of their near eastern policies. Because of secular- 
nationalist tendencies within CUP however, Islamist circles did not lend 
their full support to the CUP. The opposition within Parliament 
continuously criticised CUP as being against Şeriat. Especially after the 
takeover of the grand vizirate by Talat Pasha from Said Halim Pasha, a 
renown Islamist, in 1917, certain radical measures were legislated, some 
of which were opposed by Islamists. In fact, CUP's Islamist face can be put
50For example, see Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Millet-i Hakime" (The 
Dominant Nation), Tanin, 24 October 1324(1908); also Yalçın, Siyasal 
Anılar, 47. For the full text of the article, see Appendix B.
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into the framework of the renowned motto of its ideologue, Ziya Gökalp: 
"I belong to Turkish nation, to Western civilisation, and to Islamic 
ümmet."
The main ideological position of the CUP was Turkish 
nationalism. The Balkan wars and the enduring protection of Christian 
minorities by the "great states" (düvel-i muazzama) precipitated the overt 
expression of Turkish nationalism. The main formulation of CUP's 
nationalism was made by tlje ideologue of the party, Ziya. Gökalp. Also 
the founders of the Turkish Hearts (Türk Ocakları), and among them 
especially Yusuf Akçura was influential in the CUP's formulation of 
Turkish nationalism. The Turkist theses were developed in such 
journals as Türk Yurdu, Yeni Mecmua and Islam Mecmuası. The 
"rediscovery" of the national-self, surpassing the inferiority complex vis a 
vis the Eurocentric values and institutions, and reformulation of the 
relation between Islam and politics were the main concerns of Turkists. 
The New Life (Yeni Hayat) proposed by Ziya Gökalp was a style of life 
under the supervision of the national ideas, and was based on the Turkist 
principles that the formulated.
Young Turks and the CUP for a long time advocated Ottomanism 
complemented by Islamism. Their turn to Turkism occurred, according to 
Hanioğlu, in 1906 with the merger of the CUP with Ottoman Freedom 
Society members of which having strong nationalist tendencies. In fact, 
as Hanioğlu suggests, we can discern three different clients that the 
programme of the CUP targeted. The Ottoman polity was the first group 
of clients. The second appearance of programme targeted the Western 
public opinion. The third face was its own real programme and 
principles of actions which remained covert for a long time. The duality 
resulting from this diversification of "clients” in CUP's discourse while
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handling native and Western public opinions is quite understandable in 
that the expectations of these two sections were radically different. While 
the West demanded the establishment of a liberal regime ensuring the 
balance between various Ethno-religious communities, the native public 
opinion had nationalist aspirations. The secrecy of the CUP until 1912 
made easier the endurance of a dual discourse and the pursuance of 
policies contradicting this discourse. For example, when the CUP leaned 
towards Turkist policies, it continuously emphasised Ottomanism in its 
rhetoric.51
3. 2.1. CUP and its Ottomanist Pillar
Ottomanism, a kind of official nationalism in B. Anderson's 
term ,52 was a unique experience in the way of the formation of 
nationalisms in the Muslim world. It necessitated the secularisation of 
the state, which led to the emergence of a secular tradition inherited by 
the Turkish Republic. The understanding of nationalism as Ottomanism, 
according to Ahmet Midhat, the Ottoman writer and journalist, differed 
from all other types of nationalism because it consisted of three separate 
bonds accompanied by Islam and the Caliphate. The first bond was 
ethnicity going back to the Kayi Khan tribe, the tribe which established
51 See Hani oğlu, Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön 
Türkler, 7. Also see Hanioğlu, Interview by Şahin Alpay,Milliyet, 31 
July, 1995, 18. Akşin holds the same view that the secrecy provided SUP 
with the ability to keep a discrepancy between its official Ottomanism and 
hidden Turkism. For instance there was not any non-Turkish member in 
the central committee of the SUP See Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve 
Terakki, 156.
52Anderson defines "official nationalism as "willed merger of 
nation and dynastic empire" developed in reaction to the popular 
national movements in Europe since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on 
the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 86.
146
the Ottoman State. Turkism including Turks living in Anatolia before 
the Ottomans was the second. The third bond was that of the common 
homeland and state (Osmanlılık). Neither faith nor ethnicity could 
prevent anyone to be Ottoman. Thus while Turks could readily identify 
with all three bonds, non-Turks and non-Muslims could feel loyalty at 
least to one bond out of three. Clearly this view held that somehow Turks 
are more identified with state.53
The liberal-territorial character of the Ottoman nationalism in the 
first sight seems very egalitarian. But given the fact that the French motto 
of "liberty, equality, fraternity" was translated into Ottoman Turkish as 
"liberty, equality and fraternity" (read nationalism)54, the equality 
provided by Ottomanism was assimilationist as regards to ethno-religious 
minorities. This was again because of the question of survival of state. 
The very short time span in which the process of nation-building was 
tried to be realised created many difficulties and problems, some of which 
were insoluble. The Turkish ethnic dimension of Ottomanism led to the 
formulation of assimilation policies. A letter dated 30 August , 1878 of 
one of the prominent figures of the Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal, is 
very instructive in this regard. While commenting on the adoption of 
the Latin script instead of Arabic one, Namık Kemal speculates: "While, 
we are obliged to destroy all languages present in our country other than 
Turkish, if we can, should we provide Albanians, Lazes and Kurds with a 
spiritual weapon for strife through assigning an alphabet to them each? 
Language is a firmer barrier than even faith in order to prevent the 
transformation of one ethnie (kavim) to another."55 In another letter, he
53Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 40.
435Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey , 54.
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is more uncovered: "The fact is that we cannot generalise our language to 
Greeks and Bulgars; but it is very possible to generalise it to Albanians 
and Lazes, i.e., to Muslims. If the schools were established and properly 
ruled there, and even the provisions of our deficient education 
regulation were implemented, the and Albanian languages would be 
totally forgotten twenty years later."?6 This policy of assimilation of 
Muslim minorities suggested by Kemal was inherited by the CUP and 
later, by the founders of the Republic literally. The realisation of the 
ethno-religious homogenisation of Anatolia paved the way for the 
assimilation of essentially Kurdish minority. As we shall see, one of the 
defining parameters of the nationality policy of the CUP and later that of 
Kemalist nationalism was the creation of ethno-religious homogeneity.
The "revolution", or rather the "coup" of 1908 was a victory for 
Ottomanism. It was an Ottomanist step, at least, in appearance.5 67
55Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, ed. Namık Kemal'in Hususi 
Mektupları (The Private Letters of Namık Kemal), vol.2 (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu Yayınlan, 1967), 231; cited by Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi 
Türk Milliyetçiliği, 18.
56Tansel, Namık Kemal'in Mektupları, 244; cited by Arai, Jön Türk 
Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği, 18.
57William Miller describes the 1908 revolution as follows: "For a 
time, as if Macedonia had become a utopia. Enver Bey, the enthusiastic 
leader of the revolution, was telling that 'the arbitrary rule was ended. 
From now on, we are all brothers. There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, 
Romans, Jews, Muslims. We are all equal under the same blue sky. We 
are proud of being Ottoman/ In Serez, the chief of the Bulgar committee 
was embracing the Greek archbishop. In Drama, officers were jailing a 
Turk insulting a Christian. Turks and Armenians in an Armenian 
graveyard were listening the prayers of their men of religion for the 
spirits of those murdered in the Armenian massacre. In Samsun Turks 
were saluting a Greek bishop respectfully. In Trablus Turks and Arabs 
together were doing thanksgiving prayer to Allah. Bulgar brigades were 
surrendering." See William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its 
Successors, 1861-1927 with an Appendix, 1927-1936 ( Cambridge, 1936), 
476; cited by Ramsaur, Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali, 156. From this
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Immediately after the revolution, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
by Austria-Hungary and the declaration of independence by Bulgaria 
revealed the importance of the consolidation of the internal unity of the 
Ottoman Empire. There was one and only means for the realisation of 
such an aspiration: common loyalty of all citizens, regardless of race and 
religion, to the Ottoman dynasty and Ottoman homeland, i.e., 
Ottomanism. Yet, due to their self-defined mission of "social 
engineering", the Young Turks were very late for discovering the 
political nature of the question of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, they confessed the existence of a question of nationalities 
unwillingly. During the election campaign of the 1908 elections however, 
the minority groups put emphasis to their right to national self- 
determination and hence * independence. This attitude provoked a 
Turkish reaction and the campaign turned around this debate. CUP kept 
its commitment to Ottomanism because there was no other feasible 
option to follow. Its main ideologue, Ziya Gökalp, considered the United 
States as a model for the Ottoman Empire in two respects: the unity of 
Ottomans, and progress along the route of civilisation. According to 
Gökalp, whatever their ethnic origins, all Americans were considering 
themselves as American.58
The suggestion of Ottoman patriotism as the remedy was 
crystallised in two different understandings of Ottomanism. According to 
the first understanding, the political ideal of Ottomanism embracing all 
ethno-religious groups could be the means for the salvation of the 
Empire within a liberal, undespotic order. In this way, without
description we can readily reach the conclusion that 10 July , 1908 was a 
holiday for Ottomanism.
58Ülken, Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi, vol. 2, 496. Akçura 
refuses such a depiction of United States in his Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset, 19.
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interfering in ethnic identities, every Ottoman citizen could have both
his own ethno-religious identity as a sub-identity and Ottoman identity as
the supra-identity. All the founders of the Society of Ottoman Union did
reveal and use both of their identities without any hesitation. "I am a
Kurd and an Ottoman" was a valid motto. The writings of one of the
founders of the society and a radical westernist Abdullah Cevdet is
illuminating in this regard. In Cevdet's words, Look, I am a Kurd. I
love Kurds and Kurdishness. But, as I am an equal citizen of Turkiya in
terms of rights and obligations, I am before everything a Turk. The fact
that I am Shii-Sunni, believer-free thinker, or belong to white or yellow
race is a private matter and technical thing."59 This approach was the
only way to prevent the nationalist aspirations of ethno-religious
minorities and to provide them with an integrating political identity. The
publication organ of the Geneva wing of the Young Turks, Osmanh
responded to a letter sent from Albania which considered the CUP as a
Turkish society along this Ottomanist line:
... In the first place, we must express that the writer of the letter 
does not have the right to qualify us as Turkish. Our society today 
has more than ten thousand members. Among these are Arabs, 
Kurds, Turks, Albanians, Armenians, Lazes, Greeks, Jews, Druzes 
and so on. Even our editorial board includes non-Turks. (...) Our 
purpose in demanding to live under the banner of union is not to 
attack the denomination and language of any nationality.60
This understanding of Ottomanism did not find a wide support.
The problem was that if the participation of nationalities into the
governmental system could enhance the separatist tendencies of those
59See Bir Kürd-Türk, "Mekatip: 20 Mart 1906, Şura-yı Osmanî 
Gazetesi Müdirine"(Schools: 20 March 1906, To the Director of the Şura­
yı Osmani),İçtihad, 3 (November 1907), 255; cited by Hanioğlu, İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler, 217, footnote 23.
60"Bir Arnavut Mektubuna Cevap" (Reply to an Albanian's Letter) 
Osmanli, 76( 15 January 1901); cited by Hanioğlu, İttihat ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler, 629.
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ethno-religious groups who are decidedly embraced the teachings of 
nationalist ideology. The majoritarian view among the Young Turks 
until 1902 had a firm belief in the fact that inclusion of nationalities 
within the political system by providing them with political rights had an 
integrative effect.
The second view among the Young Turks had a Turkish-dominant 
understanding of Ottomanism. "The theme of the principal ethnie"61, or 
the necessity of the predominance of an ethnie in all multi-ethnic 
political systems were the indications of this approach. An ultra-Turkish 
nationalism was prohibited by the fact that the Europeans considered 
Turks as belonging to an inferior race (yellow race) not to the superior 
one (white race). Otherwise, the social Darwinist outlook of Young Turks 
could easily precipitate a chauvinistic Turkish nationalism. The holders 
of this approach were emphasising the uniqueness of Turks vis a vis 
other nations. "Nobility peculiar to Turks", or "the national dignity 
Turks have" were frequent expressions used in their correspondence 
with each other.62
Tunalı Hilmi, a fervent Young Turk activist, is a striking example 
of the shift from the first to the second understanding of Ottomanism 
over time. Tunalı Hilmi eventually stopped at the idea that 
"Turkishness and Ottomanism are the same."63 Because his ethnic 
belonging was not so decisive for him, he was easily inclined to
61The above-mentioned article of Hüseyin Cahit is a case in point.
62Hanioğlu, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler, 631.
63For the elaboration of this theme in Tunalı Hilmi's writings see 
his following lecture: " Türklük, Osmanlılık Bence Birdir...," in Peşte'de 
Reşit Efendi İle (Cenevre, 1317), 96. Also see Tunalı Hilmi, O nbirinci 
Hutbe. Türkiyalılık Osmanlılıktır: Osmanlılık Türkiyalılıktır (Cenevre, 
1318).
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Ottomanism defined around Turkishness. Despite the priority attributed 
to Turkish64 and the recognition of advantages to Turks in bureaucratic 
recruitments, he was trying to make use of Ottomanism as a means of 
"national socialisation."65 Akçura considers these writings of Tunali 
Hilmi as the first products of Turkish nationalism.66
The publication organ of the nationalist wing of Young Turks, 
Şura-yı Ümmet, in an article titled "Küstahlık" (Effrontery) declared that 
what we mean by Ottomans is especially Turks and Muslims. Because 
everybody knows that the reform in Ottoman government is bound to 
not the uprising of a handful of Armenians or Bulgars but to the revolt of 
Turks forming the principal‘part (element)..."67 According to these circles, 
Ottomanism was a kind of Turkism under the religious guise, which 
considered Muslims together with Turks as the real owner of the empire. 
This tendency became dominant in the ranks of the Young Turks only 
after 1906, with the merger of CUP with the Ottoman Freedom Society
The point of convergence between the two understandings 
however was a familiar theme: the salvation of state.
In this regard, Abdullah Cevdet's position in relation to these two 
understandings deserve more attention because, although he was close to 
the first understanding, nevertheless he was the only influential figure
64"Every Ottoman must be able to read what a Turk wrote. The 
genuine Ottomans are Turks. Turkish means Ottoman language." See 
Tunali Hilmi, Murat: Şehit Arkadaşlarımdan Doktor Yenişehirli
Edhem'in, Giritli Şefik'in ve Tatar İzzet'in Ruhlarına, Mezarlarına Bir 
Armağandır ( n.p., 1317), 101.
65Ibid., 99.
66See Yusuf Akçura, Türk Yılı 1928 (Turkish Yearbook 1928) 
(Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa,1928), 394-95.
67"Küstahlık" (Effrontery), Şura-yı Ümmet, 75(30 May 1905), 1; 
quoted by Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 212.
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vehemently criticising the appellation "Ottomanism" He suggested 
"Türkiya" instead of "Ottoman Empire" This was not because of the 
importance he attributed to Turks but because he thought that the 
Ottoman dynasty is not necessary for the ideal of union (ittihad). 
According to him the "Ottoman nation" meant the "slaves of Ottoman" 
There was no nation or state that carried the name of a ruling dynasty. 
The fact that the Ottoman dynasty named the people of Türkiya as 
"Ottoman nation" and "Türkiya" as "the Ottoman dominions" was a 
clear indication of its consideration of people as "nothing".68 Cevdet 
believed that only peoples given birth by free parents could preserve 
themselves from decadence. Because the Ottoman sultans were children 
of concubines, the Ottoman dynasty was decadent. His belief in political 
elitism was another factor in his rejection of Ottoman dynasty and all 
appellations related to it.69
68Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 249-50.
69Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 219-222.
The following excerpt from Cevdet is revealing in terms of 
understanding of his interest in the question of appellation:
"I ask the Armenian: Who are you?
"Ottoman"
"Where does this name come from?"
"It is the name given by the Ottoman dynasty to Türkiya and 
subjects of Türkiya in relation to the ancestor of our sultans, Osman I"
"Dear citizen, then let me ask you: You know the word Türkiya, 
don't you?"
"Yes."
"Where does this word come from?"
"From the fact that there were only Turks in the establishment of 
the government of Türkiya."
"Then, my dear citizen, instead of holding the name of such a 
despotic and immoral dynasty, is not it better to carry the names of 
Türkiya and Turkishness that you have just described? You are 
"Armenian and I am Kurd. But in the parliament of Turkiya both you 
and me could be representative of the nation. Is not Türkiya the common 
homeland of us all?" See ibid., 219.
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Although the 1908 revolution was ostensibly a victory for 
Ottomanism, in fact Turkish nationalism were gradually coming into 
ascendancy. The Balkan wars witnessed the enhancement of the process 
of the transformation of Ottomanism into Turkism. The rhetoric of the 
"dominant nation" and "the right of conquest" was running the day.
3. 2. 2. The CUP's Policy o f Nationalities
The CUP tried to make use of nationalism, the dominant ideology 
of the last two centuries, by the construction of a nationalist ideology 
through the idea of Ottomanism. But its diagnosis of separatist 
movements was very superficial. In the pre-1908 period, CUP's policies 
were locked to the idea that the despotism of Abdulhamid was the cause 
of all calamities, and of course, of separatist movements. In the words of 
Şerafeddin Mağmumi, a renown Young Turk, "It was Abdulhamid who 
sowed the seeds of disunion among Ottomans. The barrier to union and 
fraternity was Abdulhamid himself."69 70 Against the thesis of "injustices of 
the sultan" as the cause of all separatist movements, there was some who 
suggested structural-ideological reasons, among them were Prince 
Sabahattin and Abdullah Cevdet. According to the latter, separatist 
movements were fuelled by the nationalist ideology itself: Whatever
being said and done, the present era is the era of the dominance of nation 
(hakimiyet-i ümmet)" and "there is no possibility to postpone this 
dominance".71 Even when the impact of nationalism as the source of
69"Ne idik, Ne olduk?" (What were We, What are We?), Meşveret, 
19(27 March 1314), 4; cited by Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 
224, footnote 47.
70Vittorio Alfieri, Hükümdar ve Edebiyat (The Monarch and
Literature), trans. Abdullah Cevdet (Cenevre: Matbaa-i İçtihat, 1905); 
cited by Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 216, footnote 19.
154
ethnie separatism was confessed, the Unionists' approach was to have 
minority groups accept the Ottoman nationalism. The adoption and 
internalisation of Ottoman identity was the final and essential remedy. 
The magic of Ottomanism, according to Ahmet Rıza, would also prevent 
foreign interferences. The portraying of Ottomanism as a barrier to 
western imperialism was their other theme.72
3.2.2.I. Ottomanism as a Political Umbrella
From the beginning* embracing Ottomanism as its dominant 
ideology, the CUP was against all minority organisations struggling for 
independence. Ottomanism must be considered by every minority group 
as self-satisfying because through it they would be able to assert and keep 
their ethno-religious identities. Interestingly enough, the only exception 
to this stance was the tolerance conferred to the Kurdish opposition. The 
Young Turk newspaper Osmanli received important financial support 
from the nationalist Kurdish aristocratic family, B edirhans. The 
newspaper Kurdistan was printed in the same printing house with 
Osmanli and had its overt support.73 As we shall see below, the Young 
Turks shared the same view with Abdulhamid regarding the use of 
Kurds as a balancing force against Armenian separatism, a policy which 
was put into practice through the establishment of Hamidian regiments 
in 1890 .74 As a matter of fact, the CUP had adopted the idea of universal
72For the various views expressed in this regard see, Hanioğlu, 
ibid., 215.
73Malmisanij, Yüz Yılın Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliği ve Dr. 
Abdullah Cevdet (Kurdish Nationalism at the Beginning of the Century 
and Dr. Abdullah Cevdet) (Uppsalarjina NuYaymlan, 1986), 16.
74See Naci Kutlay, İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler (Union and Progress 
and Kurds) (Istanbul: Koral Yayınevi, 1991), 66-67; Malmisanij, Yüz Yılın 
Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliği, 10.
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order under the influence of Ahmet Riza's positivism, and therefore 
considered respect for ethno-national differentiation as outmoded and 
unnecessary.75 The inevitable corollary of this conception was forced 
assimilation of minorities and it was this policy that CUP favoured when 
it came to power.
The identification of the 1908 revolution with Ottomanism created 
an inescapable dilemma for the CUP. Ottomanism was seen as the 
unifying cement of such diverse groups as Turks, Arabs, Albanians, 
Kurds, Circassians, Greeks, Armenians, Bulgars and Jews. Ottoman 
Empire was a real mosaic of nationalities. When we look at the ethnic 
composition of the Empire in 1908, we see that Muslims numbered more 
than twenty million out of thirty million of the whole population.76
The ethnic composition of the post-1908 three parliaments was as
follows:77
Y ç * r T otal T u rk ish A rab A lb an ian G reek A rm e n ia n lew s S la v s
i m 2 88 147 60 27 26 14 4 19
1 9 1 2 284 157 68 18 15 13 4 9
191 4 259 _J44______ 84 ___ 12___ 14 4
In the 1908 parliament, all ethnic groups were represented in 
proportion to their population. In the 1912 parliament however, the 
number of Greek representatives were decreased because they were in 
opposition to the CUP. The vacuum created by their low representation 
was filled by Turkish (from 147 to 157) and Arab (from 60 to 68)
75Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri, 203-5.
76The figures are taken from Tanin, 102(12 November 1324), 4; and 
Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 164-65. According to the same census, the 
population of Greeks were' more than two millions, Armenians more 
than one million and Jews were more than 700.000.
77Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki, 229.
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representatives. In 1914 parliament, the CUP's policy of appeasement 
toward Arabs was reflected as further increase in the number of Arab 
representatives.78
The CUP's modernisation programme as an answer to the question 
of "how to save the country" disturbed all traditional groups cross cutting 
ethno-religious divisions. The CUP considered the millet system and its 
plurality of law as a ripe ground for disunion and separatism and hence 
introduced measures of standardisation and homogenisation regardless 
of the traditional heritage of that system.79 The Republicans would 
inherit the same line.
3.2.22. Reaction o f Minority Nationalisms
While the CUP covertly envisaged an Ottoman unity through 
more or less Turkification of ethnic minorities, all ethnic groups 
excluding Turks were well organised and active in the efforts for 
independence. They totally surrendered to the teachings of ethno- 
nationalism. The most well-organised group was Armenians. The 
killings during their revolt of 1894 and their raid on the Ottoman Bank in 
1895 asserted their powerful existence, especially through Hinchak and 
Tashnak societies. They published a fortnightly called Pro-Armenian.
Albanian nationalists were against the Young Turks and lent their 
support to Sultan Abdulhamid. Their aim was more autonomy within 
the borders of Albania and they had a publication organ carrying the 
same name, Albania.
78Ibid., 229-30.
79Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 185, and Ahmad, İttihat 
ve Terakki, 231-32.
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Kurdish nationalists were publishing the newspaper Kiirdistan in 
London a*id making financial contribution to the Young Turks' 
newspaper Osmanli. Many Kurds including Ishak Sükûti and Abdullah 
Cevdet were among the ranks of the Young Turks. But they considered 
themselves more Ottoman than Kurdish. Nationalism affected Muslim 
minorities very late in contrast to Christian minorities.
The only activities to be noted regarding the nationalist activism 
among Arabs was the Turkish-Syrian Reform Committee. Its aim was to 
make reform within the Empire. It did not have any nationalistic 
concerns.80
Against this landscape of ethnic activism, only the Turks did not 
organise and lacked a protector. "There were only Turks who could not 
gain the sympathy of anyone "as the Young Turks claimed. The 
government considered them as "the worthless reaya" In the eyes of 
foreigners they were the power behind the defects of the Ottoman 
government.
3.2.2.3. CUP's Inescapable Dilemma
On the one hand, the CUP had to enter into a secretly conducted 
struggle against these minority formations. On the other hand, it had to 
behave in line with the principles of the constitutional regime. According 
to Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), the chief writer of Tanin, it could not dare 
openly to declare that "I have to do so in order to protect Turks and the 
Empire." Therefore, it resorted to suppress the opposition. And once this
80For the nationalist organisations of ethnic minorities in the 
Ottoman Empire see Ramsaur, Jön Tiirkler ve 1908 İhtilali, 80-82 and 
Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 41-44.
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option was chosen, there was no recognised limit to arbitrary rule. The 
CUP emerged as a dictatorial power.81
The temporary enthusiasm which led to the "embracement of 
opposites" proved to be impossible to continue. Ottomanism was not a 
valid project because no ethnic group gave up its nationalist aspirations 
for the sake of a constitutional regime. On the contrary, they considered 
political representation provided by Meşrutiyet as a new means toward 
the aim of independence. The new government of numbers could 
jeopardise the dominance of Turks in the Empire. According to Hüseyin 
Cahit, "the history of Meşrutiyet is the history of the Turks' efforts not to 
be drown in the flood of ethnic groups."82
The Greeks did not want Ottoman citizenship because they tried to 
achieve their Greek ideals under the protection of the umbrella provided 
by the traditional communal privileges granted to them in the millet 
system. Ottomanism for them was just a springboard. A provision of the 
1878 Berlin Treaty prescribed the protection of Armenians against Kurds 
and Circassians and reform in accordance with local needs. After the 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungarian Empire and the 
secession of Bulgaria, the "Western concert" speculated the nullification 
of this prevision, which aroused a strong Armenian reaction. Against 
this state of affairs, the CUP as the party of Turks opted for overt Turkish 
nationalism.83
81 Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, 129.
82ibid., 42.
83See ibid., 43-44.
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3.2.2A. A Vicious Circle: Appeasement vs Assertion
In fact, the 1908 political programme of the CUP considered 
education as the means for Turkification of non-Turks. In private 
schools, all themes and elements contrary to Ottomanism-Turkism 
would be cleaned and instead Turkifying themes would be included 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Education In the primary 
schools of non-Turks, the instruction of Turkish would be compulsory. 
Except for religious institutions, in public high schools and universities 
the means of instruction would be Turkish, but in secondary schools local 
languages would be taught.84 According to Akşin, the fact that the 
programme of the CUP was silent regarding private secondary and high 
schools was an indication that without being educated in public schools, 
to become a state official would be difficult for non-Turks and hence 
"becoming Turk" would be deemed attractive.85
After the Balkan wars (1912-13), the Ottoman Empire lost the great 
bulk of its Greek, Albanian and Slav minorities. Therefore, the state did 
not have to take these groups into consideration. The new task was to 
appease Armenians and Arabs. While the CUP's ideological trinity was 
valid, nevertheless the proportions in the whole mixture changed. Now, 
Turks were the biggest ethnic group in the Empire. Hence, Turkism 
assumed the status of a defining ideology. On the other hand, Islam was 
enough for the appeasement of Arabs. Ottomanism would have the 
function of resolving conflicts within the ideological trinity.86
84Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 215.
85Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 103.
86Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki, 227-28.
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The 1913 Congress made the CUP's tendency for a Turkist doctrine 
and programme of action open.87 The CUP's open nationalism triggered 
by the Balkan wars could lead to the reaction of Arab nationalism. 
Therefore, CUP put to the fore Islamism as its first pillar in its official 
ihetoric. During the world war, however, the relative failure of the 
declaration of the holy war (cihad-i ekber) by the CUP, the Arab revolt of 
1916 and the breakdown of Tsarism in Russia triggered Pan-Turanist and 
Pan-Turkist tendencies into dominance and even uniqueness within the 
CUP's ideological trio.88 The CUP cherished the ideals of Turkish unity, 
and lent its support to Turkism through the efforts for the development 
of a national economy based on solidarism,89 the spread of education and 
through which the diffusion of Turkish among the non-Turkish 
populace. Yet, due to the continuos state of war from 1911 to 1918 
accompanied by ongoing internal revolts, and the necessity of 
maintaining the ideological postures of Ottomanism as well as Islamism, 
the CUP could not transform Turkism into a comprehensive programme 
of action as the founders of the Turkish Republic did.90
3.2.2.5. CUP's Turkification Policies
This does not mean however that the CUP did not have a Turkist 
programme of action for economic, social and legal "reforms" On the
87Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 189 and 193.
88Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 304.
89For the economic solidarism of the SUP and its ideologue Ziya 
Gökalp, see Taha Parla, Kemalizm, Ziya Gökalp ve Türkiye'de 
Korporatizm  (Kemalism, Ziya Gökalp and Corporatism in Turkey) 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989).
90Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 101.
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contrary, a nationalist programme of action in which the process of 
secularism was immanent were put into action from 1913 onwards. In 
social-cultural realm, the acceptance of women to the Istanbul University 
and the autonomy given to that university, the confining of the area of 
the responsibility of the Academy of Islamic Sciences (Dar-iil Hikmet-iil 
Islamiye) to the religious issues reveal the westemist-secularist character 
of the CUP's nationalism to a certain extent. The establishment of various 
organisations carrying the title of "milli" such as Milli Kütüphane 
(National Library), Milli Hazine-i Evrak (National Archives), M illi 
M usikî (National Musics), Millî Filmcilik (National Cinema), M illi 
Coğrafya Cemiyeti (Association of National Geography) shows the 
increasingly nationalised content of the word "milli", which is essentially 
a concept expressing religious allegiance. The enumeration of 
nationalism alongside other purposes in the regulations of sport 
associations might give an idea about the comprehensive extent of the 
CUP's nationalism.91
The close interrelationship between the CUP and the Turkish 
Hearts established in the person of Ziya Gökalp , who was a member of 
both organisations, made the CUP open to the continuos influence of 
Turkist thinkers. The societies of aid, centres of free treatment and 
vaccination established by the CUP's clubs widened the popular basis of 
national mobilisation.
91For example, Tunaya quotes from the general regulation of a 
sport association, Türk Gücü (Turkish Power): "Today, Turkish race is 
drifted toward a terrible abyss both in qualitative and quantitative 
terms.(...) The salvation of Turks and the protection of their fatherland, 
law, honour, and glories are possible only through the creation of a 
Turkish generation relying upon its own power." See Türk Gücü'nün 
Umumi Nizami (Istanbul, 1329), 5-6; cited by Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi 
Partiler, 203.
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The abolition of capitulations coupled with the policy of national 
economy (milli iktisat) based on liberal teachings but assigning the motor 
role to the state initiative in the creation of a national bourgeoisie and 
economic accumulation, the establishment of The Bank of National 
Prestige (İtibar-ı Milli Bankası), the support lent to the private enterprises, 
the emphasis put on the use of domestic goods,92 and the development of 
independent professions, including agricultural, industrial and 
commercial enterprises which the Muslim segment of the Ottoman 
population traditionally refrained to engage were all measures of CUP's 
economic nationalism.93
The dominant position of Turkism in the CUP's ideological trio led 
to the policies of Turkification through such means as assimilation, 
deportation and extermination. In fact, these policies were real necessities 
for a programme of Turkism to be implemented given the multi­
national character of the Empire. Akçura was the first to identify the costs 
of following a Turkist policy. According to him, this policy would lead to 
the loss of a series of lands and peoples. But this loss could be 
compensated for through the Turkification of non-Turkish Muslim 
minorities (Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, etc.).94
In fact, we may discern two lines in the establishment of ethnic 
homogeneity around Turkishness in the Empire. The policy toward non- 
Turkish Muslims was basically assimilation through compulsory Turkish 
education, internal deportation, measures aiming at destroying the signs
92This emphasis was inherited by the Republican regime and even 
today public primary schools continue to celebrate a holiday called Yerli 
Malları Haftası (The Week of Domestic Goods).
93Ibid., 205.
94See Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Ways of Policy) 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1987).
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contributing to national collective memoirs, such as changing of local 
names into Turkish and the prohibition of the use of local languages in 
public realm. The second policy was directed to the non-Muslim—non- 
Turkish minorities, which involved harsher measures given the fact 
that their assimilation into Turkishness was much more difficult. The 
fear of separatism was an adequate justification for the pursuance of 
Turkification policy.95
The provision of the compulsory teaching of Turkish in the CUP's 
1908 programme caused particularly the reaction of non-Muslims. None 
of them wanted to accept Turkish as the official language. The Greeks, for 
example, wanted to open their high schools and universities depending 
upon their denominational privileges and refused the supervision of 
state over these schools.96
The territorial losses made the Empire basically a combination of 
Anatolian and Arab peninsulas. The Arab peninsula hosted Arabs. Only 
Anatolia could be transformed into a pure Turkish homeland, and that 
was possible only through resolving the question of minorities in 
Anatolia. In this regard, Armenians were the greatest obstacle. According 
to Kutlay, in order to implement its policies regarding Armenians and 
Kurds, the CUP established the General Directorate of Tribes and
95In his memoirs, Talat Pasha expresses this fear as follows: 
"Because the Ottoman Empire consisted of several different nationalities 
like Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs, the 
acceptance of the recognition of political autonomy to Armenians 
according to the Armenian programme would require the recognition of 
the same right to other nationalities. This option would not only destroy 
unity but through demolishing the foundations on which the Empire 
was based for six centuries may lead to the dissolution of the Empire 
itself..." See Alpay Kabacali, comp., Talat Paşa'nın Anıları (The Memoirs 
of Talat Pasha) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 57.
96See Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, 145.
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Immigrants (Aşair ve Muhacirim Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi). The purpose 
of this directorate was, in popular language, the assimilation of those 
saying "zo" (Armenians) and "lo" (Kurds).97
After the invasion of Eastern Anatolia by Russian forces in 1915, 
the Armenians there revolted against the Ottoman state in order to help 
the Russian troops. Against this state of affairs, the CUP decided to deport 
the Armenians from the regions which may affect the course of war 
negatively, particularly Eastern Anatolia and Mersin-Iskenderun region, 
to the hinterland of Iraq and Syria. A law issued in 27 May 1915 
empowered the army with deportation. And the 30 May parliamentary 
decision extended this authorisation with no time limitation.98 In this 
way, the Armenians were discarded from Anatolia.
During the war, the assimilation policy reached its peak. The name 
of the province of Kurdistan, which was coined in 1847 as the name of an 
administrative division consisting of six cities (vilayat-i sitte), was 
changed into Vilayat-ı Şarkiye (Eastern Provinces). Interestingly, the 
deportation policy was used about Kurds as well. The twelfth article of
97Kutlay, İttihat ve Terakki ve Kürtler , 52-53. Yamleki ascribes 
these words to Nurettin Pasha, the chief of the military operation 
conducted against the Alevite Kurds of Dersim area in 1921. See A. 
Yamleki, Kürdistan ve Kürt İhtilalleri (Kurdistan and Kurdish 
Uprisings)(Bağdat, 1946),* 73; cited by Martin Van Bruinessen,
"Osmanlıcılıktan Ayrılıkçılığa: Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasının Dini ve Etnik 
Arka Planı"(From Ottomanism to Separatism: Religious and Ethnic 
Background of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion), in Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar, 
Martin Van Brueinessen, trans. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992),153.
98During the deportation, thousands of Armenians died due to 
clashes with local Ottoman forces, revenge, bad conditions of hunger, 
weather and illness. The number of Armenians killed was near one 
million according to the nationalist Armenian sources. According to 
Shaws, the number is two hundred thousands. See Stanford Shaw-Ezel 
Kuran Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (Ottoman 
Empire and the Modern Turkey) vol. 2., trans. (Istanbul: E Yayınları, 
1983), 315-6.
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directions prepared by the General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants 
read as follows: "Kurds would be divided into small tribes, and disarmed 
and to be sent to different regions where they would form not more than 
five percent of the population."99 Alongside Armenians, Kurds were 
deported to central Anatolia, especially to Yozgat and Ankara during the 
war. Although the CUP shared the same goal with Abdulhamid in its 
assimilation policies, it differed from him in that it used modem, forced 
means while Abdulhamid followed the policy of the co-optation of 
Kurdish leaders through which he aimed to use them against Russians as 
well as Armenians.100
One of the underlying reasons for the events which ended up with 
secession of Albania from Ottoman Empire (1911) was the CUP's policy of 
Turkification. The CUP envisaged that being one of the most loyal 
subjects of the Empire and un clung to the nationalist impulse, the 
Muslim Albanians could be Turkified. Thus, in Albanian schools 
Turkish was made compulsory as the means of instruction. This and 
similar policies provoked Albanian nationalism and led to the continuos 
uprisings finalised in the secession of Albania.101 This caused a shocking 
impact in the CUP's nationalist circles. The result was the acceleration of 
ethnic Turkish nationalism, assuming the form of Pan-Turanism in the 
beginning and Pan-Turkism102 later on. Both movements assumed
"M alm isanij, Yüz Yılın Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliği , 65. The 
deported Kurdish local leaders (aghas and sheikhs) would be prevented to 
enter any connection with deported Kurds in the regions they were sent 
and be kept under the supervision of government. See ibid.
100Sultan Abdulhamit, Siyasi Hatıratım (My Political Memoirs), 
4th ed. (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1984), 73-75.
101Akşin, Jön Türkler ye İttihat ve Terakki, 206.
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Turkish leadership in the Empire. The seeds of Turkish nationalism 
formed around Anatolian Turks were thus sowed.102 03
One of the important ethnic groups who showed great reaction 
against the CUP's Turkism was Arabs.104 This was clear in the reform bill 
accepted by Beirut Provincial Council in 3 January, 1913, which 
demanded the recognition of Arabic as the official language, acceptance of 
the principle of performing military service locally and decentralisation 
at large. The CUP government immediately refused these demands. But, 
upon the events of passive resistance, the CUP government first 
recognised a limited financial autonomy, and then made the Arabic as
102Pan-Turkism is a movement striving for cultural and/or 
physical union among all peoples of Turkic origin (proven or alleged), 
both inside and outside the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. Pan-Turanism is a 
movement aiming at the union among all peoples of Turanian origin, an 
undefined area in the steppes of Central Asia, the borders of which 
extends to China in the east, Tibet, India and Iran in the South and the 
desert of Dash-i in the north. Thus, Pan-Turanism is a far broader concept 
than Pan-Turkism , embracing such peoples as the Hungarians, Finns 
and Estonians. See Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study o f 
Irredentism (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 1.
103Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki, 228-29.
104See Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, Ziya Gökalp'in Tenkidi (The 
Criticism of Ziya Gökalp) (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1989), 85. In his 
political memoirs, Hüseyin Cahit mentions a case of the eruption of Arab 
nationalism. Elected to the 1908 parliament as the SUP candidate from 
Fizan, the membership of Cami Bey was objected by an Arab deputy 
claiming that "Cami Bey is an officer and sent to Fizan as a state official. 
He is not from local people; therefore his membership cannot be 
accepted." Another Arab deputy, Abdulhamid Zehravi, intervened and 
warned: "Consider the safety of the country!" The election of a Turkish 
officer from an Arab city was considered as detrimental to the interests of 
state. In this way, Arab nationalism asserted its power in the parliament. 
See Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, 144-45. Atay notes that Cemal Pasha, the 
Ottoman commander in Syria and Palestine during the World War I, was 
seen as the commander of an occupying army by the native Arab 
residents due to his harsh security measures and execution of leading 
Arab notables. See Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı (Istanbul: MEB Yayınları,
1987), 41.
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the main language in schools in the Arab regions except for some lessons 
such as history and geography. In the Arabic speaking regions, the Arabic 
could be used in courts. The performance of military service locally 
followed these measures. But they were not enough to satisfy Arab 
nationalist circles although part of Arab public opinion was persuaded.105
During the war, after the resignation of Süleyman al-Bustami, no 
non-Turkish minister could become minister. In 1-2 June, 1916, the 
governor of Mecca Şerif Hüseyin revolted against the Ottoman Empire 
and seized Mecca. Arabs chose their way. Once again, it became evident 
that the CUP was the representative of Turkish nationalism and now 
there remained no internal obstacle to which Akçura referred before the 
realisation of a Turkist programme.106
The nationalist policies of the CUP faced severe criticisms of the 
political opposition. According to Şerif Pasha, one of the leading figures 
of the post-1908 period, the CUP collided with every race and ethnie one 
by one. By ascribing separatist and revolutionary goals to this and that 
without any ground however, it offended all ethnies, from Greeks to 
Armenians, from Arabs to Albanians respectively, and turned them into 
its enemies.107
According to Abdullah Cevdet, the real equality for all ethnies 
comprising the union must be recognised: Citizens! Turkiya belongs
to those from Turkiya. Turkish citizens have definitely the same rights 
and liberties. No ethnies, for example Arabs over Turks, Turks over 
Arabs, Arabs over Albanians, have supremacy over another one."108
105Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 257-258.
106Ibid., 287 and 289.
107Şerif Pasha, Bir Muhalifin Hatıraları, 22.
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Moreover, nations and ethnies comprising the Ottoman union could 
develop their own cultures and take into account their national interests. 
Cevdet7s position seems to be in the middle of those who were inclined to 
Turkish nationalism and those lending support to minority nationalism. 
Cevdet was a real Ottoman Kurd.108 09
The criticisms levelled against the CUP's policy of nationalities 
were replied by Hüseyin Cahit, in his article titled "Türklük- 
Müslümanlık- Osmanlılık"110 in 1909. According to the article, the CUP 
gave up its enthusiastic embracement of Ottomanism and had no other 
way except Turkism to follow. If the Turks would remain in the rule of 
the Ottoman Empire, then Turkism was the only option to prefer. 
Because of ethnic separatist movements, the CUP was strongly against the 
measures of decentralisation. According to Cahit, decentralisation meant 
"to throw Midilli, Sakız and other islands to the embrace of Greeks."111
3.3. CU P and Its T urkish Pillar
The disintegration of the millet system accompanied by the 
secularisation of the concept of millet with the introduction of a new 
division of labour based on abstract and segmented crystallisation of 
human relations prepared a ripe socio-economic and intellectual ground 
for the rise of Turkish nationalism.
The nineteenth century was essentially the age of minority 
nationalism for the Ottoman Empire: The permanently increasing trend
108Cited by Hani oğlu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 217.
109Ibid., 218.
110Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), "Türklük-Müslümanlık-Osmanlılık" 
(Turkishness-Muslimness-Ottomanness)Tflnm,16 September 1909 (1325). 
For the full text of the article, see Appendix A.
m Ibid.
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of the development of minority nationalism beginning with the 
secession of Greece from the Empire in 1829, the military clashes caused 
by the internal nationalist uprisings and as a consequence the nationalist 
socialisation the Ottoman-Turkish officers experienced during their 
counter efforts against minority nationalisms, particularly in Macedonia, 
and the nationalist awareness created by the studies of orientalist scholars 
on the history, folklore and language of ethnic Turks at the elite level.112
With the emergence of a nationalist Turkish elite, the content of 
the concept "Turk" assumed a new character. The newspapers used 
frequently the expressions’ like "the noble Turkish nation" Yet the 
appearance of "Turk" as a "noble" concept and the locus of a new identity 
was making sense alongside Ottomanism and Islamism only 
Turkishness was secondary with respect to Ottomanism and Islamism.113 
But not all Young Turk intellectuals and activists shared this view. For 
example, the leading positivist Young Turk Abdullah Cevdet considered 
religion as a setback before the development of the national 
consciousness.114
112For the orientalist studies on ethnic Turks in nineteenth century 
see Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Türkçülük"(Turkism), Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.5 (Istanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1396; and 
Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 107-110.
113This interrelationship was expressed by Mizancı Murat, an 
outstanding figure of the Young Turk Movement in the newspaper 
Saadet as follows: "Saadet is an Ottoman newspaper. Ottoman means 
Turkish. The concepts of "Turk" and "Ottoman" are not alien to "Islam" 
in view of those who hold these identities." Cited by Mardin, Jön  
Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 113.
n4"Today, Turkish soldiers do not understand anything from 
nationality. Because it was forbidden for them to understand that until 
near times. This prohibition was valid even for the Sultan himself. In 
musics, pieces exciting Turkishness and nationality were prohibited. God 
willing, from now on, they will learn and understand. Yet, today the 
Turkish soldier who does not understand anything from nationality, is
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In the grasp of nationalism by Ottoman intellectuals we observe the 
overt effects of Ottoman political structure, i.e., state tradition. Because 
Ottomans considered state formation as the most important political 
action, the preservation of the "eternity of state" was seen as the most 
important political activity. This is why the Young Turks held the same 
view with Abdulhamid, their arch enemy regarding Turkism. They 
adopted Ottomanism as the main political frame and ascribing 
Turkishness a place only within it. They could envisage the feasibility of 
the inculcation of the idea of Ottomanism in order to protect the integrity 
of the Empire.* 115 Accordingly, ethnic nationalisms of all kinds were 
refused.116
During the Hamidian period, the secularising impact of Turkist 
studies was reflected essentially in cultural realm. Due to severe political 
censorship however, positions taken around literary questions 
sometimes reflected political tendencies.117 Overall, questions of history
fairly loyal to his religion which he does not know its true nature." In 
order to remove the lack- of consciousness in society, the national 
consciousness should be awared through deliberate efforts including the 
instrumental use of religion for this purpose. See Hanioğlu, Dr. Abdullah 
Cevdet ve Dönemi, 340.
115Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 305-306.
116See Niyazi Berkes, Development o f Secularism in Turkey 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 321.
117The following quotation from Şemsettin Sami, a leading Turkist 
intellectual is an clear-cut example of the state of "making politics 
through linguistics": "What is and where does the language we speak 
originate from?
We don't see the expression "Ottoman language", because this is a 
title given to the state established by the first of Ottoman Sultans. 
Whereas, language and race (cinsiyet) are older than the rise of this state. 
The name of the nation (kavim) speaking this language is Turk and their 
language is called Turkish. Considered as blameworthy in the opinion of 
the ignorant people and used to refer only to Anatolian peasants, this 
name is the name of a nation (millet) which gives honour to those
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and language were as Berke.s proposes, not "nationalistic question(s), but 
(...) an aspect of the trend of enlightenment."118 Alongside censorship, 
the interest of Turkist writers for the integrity of state led to the 
confinement of Turkism into its cultural aspects.119
Despite Ottomanism, and hence the refusal of recognition to 
Turkishness a political status, the promotion of Turkish ethnie 
(kavmiyet) in terms of its separate existence led to a new cultural drive in 
studies of Turkish history, geography, and literature.120 The 
establishment of the concept of an independent Turkish language instead 
of Ottoman language and the creation of an intellectual climate 
conducive for language reforms were the achievements of this cultural 
drive.121
The increasing signs of the dissolution of the Empire, e.g., the 
Macedonia question, and the Japanese victory over Russians (1904), 
which dealt an heavy blow to the European hierarchy of races considering 
Turks within non-Aryan, yellow, i.e., inferior race created a national self 
confidence which reflected itself first in Yusuf Akçura's Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset. 
Ahmet Riza's use of "Turk" instead of "Osmanli" was another indication 
of this nationalist mood. The theory of the racial supremacy of Europeans 
and the European imperialism led the Young Turks toward a strong anti- 
western position. Nevertheless, the Young Turks were influenced from a
feeling allegiance to it", Şemsettin Sami, Hafta, No: 2; cited by Mardin, 
Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 114.
118Berkes, Development o f Secularism, 321.
119Kushner, Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 98 and Mardin, Jön  
Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 62.
120Kushner, Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 26.
121Ibid., 80.
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theory such that a positivist like Ahmet Rıza could mention "purity of 
blood" and "the nobility of character".122 Akçura's description of 
"Turkish nationalism based on race" reflects the same effect.
With the merger of CUP with Ottoman Freedom Society a s 
mentioned above, ethnic nationalism based on the dominance of Turks 
within the CUP took its decisive form and became the defining 
component of the CUP's ideological trio.123 In a letter dated 2 June, 1906 
written from the central branch of the CUP to its Kızanlık branch in 
Bulgaria, the following remarks are noteworthy: "We can accept non- 
Muslims to our Society only under certain conditions", and then the final 
remark comes: "Our society is a pure Turkish society".124
In pre-1908 revolution, nationalism had became a ground of 
justification both for Turkists, and some Islamists and Westernists. The 
transformation of the concept of "Turk" into a source of proud, the 
establishment of Turkish speaking peoples outside the Ottoman Empire 
as brothers in race, and the fixing of Turkish language and Turkish 
history as the bases of nationality were developments majority of the 
educated elites embraced. When the CUP came into power, it intensified 
the process of the transformation of cultural Turkism into political one.
The period CUP remained in power (1908-1918) was marked by 
continuos wars and rebellions. At the end of the First World War, 
Ottoman Empire was basically confined into the Anatolian peninsula 
with the addition of a small part of Thrace. On the other hand, during 
this period, CUP faced incessantly with demands for decentralisation and
122Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 208-9.
123 Hanioğlu, Interview by Şahin Alpay, Milliyet, 31 July 1995,18.
124Quoted by Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihad ve Terakki, 57 and 78.
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self-rule by ethno-religious minorities. When accompanied with 
demands for sharing political power, these demands greatly contributed 
to the increasing sense of isolation in the Turkish nationalist elites and 
hence accelerated the CUP's drift toward the manifest Turkish 
nationalism as its official policy.125
It was Hüseyin Cahit who first declared this position in an article 
titled/,Millet-i Hakime" (The Dominant Nation) in Tanin.126 "No" said 
Cahit, "this country would be the country of Turks. We all would unite 
under the name of Ottoman. But the form of state never would change 
except (required by) the special interests of Turkish nation." Because, "the 
dominant nation in this country is Turks and would be Turks".127 The 
fact that the CUP was the organisation of Turks vis a vis the organisations 
of ethnic minorities invited no doubt. The possibility of falling under the 
dominance of non-Turkish peoples marked the nationalism of the CUP. 
That is why it did not comply with the constitutional rules of the game 
and suspended the representative system of politics. But it could not 
confess this state of affairs and hence oscillated between the requirements 
of M eşru tiyet, which it could not give up, and that of Turkish 
nationalism, to which it felt strong loyalty.
Until the Balkan wars there was no nationalist refusing the idea of 
Ottoman nation except for Yusuf Akçura. A Turkist journal G enç  
Kalemler (Young Pens), appeared in Salonica in 1911, advocated linguistic 
nationalism, offered many suggestions for language reform but kept
125Kushner, Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 97-99.
126Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), "Millet-i Hakime" (The Dominant 
Nation), Tanin, 25 November 1324(1908). For the full text of this article, 
see Appendix B.
127Ibid.
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emphasis on the Ottoman union. Its purpose, in fact, was to contribute to 
the efforts for "saving the country" It had no interest in outside Turks.128 
Another Turkist publication Türk Derneği (Turkish Society) (1908) was 
full of articles reflecting the idea of Ottoman patriotism. In the 
contributions of writers from Russia, however, the signs of Pan-Turkism 
can be identified.129
The real Turkist platform turned out to be Turk Yurdu (Turkish 
Homeland) (1911), a fortnightly journal. Among the contributors were 
Ziya Gökalp, the member of CUP's central committee, Yusuf Akçura, 
Ahmed Agayef, Mehmet Fuat and Hüseyinzâde Ali. It emerged as the 
publication organ of Turk Yurdu Cemiyeti (Society of Turkish 
Homeland), founded in 31 August, 1911. The programme of the Cemiyet 
adopted the policy of Tevhid-i Etrak (Turkish union) proposed by Yusuf 
Akçura in Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset.
Unlike Türk Demeği and Genç Kalemler, in Türk Yurdu only two 
articles dealing with Ottoman Empire and Ottoman Turks appeared, and 
none of these articles did touch upon the question of the Ottoman 
integrity. These qualities turned Turk Yurdu into a non-Ottomanist, Pan- 
Turkist journal providing a common platform for the theoretical issues 
of political as well as cultural Turkism.130
Turk Yurdu tried to create a national identity for Turks besides 
Ottomanism. Its main purpose was to make Turks gain national
128For Yeni Lisan (New Language) thesis of Genç Kalemler, see 
Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği, 49-79.
129 Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey A Study o f Irredentism , 38-39. 
For Türk Derneği, also see Arai, Jön Türk Milliyetçiliği, 47-48; and Lewis, 
Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 343-44.
130Arai, Jön Türk Milliyetçiliği, 85 and Lewis, Emergence o f  
Modern Turkey, 344.
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consciousness, "who lived an unconscious life under the Ottoman flag." 
Therefore, it attempted to examine pre-Ottoman Turkish history, 
traditions and states. According to the intellectual circles around Turk 
Yurdu, Ottomanism was not a national identity because nation formation 
was a natural fact. This was, of course, valid for Turks as well. All these 
efforts in this line were described as "the discovery of a new race"
Balkan wars strengthened Turkist position because Ottomanism 
was buried at the end of the war with the loss of all non-Muslim 
minorities except Armenians and a small number of Greeks (Rum). 
Ottomanism lost its raison detre. For Arabs, of course, pan-Islamism 
seemed enough. In this conditions, cultural Turkism rapidly assumed a 
political dimension and turned into a political movement aiming at the 
arousal of a national consciousness among the Ottoman Turks and 
securing the unity of all Turks (Pan-Turkism). The final aim was to unite 
the world Turks under one political organisation around a common 
language and culture (hars).
There was two views about this organisation regarding the borders 
and the nations it covers: The first view was the idea of Pan-Turanism, 
expressing the unity of all Turanian peoples including Turks, Mongols, 
Magyars, Bulgars and others.131 The second view envisaged only the
131For pan-Turanism see Kushner, Rise o f Turkish Nationalism, 
43-44, and Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey A Study o f Irredentism 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981).
Ömer Seyfettin, a Turkist-Turanist storian and one of the 
contributors of the Turkist literary magazine Genç Kalemler, in one of 
his stories entitled " Primo Türk Çocuğu Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Öldü?" 
(Primo, the Turkish Child, How was He Bom, How did He Die?) narrates 
the tale of a young person whose father is Turk and mother Italian, 
considering himself Italian and not knowing any Turkish. The story is 
about Primo's turning toward himself, i.e. Turkisness, which was deemed 
as "backwardness" and "blockheadness" in foreign and high society circles 
in a time when Trablus was occupied by Italy.
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unity of Turkish peoples (Pan-Turkism). it covered Ottoman, Russian 
and Chinese Turks. These organisations could be created after the 
formation of national consciousness and hence national existence. The 
main proponents of these ideas were Ziya Gókalp, Omer Seyfettin and 
Tekin Alp.
The political programmes of Pan- Turanism and Pan-Turkism did 
not gain much support unlike its socio-cultural and literary aspects. 
During the World War I, however Turkism became the official ideology 
of the CUP and the Bolshevik Revolution revived the Pan-Turkist 
visions and created an enthusiastic mood in Turkish circles, which led to 
Enver Pasha's invasion of Transcaucusia in 1918 and his later military 
struggle against Bolshevik forces in Central Asia.
With the conclusion of Mondros Armistice (1918), all hopes for 
Pan-Turkism turned into wishful thinking. Turkism, from then on,
The dialogue occurred between Primo and his father while he was 
choosing a Turkish name for himself gives some credits to Süleyman 
Nazif's accusation of "Jenghiz illness" levelled against Turkists. Primo 
readily accepts his father's suggestion of selecting a Turkish name for 
himself and lists some names: Enver and Niyazi. These names are 
refused by his fathers due to the fact that they are of Arabic origin. Upon 
this, the following dialogue takes place between them:
Primo: "Are the Turkish names different?"
Father: "Yes."
Primo: "Like what?"
Father: "For example, Oğuz, Turhan, Orhan, Cengiz, Turgut, Alp 
and so on."
Father: " Oh, Oğuz, Oğuz... Lets name you Oğuz"
Primo: "Is that the name of a great man?"
Father: "The name of the greatest Turk."
Primo: "Is it a Pasha?"
Father: "No, he is the first khan of Turks." See Ömer Seyfettin, 
"Primo Türk Çocuğu Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Öldü?" in Türklük Ülküsü (The 
Turkish Ideal)(Istanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1990), 120-121.
From then on, the little Oğuz starts reading the book "Gök Bayrak" 
given to him by his father and dreams of the armies of Cebe Noyan, a 
famous commander of Jenghiz, and palaces of Jenghiz Khan. See Ömer 
Seyfettin, ibid., 87-130.
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would survive within the Anatolian independence movement. But the 
new nationalism in Anatolia focused only to Anatolian geography. 
Nevertheless, as Arai aptly observed, it inherited from Turkism the ideal 
of creating a national community proud of being Turk.132
3.4. C U P's T hird Pillar; Instrum ental Islam ism
Developed essentially by the Young Ottomans and reactivated by 
Abdulhamid II in coalition with the representatives of folk Islam, i.e., 
tarikats, and particularly* the Nakşibendis, as an anti-imperialist 
movement against Western domination, Pan-Islamism as a reactive 
formation prescribing Islamic modernisation as well as the unity of 
Muslim peoples133 was a common ground of justification shared also by 
Young Turks as well as the state as the main component of its official 
ideology.
The Young Turks were socialised with positivist-progressivist 
theses of the nineteenth century. Therefore they categorically refused the 
revelational side of all religions and believed that the socio economic 
backwardness was essentially caused by religious teachings. Accordingly, 
the positivist suggestion was the substitution of religion with a scientific 
world view. The criterion for truth was scientific "laws" Another point 
of emphasis was the melting of individual within society. The society 
envisaged by positivism was a "programmed society" and hence the 
direction of social evolution could be predicted and be taken under 
control through "social physics", i.e., sociology. The mottoes of "progress"
132Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği, 146.
133Foı pan-Islamism and its process of emergence, the following 
source is an excellent one: Mümtaz’er Türköne, Siyasi Bir İdeoloji Olarak 
İslamcılığın Doğuşu (The Emergence of Islamism as a Political Ideology) 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991).
178
and "order" were two keys corresponding to the diagnoses of the Young 
Turks with regard to the problems of Ottoman Empire. Besides, as a non- 
Christian Western philosophy, the dominance of positivism could 
became an integrative factor with the western world.134
The main determining factor shaping the attitude of Young Turks 
toward Islam was thus positivist teaching. Although they believed that 
Islam was the real cause of socio-economic backwardness, nevertheless, as 
a political movement struggling against the autocracy of Abdulhamid II, 
they had to find a way of temporary cohabitation with Islam due to the 
fact that the basis of the justification of the Ottoman rule in Muslim- 
populated areas was Islam and that Abdulhamid was co-operating with 
religious orders, particularly Nakşibendis, in his pan-Islamist leanings. 
Given this state of affairs, the Young Turks could not take an anti- 
Islamist position. On the contrary, given the solidaristic ties created by the 
consciousness of belonging to the same religious community and being 
the only legitimate popular communication channel which could 
mobilise "masses" as an opposition force against Abdulhamid’s rule, 
Islam was the most appropriate means of popular legitimacy and political 
opposition.135
Thus, an Islamic position was extremely meaningful in terms of 
realising the ideals of "liberty", "union" and "progress", which the CUP 
adopted as its motto. On the other hand, Islam was useful in the 
introduction of modernist/ westernist "reforms" The presentation of non 
or even anti-Islamic changes on the ground of Islamic teachings rather 
than positivist credentials based on biological materialism could
134Hanioğlu, ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler, 619-21.
135Hanioğlu, ibid., 141-157.
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neutralise popular opposition to the products of Ottoman 
modernisation.136
The 1906 was a turning point in the ideological evolution of the 
CUP. With its merger with Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti, the CUP gave up 
its emphasis on Islamism and shifted to Ottoman (read Turkish) 
nationalism. The precedence of Ottomanism over Islamism found a clear 
reflection in the elimination of the CUP's Cairo branch, which, unlike the 
central branch, was under the control of the ulema. The coalition of the 
CUP with ulema was, to an important extent, dissolved.
The anarchical climate of the post-1908 Revolution removed the 
necessity of presenting modern-secular views through the Islamic 
filtration.137 In the first days of the revolution, the hero of Meşrutiyet, 
Enver Pasha explicitly stated that "there is no place in their program for 
Pan-Islamism."138 This did not mean that the policy of making use of 
Islam for the attainment of the ideals of CUP was totally abandoned, 
however. Islam always remained as a reserve power for the CUP.
136For example, in terms of the use of Islamic teachings for the 
propagation of biological materialism, the position of Abdullah Cevdet is 
most illuminating. Cevdet is of the opinion that nothing originated from 
Christian West could be introduced in Ottoman polity due to the popular 
contempt felt against the Christian world. The thing to be done is to 
carefully abstain from violating religious sentiments of people and 
present western institutions and way of life through covering them in an 
Islamic garment. This was a temporary but essential strategy in the 
evolutionary transition to scientific society. See Hanioglu, Dr. Abdullah 
Cevdet ve Donemi, 130-140. This attitude was exactly imitated by Mustafa 
Kemal during the Anatolian war of independence in his resort to the 
support of ulema and sheikhs as a transitional tactic.
137Abdullah Cevdet could translate and openly publish The History 
o f Islam written by the Flemish orientalist Reinhard Dozy, which 
Muslims found insulting and pejorative.
138Hanioglu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Donemi, 157.
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The continuing force of Islam at popular level and the 
transformation of Ottoman Empire into a de facto Turkish-Arab state 
however, caused the CUP leaders to be sensitive to the Islamic feelings. 
After the Arab revolt of 1916 however, the CUP freed itself of Islamic 
restraints more easily. Nevertheless it tried to form its own conception of 
reformed Islam, which resulted in the issuance of the Islam Mecmuası 
(Islamic Review) in 1914. The journal tried to develop a Turkish version 
of Islam under the motto of "A life with religion, and a religion with 
life."139
Overall, one can safely suggest that the CUP pursued a policy of 
reformed Islamization circumscribed by the principles of Turkish 
nationalism developed basically by its main theoretician and at the same 
time ideologue, Ziya Gökalp.140
3.5. Ziya G okalp (1876-1924)
Ziya Gokalp141, the main theoretician of the Young Turk 
movement, joined the CUP in 1909 and was elected to its Central 
Committee in 1910. He fulfilled the same duty until 1918. While he was
139For a detailed evaluation of Islam Mecmuası see Arai, Jön Türk 
Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği, 127-143.
140Arai's suggestion that Turkish nationalists did not always 
adhere to secular policies and that they were after a way of modernisation 
other than westernisation which would allow Islamization could be seen 
from this perspective of "Turkified Islam" of the SUP. See Arai, ibid., 147.
141The original name of Ziya Gökalp is Mehmet Ziya. He used the 
nickname "Gökalp" in his writings and poems published in G enç 
Kalemler during 1912. See Rohat, Ziya Gökalp’in Büyük Çilesi Kürtler 
(Istanbul :Fırat Yayınlan, 1992), 59-60. For his short life story see Ziya 
Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation, trans. Niyazi 
Berkes (New York: Colombia University Press, 1959), 35-45, and Heyd, 
Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 19-40. Also see Ülken, Türkiye'de 
Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi, vol. 2 , 493-543 and 584-614.
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leading the Turkist movement intellectually, in his capacity as the 
member of the CUP's Central Committee he exerted great influence in 
giving a Turkist character'to the policy-making process as it became 
manifest during the 1916 CUP Congress where he formulated public 
policy suggestions discussed during the debates there. 142 143
The main problematic of the last decade of the Empire (1908-1918), 
apart from the question of political survival, was the formulation of a 
new identity in view of changing socio-political conditions, the direction 
of which was toward a culture-based national state instead of a multi­
cultural, religiously-legitimated Empire. Against this nationalist 
challenge, Gôkalp suggested a new matrix of identity with three faces: 
Turkism, Islamism and Modernism. The main dynamic of this 
ideological trinity resulted from the fact that religion has lost its total 
hold over society both at national and international level. In structurally- 
differentiated modem societies, religion could only be one among many 
determinants of human condition. Culture at national level and science 
at international level assumed the functions previously held by religion. 
143 Thus, he offered a new synthesis between Turkish national culture, 
Islam and modernisation where each of them came together to form an 
aspect of the new Turkish identity.
142These policy suggestions included the removal of the highest 
Islamic official of the Empire, the Şeyh-ül Islam, from the cabinet, the 
transfer of the religious courts to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Justice and the transfer of the religious colleges (m adrases) to the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Apart from all this, he 
suggested the termination of the financial and administrative autonomy 
of religious foundations [evkaf), including the Christian ones. See 
Andrew Davison, "Secularisation and Modernisation in Turkey The 
Ideas of Ziya Gökalp," Economy and Society, 24:2(May 1995), 196-197; 
Heyd, Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 35-36, and Arai, Jön Türk 
Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği, 142.
143Davison, "Secularisation and Modernisation in Turkey," 202.
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Like other Unionists, in the beginning of his political-intellectual 
career, Gökalp favoured Ottomanism vis a vis Islamist and Turkist 
visions of polity. This was in a way an inevitable choice "imposed" by the 
practical reality of political survival. The Turkish elements under 
Ottomanist guise in Gökalp's ideas however, gradually displaced 
Ottomanism to a secondary position, as it became manifest in his famous 
poem Turan (1911), which Gökalp himself considered it as an expression 
of outright Turkism.
Following the waning of Ottomanist enthusiasm of the first days of 
the 1908 revolution after Balkan and the First World War provoked by 
secessionist as well as imperialist nationalisms, Gökalp observed that 
multinational empires are doomed to extinction and due to the necessity 
of forming a homogeneous national society in accordance with the 
nationalist creed only people embracing the same culture can have 
allegiance to the same fatherland and hence there exists no way but 
Turkism for the restructurisation of the Ottoman Empire as a national 
state. 144 The "forced" hypocrisy of the CUP hiding its Turkism under 
Ottoman cloak was thus come to an end.145
The Ottomanism of the CUP, according to Gökalp, delayed the 
development of Turkish nationalism and accelerated the secessionist 
tendencies of minority nationalisms including Muslim ones because the 
march of history was toward national communities from ethno-religious 
ones, a view shared also by Abdullah Cevdet. The imminent task facing 
the Turkish national elites was to develop a comprehensive Turkist 
programme in order to create national consciousness among the Turkish 
people.
144Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları, 43-45.
145Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak, 58.
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Shifting Durkheimian observations at the social level to the level 
of nation,146 Gôkalp emphasised the importance of the unravelling of 
ideals immanent in the national spirit, which would form the basis of 
national culture. In the process of rediscovery of "ideals" immanent in 
the national subconscious (ma'§eri vicdan),147 the nationalist elites 
would have the leading role. National education would socialise people 
into the national ideals through which a purified and living cultural 
tradition would be built up. In order to develop Turkish culture, a two- 
tier policy should be followed: the inquiries into the history of the non- 
Muslim ancient Turks and studies of popular culture protecting its 
original character vis a vis external influences.148 Gôkalp considers the 
preservation of Turkish national culture as essential in the context of 
modernisation in that it is culture that makes a nation peculiar to itself. 
The reproduction of culture through living native institutions is one of 
his primary concerns, which he expressed as follows: "The culture of a 
nation is not something to be imposed or instituted."149
According to Gôkalp, "the ideal of modernity necessitates only the 
acceptance of the theoretical and practical sciences and techniques from 
Europe."150 As a positivist sociologist, for him, modern civilisation 
meant the civilisation common to the nations of Europe, but not
146For Gokalp’s sociological idealism and his way of adoption of 
Durkheim’s concept of society into nation see "Historical Materialism 
and Sociological Idealism," in Gôkalp, Turkish Nationalism, 104-109.
147Ibid.
148Ibid., 15-17 and 61-62.
149Gokalp, "Manifestations of National Ethos," in T urkish  
Nationalism, 166.
150Gokalp, "National Education," in Turkish Nationalism, 245.
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reducible to their cultures owing to his belief that modern civilisation 
was non-religious (lâ-dinî).
Unlike Durkheim, he made a distinction between culture and 
civilisation. Culture, according to him, have a subjective and emotional 
character and covers the totality of feelings, judgements and ideals 
particular to a certain nation. Civilisation, on the other hand, is objective 
and intellectual and involves the intersectional set of spiritual and 
material values common to different nations.151 Objective and scientific 
nature of modem civilisation created a new, true internationality, which 
could be shared by all nations embracing different cultures.152
Drawing upon this differentiation of culture from civilisation, 
Gôkalp believes that with the embracement of manners and customs of 
the ancient Turks,153 and the examining of various aspects of living 
popular culture such as Turkish folklore, ethnography, archaeology and 
popular literature, the elite-mass dichotomy would be resolved and a 
strong national culture would emerge both of which instrumental in 
absorbing the spread of values stemming from the presently dominant 
Western civilisation within the exclusive domain of national culture. In
151Gokalp,"Towards Western C ivilisation "in Turkish 
Nationalism, 269. See also Gôkalp, "Culture and Civilisation ,"ibid., 104- 
109.
152Gökalp, "Three Currents of Thought," in Turkish Nationalism,
76-77.
153According to Gôkalp, ancient Turks had all "good" qualities for 
daily life. They were open-minded, modest, faithful, free from fanaticism, 
courageous, respectful of women, inclined to social equality and dedicated 
to the principle of consultation in the conduct of their common affairs. 
See Heyd, Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 113-114. It seems that 
this naive description of the ancient Turks, which was shared by Kemalist 
nationalism, have a thoroughly anachronistic character. For a criticism 
of the over-sublimation of the collective attributes of ancient Turks, see 
Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, Ziya Gökalp'in Tenkidi, 109-111.
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that way, civilisation conceived as techno-scientific methods would 
become easily assimilated into the fabric of national culture.154
The main reason why Gôkalp put such an emphasis on the 
dichotomy of culture and civilisation lies in his understanding of nation 
and nationalism. According to Gôkalp, nation is a society consisting of 
people who speak the same language, have had the same education and 
embraced the same religion, and moral and aesthetic ideals, in short, 
those who participate in a common culture (terbiye) " .155
Gokalp's understanding of culture-civilisation as a conceptual 
frame for modernity is a positivist answer within the context of social 
evolution which diagnoses nationalism and science as the new building 
powers of human identities, and accordingly, considering the place of 
religion in this new matrix of identity as not private but "necessarily 
social", yet at the same time non-political. Criticising the views that 
considering Gokalp's position regarding the place and significance of
154Gökalp rejects the reception of spiritual values from other 
nations.According to him, these values should be derived from the 
religious and national heritage. See Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, 
Muasırlaşmak, 16 and 35-36. Also for Gokalp's consideration of religion 
as part of national culture see Gökalp, "Is Turkey a Modern Nation?" in 
Turkish Nationalism, 142-144. According to Gökalp, "There are three 
main points to be considered in discussing the culture of a people: social 
structure, religion and language. These are the criteria indicating to 
which social species a society belongs."(...) "Turkish culture (...) is based 
on a social structure which is democratic, and on a religion which is 
modem," ibid., 43.
155Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları (The Principles of Turkism), 22; 
and "Culture and Refinement," in Turkish Nationalism, 281. This 
definition was adopted for the first time in the 1931 programme of the 
Republican People’s Party, with the exclusion of the religious element: 
"The nation is a political and social body composed of citizens who are 
bound together by unity of language, culture and ideal." See Mete 
Tunçay, Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulmasi(1923-1931) (The 
Establishment of One Party State in Turkey, 1923-1931), 2nd ed. (Istanbul: 
Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 447.
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religion in modem world as secular,156 radically secular157, not enough 
secular158 or more religious than secular,159 Davison asserts that there is 
no conclusive definition of secularity and hence what these authors 
engaged is an example of "norm-setting". To Davison, Gôkalp did not 
aimed to provide a secular vision of human evolution. Instead under 
changing conditions of modern life, he prescribed a semi-public, non­
private, non-political social role as a legitimate and necessary component 
of Turkish culture. 160 This position is in total agreement with that of 
Durkheim who accepts the enduring significance of religion in modern 
life. With the conditions that if required, nass (conclusive injunctions of 
Islam) should be interpreted according to ôrf (customary law), and that it 
becomes non-political, Gôkalp considers Islam as part of Turkish identity 
and as a living institution of the Turkish national ethos.161
Gôkalp's demarcation between culture and civilisation was refused 
altogether by Kemalist nationalism which suggested that there is only 
one civilisation, that is, the western civilisation. There can be no 
independent space for culture distinct from civilisation.162
156See Niyazi Berkes, "Translator's Introduction," in Turkish  
Nationalism and Western Civilisation, Ziya Gôkalp, 57-58 and 88-92.
157Parla, Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm, 47-50.
158Dodd, C. H., Democracy and Development in Turkey (North 
Humberside: Ethoen Press, 1979).
159Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği ,145-147.
160Davison, "Secularisation and Modernisation in Turkey," 190-
191.
161Ibid., 212.
162Although Kemalist nationalism refused Gokalp's culture- 
distinction, it accepted its glorification of ancient Turks, an indication of 
which was the names given to two government banks: Sumer Bank
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Gökalp adopts the Durkheimian scheme of the historical 
evolution of human polity which suggests four main stages humanity 
has passed: tribal society (aşiret), kinship society (kavim), religious 
community (ümmet) and national society (m illet).163 Here millet 
represents the climax of social development with its corollary of 
democratic and independent state. Though he does not conceive millet as 
the final and ideal form of society, nevertheless he attributes all the 
divine attributes to it in that according to him, millet is the source of all 
ideals and hence what national society wills is morally good: nationalism 
assumes a religious character as seen in the writings of the Italian 
nationalist thinker Giovanni Mazzini. 164
Gökalp rejects all definitions of nationality based on solely race, 
language, religion, ethnicity, territory, political identity and volition.165 
Contrary to common fallacies common in Turkey regarding Gökalp's 
nationalism, he does not relate national character to racial origins. 
According to Gökalp, no nation can be racially homogeneous. Turks are 
one of the most heterogeneous nations in racial terms. Those from 
different origins but socialised into the same culture (Turkish culture) 
—Arabs, Albanians, etc.— should be regarded as Turks.166 Otherwise,
(Bank of the Sumerians) and Eti Bank (Bank of the Hittites). See Heyd, 
Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 112-3.
163 Heyd, Foundations o f  Turkish Nationalism, 57-60. In his 
manifesto of Turkism, Türkçülüğün Esasları (Principles of Turkism), 
which offers a detailed programme of reform, he mentions only three 
stages: cemia (aşiret), cemaat (ümmet) and cemiyet(millet). See Gökalp, 
Türkçülüğün Esasları, 81-84, and Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, 
M uasırlaşmak, 113.
164Heyd, Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 59.
165Gökalp, "What is a Nation?" in Turkish Nationalism, 134-138.
166Rehat, from a Kurdish nationalist view point, suggests that 
Gökalp's denial of ethnic origin as a basis of nationality is related to his
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many intellectuals and thinkers would have to be sacrificed, 167 
including the poet of the National Anthem Mehmed Akif, an Albanian 
in ethnic terms.
For Gökalp, education (terbiye) and ideals (mefkure) are essentials 
of nationality: "Men want to live together, not with those who carry the 
same blood in their veins, but with those who share the same language 
and the same faith."168 Religion makes sense to the extent that it 
contributes positively to the formation of national ideals. What matters is 
not ontological-legal dimension of religion. Only the social value of 
religion has relevance in this regard. To Gökalp, "all ideals connected 
with ethnic unit, religion, state, national home, family, class, corporation, 
etc., are auxiliary to the national ideals."169 And it is these national ideals 
(hars) which make Turks superior to the western nations dominating all 
over the world through their civilisational power. According to Gökalp, 
a nation with supreme culture and weak civilisation is more powerful 
than those with an higher civilisation but weak culture, which 
corresponded to the situation Turks live in. 170 This position is a clear
Kurdish origin. The dispute between Gökalp and an Ottomanist 
journalist Ali Kemal is the case in point. By referring to his Kurdish 
origin, Ali Kemal asks how a person from a different ethnic background 
can assume the intellectual leadership of Turkism. In his reply to Ali 
Kemal in poetic style, Gökalp cries: "Ben Türküm diyorsun, sen... Türk 
değilsin!/ îslamım diyorsan değilsin İslam!/ Ben, ne ırkım için senden 
vesika,/Ne de dinim için istedim i'lam. (...) Türklük hem mefkurem, 
hem de kanimdir;/Sırtımdan alınmaz çünkü kürk değil!/Türklük 
hadimine Türk değil diyen,/Soyca Türk olsa da, ...tir, Türk değil!" See 
Rohat, Ziya Gökalp'in Büyük Çilesi, 73-77.
167Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları, 23.
168Gökalp, "What is a Nation?" in Turkish Nationalism 137.
169Gökalp,"Nation and Fatherland,"in Turkish Nationalism, 82.
170Heyd, Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 63-64.
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indication of the fact that Gökalp's thought was conditioned more by the 
need to find remedies for actual problems of society and less by theoretical 
interests, which may explain its vicissitudes and contradictions. 171
Gökalp’s "one state, one language and one culture"172 has found an 
analytical framework of justification in Ernest Gellner's theory of 
nationalism matching industrial state with a mono-culture. Gellner 
suggests that nation is a social formation peculiar to modern era. 
Nationalism, according to him, is the cultural reflection of standardising 
and homogenising dynamics of industrial society. This is a reformulation 
of Gökalp's theory of hars (culture) involving the totality of religious, 
moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic and scientific 
lives of a nation. 173
The borders of Gökalp's nationalism underwent changes over 
time. In the first year of the 1908 revolution, under the impact of 
immigrant political nationalists like Ahmet Agayef, Hüseyinzade Ali and 
Yusuf Akçura, Gökalp was inclined first to the ideal of Turan. In 1911, he
wrote a poem called "Turan", a couplet of which was:
The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Türkistan,
Their country is a broad and ever-lasting land, Turan.
On the ground of common cultural ties, Gökalp dreamt of a union 
of Turkish peoples as realised in the days of Attila, Jenghiz Khan and 
Timur. After the 1918 armistice of Mondros, however, Turanist 
aspirations waned due to the impossibility of achieving the Turan ideal 
under Ottoman leadership, and accordingly, he narrowed down his 
political programme to include only Oghuz Turks, while keeping his
171For a personal evaluation of Gökalp's formation of views in 
continous evolution, see Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, 123.
172 Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları, 105.
173Ibid., 30.
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Turanist vision as a distant ideal. In his last writings, Gökalp makes a 
three-level categorisation of Turkism: 1) Turkism confined to Turkey. 2) 
Turkism covering Oghuz Turks living in Harezm, Iran, Azerbaijan and 
Turkey. 3) Turanism involving all Turanian peoples comprising all the 
Turks and Turkic peoples. The third category represented the distant ideal 
of Kızıl Elma (the legendary Turkish land in Central Asia) of Turkists. 174 
Gökalp's speculations in his capacity as a theoretician and party 
ideologue constituted one of the main links between the ideology of the 
CUP and the Kemalist regime. Though Kemalist nationalism differed 
from Gökalp's nationalism in many respects, nevertheless it inherited 
some of its main credentials from it. Gökalp’s Turkified and reformed 
religion,175 his suggestions regarding family law and family names, 
glorification of the ancient Turkish past, principles of republicanism, 
nationalism and laicism176 and his solidarist conception of political 
economy formed the founding stones of the Kemalist world view. It 
must be noted however that Kemalist nationalism was incomparably 
radical in its approach to everything remembering the ancient regime 
(Ottoman socio-political order). Kemalist reforms in religion177 and 
language178 is most revealing in this respect.
174Ibid., 28-29; Kushner, Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 100-101; and 
Heyd, Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 126-130.
175According to Gökalp, "Turkism in religion simply means 
having religious scriptures, sermons and preaching all in Turkish" (...) 
"In order to ensure to our religious life a greater enjoyment and 
stimulation, it is necessary to have the Quran —except during the recitals, 
the litanies, the supplications that are read after prayers— and the 
sermons read in Turkish." See Gökalp, "Religion," in T u rk ish  
Nationalism, 301.
176Parla, Ziya Gökalp, Kemalism ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm, 82-83.
177While Kemalist nationalism put a deadly blow to the Arabic 
script and the Caliphate, Gökalp lent support to both, with a qualification
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Regarding the constitution of ethnic homogeneity, Gdkalp 
distinguished between Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. The starting 
point for him was the assumption that Turkish nation should composed 
of Turkish-speaking Muslims only. Non-Muslim minorities, that is, 
Greeks, Armenians and Jews who lived in Turkey were Turks only in 
respect of citizenship , not of nationality. Being alien to Turkish culture, 
they could enjoy at most a highly limited cultural autonomy in contrast 
to the privileges provided by the Ottoman millet system. Gokalp's 
attitude regarding Muslim minorities, basically Kurds, is their 
assimilation into Turkishness.178 79
Kemalist nationalism inherited Gokalp's ideal of a homogeneous 
Turkish nation through seclusion of non-Muslim minorities by keeping 
them within the social fabric as a non-harmful element and applying a 
fierce assimilation policy to Kurdish-speaking people.
emphasising the non -political character of the Caliphate as a symbolic 
force of Islamic unity.
178Kemalist reforms in language excluded every words of Arabic 
or Persian from Turkish because of their common Islamic roots and 
instead introduced new words derived from non-used ancient Turkish 
dialects. Gökalp, however, suggests the modernisation of language in 
respect of notions, Islamization in respect of scientific terms, and 
Turkification in respect of all other words, and of grammar, syntax and 
orthography." See Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak, 21; 
and Türkçülüğün Esasları, 132-139.
179Heyd, Foundations o f Turkish Nationalism, 132.
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CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL BACKDROP: TOWARD THE BREAKDOWN OF 
THE POLITICO-RELIGIOUS MIND
4.1. Introduction
The dichotomy of the subject(ruled) and the sovereign(ruler) and 
the crystallisation of the main social cleavage around this dichotomy was 
the main social space in which political legitimacy and authority were 
located in the Ottoman politico-religious community. Throughout the 
Ottoman history, sultans were removed from their post from time to 
time; but the patrimonial legitimacy of the ruling Ottoman dynasty was 
never questioned. The Ottoman orf-i sultani (sultanic laws) and the 
Ottoman version of sharia (the Islamic law) were two basic determiners of 
the political framework.
Allegiance to the sultan-caliph was the only comprehensive, cross­
cutting political identity for the ordinary people before and after the 
millet system. To shift, therefore, the locus of the political allegiance 
from the sultan-caliph to the Republic and from the Muslim umma to 
the nation as a well-defined territorial vision, was revolutionary indeed. 
And it was this revolutionary transformation that took shape during the 
period of the National Struggle (1919-1922) and after.
There was only one source of appeal that could transcend the 
religio-dynastic bond: the people itself. The Rousseauian understanding 
of popular sovereignty found strong echoes in the last decades of the
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Ottoman Empire, and particularly in the Kemalist practice of "halk 
hükümeti" (people's government).1 The mobilisation of people around 
the idea of the popular sovereignty accompanied by its Rousseauian 
complementary, "wise legislator," i.e., military-civilian intelligentsia, and 
later on, "Büyük Reis" (the Great Chief),2 was the channel of 
transformation from the empire to the republic, from umma to nation, 
and from "subject- citizen" to "participant-individual citizen."
According to Anthony D. Smith, this model of national identity 
involved popular participation more than civic-political rights; populist 
organisational patterns rather than political parties; the interventionist 
nation-state instead of the protection of the rights of individuals and 
minorities against state interventions; and upon all this, the creation of 
newly formed ethno-political nation out of pre-modem demotic ethnies.3
Ottoman Empire in the last years of the second decade of the 
twentieth century was at the threshold of such a total transformation. The 
general landscape of the Empire exhibited a profound disarray. The Treaty 
of Sevr (10 August, 1920) was the epitomisation of the imperial political 
disintegration, which involved ethnicization of territoriality at the micro 
level. It was in this situation of popular helplessness and indifference at
!The phrase "Türkiye Halk Hükümeti" (People's Republic of 
Turkey) was used officially for the first time in the article 8 of the 
declaration of the government submitted by Mustafa Kemal as the 
Speaker of the Grand National Assembly to the Presidency of the Grand 
National Assembly in 18. 09. 1920. See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi (Registers of 
the Grand National Assembly), vol.4, 180.
2As an example of the official use of this title see, Afet İnan, Türk 
Tarihinin Ana Hatları (The Main Lines of Turkish History), 2nd 
ed.(Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınlan, 1996), 72.
3Anthony D. Smith, Milli Kimlik (National Identity), trans. 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1994), 202.
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the socio-political level that the The National Resistance Movement' 
in Anatolia took a fresh start.
4.2. R oad to the R epublic: Political D evelopm ents
National Struggle was a struggle aiming at inculcating national
consciousness into a community of peasants devoid of any national sense
through transforming the popular determination against the insult of
"Christians", particularly the Armenians and the Greeks, into the sense of
patrie (vatan ) and nation (millet). Its basis level was nationalism
revealing its ethnosecular Turkish character during the period of radical
reforms in the aftermath of the so-called "National Liberation War."
The realisation of the national ideal and the achievement of the 
main goal of ittihat ve terakki (union and progress) -this unionist ideal 
was thoroughly inherited by the Kemalist nationalism -necessitated a 
pragmatic, tactically-motivated approach. In Mustafa Kemal’s own words, 
It was incumbent upon me to develop our entire social 
organisation, step by step, until it corresponded to the great 
capability of progress which I perceived in the soul and future of 
the nation and which I kept to myself in my own consciousness as 
a national secret.4
This step by step approach to the unfolding of the Cevdetian dream 
of "Pek Uyamk Bir Uyku" (A Very Wakeful Sleep) was a clear 
manifestation of Kemalist Machiavellism justifying the maxim that "the 
goal justifies the means".The transformation of popular determination 
to stand against the "Christian" invasion into the national zeal first, and 
to "guided national will and sovereignty later is a short and concise 
story of the period of the National Struggle. The National Pact (28 
January, 1920), the opening of the Grand National Assembly ( 23 April, 
1920), the final defeat of the invasion forces (30 August, 1922), and the
4Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk 1927 trans. (Istanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant, 
1963), 9-10.
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promulgation of the Turkish Republic (29 October, 1923) are all the 
milestones of the unfolding of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "national secret"
The occupation of Izmir by Greece (15 May 1919) in violation of the 
provisions of the Mudros Treaty (30 October 1918) engendered popular 
resentment and triggered the resistance movements in the form of 
separate Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri (Societies for the Defence of 
Rights) in Anatolia. The will to resist against the Greek invasion was 
the first manifestation of the rising Turkish national consciousness 
embedded in Islamic enthusiasm. The invasion turned to be the driving 
force of the Turkish National Movement and nurtured further the 
Turkish age-old beka (survival) syndrome. As in many other cases of the 
national formation, war functioned as the cradle of the newly emerging 
national identity.
The Turkish nationalist elites strove to organise a national 
resistance in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. 
They had to fight both the internal (the Istanbul government under the 
tutelage of the invasion forces)5 as well as external attackers (the allied 
forces of occupation). With the purpose of organising a national 
resistance movement, they held a number of meetings and congresses in
5There were many declarations of the Ankara government to the 
Anatolian people that it is loyal to the sultan-caliph and that they should 
not let themselves to be seduced by the propagandists of the Istanbul 
government and the allied forces. As examples, see "BMM’nin Açılması 
Üzerine Padişaha Telgrafla'Gönderilen Sadakat Arizası" (The Letter of 
Loyalty Sent to the Sultan-Caliph upon the Opening of the Grand 
National Assembly), with the directive of the Grand National Assembly 
and signed by Mustafa Kemal, dated 27. 04. 192. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri (Atatürk’s Circular 
Letters, Telegraphs and Declarations) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1991), vol. IV, 320-322; and "Düşman Propagandasına 
İnanılmaması İçin BMM’nin Memlekete Beyannamesi" (The Declaration 
of the Grand National Assembly to the People for Avoidance from the 
Enemy's Propaganda) with the directive of the Grand National Assembly 
and signed by Mustafa Kemal, dated 25. 04.1920, ibid., 317.
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Amasya (19 June 1919), Erzurum (23 July 1919), and Sivas (4 September 
1919), at which they outlined the sine qua nons of the framework on 
which the resistance movement would be built, which later took the 
form of the Misak-ı Milli (National Pact) and expressed their 
determination to use the Kuvay-ı Milliye (National Forces) through 
various Müdafaa-ı Hukuk-ı Milliye Cemiyetleri ( Societies for the Defence 
of National Rights) at first, followed by the H eyet-i Temsiliye 
(Representative Committee) after the Erzurum Congress, and then 
through Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly) as from 23 
April 1920. 6
The National Pact, which reflected basically the provisions alluded 
to in the Circular Letter of Amasya, and the congresses held in Erzurum 
and Sivas, laid the foundation for the complete independence of the 
country. It delimited the boundaries of new Turkey, inhabited by a 
Muslim majority and united in religion and culture. It became a rallying 
point for the national resistance movement and a basis for nationalist 
diplomacy. The National Pa'ct prescribed the retainment of the Ottoman 
State with its sultan-caliph and the constitution.6 7 To Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha, however, the Pact was just a step forward toward a new state and a 
new regime he has kept in his mind as a "national secret" 8
The invasion forces of the allies countered the declaration of the 
National Pact by making their invasion of Istanbul official (16 March
6For the general highlights of the evolution of the Turkish 
national resistance movement see Salahi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the 
Destruction o f the Ottoman Empire (Ankara: Atatürk Supreme Council 
for Culture, Language and History Publications of Turkish Historical 
Society, 1993), 332-333.
7For the full text of the National Pact see Appendix C.
8Suna Kili, Kemalism " ( Istanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1969), 19.
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1920) and by arresting and deporting many deputies to the island of Malta. 
The dismantling of the Ottoman parliament necessitated the 
establishment of a legitimate basis of action in order to face local risings, 
the forces provoked by the Istanbul government and the Greeks. 
Following the official occupation of the capital city of the Empire, 
Istanbul, and the closing down of the Parliament, the Turkish nationalists 
retaliated on 23 April, 1920 by establishing their own parliament, the 
Grand National Assembly (GNA) and government in Ankara, and 
declared to the whole world that they refused categorically to accept "the 
foreign slavery" imposed upon the Turkish nation by the entente powers 
and that they were determined to strive for self-determination and 
"istiklal-i tarn" (full independence).9
The programme of new revolutionary government tried in theory 
for the liberation of the sultan-caliph, a captive in the hands of the 
entente powers in Istanbul, to whom the nationalists professed loyalty, 
and who would take his place within the legal framework to be 
determined by the GNA as soon as he was emancipated from all 
pressures and coercion. Furthermore, it struggled to save 'the homeland 
and the nadon,' from the dictate of "imperialism and capitalism" and to 
restore "complete sovereignty and independence" of the people. To that 
effect the deputies had already taken an oath.10
Meanwhile, the Supreme Council of the allied powers met at San 
Remo on 19 April to give the peace terms its final shape which were to be
9Biiyuk Millet Meclisi Zabit Ceridesi (The Registers of the Grand 
National Assembly), vol. 1, 2.
10The introductory section of the government's programme 
submitted to the GNA by Mustafa Kemal, and read out on 18. 09.1920. See 
TBMM Zabtt Ceridesi, vol. 4, 179-180. See also Section 1 of Law No. 18 
passed on 05. 09. 1920 and issued in Ceride-i Resmiye (Official Gazette), 
No: 3, 21 February 1337.
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imposed on Ottoman Turkey. The main provisions of the draft treaty, 
among others, included: Turkey would accept, in advance, a scheme of 
local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas, the people of which 
could appeal for independence to the council of the League of Nations. 
The Turkish government would transfer to the Greek government the 
sovereign rights over a special area around the city of Izmir. Turkey 
would renounce in favour of Greece her rights over Turkish territory in 
Europe, and over the islands in Aegean Sea. She would recognise 
Armenia as a free and independent state, and would agree to accept the 
arbitration of the president of the USA upon the question of frontiers 
between Turkey and Armenia in provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van 
and Bitlis, and upon Armenia’s access to the sea. 11
The treaty also included special provisions for the protection of the 
minorities in Turkey. The capitulatory regime would continue, and the 
pre-war concessions of the allies in Turkey would be safeguarded. 12 The 
Istanbul government was compelled to sign the treaty on 10 August, 
without the final ratification of the sultan however. This was a treaty of 
war, not peace, and the Turkish nationalists had already expressed their 
determination in order to avert its realisation. Their alternative to this 
treaty was the National Pact.
The treaty, never ratified by imperial or republican Turkey, had 
satisfied nobody except Greeks, the British, the Armenian leaders and a 
few Kurdish chieftains. The French and Italians were against it. The 
efforts to revise the treaty failed and the allied pressure on the Ottoman 
government to ratify the treaty equally met with no success.
11Sonyel, ibid., 335.
12Ibid.
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In the London Conference of February 1921, the suggested 
proposals were rejected by both Ankara government and the Greeks.
On 11 March, Bekir Sami, the foreign minister of the Ankara 
government, which was of Circassian origin, signed a secret agreement 
w ith Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister, which conflicted with 
the provisions of the National Pact, and therefore was not approved by 
th e GNA. In particular, Mustafa Kemal Pasha rejected the clause 
proposed by the French about the "protection of racial minorities" as 
distinct from "religious minorities", which meant the protection of the 
Armenians as a political ethnie with the object of increasing their 
number in the region. 13
The Ankara Accord, signed between the Ankara government and 
France in 24 September 1921, achieved peace and confirmed the rights of 
minorities as recognised in the National Pact, upon the same basis as the 
minority clauses of European peace treaties. 14
In January 1922 the allies, now disunited, embarked upon a policy 
of mediation between nationalist Turkey and Constantinist Greece, but 
they met with the Greek's opposition. Nonetheless, the Greeks finally 
suffered an overwhelming defeat in September 1922 and had to leave 
Anatolia. The battlefield victory was concluded with a peace treaty on 24 
July 1923 when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed between Turkey and 
the allied powers, including Greece.
According to the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish frontier on Thrace 
would be established on the Meriç river, and Greece would return the
13Atatürk, A Speech , 497-499. This sensitivity of Mustafa Kemal to 
"racial rights" would surface in the republican period in the form of 
various ethnic management strategies to be insistingly pursued by the 
state.
14Sonyel, ibid., 338.
200
islands of İmroz and Bozcaada. A compulsory exchange of populations 
would be arranged, as a result of which an estimated number of Greeks 
would leave Turkey in return for a number of Turks living in Greek- 
held territories. The question of Mosul would be left to the League of 
Nations, which, in 1925, recommended its retention by Iraq. The treaty 
also provided for the apportionment of "Duyun-ı Umumiye" (the 
Ottoman Public Debts), for the gradual abolition of the capitulations 
(Turkey regained its tariff autonomy in 1929), and for an international 
regime for the straits. 15
İsmet Pasha, the chief representative of the GNA in Lausanne 
deliberations, describes the consequence of the Treaty for Turkey in the 
following terms: "A homogeneous, unified homeland; within it,
freedom from the obligations imposed by foreigners, and from privileges 
of a nature creating a state within a state; freedom from imposed 
financial obligations; a free, rich homeland, with a recognised absolute 
right of self-defence." 16
4.3. Two Bases of the National Struggle
The two basic principles upon which the national resistance was 
based were "istiklal-i tarn" (complete independence) and "bilakayd ü şart 
hakimiyet-i milliye" (national sovereignty without reservation and 
condition).17 The embodiment of the first principle was Misak-ı Milli 
(National Pact). The manifestation of the second and more important
15 Ibid., 339.
16Ibid.
17Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçler (Atatürk’s Speeches 
and Statements) , Vol. II, 16. 01. 1923 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1989), 61-62 and the first article of 20 January 1921 constitution.
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principle was Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu (The Fundamental Law)18 The 
basis of the legitimacy of the National Resistance (1919-1922) was 
national sovereignty. The only locus of legitimacy of the struggle against 
the Armenian rebellion and the Greek invasion was people itself. But 
this people was tired of war and did not want to join the army. Besides, it 
was too much for it to think a country without a sultan and a caliph. On 
account of religious and traditional ties, it was loyal to the throne and its 
incumbent. Those who conceived of the possibility of the removal of the 
sultan-caliph could be only men without faith and patriotism in the eyes 
of people.19 "Dealing with each problem at the right time" was Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha’s "practical and safe way to success". 20 He was therefore 
extremely cautious in his steps in the transitional period from religious to 
the national basis of collective legitimacy. Thus when he had to talk of 
"enemies of religion" he was saying "enemies of religion and nation" or 
"sultan and nation" instead of mere "sultan".21 To reach the objective of 
an unconditionally independent Turkish state, based on the idea of 
"hakimiyet-i milliye" (national sovereignty), was his main goal, declared 
in the first days of the National Struggle, to be achieved at all events. 22
18For the full text of 20 January 1921 Constitution see Suna Kili-A. 
Şeref Gözübıyık, Türk Anayasa Metinleri. Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze 
(Turkish Constitutional Documents from the Deed of Alliance up to the 
Present) ( Ankara: Türkiye iş Bankası Kültür Yayınlan, 1985), 91-93.
19Atatürk, A Speech, 8.
20Ibid., 11.
21Baskm Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği. Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir 
İnceleme (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology)
(Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1988), 108.
22Mazhar Müfit Kansu, E rzurum dan Ö lüm üne K adar A tatü rk le
B era b e r  (Together with Atatürk from Erzurum to his Death), vol.l,
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), 32. Likewise, a daily
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The first article of 20 January 1921 constitution was the reflection of 
this ideal. 23 As a matter of fact, the motto of national sovereignty was 
only a means, not an end. It was used just as a functional symbol and 
when the "right time" came, this idea was transformed into a tutelary 
understanding of national sovereignty. The speeches made and the 
attitude revealed in the occasions of the extension of the period of being 
in force of the Law of Commander-in-Chief and of the abolition of the 
sultanate are two graphic examples of this tutelary understanding 24 
Following the proclamation of the republic, the Rousseauian notion of 
"wise legislator" appeared in the political scene and the national 
sovereignty became identified with the person of the founder of the 
republic, Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself. The National Assembly, 
previously popularly elected, now was chosen by Mustafa Kemal and his 
close associates. 25
newspaper İrade-i Milliye (National Will) began to issue at the time of 
Sivas Congress which changed its name into Hakimiyet-i Milliye 
(National Sovereignty) as the movement transferred its headquarter to 
Ankara. See Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-Builder," in 
Atatürk: Founder o f a Modern Nation State eds., Ali Kazancigil and 
Ergun özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 70.
23The first article of- 20 January, 1921 constitution reads: "The 
sovereignty is vested in nation without reservation and condition. The 
system of administration is based on the principle that the people guide 
their own destiny." See Kili and Gözübıyık, ibid., 91.
24According to Heper, Kemalism took away the sovereignty from 
the sultan, but despite its official rhetoric of populism, did not transfer it 
to the people. See Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington: 
The Eothen Press, 1985), 51. For this required the maturation of the 
collective conscience the time of which to be decided by the Kemalist 
elites, a reflection of the civilising mission of Kemalism.
25Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, 110.
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4.4. D eclared G oal of the N ational Struggle
The declared goal of the national resistance movement was 
expressed in various official documents. The purpose of the 
commencement of the Grand National Assembly is overtly set in the 
"Declaration of the Grand National Assembly", dated 18.11. 1336 (1920), as 
follows: "Grand National Assembly is formed with the purpose of 
preservation of the independence of Muslim majority within the 
national frontiers, and the salvation of the posts of the caliphate and 
sultanate. Therefore, it is of the opinion that it would reach its purpose 
through making the people of Turkey to own her will and sovereignty by 
freeing itself from the oppression and darkness of imperialism and 
capitalism, which it considers its sole and holy aspiration."26
Likewise, the law no. 18, dated 05.09.1336(1920), and titled "Nisab-i 
Miizakere Kanunu" (the Law of Quorum), states the goal of the Grand 
National Assembly as "the attainment of the salvation and independence 
of the caliphate and sultanate, of fatherland and nation."27
The same purpose is confirmed in the words of Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha as follows: "The Ottoman state is not formed around the temporal 
power of the ruler like any other state. Our ruler, being caliph as well as 
sultan, is at the same time the head of the Muslim people. The first goal 
of our mucahede (holy fighting) is to show those who advocate the 
separation of the post of sultanate from caliphate that the national will 
does not fit to that, and to save the authority of the rulers (ulu’l emr)
26TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, vol. 5, 371. The phrase of Muslim 
majority within the national frontiers" is added by the Encum en-i 
M a h s u s a  (Special Commission) in order to preempt wrong 
interpretations. The rapporteur of the Commission, Ismail Suphi Bey, 
clarifies the meaning of the term "national frontiers" as the frontiers 
drawn by the National Pact passed by the Ottoman Assembly in Istanbul.
27Kili and Goziibiyik, Turk Anayasa Metinleri, 89.
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from the threats and impositions of the enemy by liberating those sacred 
posts from the captivity of the foreigners."28
4.5 . M ustafa K em al Pasha’s Pow er Instinct: T he Lim its o f Political 
Expediency
The main question before Mustafa Kemal Pasha was to find a 
secure popular basis for the national resistance movement while paying 
lip service to the authority of the sultan-caliph. His position vis a vis the 
idea of national sovereignty and dynastic allegiance was crystallised by 
his power instincts, practical imperatives and prophetic ideals unravelled 
openly in the days of Erzurum Congress but kept as "a national secret" 
until the end of the National Struggle.29 As a matter of fact, this
28Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçler I, 24 April 1920, 62. The same views 
repeated time and again. See for instance, Söylev ve Demeçler, vol. I, 1 
March 1921, 176 and ibid ., 1 March 1922, 243.
29In his memoirs, Mazhar Müfit, a person belonging to the close 
circle of Atatürk, tells us that Atatürk's decision to shift to the republican 
regime was given before the convening of the Erzurum Congress. See 
Kansu, Erzurumdan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürkle Beraber, vol.l, 72 and 74. 
Mustafa Kemal openly criticised reform efforts in the Ottoman Empire , 
such as the reception of European laws and regulations, and ways of 
clothing on the basis of their imitative and therefore non-national 
character, as was done in Russia under Peter I the Great. The following 
"radically conservative" words belong to him: "We have taken European 
dress. But, badness, happiness and disaster depend upon a nation's way of 
understanding. A thing considered to be good by a nation may cause a 
disaster for another nation. Therefore, a nation could attain her purpose 
when she was able to subtract from her spirit the ways and means she 
would exploit in order to reach the thing she considered to be good. But 
since that "good" could become "bad" for another nation, when you 
exploit its ways and means the point you would reach would be 
disastrous although it is good for that nation. Yes, dress was taken from 
Europe. Look, trousers in below and stout jacket above. Jacket in above 
and shalwar below, it has somehow not been digested and continuing 
to be so. Even Peter I the Great attempted to better his nation through 
imitation. He had a genius in imitation indeed. But never he had an 
original genius capable of creation from nothingness. Therefore, while 
he was trying to "reform" his nation as Russian, he was using German 
and English means. Whereas, it was impossible for a Russian to be
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positional tactic worked very well. He was successful in getting the 
support of the poor, war-tired and helpless Anatolian masses on the one 
hand, and continued its vision of a loyal leader to the sultan-caliph in 
the eyes of the majority of the people, on the other.
Mustafa Kemal was a master of step by step approach in his political 
strategy.30 According to Parla, his Nutuk is the story and defence of the 
application of a certain military-political project over time.31 He also 
skilfully guised the novelty of institutions he was building. As Rustow 
observed, he was careful in presenting the representative committee 
formed after the Sivas Congress as "the nation's agency for 
communication," not as a provisional government. His assembly was a 
transient, extraordinary one, not a constituent assembly, which in fact
German, and therefore in the end, he has lost his identity, failed to be 
what he aimed to be. The result was the emergence of a perplexed 
creature." See Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 December 1921, 219. This 
speech seems to be extremely ironic given the "imitative", symbolic 
features of subsequent Kemalist reforms, such as the adoption of hat as 
the new national headgear, the removal of tesettür , change of alphabet 
and the total reception of western laws, based on the notion that the 
western route to civilisation is the universal one, and hence rejecting the 
existence of different national selfhoods.
30The content of Atatürk's renovational introductions is radically 
reformist, not revolutionary; its discourse and manner incrementalist 
and ameliorist. The completion of reforms took 15 years (1923-1938). 
Atatürk himself describes his renovations as "radical reform" See "İkinci 
Dönem Dördüncü Toplanma Yılını Açarken" (Opening the Fourth 
Meeting Year of the Second Period), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 November 
1926, 362. Radicalism in content, incrementalism in the means and ways 
of realisation characterises the Kemalist method of "choosing right time 
and right place". See M. Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk (Speech), vol.l (Ankara: 
Atatürk’ün Doğumunun. 100. Yılını Kutlama Koordinasyon Kurulu, 
1987), 10-11. Also see Mete Tunçay, Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin 
Kurulması(1923-1931) (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey), 
2nd ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 198, 85; Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal 
Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün Nutuku (The Official Sources 
of Political Culture in Turkey: The Speech of Atatürk), vol.l (Istanbul: 
iletişim Yayınları, 1991) 9-11 and 37.
31Parla, Atatürk'ün Nutuku, 11.
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was. Even the national make-up of the Grand National Assembly left 
open to debate.32
Nevertheless, all the terms and appellations used during the 
National Resistance are related to "nation" and "nationalism", 
containing a vague content though. As Safa observed, Ankara 
represented Turkish nationalism under the guise of liberating the sultan- 
caliph. The expressions "Milli mücadele," (national struggle), "milli 
istiklal" (national independence), "milli hareket" (national movement), 
"kuvay-i nilliye"(national forces), "milli zafer" (national victory), 
"hakimiyet-i milliye" (national sovereignty) and "Büyük Millet Meclisi" 
(Grand National Assembly), all signified the nationalist discourse of the 
cause of liberation, the gist of which was to be "national". 33 Due to the 
dual content of the word "milli" which originally meant "related to 
what is religious" but has undergone a shift of meaning in the nationalist 
discourse of the late nineteenth century Turkist intellectuals and later 
came to be identified with "what is national", the mottoes of the national 
resistance movement provided an easy transition for a nationalist
32Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-Builder," 57-77. The 
deliberately cautious stance of Mustafa Kemal regarding the "national" 
character of the Resistance Movement was illustrated by an incident in 
May 1920. One of the members of the de facto cabinet, the commissioner 
of health, had emphatically referred to the Anatolian movement as a 
Turkish movement, and this drew a strong protest from a delegate of 
Circassian background. Mustafa Kemal, as the presiding officer, 
intervened to say: "Gentlemen, with the request that this matter should 
not come up again , let me point out that what is intended here, which 
comprises your high council are not composed of only Turks, of only 
Kurds, of only Lazes. But it is the Muslim elements comprising all of 
these, a sincere community." Atatürk, "Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden 
Müslüman Öğeler Hakkında" (About Muslim Elements Comprising 
Turkish Nation), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 May , 1920, 74
33Peyami Safa, Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar (Glances at Turkish 
Renovation) (Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1990) 81-82.
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restructuring, at least in conceptual terms, through the exploitation of 
that duality.
Camouflage first, and rapid surprise moves later: This adaptation of 
military tactics to the political arena testified to Kemal's keen 
power instincts. In a setting where organised opposition could 
readily have overwhelmed his radical program, his public 
statements suggested first that opposition was unnecessary and 
later that it would be hopeless. Thus at all times he kept in full 
control of both the direction and the pace of events. 34
Hence major innovations came as fa it accomplis. When the
Ankara Assembly on 1 November 1922 abolished the monarchy, it did so
upon a motion that declared that the sultanate had ceased to exist on 16
March 1920, the day of the official British occupation of Istanbul. The
sultanate was not declared abolished until after the nationalist military
victory had been confirmed by the armistice of Mudanya on 11 October
1922. Similarly, the most drastic measures breaking with the past-the
proclamation of the Republic (29 October 1923) and the abolition of the
caliphate (3 March 1924) were delayed until well after the signing of the
the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923).
The matching of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "national secret" with the
unfolding of events were complete and conclusive.
4.6. The Forced Pluralism  of the Period o f the N ational Struggle
In the political discourse prevailing during the years of national 
resistance, the phrases of Turkishness and Turkish identity were not 
overtly spelled out. Both in the Circular Letter of Amasya (Amasya 
Tamimi), and in the decisions taken in Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, 
as well as in the National Pact, the national community were defined in 
such traditional criteria as being Ottoman and Muslim. Moreover, this 
national community was not conceived of as a monolithic block, but of
34Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-Builder," 71.
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composed of various ethnic brands. The uniting ties among these ethnies
were expressed as "pure fraternity", "mutual respect and feeling of
sacrifice", "complete partnership both in happiness and calamity", and
the willingness of "sharing the same destiny" All of these documents
stated that "racial and social rights" of the ethnic elements and their
"environmental conditions" would be respected, though with vague
indication of the content of "racial and social rights" Despite this
vagueness, it is clear that in legal-cultural plain, the ethnic rights would
be recognised and respected within the framework of "unity in variety."35
According to Ozbudun, this strict avoidance of the nationalist
discourse could be explained with the political imperatives of the day.
This imperative forced the nationalist cadre who founded the Republic
into alliances which they would not continue after the consolidation of
the new regime. These alliances were made with conservative-Islamist"
groups and Muslim ethnic groups other than Turks. 36
The spirit of this pluralist approach to the national, unity can be
grasped from the following statement of Mustafa Kemal Pasha:
Within these boundaries (drawn up by the National Pact) no one 
must imagine that there is only one type of nation among Muslim 
elements. Within these boundaries, there are Turks, there are 
Circassians and other Muslim elements. These boundaries are the 
national boundaries of brother nations united in their all aims and 
living in a mixed state. The privileges peculiar to the social 
environments, customs and races of the Muslim elements living 
within the boundaries of this homeland were sincerely and 
mutually acknowledged and confirmed. Of course, there are no 
details as regards to this in that now it is not time to deal with the 
details. God willing, they will be resolved among brothers after the
35The National Pact and the Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas 
Congresses lend emphasis to this point. See Kili, Kemalisin , 11-14
36Ergun Özbudun, Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi 
Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu (The Question of Citizenship 
and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the 
Republic), Unp. Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996).
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deliberation of our existence and therefore the details are
neglected.37
Oran shares the same view with Ozbudun as regards why the policy 
of a pluralist conception of national unity was pursued during the period 
of National Resistance.38 In this period, due to the general conditions 
prevailing in Anatolia -difficulties in communication and transportation, 
the dire lack of money and arms, internal uprisings, the competition of 
rival ideologies-, it was extremely difficult to conduct a national resistance 
movement. This state of affairs led to the adoption of a pluralist 
approach by the nationalist elites. Instead of Jacobeanist means, a 
democratic-pluralist approach based on compromise with ethno-religious 
communities of the time w?s adopted so that to make use . of their ideas 
and resources to the extent the need arised for them, and thus obtaining 
the popular backing. The fact that people were loyal to the sultan-caliph 
and hence were far away from lending support to a military-dominated 
movement against the Istanbul government and the need for a popular 
basis of legitimacy for the nationalist leadership in the struggle against the 
Istanbul government and the allied powers, made this approach a 
practical necessity. Moreover, having a popular backing was an essential 
supremacy for Mustafa Kemal Pasha vis a vis other senior military 
officers, who were potential candidates for political leadership. 39
37Atatürk, "Mütarekeden Meclisin Açılmasına Kadar Geçen Zaman 
Zarfında Cereyan Eden Siyasi Olaylar Hakkında" (About Political Event 
Occurred in the Period Between the Armistice and the Opening of the 
Assembly), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 24 April, 1920, 30. According to
Mustafa Kemal, this understanding forms the basis of the national policy, 
together with the principle of national sovereignty. See ibid.
38Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, 92-97.
39Ibid.
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In this "forced" pluralism, the Circassian revolt in Bolu and 
Marmara regions (1920) was suppressed by the forces of another 
Circassian military commander, Ethem Bey. In this contingency, Kurds 
besides Circassians received particular attention. When Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha was in Samsun, he sent lots of telegrams to various places in 
Anatolia in order to assure and persuade that Turks and Kurds were co­
partners in the same struggle.
I had the zeal and determination to unite the Kurds and even the 
whole nation as genuine brothers around the same point and to 
show this to the world through the Societies for the Defence of 
National Rights (Müdafa-i Hukuk-u Milliye Cemiyetleri). 40
The themes emphasised by Mustafa Kemal in his telegrams to the
Kurdish tribal and religious leaders during the National Struggle were
two: the insult of the infidels against the high posts of the caliphate and
sultanate, and the occupation of the holy fatherland by Armenians. Islam
and the Armenian peril emerged as the common denominators of the
Turkish-Kurdish unity. In this respect, the careful use of the phrase
"Türkiye m illeti” (the nation of Turkey) instead of "Türk m illeti”
(Turkish nation) was a deliberate choice by Mustafa Kemal during the
years of the National Resistance. 41
4.7. Kemalist Way to Modernity: Aspects of Continuity and Change
4.7.1. Pragmatic, Non-doctrinal Character o f Kemalist Nationalism 
Kemalist tradition contains a deep commitment to westernisation 
in the nineteenth century sense of the term, meaning values and
40Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "15. Kolorduya Çektiği Telgraf” (The 
Telegram (Mustafa Kemal Pasha) Sent to the 15th Army Corps), in 
Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri , vol. IV, 34.
41Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, 101.
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institutions believed at the time to contain the secret of western 
economic and military power.
Modernisationist-developmentalist ideology of Kemalism is not a 
compact package of predetermined principles and projects, which 
distinguished Turkey from other countries trying to modernise under the 
banner of various brands of Marxism.42 However deep is the 
commitment to modernisation, Kemalism is not based on an elaborate 
and well-expressed doctrine.43 Yet, in Gellner's words, "No doubt there is
42According to Atatürk, the programme of the Republican People's 
Party constitutes the main guiding principles of government and politics. 
"But these principles must not be considered the same with the dogmas 
of the books thought to be revealed. We have taken our inspiration 
directly from life, not from the heaven and the unknown. " See "Beşinci 
Dönem Üçüncü Toplanma Yılını Açarken" (Opening the Third Meeting 
Year of the Fifth Period), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 01. 11. 1937, 423. This 
empiricist position preaching practicalism without theories is adopted 
also by Mussolini whose motto was "There is no need for dogma; 
discipline suffices." See George H. Sabine&Thomas L. Thorson, A History 
of Political Theory, 4th ed. (Tokyo: Dryden Press, 1981), 799. In an article in 
1924, Mussolini declared: " We Fascists have had the courage to discard all 
traditional political theories.... It is sufficient to have a single fixed point: 
the nation. The rest is obvious." Ibid., 800. Kemalist position seems to be 
no different.
43This point is emphatically expressed by many "disciples" of 
Atatürk. For example, Şükrü Kaya, the Ministry of the Interior, asserts 
th a t" The essence of the regime and its principles devised by the Turkish 
Republic is not constructed to adopt it to the abstract concepts made up by 
the philosophers of the past. They are the essentials taken from the new 
conditions , pains and necessities of history, they are the practice of a 
walking based on reality. " see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period V, vol. 16, 70- 
71. Maintaining the same point, Başar argues that the main principles 
cannot keep the eternal status of dogma and therefore must be amenable 
changes in life; because they are derived from life, and not vice versa. 
"To be against all kinds of dogmas is a leading feature of Kemalism." 
Ahmet Hamdi Başar, "Atatürk'ün İdeolojisi" (The Ideology of Atatürk), 
Cumhuriyet, 7 November 1937, 2. This view is also shared by İsmet 
İnönü. See "Ankara İnkılap Kürsüsünün Açılışı Münasebetiyle Başvekil 
İsmet Paşa Hazretleri İlk Dersi Verdi" (ismet Pasha Gave the First Lecture 
on the Occasion of the Opening of the Department of Renovation at
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a corpus of Kemalist hadith , but it is not specific enough to prejudge too 
many options in the Turkish path of development."44 RPP's 
programmes, as Atatürk himself acknowledges, are in fact form a political 
doctrine, which is called "Kamâlizm” in 1935 programme,45 and 
"Kemalizm” in 1939 programme. The fact that it is pragmatic and pays 
close attention to the "imperatives of life" does not put it outside the set 
of ideologies; it only shows that it belongs to the pragmatist family of 
ideologies.46
According to Gellner, Kemalism, like its predecessors' 
commitment to state-centric modernisation, had a state-based 
legitimation. 47 As Paul Stirling pointed out, during the early decades of 
its existence, the Kemalist republic had transformed the upper levels of
Ankara University), Ayın Tarihi, 4(April 1934), 36. As Safa observed, 
"Life is superior to doctrine." Safa, Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar, 194.
44Ernest Gellner, "Kemalism," in Ernest Gellner, Encounters with 
Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 83.
45According to the 1935 programme, "All these principles(the six 
arrows ) followed by the Party is the principles of Kamâlism." See CHP 
Programı (The Programme of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), 2.
46For this reason, Parla maintains that the argument that 
Kemalism was turned into an ideology after the death of Atatürk under 
the impact of the political conjuncture prevailing in Europe is out of 
basis. Because the Kemalist ideology was well crystallised in the 1935 RPP 
programme and its roots go back to 1920s. The 1935 programme is no 
different from that of 1931 and this date precedes the assuming of political 
power by the Nazis in Germany(1933). Therefore the distinction between 
Kemalism and Atatürkism is only a nominal one. See Taha Parla, 
Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti 
İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku (The Official Sources of Political Culture 
in Turkey: Kemalist One Party Ideology and the Six Arrows of RPP), vol.
3. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 19-24. For a view by Kazım Nami 
Duru, a deputy from Manisa, considering Kemalism as a social and 
political philosophy and the creed of the Turks, see CHP Beşinci Büyük 
Kurultayı Zabıtları (The Minutes of the Fifth General Congress of the 
Republican People's Party) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939), 86-87.
47Gellner, "Kemalism," 83.
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society, the state and the higher intellectual or ideological institutions, but 
left the mass of the peasantry largely untouched.48 The efforts for creating 
popular mobilisation through the establishment of People's Houses 
(Halk Evleri) and People's Rooms (Halk Odaları) in the 1930s did not 
register any considerable success.
Distinctively based on secularism and the state, and relatively free 
of rigid commitments to a predetermined doctrine, Kemalism was 
capable of pragmatic development, without having to worry about 
doctrinal prescriptions.49
4. 7. 2. "Historical" vs "Invented" Tradition: The Originality o f 
Kemalist Nationalism vs Its Contextual Historicity
The extent of the novelty of Kemalist nationalism and its roots or 
rootlessness in history is a much discussed but less clarified question. Yet 
this is awfully important in the diagnose of the "historically created" or 
"invented" character of the ethnic elements in the make-up of the 
Kemalist nationalism. Those who are inclined to glorify the person and 
ideas of Mustafa Kemal tend to stress its novelty more. On the other 
hand, those who point to the contextual crystallisation and historical 
roots of Kemalist nationalism put emphasis on the fact that it does not 
represent a starting point. Rather, it is a concluding point in the 
westernisation current going back to the Tanzimat (Reform) period, and 
therefore, should be considered from an historical perspective.
48Paul Stirling, "Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Toplumsal Değişme ve 
Toplumsal Denetim" (Social Change and Social Control in Republican 
Turkey), in Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar: Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu 
(Papers and Discussions: International Symposium on Atatürk) (Ankara: 
Türkiye îş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), 556-562.
49Gellner, "Kemalism," 90-91.
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According to Yakup Kadri, a fervent Kemalist journalist and 
novelist and Atatiirk's long time advisor and spokesman,50 there is no 
link between Kemalist nationalist regime and the Ottoman 
constitutionalist movement. The works of a handful of Turkists, like 
Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gôkalp, in the period of the Society for Union 
and Progress(1908-1918) cannot be said to have inspired Mustafa Kemal. 
Turkish Republic is a completely new and original entity. It is a total 
novelty and has pioneered many regimes appeared during the post-world 
war political crisis. 51
In diametrical opposition to this "tabula rasa" thesis of Kemalist 
modernisation in terms of both context and content, Mardin asserts that 
"social thought never starts with a clean slate. The contributions of social
50Sabri M. Akurgal, "Kemalist Views on Social Change," in 
Atatürk and the Modernisation o f Turkey , ed., Jacob M. Landau (Boulder- 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 130.
51Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Atatürk: Bir Tahlil Denemesi 
(Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971), 72. While forwarding his thesis of 
complete novelty, Karaosmanoğlu admits that Lenin's "Soviets system" 
is as original as Mustafa Kemal's system of "tevhid-i kuvva" 
(concentration of powers), with a remark of exception: "The Turkist 
reformist was not the disciple of a revolutionary master like Karl Marx; 
nor did he has principles empowered by the technical force of Marxist 
dialectics of half-century year old under his hands. He was a solitary man 
among the problems and needs of a nation still unidentified and 
unclassified. He himself would put the diagnose, process the raw realities 
and create their synthesis out of his mind." Ibid., 73. In opposition to 
Karaosmanoğlu's thesis of "complete novelty," Mahmut Esat, a leading 
ideologue of Kemalism, suggests that the Kemalists have their 
intellectual predecessors in the Ottoman Empire. The Kemalist 
Revolution rested on an centennial culture. There is no doubt that 
Tanzimat thinking and the two constitutional periods nurtured in 
ideological and institutional terms the Republican Revolution. In its easy 
adaptation to the new institutions this centennial culture played a key 
role. The revolution was based on the past economic, political and social 
causes, and takes its meaning from the historical destiny. See Mahmut 
Esat Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali (Atatürk Revolution) (Istanbul: Altın 
Kitaplar Yaymevi, 1967), 374-380.
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innovators, therefore, become fully meaningful only when their 
proposals are set in the framework of their institutional and intellectual 
inheritance." 52 This holds true for a series of reforms which were carried 
out in Turkey in the 1920s and the 1930s. Saying that Kemalist reforms 
can be better understood when seen from historical-contextual 
perspective makes our understanding of identifying where Kemalism 
stands in the meeting of the so-called East and West better. Taking into 
account "the cultural background" both in terms of events and 
traditional as well as institutional arrangements provides us with a more 
clear picture of Kemalist reforms in historical context.
In this respect, Mardin suggests that there are at least two 
antecedents of Kemalist secularising reforms in the Ottoman history, 
namely Kemalist position as to the function of religion in society and 
the methods which it used to translate its teaching into policy. Its position 
on religion reflects empiricist thought prevailed in the secular 
administration of the Ottoman Empire. The method of legislation it used 
to implement its teaching had its forerunners in the policies of the 
nineteenth century Ottoman modernising statesmen. 53 Parla seems to 
share the same view with a lesser emphasis on the elements of continuity 
when he suggests that Kemalism is essentially not a product of Ottoman 
political culture but a new synthesis of the westemism making use of the 
Ottoman political culture and borrowing certain elements from it. In this 
sense, Kemalism is determinative and pioneering. 54
52§erif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," in Atatürk 
Founder o f a Modern State , eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun 
(London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 191.
53Ibid., 192.
54Parla, Atatürk'ün Nutuku 173-175.
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Rustow, on the other hand, puts emphasis on the revolutionary 
character of Kemalist institutional reforms, namely the proclamation of 
the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the adoption of the Swiss 
civil code. These innovations brought about a drastic change of direction 
from the Ottoman and Islamic past such that implementation of the 
programme of nationalism and integral westernisation would have 
seemed visionary only a decade before.55 Despite this radical change in 
ideological and institutional orientation, there was not any break in 
institutional continuity, however. The durability of the new institutions 
was essentially caused by their preparation and testing beforehand.
The substitution of national for dynastic sovereignty implied a 
momentous change; yet in at least two basic respects, Kemalist 
modernisation carried the inheritance of the Ottoman tradition. The 
Ottoman polity was a ghazi and hence a military-centred polity. But the 
continuos waves of military defeats caused an irreparable loss of 
legitimacy. Mustafa Kemal had asserted the new principle of national
55 Rustow, "Atatürk As an Institution-Builder," 71. One must 
remember that Abdullah Cevdet presented his programme of radical 
westernisation as a utopian dream in his periodical İçtilıad in 1912: "Pek 
Uyanık Bir Uyku" (A Very Wakeful Sleep). In his vision of the future, 
the fez would be abolished and a new headgear adopted. Women would 
dress as they pleased without the obligation of the Quranic injunction of 
tesettür. Polygamy would be abolished. Convents and tekkes would be 
closed down. Turban, cloak and so on, would be limited to certificated 
professional men of religion and forbidden to others. Vows and offerings 
to the saints would be prohibited and the money saved in that way 
devoted to national defence. Popular misconceptions of Islam would be 
corrected. A purified Ottoman-Turkish dictionary and grammar would 
be established by a committee of philologists and men of letters. Starting 
with the land evkaf laws, the whole legal system would be reformed. 
See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 231-232. For the full text of "Pek Uyanık Bir 
Uyku" see Safa, Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar, 57-61. This utopian vision of 
the most radical and uncompromised westemist was nearly completely 
realised during the Kemalist era ( 1924-1938).
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sovereignty in a series of military victories as the Ottoman state did. His' 
shift, following the victory, to educational reforms was equally true to the 
original Ottoman spirit: the palace schools (enderun and birun) in which 
the military and civil servants(kuls) of sultans were trained had been 
among the most characteristic Ottoman institutions from the 
beginning.56
In line with Mardin, Davison lends emphasis to the aspects of 
continuity. According to him, "the new state could not be created out of 
thin air."57 Human, cultural and economic resources possessed by the 
Empire were all inherited by the Republic. This was also to a large extent 
true of political resources: governmental institutions, administrative 
practices and political concepts. 58 Despite the breakdown of the Ottoman 
Empire and the removal of the sultan-caliph, much of the imperial body 
politic remained, being reflected in the denunciation of the sultan but the 
acceptance of the heritages of political concepts and institutions from the 
Ottoman Empire without any condemnation: constitution, cabinet, 
parliament, elections, deputies, vilayet, vali, mutasarnf.
What the Republic took over from the Empire came mostly from 
the Tanzimat period, though certain elements came from the Hamidian 
and Second Constitutional Periods. The Tanzimat period in broad terms 
is a seed-time in which ideas and institutions which later came to fruition 
under the Republic first took root.
56Ibid., 72.
57Roderic H. Davison, "Atatürk's Reforms: Back to the Roots," in 
Roderic H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. 
The Impact o f the West (USA: University of Texas Press, 1990), 243.
58Ibid.
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According to Davison, the Republican inheritance of the Ottoman 
concepts and institutions have had a wide coverage indeed. Among these 
are the concept of the state as the fatherland of its people, the concept that 
sovereignty should be complete and unfringed, and the concept of state as 
an indivisible territorial unit, which are concerned with the nature of 
the state as a whole.59 The concept of people as individual citizens of a 
state, not as members of a religious community from which they drive 
their civil status, the concept of the equality of all citizens before the law 
and the concept of guaranteed individual rights and civil liberties are 
concerned with the position of the individual within the state.60 The 
concept of the right of the people to governmental representation, the 
concept of a written constitution along western models, the concept of the 
popular control of the government, the concept of responsible 
government and the concept of separation of powers focus on the 
question of who is to control the government.61 The last two concepts 
inherited by Kemalism without any reservation are the concept of an 
expanded sphere of governmental activity and responsibility (positive 
state),62 which relates to the scope of governmental activity.
Against this background, it is an established fact that many aspects 
of Kemalism go back to the Ottoman past, the most prominent of which 
being a modified version of Turkist nationalism. 63 Kemalism
59Ibid„ 244-246.
60Ibid., 246-249.
61Ibid., 249- 255.
62Ibid., 256-260.
63Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the 
Nationalist Action Party of Turkey," C.E.M.O.T.l, 13(January-May 1992), 
41-142. See also Orhan Türkdoğan, Atatürk'te Milli Devlet Anlayışı
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constituted a continuum with the Tanzimat, Young Ottomans and Young 
Turks, as far as its major concern was the state considered as the main 
source of legitimacy in the society. It also had to rely on the officials, 
legitimating symbols and certain traditional values of the former regime, 
until it could impose a newly-defined legitimacy. The fact that 93 percent 
of the Empire's staff officers and 85 percent of its civil servants retained 
their positions in the republic 64 shows the extent of "bureaucratic 
continuity" between the old and the new regimes. In building the 
modern state however, Kemalists were successful in narrowing the gap 
between the political centre and the periphery and in mobilising societal 
resources, which created the alliance between status elites and 
economically active social groups. This interest to periphery, unlike from 
Ottoman patrimonialism, was associated with the identification of saving 
the state with the nation. 65
The economic nationalism of the Young Turks based on positivist 
solidarism and implemented through a national economic policy 
constituted the economic pillar of the Kemalist state. The political 
economy of the Young Turk regime was the forerunner of that of the 
Kemalist republic, which regarded economic sovereignty as the basis of 
political independence. The assertion that state elites should serve as 
guides to the nation in every fields including economics was a common 
denominator of Young Turks and Kemalists.
(Atatiirk's Nation-State Understanding) (Istanbul: Türk Dünyasını 
Araştırma Vakfı, 1981), 113.
64Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military: Turkey" in P olitica l 
Modernisation in Japan and Turkey , eds., Robert E. Ward and Dankwart 
A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 338.
65Ali Kazancigil, "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," in 
Atatürk: Founder o f A Modern State,, eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun 
özbudun ( London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 49.
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Ideologically, Mustafa Kemal held a position close to westernist 
and positivist Young Turks. He firmly believed in progress and science, 
and was an heir to nationalist, secularist and populist trends. His 
nationalism was territorial in scope and carried a strong content of racial- 
ethnic elements.66 His secularism was the extension of the Cevdetian 
conception of the place of Islam in daily life. It was Mustafa Kemal who 
transformed Cevdet's socio-political utopia into a reality,67 the mainstay 
of which was the claim that "there is no second civilisation; civilisation 
means European civilisation, and it must be imported with its roses and 
thorns" 68 His populism used as an ideological instrument in forging the 
alliance of the state elites and the civil elites had a changing content 
according to changing political circumstances. The final definition which 
was contained in the 1931 programme of the RPP reflected an elitist, "for 
the people, with or without the people" kind of populism.69
The Kemalist state could best be characterised as Jacobean. With its 
positivist, secularist and nationalist ideology, it was a "paradigmatic 
revolution"70 which distinguished Young Turks and Kemalists from the
66The claims that "Atatürk did not have any racial prejudice" 
reflects a superficial bias rather than a critical opinion, as would be 
substantiated later. See, for example, Akurgal, "Kemalist Views on Social 
Change," 131.
67Dankwart A. Rustow, The Founding o f a Nation-State: Atatürk’s 
Historic Achievement (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981), 15.
68Quoted by Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 231.
69Ibid., 51.
70This phrase is borrowed from İlkay Sunar, "Anthropologie 
politique et economique: l'Empire Ottomen etsa transformation," 
Annales: Economies, Societies, Civilisations, 35: 3-4 (May-Aug. 1980), 
571; quoted by Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," 
48.
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previous traditional Ottoman elites. The Kemalist movement, following 
the Young Turk regime, brought about drastic changes into the Turkish 
polity. As a "revolution from above" however, it was not a social 
revolution. There were no insurrections in the cities or rural areas and it 
was commoners who participated in the Kemalist movement as soldiers 
and not as revolutionaries. 71
Against this background one can legitimately claim that the 
Kemalist republic was radically different from the Ottoman Empire of 
classical as well as modern periods. Nevertheless, the idea that the 
concepts and doctrines such as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean 
positivism and solidarism are imported from the French Revolution and 
nineteenth century scientism by Kemalism does not reflect the whole 
reality in that, as it is seen,'in many instances Kemalism inherited them 
from the intellectual wealth accumulated by several generations of 
Ottoman-Turkish reformers and nationalists.
Kemalism, building on the reform movements in the Ottoman 
Empire of the last two centuries, led them to their ultimate consequence: 
the creation of a modem Turkish state. Therefore, the emergence of the 
modern Turkish state and Kemalist nationalism cannot be properly 
analysed and explained without duly taking into account these elements 
of continuity. 72 This does not negate the fact that Kemalism represents a 
radical break from the past, which transformed Turkey from a military- 
religious empire into a modern nation-state in which the secular 
nationalist doctrine replaced Islam as the cultural foundation and overall
71Kazancigil, ibid.
72For a parallel view see Nora Şeni, "Anti-Kemalistlere Kötü 
Haber" (Bad News to Anti-Kemalists), Interview by Nilüfer Kuyaş, 
Milliyet, Entellektüel Bakış, 17 June 1996, 18.
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ideology of the polity. In the last analysis, Kemalism must be 
considered as the last response to the age-old question of the Ottoman- 
Turkish elites: how can this state be saved? 73
As Einstadt observed, from the view point of discontinuities, 
Kemalism first realised a shift in the basis of political legitimation and the 
symbols of the political community, together with the redefinition of the 
boundaries of the collectivity. Due to the nationalist and anti-religious 
character of the Kemalist ideology,74 the redefinition of political 
community took place in a unique way: the society withdrew from the 
Islamic framework into that of the newly-defined Turkish nation. This 
process involved the negation of a universal framework: Islam. Thus, 
the Kemalist revolution
rejected completely the religious basis of legitimation and 
attempted instead to develop a secular national one, as the major 
ideological parameter of the new collectivity, with very little 
emphasis on the social components of ideologies. This shift was 
connected with an almost total displacement of the former ruling 
class-political as well as religious- by the members of the secondary 
(bureaucratic and intellectual) elites.75
Secularism emerged as the bedrock of Kemalist nationalism such 
that whatever might constitute a potential or real impediment on the 
way of creating the new "secular Turkish man" was overwhelmed by the 
state, namely, Islam, ethnicity, sectarianism, social class, and even 
liberalism.
73Bülent Daver, "Atatürk ve Sosyo-Politik Sistem Görüşü" 
(Atatürk and His View of Socio-Political System), in Çağdaş Düşüncenin 
Işığında Atatürk (Istanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 247.
74S. N. Einstadt, "The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative 
Perspective," in Atatürk: Founder o f A Modern State , eds., Ali Kazancigil 
and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 138.
75 Ibid.,135.
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4. 8. T he G en eral Landscape o f T u rk ey  in  1923 from  the K em alist 
V antage P oint
At first glance, the general landscape of Turkey at the outset of the 
republic exhibited the characteristics of a situation of "total nothingness." 
All commercial and industrial enterprises were owned by the British, 
French and German companies. There was hardly any industry. Farming 
methods were entirely traditional. There was no mechanisation 
whatsoever. Custom protection for domestic products was not possible 
due to the provision of the Lausanne Treaty fixing tariffs until 1929. 
Budget deficit was a usual thing, which was tried to be balanced through 
the foreign debts taken with high rates of interest (around 70 percent). 
Duyun-1 Umumiye (Public Debt Administration) have held reserves on 
state revenues. In socio-economic terms, Turkey was still characterised by 
tribal relations, despite the continuos efforts of the reformist state to 
widen its authority. 76
According to the Church records of the pre-World war I, the 
proportion of non-Turk and non-Muslim population to the whole 
population in Anatolia was approximately 40 percent.77 Interestingly 
enough, the Kemalist republic brought about a "Turkey without 
Christians." This was not the consequence of "a tragedy of bigotry," 
however. The Armenian calamity was due to their collaboration with
76Ali Kemal Meram, Türkçülük ve Türkçülük Mücadeleleri Tarihi 
(Turkism and The History of Turkist Struggles) (Istanbul: Kültür 
Kitabevi, 1969), 195. Meram's book is a study in "scientific Turkism", i.e., 
Kemalism, and in its general highlights, it is a sheer praise of westemist 
Turkism.
77Falih Rıfkı Atay, Ç/ınkaya: Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne 
Kadar (Çankaya. From the Birth of Atatürk to His Death) (Istanbul, 1969), 
449. Church records are reliable because their population registers formed 
the official basis of taxation for administrations of the Christian millets
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the Russian invasion forces. It is a pity that it was this tragedy that fuelled 
the movement of Kuvay-i Milliye. The victorious states had the aim of 
establishing an Armenian state extending from Caucasian borders to 
Cilicia. The Western Anatolia had come under the Greek invasion after 
the Treaty of Mudros (30 October, 1918). The basis of this Greek 
domination was the Greek population living in western Anatolia and 
the Black Sea coasts. The War of Independence ended up with the 
clearing of Armenian and Greek populations from Anatolia. For the first 
time in the history of Anatolia, it has purely become the homeland of 
Muslim Turks except a small proportion of non-Muslim minorities 
within the inner spheres of Istanbul walls.
The clearing of Anatolia and Thrace from Christian population had 
its cost as well. The foundations of the national economy were shaken. 
Because Turks were involved in administrative and military affairs only, 
most of commercial, agricultural and industrial activities were carried out 
by the non-Muslims. In their absence, large lands remained uncultivated, 
and handicrafts, foreign trade and industrial enterprises nearly ceased to 
exist.
Anatolia and Thrace were burned and ruined in successive, 
continuos wars. Thus, everything had to be reconstructed with native 
resources. Yet, the budget of the new state was only 12 million pounds. 78
Decolonisation/nationalisation of railways and the liquidation of 
foreign debts were imminent questions to be tackled. In the absence of 
national bourgeoisie, only state could undertake such an imperative. 
Therefore, etatism in new Turkey necessarily meant nationalism. The 
foreign companies in Turkey did not employ Turks and use Turkish in 
their workings. The prescribed task of Kemalists therefore was to
78Ibid., 449-451.
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eradicate the racist fixation that "Turks cannot do!"79 Thus came the 
motto of Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene ! (How fortunate is he who says I am 
a Turk) in order to create "happy Turkish man"
4. 9. "P an” Politico-C ultural System s and K em alist N ation alism
4.9.1. The Rise o f Milli Siyaset(National Policy)
In contrast to the multinational Ottoman Empire hosting such 
ethno-religious communities as Muslims, Christians, Jews, Turks, Arabs, 
Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Serbs, and Bulgarians, the newly proclaimed 
Turkish Republic was ethnically homogeneous in the wide sense of the 
term. Over 90 percent of its population spoke Turkish as their mother- 
tongue, and over 98 percent of its population accepted Islam as their 
religion.80
The transition from the empire to the republic terminated all kinds 
of "international brotherhood" dreams, namely Ottomanism, 
international communism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. The 
"retractionist" character of Kemalist nationalism in territorial terms was 
pre-emptive for all kinds of irredentist intentions. Specifically, the 
boundaries drawn by the National Pact, which confirmed the lines drawn 
by the peace treaty of 1913 at the end of the Balkan wars, and by the
79The mood of the period is well reflected when the Turkish 
government attempted to buy the shares of a foreign bank. The answer 
the government received was "Turks cannot do banking. If you leave 
money to us, we would manage it and provide you with its interest" 
Waging a successful war of liberation but being unable to do banking was 
a reflection of western imperial bias as to the inner inability of Turks to 
create change with its own internal dynamics, a classic view of the 
nineteenth century orientalism. See Atay, Çankaya, 452-453.
80Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-Builder," 59. Of course, these 
figures are official, and therefore, based on the deliberate acceptance of the 
ethnic homogeneity of the population of Turkey.
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armistice of 1918 at the end of the First World War, became the 
irreducible territory of the new Turkish Republic. This territorialism had 
no Islamic reference whatsoever due to the disestablishment of Islam as 
the frame of political legitimacy. The more universal boundaries 
suggested by Turkic and Islamic frames of references thus were negated 
in view of the national imperative as construed by Mustafa Kemal.
During the National Struggle, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his 
associates had an accomodationist approach contrary to their future 
stance. The speeches and statements of Mustafa Kemal Pasha between 
1919-1924 are full of religious themes. In this period, the Ottoman trend of 
secularisation experienced a heavy blow, the clear reflection of which was 
the ban put on the consumption and production of alcoholic beverages 
through the law entitled Men-i Müskirat Kanunu (The Law for the 
Prohibition of Alcoholic Beverages).81
In contrast to the near absence of the national consciousness, the 
religious allegiance and the feeling of solidarity formed around the idea 
of umma were very powerful at the popular level. Instead of being 
stamped by the people as "freemason" meaning irreligious, it was 
contingently more "rational" to make instrumental use of religion in 
deterring the opposition forces of both Pan-Turkists and Pan-Islamists. 
The forbidance of non-Muslims to participate in the elections for the new 
National Assembly due to their general state of "rebellion against the 
state" in collaboration with the invasion forces, and accordingly, the use 
of "anti-crusade" discourse  ^ in the mobilisation of war-tired peasants 
formed the ideological basis of the ethnic coalition between Muslim
81 TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası (Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Journal of Laws), vol. 1, Law No: 22,14 September 1336 (1920), 23.
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elements, namely Turks, Kurds, Lazes and Circassians. In other words, 
the Islamic allegiance was the driving force of the National Struggle. 82 
Apart from Islam, the Kemalist cadre had an accomodationist 
approach towards international communism as well. This stance 
basically stemmed from the practical imperatives of the day. The urgent 
need for the Soviet support made a necessity for the national 
government to tolerate the existence of a pseudo-communist party of 
Turkey. But the decision in the Third International to support national 
liberation movements all over the world without any distinction made 
unnecessary to stay seemingly close to Bolshevism in order to obtain 
Soviet help. To be against the capitalist world was considered adequate, 
and almost all national liberation movements were in struggle against 
capitalist imperialism.83
82On the floor walls of the National Assembly there was a verse 
from the Qur’an , which read: "Their works among them are through 
consultation."See A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Quran (Beirut: Dar A1 Arabiya, 
19687, Sura XLII, Shura, the Verse 38,1317. Pointing to this verse, a deputy 
from Kastamonu, Ahmet Mahir Efendi, underlined the fact that it was 
the spirit of this verse that gave life to the Muslim ethnic coalition 
including Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, Georgians and Albanians formed 
around the goal of the independence of the country. See TBMM Zabıt 
Ceridesi, vol. 14, 213, dated 21. 02.1341(1924).
83The position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as regards to Bolshevism 
may be grasped from his following statements: "The new Turkey has no 
relationship with the old one. The Ottoman government remained in the 
past. Now, a new Turkey has emerged, though the nation has not 
changed. The same Turkish element comprise this nation. But the way of 
government has changed... One should not forget that this way of 
government is not that of Bolshevism. Because we are neither Bolshevik 
nor communist." Atatürk, "Petit Parisien Muhabirine Verilen Demeç" 
(The Statement to the Correspondent of Petit Parisien),Söylev ve 
Demeçler I I I , 2 November 1922, 72.
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After the War of Independence, Kemalists ended their war-time 
tactical alliance with Islam and Islamic forces. Already they had ended 
their putative link with Bolsheviks.84
Creation of a totally • homogeneous Turkey without resorting to 
racial or religious-based irredentism, and through commitment to the 
idea of secular progress basically by use of such means as legislation and 
education apart from the exploitation of sheer power and de facto 
administrative measures, the common manifestations of socio-political 
engineering, have been the qualifying characteristics of the Kemalist 
ethno-secular nationalism. As referred before, Kemalist nationalism 
represents a radical and relatively successful response to the age-old 
question of "how to save the state? "By attempting to create a new 
collective identity, it tried to do this mainly through "a revolution of 
national honour" and hence emphasised the virtues, sometimes of inner 
character, of being Turkish. Kemalist historical answer regarding the 
state of "the state" can be better grasped in comparative view of other self- 
sufficient ideological programmes preceding the Republican era
In the period of the Second Constitution (1908-1918) there were 
three discernible ideological currents in the Ottoman Empire: Islamism, 
Westernism and Turkism. The programme of Islamists was dedicated to 
Pan-Islamism (the politico-cultural union of all Muslims). Its main 
argument had a defensive-apologetic character: Islam is not an 
impediment to material progress. Rather, it encourages and even 
necessitates material growth. In doing this, it differentiated between 
technology, considered to be universal not western, and culture seen as 
inherently western and therefore "alien" Since Islam considered to be
84Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, 107.
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the source of all perfections, the Islamic law could be codified to cope with 
the problems posed by the intrusion of "modernity" into the Empire.85
The westernist programme is concisely worded in Abdullah 
Cevdet’s renown article "A Very Wakeful Sleep" (Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku ), 
summary of which was noted before. 86
The Turkist programme reflected a conciliation to some extent 
between the Islamist and westernist programmes; but it had also its 
distinct character. It emphasised the great unity of all Turks (Pan- 
Turkism). Its conception of history was not limited to Islamic times; but 
extended back to the pre-islamic period. Simplification and purification 
were two major aspects of their proposed language reform. Turkish unity 
was considered as a subset of Islamic unity. In fact, it had the trio of 
"Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak" (Turkification, Islamization, 
Modernisation) as its motto. Yet the position of Islam in this trio was 
secondary and instrumental. National economy (milli iktisat) and 
national literature (milli edebiyat) were other points of importance. 87 In 
fact, Turkism formed the driving forces of westernisation in this period 
with its emphasis on the construction of a new, simple language, the 
development of a Turkist interpretation of Islam and the participation of 
women in public life. 88
Out of these three rival ideological programmes, Kemalist ideology 
was influenced by the westernist programme most, and Islamist
85For the programme of Islamists, see Safa, Türk inkılabına 
Bakışlar 62-67.
«¿Ibid., 57-61.
87 Ibid., 52-56.
88Hans Kohn, Türk Milliyetçiliği (Turkish Nationalism), trans. 
(Ankara, 1944), 38.
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programme least. Important steps had already been taken for the 
implementation of the westernist programme in the Ottoman Empire. 
Particularly, the participation of women in public life both in work and 
education, the abolition of polygamy, discreet experiences for the use of 
Latin alphabet and the introduction of secular laws and courts took place 
well before the occurrence of a Kemalist revolution. 89
What Mustafa Kemal did was to radically change the basis of the 
legitimacy of the political system by creating a new power space. Its 
reception of the West was total, with its "rose and thorn." It viewed 
westernisation not as a means but an end , and identified with it through 
making "a revolution based on symbols." Kemalism was an effort of 
"westernisation through Turkification". 90
It is difficult to dissociate the establishment of the Turkish national 
state from the War of Independence in the process of the making of the 
Kemalist nationalism. The adoption of the idea of national sovereignty 
and its embodiment through the opening of the Grand National 
Assembly were in fact a de facto change of political regime. A national 
government pursuing a national policy was a direct remnant of the 
period of National Struggle.
89For a thesis stressing the fact that Kemalist ideology is the 
continuation of Tanzimat and the period of the Second 
Constitution(1908-1918), see Aykut Kansu, The Elusive Transformation: 
The Revolution o f 1908 in Turkey (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997). For the 
Turkish translation of the same study see Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi 
trans. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1995).
90"His (Mustafa Kemal's) life and experiences had him to believe 
that we cannot save ourselves unless we become a westernised nation 
and western state." See Atay, Çankaya 369-370.
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4.9.2. Kemalist Nationalism and Milli Siyaset (The National Policy) 
It is a self-evident fact that Kemalist nationalism openly rejected 
the "three ways of policy", namely Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan- 
Turkism as a solution for saving the state. It embraced a well-defined 
territorialism imbued with ethnic elements of a Turkic character, 
symbolised in the name of Turk . 91
The fourth point in a telegram sent to the province of Sivas and 
the Central Committee by Mustafa Kemal Pasha entitled "Basının Dikkate 
Alacağı Hususlar" (Points to be Noticed by the Press) recommended to the 
pro-national press to avoid in their publications about the Muslim 
World from Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist propaganda, and to declare that 
national movements in Asia are simply movements aiming at the 
achievement of the cause x>f independence by Muslim nations within 
their boundaries. 92
The National Policy cleared of Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist 
inclinations found its best expression in the words of Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha:
...It is an unrealisable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe all the 
Turks existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. 
There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Pan- 
Islamism and Pan-Turanism could have succeeded or how they 
could have found a basis for their realisation on this earth. As 
regards the result of the ambition to organise a state which should 
be governed by the idea of world-supremacy and include the whole 
of humanity without distinction of race, history does not afford 
examples of this. For us, there can be no question of the lust of 
conquest. On the other hand, the theory which aims at founding an 
"humanitarian" state which shall embrace all mankind in perfect 
equality and brotherhood and at bringing it to the point of
91 Afet inan, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım (What I 
Have written Down From Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1971), 121.
92Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri 251.
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forgetting separatist sentiments and inclinations of every kind is 
subject to conditions which are peculiar to itself.
The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is 
national policy. In view of the general conditions obtaining in the 
world at present and the truths which in the course of centuries 
have rooted themselves in the minds of and have formed the 
characters of mankind, no greater mistake could be made than that 
of being utopian. This is borne out in history and is the expression 
science, reason and common sense.
In order that our nation be able to live a happy, strenuous and 
permanent life, it is necessary that the State pursue an exclusively 
national policy and that this policy be in perfect agreement with 
our internal organisation and be based on it. When I speak of 
national policy, I mean it in this sense: To work within our 
national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the 
nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength 
in order to retain our existence. We must not lead the people to 
follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which can only bring 
them misfortune, we expect from the civilised world a civilised 
human treatment, friendship based on mutuality.93
These words are a concise expression of non-imperialist, non­
expansionist, anti-irredentist aspect of Kemalist nationalism. They are an 
outright reflection of territorial nationalism based not on ethnic bond or 
race but on collective sense of belonging and culture.94 However, 
ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism includes racial/ethnicist 
elements going well beyond the defensive nature of the "liberation 
nationalism s" and this makes a hidden shadow on the 
territorial/political charactef of Kemalist nationalism. Taken the ethnic 
hegemony of Turks as given, the ethnicist grasp of Kemalist nationalism 
has had an understanding of national character considered to be natural, 
fixed and superior rather than formed in socio-historical contingencies. 
The cult of personality formed around Mustafa Kemal, "Biiyilk Reis
93Atatürk, A Speech , 379-380.
94Parla, Atatürk'ün Nutuku , 76.
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(the Great Chief), is another important manifestation of an atavistic 
political culture95 to be dealt with in the following section.
4.9.3. Question o f AppellatiomThe Idea o f an Anatolian Homeland 
versus Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist Universalism
In the first decade of the twentieth century the name of Turkey was 
not either a political or a geographic concept in the Ottoman political 
vocabulary. It was rather a European misnomer for the Ottoman 
Empire.96 In the process of the transformation of religious communities 
into political groupings, the word of Turk still carried over its pejorative 
meaning of illiterate, poor peasants of Islamic faith. Since the Empire 
known as the "Ottoman," when the Kemalist Republic decided to change 
its name it had to adopt the Turkish version of the Italian word 
"Turchia" due to the absence of a Turkish counterpart for Turkey.97
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia emerged as the 
homeland of the newly rising Turkish national state. The idea of Turkish 
nation-state seemed something natural to the educated class only. Yet, for 
the Pan-Turkist intellectual circles, the idea of a new Pan-Turkish Empire 
appeared more attractive. Mustafa Kemal categorically opposed to such 
options on the ground that no new adventure could be afforded by the 
nation.
95Parla, Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku 210-
211.
96Rustow, The Founding o f A Nation-State: Atatürk's Historic 
Achievement, 1.
97Kohn, Türk Milliyetçiliği, 29. For an elaborate treatment of the 
origin of the name of Turkey, see Ismail Hami Danişment, Türklük  
Meseleleri (Questions of Turkishness) (Istanbul: Istanbul Kitabevi, 1983), 
154-159.
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Other than the option of "Turkish Republic" that the Kemalists 
espoused, there were basically two suggestions as regards the name of the 
new state: "Anatolian Republic" proposed by the Pan-Turkists and 
"Islamic Republic of Turkey" suggested by the so-called "Islamists". Since 
Islam was thought to have no place whatsoever in the "living space” of 
the new regime, nothing could have the chance of life that made 
reference to Islam.
Those who proposed the name of the Republic of Anatolia 
criticised the appellation of the national history in relation to a dynasty, 
like the appellations of Seljukian or Ottoman Turks. 98 Because in every 
case the same nation was renamed differently, while the changing thing 
was the dynasties only. 99 Therefore, our national history should be 
understood as covering all Turkish ethnies establishing states in 
Azerbaijan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Russia, Horasan, India, Türkistan, Mongolia 
and China. Hence the name of Turkey cannot be the peculiar name of our 
national history. The right name, accordingly, could be history of 
Anatolian Turks or just history of Anatolia. 100 Thus, the appellation of 
"Turkish Republic" should be avoided. The suggestion was the Turkish 
Republic of Anatolia.
However, the new regime was both anti-Pan-Turkism and Pan- 
Islamism. Mustafa Kemal's choice, Turkey, reflected the anti- 
dynastic(non-Ottoman), non-Islamic and territorially limited Turkishness 
with an ethnoterritorial connotation, the main parameters of Kemalist
98See Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, "Milli Tarihimizin Adi"(The Name 
of Our National History), in Milli Tarihimizin Adi (Istanbul: Hareket 
Yayınları, 1969), 13-14.
"Ibid., 16.
100Ibid., 18.
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nationalism. 101 The term vatan experienced a shift of meaning and was 
relieved of its Islamic content that "the fatherland of a Muslim is the 
place where the Şeriat prevails". The new idea of Turkish fatherland 
replaced pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist appeals and a new loyalty to 
Turkish homeland was inculcated through the Kemalist thesis of 
history.102
4.9.4. National Humanitarianism o f Kemalist Nationalism
Unlike its contemporaries in Germany , Italy and USSR, Kemalist 
one-party state was essentially pacific, which nourished no territorial or 
political ambitions at the expense of other countries. Policy of peaceful 
coexistence under the motto of "Peace at home and peace abroad," were 
Mustafa Kemal's catchword. The Kemalist nationalist elites were 
determined in joining the race of progress together with the "civilised" 
nations and having their place in their sides. Kemalist nationalism did 
not conceal any intention of reconquest or revision of frontiers. "Of all 
the dictatorial regimes that of Turkey had been alone in basing itself on a 
policy not of expansion but retraction."103
Kemalist nationalism in its outer face was not parochial. Empires 
were something of the past and the day of nations had arrived. But this 
has not negated the fact that the welfare of nations was interdependent. 
As Mustafa Kemal observed,
101Bozkurt Güvenç, Türk Kimliği: Kültür Tarihinin Ana 
Kaynakları (Turkish Identity: The Main Sources of Cultural History) 
(Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1996), 227.
102 Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey , 352-353.
103Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth o f A Nation (London: 
Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 458.
236
We must think of the whole mankind as being a single body and 
of each nation as constituting a part of that body.... We must not 
say, "If there is sickness in a certain place in the world, what does 
that matter to me?... If there is such sickness, we must be just as 
much concerned with as though it happened right in our midst. 
This way of thinking liberates peoples, nations and governments 
from selfishness.104
According to him, the world nations were the residents of an 
apartment building, interests of which being interrelated.105
Kemalist nationalism recognises the imperatives of nation-state 
system as equal for all nations and refuses national ego-centrism in this 
regard.106 It demands the recognition of the right of national self- 
determination for all nations as a universal principle. 107 The national 
humanism of Kemalist nationalism values national existence as the 
highest political value. In this context, the "normal entity" for Kemalist 
nationalism is a nation state united with a special political consciousness 
being visible in the national unity and uniformity. Any formation 
outside this normality is considered to constitute a permanent threat to 
the world peace. By assuring the national homogeneity through the 
application of national principle, a state can become a founding stone for
104"Romanya Dışişleri Bakanı Antonescu İle Konuşma" (Talk with 
The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonescu), Söylev ve 
Demeçler II, 17 March 1937, 326. See also Ulus , 20 March 1937.
105"Yeni Vaziyet"(The New Situation), Söylev ve Demeçler III, 21 
June 1935, 138.
106"Erzurum Milletvekili Durak ve Arkadaşlarının, Şark Cephesi 
Kuvvetlerinin Mütecavizlere Karşı Mukabele Etmemeleri Sebeplerinin 
Bildirilmesi Hakkındaki Sual Takriri Üzerine,"(On the Interpellation of 
Erzurum Deputy Durak and His Friends Regarding the Reporting of the 
Causes of the Failing to Retaliate Against Aggressors by the Forces in the 
Eastern Front), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 14 August 1920, 102.
107"Üçüncü Toplanma Yılını Açarken"(Opening The Third 
Meeting Year), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 March 1922, 251.
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the peaceful coexistence of interstate system. Kemalism has achieved this 
s ta te  thanks to its "national humanism" based on the national 
consciousness rather than the individual reason as was the case in the old 
conception of humanism. 108
In terms of the relevance of three ways of policy to Kemalist 
national policy, cultural Pan-Turkism was particularly relevant, which 
shared many commonalties with Kemalist nationalism.
4.9.5. Pan-Turkism and Kemalist ■ Nationalism
The distinguishing feature of Pan-Turkism is its ethnic based 
irredentism. Irredentism is an ideological or organisational expression of 
emotional interest in the well-being of an ethnic minority living outside 
the boundaries of the state inhabited by the same ethnic group. Its 
moderate version is related to the prevention of discrimination or 
assimilation of the kindred group. The extreme version of irredentism 
aims at annexing the territories that the group inhabits.109
The main exponent of irredentism in the late Ottoman Empire and 
Turkish Republic was the adherents of Pan-Turkist ideology, the objective 
of which was to strive for cultural and/or political union among Turkic 
peoples living within and outside the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, 
and subsequently of the Turkish Republic.
Pan-Turkism differs from Pan-Turanism in terms of its ethnic 
coverage. Pan-Turanism aims at union of all Turanic peoples embracing 
Mongols, Hungarians, Finns as well as all peoples of Turkic origin. Thus,
108Yavuz Abadan, Hukukçu Gözü ile Milliyetçilik ve Halkçılık 
(Nationalism and Populism in a Jurist's View) (Ankara: Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi Yayım, 1938), 11-12.
109Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey. A Study o f  
irredentism ((London: C. Hurst &Co., 1981), 1.
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it has a wider coverage than Pan-Turkism limited to Turkic peoples. In 
proportion to its wide coverage, Pan-Turanism had a lesser appeal in 
comparison to Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkism had a strong appeal in 
intellectual circles and was adopted by the CUP as the dominant aspect of 
its ideological position.
Pan-Turkism began as Diaspora nationalism in Tsarist Russia in 
the late nineteenth century as a reaction to Russification and Pan- 
Slavism. It aimed at the revival of an ancient culture, as part of its search 
for common roots. In this regard, the prominence was accorded to 
language, history and literature, three pivots of nationalism. For many 
Pan-Turkists, the existence of a "common language" served as sufficient 
proof that all its speakers were members of one and the same nation.
In addition to language, Pan-Turkists perceived several other 
cultural characteristics in history, literature, culture and mythology, 
which was suitable for creating an ethnically homogeneous nation and 
differentiating it from others. Although less pronounced in comparison 
to Pan-Turanism to which ethnicity was central, Pan-Turkism also had a 
strong emphasis on ethnic bond and the notion of common origin. The 
racist writings of the 1930s stressing the superiority of Turkish race and 
linking common physical attributes with mental abilities were the 
exaggerated continuation of Pan-Turkist doctrine viewing language, 
culture, race and territory as inseparable elements of first a cultural and 
subsequently, political union.110
Contrary to other types of "Pan" ideologies, religion (Islam) had a 
low profile in Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkists saw Pan-Islamism as a rival 
ideology and for doctrinaire and tactical reasons kept Islam outside their
110Karpat argues that racist ideas penetrated into Turkey after 1935 
under Nazi influence. See Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: Transition to 
a Multiparty System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 263.
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ideological formulations, which was based on the refusal of politicisation 
of religion, that is it was in political sense secular. 111 They perceived that 
only a secular movement might avoid taking sides in the Sunnî-Shiî 
rivalry. 112
Irredentism is a vital component of Pan-Turkism and the main 
element differentiating it from Kemalist Turkish nationalism. Kemalism 
displaced Pan-Turkism as the official state ideology and focused on the 
nation-state's narrower interests, renouncing the overriding concern for 
the Outside Turks, which had been the core of Pan-Turkism. While 
Kemalism was polycentric in character, Pan-Turkism was essentially an 
ethnocentric ideology and movement. Under the firm guidance of 
Kemalist nationalism, the new Turkey sought to join other nations on 
equal footing in the mainstream of world civilisation. Pan-Turkists, 
however, have consistently emphasised the special attributes of all Turks 
with a view to uniting them, demonstrating much less concern for 
modernisation or world civilisation. Despite Pan-Turkists' claim that 
there was no real conflict between these two approaches to nationalism 
and that their own policies were bound to serve the interests of the
m In fact nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, basically Pan- 
Turkism, was imported to a setting where Islam was still the main source 
of legitimacy. In the western experience, however, nationalism was a 
corollary of secularisation process. Thus, Islam was inescapably 
influenced the native teaching of nationalism such that being Turk in the 
popular imagery was meant being Muslim, particularly in the Balkans. 
Therefore the secularism of Turkists was not the same with that of 
Kemalist nationalism according religion a living space only in the 
hearths of its faithful. See Etyen Mahcupyan, "Laik Kesim ve Bastırılmış 
Irkçılık" (Laic Segment and the Latent Racism)Yeni Yüzyıl, 16. 09. 1995, 
14.
112Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey 181.
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Turkish nation-state, 113 Kemalists remained watchful of them and their 
activities. 114
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire discredited the main 
political ideologies which had been prevalent during its later years. 
Ottomanism had lost its very raison d'être Pan-Islamism and Pan- 
Turkism registered a great failure in saving the imperial state. The 
determination of the future "of Turkey within its own borders came out 
in a way as a practical imperative. With the establishment of the 
Republic, Mustafa Kemal put its personal stamp on the determination of 
the conception of ethno-secular, strictly territorial conception of new 
Turkish nationalism.
Evidently, many ideas of Young Turks, particularly those of Ziya
Gökalp, carried over into the Republic. Several elements of Turkism and
Pan-Turkism of the late Ottoman Empire passed to the Kemalist
nationalism. Nevertheless, Kemalist nationalism had an essentially
different orientation. As early as 1921, during the War of Independence,
Mustafa Kemal, speaking at Eskişehir, declared:
Neither Pan-Islamism, nor Turanism may constitute a doctrine, or 
logical policy for us. Henceforth the government policy of the new 
Turkey is to consist in living independently, relying on Turkey's 
own sovereignty within her national frontiers.115
The new approach regarded the national (internal) interests of the
new Republic as the most important of all considerations. Mustafa Kemal
113Hikmet Tanyu, Atatürk ve Türk Milliyetçiliği (Atatürk and 
Turkish Nationalism) (Ankara: Orkun Yayınları, 1961). For the 
differences between Kemalist nationalism and Pan-Turkism see Hamza 
Eroğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik" (Atatürk and Nationalism), in 
Atatürkçü Düşünce (Ankara: Atatürk Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 1992), 366-367.
114Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey 183.
115Ibid., 72.
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repeated this view in several occasions, including his six day-speech in 
1927. This was not only because of allegiance attested to the patriotic 
ascendancy in view of the failure of other ideologies; but also because 
Turkey, badly ravaged by war, needed to concentrate its efforts on its own 
construction. Turkey was now a smaller and fairly homogeneous state as 
compared to the huge multinational Ottoman Empire; hence the 
retractionist option appeared more feasible. A self-centred policy would 
also prove advantageous in foreign relations, as the renouncing of Pan- 
Turkist ideals would assist in the normalisation of relations with the 
Soviet Union.
With very few exceptions, such as in the case of Syrian district of 
Alexandratta annexed by Turkey in 1939 and renamed Hatay, political 
Pan-Turkism, particularly its irredentist element, was officially discarded. 
One may even say that the wave of secularising reforms in Turkey raised 
a barrier between Turks of Turkey and Outside Turks, the most 
prominent one of which was in cultural terms being the change of 
alphabet from Arabic to the Latin script. Interest shown in the areas 
inhabited by Turkic groups was always minimal and discreet at the official 
level. While the Turkish authorities did encourage Turks from other 
countries, particularly from Cyprus and Balkans, to emigrate to Turkey 
during the 1920s and 1930s, this policy has nothing to do with Pan-Turkist 
drives. Rather it represented a desire to restore the loss in population 
sustained during the First World War and the War of Independence. 
During the 1930s, the Turkish government did officially not give any 
support to associations and informal groups with Pan-Turkist leanings 
active outside and inside Turkey. On the contrary, the governmental 
position expressed reservations about Pan-Turkist manifestations. 116
116Ibid., 73.
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As a matter of fact, as an inescapable consequent of the Kemalist 
thesis of history, Kemalist nationalism preserved only a cultural interest 
with outside Turks. Unlike some Pan-Turkists, the ending point for 
Atatürk was Anatolia starting from Central Asia, and not vice versa. His 
interest in outside Turks was purely historical-cultural and contained no 
political implication:
We take the cause of Turkishness within a positive capacity. We 
attest importance to the great Turkish history, the sources of 
Turkish language, its rich dialects, and the ancient Turkish 
remains. We do not ignore even the language and culture of the 
Yakut Turks beyond the lake of Baikal.117
Kemalist nationalism displayed considerable talent in assimilating 
the immediate past and shaping a new future. Whenever possible, its 
proponents eliminated potential rivals, accommodated existing 
institutions and absorbed diverse ideological elements, including those of 
Pan-Turkism. Several Pan-Turkist elements can be discerned that are 
absorbed by Kemalist nationalism
4.9.5.1. The Cooption o f Pan-Turkist Writers By Kemalist 
N ationalism
Most of Pan-Turkist intellectuals were easily coopted by the 
Kemalist regime due to either change in their Pan-Turkist persuasion or 
the "policy of carrot and stick" of the Kemalist Republic. Among the 
prominents of these intellectuals were Halide Edip, an ardent Pan- 
Turanist novelist and journalist, whose novel Yeni Turan (The New 
Turan) had deeply inspired the Pan-Turkists. Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul), 
the poet of "Ben Bir Türküm" (I am a Turk) reedited some of his poems 
to read vatan (homeland) instead of Turan (the legendary land where
117Utkan Kocatürk, Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri (The Ideas 
and Thoughts of Atatürk) (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1984), 186.
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Turanic peoples resided). The renown Pan-Turkist journalist Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu accepted the official position of Director of The Press Bureau in 
Ankara in 1921. As early as 1923, Ağaoğlu impressed a French journalist 
interviewing him with his devotion to Mustafa Kemal and made clear 
his new ideological position: "Ankara is nationalist, renouncing the 
pretensions of the old Ottoman Empire: It wishes to establish a modest 
Turkish national home, restricted to the ethnographic Turkish 
frontiers... for that she needs peace." 118
In 1928, Yusuf Akçura, one of the leading figures of Pan-Turkism in 
the late Ottoman era, proclaimed that the Republic of Turkey was the 
embodiment of all Pan-Turkist ideals. 119 In fact, Akçura became the 
main contributor to the formation of the new line of nationalism. Tekin 
Alp and many other Pan-Turkists had also become fervent adherents of 
Kemalist nationalism. In particular, Tekin Alp became a theoretician of 
Kemalist nationalism and the author of a standard work on Kemalism.120
4.9.5. 2. Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearts) and Kemalist Nationalism
A rather similar process of co-optation occurred with respect to 
Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearts), the only effective organisation that Pan- 
Turkists had established in Istanbul in 1912. It had participated in the 
war efforts through the dissemination of political propaganda within the 
Empire and had set up branches in the Caucuses and Türkistan. In 1917, 
the emissaries of the organisation spread Pan-Turk propaganda in the
118Landau, ibid., 74.
119 Yusuf Akçura, Türkçülük (Turkism) (Istanbul: Türk Kültür 
Yayım, 1978), 221-23.
120See Tekin Alp, Kemalizm (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1936). 
For its French translation, see Tekin Alp, Le Kemalisme ( Paris: F. Alcan, 
1937).
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Arabian peninsula, particularly in Syria which caused a strong anti- 
Turkish feeling among the local people. In March 1919, many members 
of the organisation met in Istanbul and adopted unanimously a 
resolution which was later presented as a petition to the British High 
Commissioner protesting the projected dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire In April 1920, the organisation reaffirmed its support for 
Azerbaijan's struggle for independence and for closer ties with Turkey. In 
the subsequent years, however, its activities were frozen. It reopened in 
1924.
In this second period, many leading Turkists assumed senior 
official positions in the new bureaucracy. Turkism, however qualified by 
Kemalist nationalism, was the major source of inspiration for the 
Kemalist reforms. Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the interior, made this 
relationship clear with his following statement: "Turkism for us is both a 
basis and a purpose."121
Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) was the President of Türk Ocakları 
from the beginning As a famous orator, he was acceptable to the Pan- 
Turkists although he had never been a leading Pan-Turkist. It would 
not be too difficult for him in the political climate of Kemalist incomplete 
totalitarianism to persuade Türk Ocakları, from the mid-1920s on, to 
adopt Kemalist nationalism that had become the official state doctrine. At 
the first congress of the new Hearths, convened in Ankara in 1924, 
Tanrıöver determined that the main objective of Türk Ocakları was to 
preserve Turkish culture and defend Kemalist reforms. The organisation 
did indeed concentrate its efforts increasingly on cooperating with the 
ruling Republican People's Party, in both larger and smaller population 
centres. It assumed a vanguard position in public dissemination of the
121Cumhuriyet, 2 August 1929, 3.
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features of the new archetype of ethnosecular Turkish man introduced by 
the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism. For Türk Ocaklari, this 
involved an intensive westernisation campaign, expressed in terms of 
westernised education, the establishment of reading rooms and libraries 
with Turkish, French and English journals and books as well as the 
introduction of western music, theatrical performances and sports 
activities.
Despite its commitment to Kemalist nationalism, Pan-Turkist 
tendencies continued to manifest themselves in the organisation. In 
consequence, the organisation's constitution was amended in 1927, 
limiting "the field of operations of Türk Ocaklari to the frontiers of the 
Turkish Republic."122
122In the congress held in 23 April 1927, the constitution of the 
Turkish Hearts was amended. The following are the articles included in 
the "fundamentals" of its constitution.
"Article 2: The aim of Türk Ocağı is to strive for the strengthening 
of the national consciousness, to provide for the civic and hygienic 
evolution and the growth of national economy.
The field of operations of Türk Ocakları is limited to the frontiers 
of the Turkish Republic.
Article 3: Türk Ocağı/ pursuing the ideals of republic, nationality, 
contemporary civilisation and populism, is together with the Republican 
People's Party, which has been realising these ideals, in state policy. 
Türk Ocağı strives and endeavours for promulgating and inculcating 
these ideals in the fields of science, culture and social sciences. ...
Article 6: Every woman and man who are of Turkish origin or 
nurturing entirely sense of Turkishness and language through culture, 
and have proved their allegiance to Turkishness through their past can 
be a member of Türk Ocağı. " See Türk Ocakları Yasası (The Regulation 
of Turkish Hearts) (Türk Ocakları Merkez Heyeti Matbaası, 1927), 3-4. 
These fundamentals are shared and confirmed by Mustafa Kemal as well:
" Turkish Hearths is the cultural branch of the Republican People's Party. 
The party would educate the nation and make leadership in all cultural 
fields such as science, economy, politics and fine arts in order to bring up 
the citizens. Members of the Hearts would do their basic duty and fulfil 
the greatest service to their ideals by explaining the programme of the 
RPP to people. This aspect is overtly expressed in the third article of your 
constitution." See Atatürk, "Aydın Türk Ocağında Bir Konuşma" (A
246
Nevertheless Pan-Turk demands continued to be voiced among its 
members. As late as 1930, there were requests from Turkic groups in 
Azerbaijan, Turkistan and Bulgaria to set up the branches of Türk 
Ocaklan in their areas. Coupled with other reasons, related basically with 
the concerns of internal politics, the organisation was dissolved in March 
1931 and replaced by the Halk Evleri (People' Houses), completely 
committed to Kemalist nationalism and its propagation. 123 But the 
dissolution of Turkish Hearts resulted only with the purge of certain 
Turkists orly. Turkism continued to exert its previous influence upon 
the RPP. Thus, the question was related more to who would hold the 
power rather than an ideological conflict.The development of language 
and history thesis and the removal of the Turkish classical music from
Speech in Aydın Turkish Heart), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 4 November 
1931, 300.
123Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 380. In fact, Turkish Hearts was the 
only independent organisation from the ruling Republican People's Party 
(RPP) which continued its existence. With its vanguard position in 
dissemination of the Republican ideal, it has assumed a considerable 
strength. The question of eliminating this organisationally independent 
entity became a real one before the Kemalist power elites when the Ocak 
members openly sided with the newly established Serbest Fırka, at the 
cost of violating its non-political character. Also, Atatürk has noticed the 
higher quality of Ocak members all over the country in contrast to the 
stagnant and poor quality membership of the ruling RJPP. The potential of 
opposition the Ocak embodied and the desire of Mustafa Kemal to make 
use of this potential for the RPP signalled its end. See Kenan Akyüz, Türk 
Ocakları (Ankara: Türk Yurdu Neşriyatı, 1983), 116-124. The first theme of 
emphasis was that there was no need for two separate organisations that 
espoused the same goals. See Falih Rıfkı, "The Editorial", Hakimiyet-i 
Milliye, 21. 03. 1931,1. Upon the request of Mustafa Kemal that "Forces of 
the same kind should be united" (Cumhuriyet, 25.03. 1931), the Congress 
of the Turkish Hearts decided to join the RPP and its head, Hamdullah 
Suphi (Tanrıöver), was sent to Bucharest as ambassador. According to 
junior Ağaoğlu, the assumption of the name "Turkey" by the new state 
and the adoption of nationalism as a constitutional principle left no need 
for a distinction called "Türkçüler"(Turkists) and it was because of this 
that the Turkish Hearths were closed down. See Samet Ağaoğlu, 
Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve Yükseliş SebeplervBir Soru (The Causes of 
the Rise and Fall of Democrat Party: A Question) (Istanbul, 1972), 73-74.
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the state radio were after the closing of the Turkish Hearts, all of which 
were Turkist policies in nature.
4.9.5.3. Intersection o f Pan-Turkism and Kemalist Nationalism
Pan-Turkism is a type of Turkish nationalism taking the racial- 
ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism to its extreme. It differs 
from Kemalist nationalism basically in its definition of the scope of 
vatan (homeland). But in terms of their organic understanding of society 
they have only a difference in degree rather than a difference of essence. 
The conception of history based on the imagery of the eternal national 
existence and the idea of "national religion" are the two main points of 
intersection between Pan-Turkism and Kemalist nationalism. 124
Kemalists, like the Turkists of the two preceding generations, 
studied the "glorious" past of the Turks since their pre-islamic origins by 
concentrating upon language, history, literature and geography. It was 
hoped that the new Turkish nation would be provided with a national 
past of its own, of which it could be proud. Accordingly, the new image of 
the future would be derived from the newly-crystallised past in 
accordance with the ideological preferences of the new regime. 
Purification of the Turkish language and rewriting of history are two 
prominent examples. In language policy, systematic elimination of Arabic 
and Persian words was interpreted by the Pan-Turkists as a step in the 
direction of creating a language common to Turks in Turkey and abroad. 
The new thesis of history provided the Kemalists with the pseudo­
scientific tools that Turks spread civilisation to the whole world when
124Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Söylemleri: Melez Bir 
Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügati" (Nationalist Discourses in Turkey: The 
Thick and Untidy Vocabulary of an Hybrid Language), Birikim , 
67(November 1994), 20.
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they had to emigrate from their homeland in Central Asia. Thus came 
the Kemalist proposition that westernisation is in fact a process of 
returning back to native roots and hence it is the rediscovery of the 
forgotten national selfhood.
Kemalist historians *and academicians continued the pre-war 
tradition of demonstrating the historical unity of all Turks. The most 
relevant work in this regard was the new, four volume history textbooks 
for secondary schools prepared by Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Society 
of History) upon the request of the Ministry of National Education. The 
first volume printed in 1932, put forth observations which may have had 
Pan-Turk connotations including the claim that the ancient Turks had 
already possessed the idea of nationality; the concept of "Turkish race" 
and so forth. 125 Such ideas occasionally penetrated the journal Ülkü 
(The Ideal), the officially-inspired monthly of the Peoples' Houses began 
to publish since February 1933, although this is hardly an indication of 
Pan-Turkist feelings; rather it provides additional evidence of the 
absorption of Pan-Turkism into Kemalist nationalism. 126 The earlier 
confusion between Turkism and Pan-Turkism seemed to be resolving 
itself by the fusion of the latter into the former. Even the official policy of 
encouraging the Turkic-speaking minorities in Bulgaria and Greece to 
emigrate to Turkey was regarded in the light of the interests of the 
Republic of Turkey. Similarly, Law No: 2550, passed in 1934, provided the
125For details and examples see Danişment, Türklük Meseleleri 
esp. 7-8, and 190-195.
126An irregular check of the first volumes of Ülkü , the publication 
organ of the Ankara Halk Evi, is an indication of this. The term "Turan" 
does appear in an article on sports in Turkish history (6 July 1933, 477), 
but only as information about the Turan-Iran. A rare exception is an 
article by Reşit Galip (9 October 1933, 164-167), but even this is chiefly 
relate to the refutation of "foreign misconceptions"
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means for assimilating Turkish nationals of non-Turkish culture into 
Turkishness and for absorbing and settling immigrants of Turkish culture 
arriving from abroad.
In sum, certain elements of Pan-Turkism were incorporated into 
Kemalist nationalism with particular exclusion of the leitmotif of 
irredentism. That is why the credentials of Pan-Turkism did not become 
the criteria of policy decision making in the Kemalist era. 127
127Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey 76.
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CHAPTER V
DELIMITATION OF THE SECULAR BOUNDARY OF 
TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY
5.1. T otal W esternisation
Kemalist Turkification by way of westernisation1 was the self­
assimilation of the new "Turkish society" with the view of a total change
1 Mustafa Kemal feels no difficulty in presenting what is western 
as Turkish. To illustrate, regarding the acceptance of the Latin alphabet, 
he points out: "Citizens, these notes of mine are written by original,
genuine Turkish words, Turkish letters....Our harmonious, rich language 
will reveal itself with the new Turkish letters." "Türk Yazı İnkılabı 
Hakkında Konuşma" (Speech About Turkish Alphabet Change), 
A tatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II (The Speechs and Statements of 
Atatürk II) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu 
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi; 1989), 9/10. 08. 1928, 272. Accordingly, he 
asks: "Is our general appearance and dress national? (the voices of ’no’) Is 
our dress civilised and international? (voices of 'no, no') I agree with you. 
Forgive my expression. A dress which can be qualified as smoothbore 
below and fifled above is neither national, nor international. Therefore, 
can there be a nation without a dress, friends? (voices of 'no, no, 
never!)... Friends, there is no need to explore and revive the Turanian 
dress. Civilised and international dress for us is very precious and 
appropriate for our nation. We will wear that." "İnebolu'da Bir 
Konuşma"(A Speech in İnebolu), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 28. 08. 1925, 220. 
He sees no contradiction between the national ideal and the reception 
from the West. According to him, this is because "the modern principle 
of nationality has got international recognition. We too endeavour for 
preserving our Turkishness with great care. Turks are noble in 
civilisation. We are trying to prove that we were the original nation 
resided around İzmir before the Greeks came there." "Atatürk ve 
inkılap" (Atatürk and Renovation),Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III 
(The Speechs and Statements of Atatürk III) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil 
ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 30. 11. 1929, 
128.
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through a continuos socio-cultural and political revolution into the 
western sphere of modern secularity. The dialectic of political 
independence from the West and the cultural dependence to its 
secularised Judeo-Christian cultural tradition of Enlightenment 
constitutes the main frame of the Kemalist endeavour for 
m odernisation .2 Kohn attests this "self-imposed" voluntarism of 
Kemalist endeavour for total westernisation to the lack of an old, great 
tradition of civilisation particular to the Turks, 3 which is indeed the real 
leitmotif of Kemalist reasoning.
Kemalist nationalism was the first example of national liberation 
movements. The attainment of political independence accompanied by 
socio-political and cultural westernisation, and the creation of a new, 
"unique" national identity in order to restore the damaged collective 
honour characterises this liberationist nationalism. In other words, 
political independence (the National Struggle and the promulgation of 
the Republic), modernisation (nation-state and secularising reforms),
As a matter of fact, by "Turk", Kemalists mean "Garblı Türk" 
(westernised Turk). See Tekin Alp, Türkleştirme (Turkification) (Istanbul: 
Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1928), 21. The expression belongs to Falih Rifki, a 
renown Kemalist journalist and a close associate of Atatürk.
2Ali Mazrui, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Atatürk Mirası Açısından 
Afrika: Siyasal Kültürde Yerellik ve Evrensellik"(Africa in Terms of 
Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Heritage: Locality and Universality in 
Political Culture), in Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk (Istanbul: 
Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 579-580.
3Hans Kohn,The Idea o f Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1944),
5. The translator of the Kohn work, the original of which is A History of 
Nationalism in the East, Ali Çetinkaya, then deputy from Afyon, and 
formerly the head of Ankara Independence Tribunal makes a quick 
criticism of Kohn's argument by asserting that the new scientific 
researches have demonstrated that the Turks had their own civilisation 
in very old times, drawing upon the pseudo-scientific history thesis of 
Kemalism. See ibid. This objection catches the gist of Kemalist will to 
westernisation and its defensive narcism resulting from the mood that 
"We Turks are capable of being modem ."
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and a new collectivity of national form (the new Turkish man) have been 
translated into actuality by the Kemalist nationalism. The potential crisis 
of collective identity on the part of Kemalist political elites was aimed to 
be resolved through the argument that all civilisations and languages are 
of Turkic origin, and that Turkey is a western country uniting the 
western and Turkic poles of identity in herself.4
Kemalist westernising reforms which opted for the total 
secularisation of polity in the Berkesian sense, i.e., the cleansing of every 
aspects of life, private as well as public from "the dictates of religion"5 
were, according to Mardin, based on the following "social findings": 1) 
Passing to a new conception of national honour based on rules and laws
4Baskm Oran, Atatürk M illiyetçiliğ i: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir 
İnceleme (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology),
80.
5According to Berkes, "Kemalist secularism was nothing but 
rejection of the ideology of Islamic polity." Niyazi Berkes, T he  
Development o f Secularism in Turkey (Canada: McGill University Press, 
1964), 499. It aimed at "liberating individual from the yoke of tradition," 
ibid., 412. For the Berkesian interpretation of Kemalist secularism see, 
ibid., 479-503. Enver Ziya Karal, an official historian, points to the same 
thing when he asserts that Kemalist secularism not only prescribes the 
"liberation" of three branches of powers from Islam but also it rejects all 
the popular customs, traditions and styles of life prevailing in social, 
individual and family level that may have any relevance with Islam. See 
Enver Ziya Karal, "The Principles of Kemalism," in Atatürk: Founder o f 
A Modern State, eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ózbudun (London: C. 
Hurst & Company, 1981), 29. Levonian interpretation of Kemalist 
secularism in this respect is striking:" at bottom there is a materialistic 
interpretation of human life, and a quite false understanding of religion. 
They are in revolt against Islam, because Islam is Arabistan.... They are in 
revolt against all religions because they think religion and science, faith 
and knowledge cannot agree; they are essentially opposed to one 
another... religious creeds, teachings, and books are unreliable. Religion is 
for primitive-minded people. "See Lütfi Levonian, Moslem Mentality 
(London, 1928), 141; quoted by Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The 
Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1959), 58.
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rather than ascription and personal authority as was the case in the 
ancient regime; 2)Transition from Islamic transcendentalism to the 
materialism of positive sciences in the comprehension of the human 
existence and the universal- order; 3) Transition from a communitarian 
social organisation composed of the high (havas ) and the low(avam) to 
an homogenous society of a demotic ethnie; 4) Transition from a 
religious community to a national society and state. 6
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire secured the 
establishment of a national state inhabited almost thoroughly by Muslim 
ethnies. The territorial boundaries of this state had a consensual 
definition as prescribed by the National Pact. But the definition of the 
boundaries of the national identity was a problematic one. While the 
territorial definition was basic to the French definition of national 
identity, it was culture defined along ethnic lines that constituted the 
German boundary of national identity. The Anglo-Saxon tradition, on the 
other hand, basically, defined the boundary of national identity around 
citizenship only. The two ends of the boundarial continuum were rested
6Şerif Mardin, "Yenileşme Dinamiğinin Temelleri ve Atatürk" 
(The Foundations of the Dynamics of Renovation and Atatürk), in 
Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk (İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 
1983), 24. The spring of the dynamics of Kemalist ethnosecular 
nationalism was this understanding of the new collectivity founded on 
the conception of the "new honour." Needless to say, Kemalist 
conception of positive science was entirely materialistic and based on the 
refutation of the religious description of the universe. One of the main 
leitm otifs  of the Kemalist history thesis was to inculcate the 
materialistic conception of life and universe through the teaching of the 
credentials of the nineteenth century naive positivism. See Afet İnan, 
Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (The Main Lines of Turkish History), 2nd ed. 
(Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), preface. The first edition was in 1930. 
Also see Türk Tarihini Tetkik cemiyeti, Tarih I (History I), (Istanbul: 
Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 1-8. For the Kemalist notion of demotic ethnie 
based on the rejection of cfass conflict, see Taha Parla, Kemalizm, Ziya 
Gökalp ve Türkiye’de Korporatizm (Kemalism, Ziya Gökalp and 
Corporatism in Turkey) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989).
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on the criteria of choice and birth respectively. The French tradition was 
in the middle: it represented the mixture of birth and choice principles.
In this regard, Mustafa Kemal's definition of national boundary 
approximated Gokalp’s definition of national identity based on shared 
culture, with the essential difference of Kemalist derivation of this 
culture from the non-Islamic past, and thereby rejecting Islam, in 
present or past, as a source of cultural formation. 7 Anything Islamic 
represented the ancient regime for the Kemalists. Therefore the locus of 
the new "national identity developer" would be the later Kemalist thesis 
of history. 8
Kemalist nationalism* secularised the past in order to create a 
secular present. As such, cleared of Islamic influences and "enriched" by 
the selectively reconstructed elements of the pre-Islamic Turkish past, 
Kemalist nationalism was the basic frame on which the Republican 
polity was structured. It was the supreme force which informed all 
socio-political activities. With the crystallisation of the contours of 
Kemalist definition of national identity, the Republic started a new,
7Although some writers see Gökalp as the intellectual architect of 
the Kemalist revolution, this is an unsubstantiated claim. Mustafa Kemal 
entirely rejects Gökalp's distinction between culture and civilisation. They 
have radically different views as regards positivism, nationalism, 
populism, secularism, purification of language, pan-Turkism, and 
conception of history. It is not Gökalp's Turkism that became the 
nationalism principle of the Republican People's Party. Mustafa Kemal 
differs form Gökalp in his consideration of the elements that comprise a 
nation. Unlike Gökalp, Mustafa Kemal does not accept religion as a 
constituent element of Turkish nation. For Gökalp, religion is "necessarily 
social.” To Mustafa Kemal, religion may be an intimate feeling in the heart 
of individuals only. See Taha Akyol, "Ulus Devlet" (Nation-State), 
M illiyet, 14 September 1995, 15; and Şerafettin Turan, A tatürk'ün  
Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar (Incidents, 
Thinkers and Books That Affected the Structure of the Thought of Atatürk) 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlan, 1982), 18-20.
8Mardin, "Yenileşme Dinamiğinin Temelleri ve Atatürk, "46.
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"fresh" life of its own. History functioned as the motor force of destroying 
the remaining of the Ottoman-Islamic past and their substitution by the 
purely Turkish elements with the view of restoring Turkish national self- 
respect badly undermined by the western anti-Turkish biases.9
9Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 251. One of the inner drives of Mustafa 
Kemal was to gain European respect and admiration through his 
secularising reforms. This fact had become his "subconscious", to use a 
Freudian concept. His experiences of European's treatment of Ottomans 
with scorn and mockery made a decisive impact on his personality. To cite 
an example, when he was going to Paris in 1910 to join the Picardie 
manoeuvres, in the Belgrade train station his colleague, major Selahattin , 
was ridiculed by a peddler due to his fes on his head, which constituted 
the spring of his determination to replace it with hat as the national 
headgear. See Turan, Atatürk’ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, 
Düşünürler, Kitaplar , 4. His evaluation of the new form of the traditional 
zeybek dance reflects the same mood "Ladies and gentlemen! Mr. Selim 
Sırrı gaved a civilised form to the zeybek dance while reviving it. ...From 
now on, we may say to the Europeans that 'we too possess a perfect dance."' 
"İzmir Kız Öğretmen Okulunda Bir Konuşma" (A Speech in İzmir School 
of Female Teachers) Söylev ve Demeçler II, 13. 10. 1925, 240. His 
presentation of hat as a sign of civilisation is another reflection of his 
defensive mood: "Within a short duration of time the dervishes and 
hodjas will have become pleased from wearing hat, which is a nice 
headgear. Intelligent and clever man lose their personal and scientific 
worth under a non-civilised garment. Therefore they must wear civilised 
costumes in order to protect their honoured positions.
We had considered ourselves different from the civilised world 
with a distinct sign on our head. Today we have weared hat. Many 
foreigners would must be happy because of that for they have assumed 
more privileges than us due to the hat on their heads. "
Upon a question, Ghazi responded:
"Ladies too should wear hat as men. It is not possible to act 
otherwise. Here is an example for you: with this type of headcover (the 
reference is to the old one), a civilised lady cannot appear in the 
European social environments." "Bursa Türkocağı'nda Bir Konuşma" (A 
Speech in Bursa Turkish Hearts), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 23.09. 1925, 229. 
According to Falih Rifki, a journalist and close associate of Kemal 
Atatürk, the acceptance of hat as the new national headgear 
distinguishes Kemalist secularising reforms from the Ottoman 
reformism with its uncompromised character. "Because Mustafa Kemal 
did not believe in the legend of mermaid. For him, there is either fish or 
man. There is either the East or the West.... The hat was not only a 
headgear but the symbol of the revolution in the way of thinking." Falih 
Rıfkı Atay, Ç a n k ay a : A tatürk’ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar
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On practical ground, however, nationalism in Turkey followed a 
path different from the anticipated one. It has taken a shape more in 
accordance with the prevailing political and cultural conditions rather 
than deliberately forged utopian ideals of Kemalism.* 10
Kemalist Republic was bom from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire 
and devised nationalism as its reference ideology to replace the broader 
constructs of Islamism, Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism. 11 According to
(Çankaya. Prom the Birth of Atatürk to His Death) (Istanbul, 1969) 442. 
The introduction of hat was a revolutionary step indeed. Because 
Muslims called good Christians "makul kefere" (reasonable unbelievers), 
the bad ones "gavur" (infidel) and the worse ones "şapkalı gflywr'Xinfidel 
with hat). See ibid., 430.
Given that there was a widespread bias in the "European circles" 
considering Turks as a Mongoloid, inferior race that does not deserve seli­
mle, as Clemenceau, the French delegate in the Paris Conference (1919) 
emphatically expressed, this defensive mood might gain an empathic 
understanding. For Clemenceau’s speech see M. Cemil Bilsel, Lozan, 
vol.l (Istanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933), 236.
10Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 252.
11Mustafa Kemal's personal notes to Ruşenî Barkur (a deputy from 
Samsun)'s book "Din Yok, Milliyet Var” (There is No Religion But 
Nationality) are the overt reflection of his consideration of nationalism as 
a kind of the "official religion" of the new regime. To Barkur's assertion 
that "Our holy book is our nationality , which protects knowledge, carries 
the existence, embraces the happiness, exalts the Turkishness and unites 
all the Turks. Thus, in our philosophy, the exact correspondent to the 
word "religion" is "nationality". The one who loves and glorifies his 
nation, and relying upon it is always a powerful, honest and honoured 
man", he makes the following comment: "Bravo! Congratulations. "See 
Gürbüz Tüfekçi, Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar Eski ve Yeni Yazılı 
Türkçe Kitaplar - (The Books Read By Atatürk-Turkish Books with Old 
and New Turkish) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), 
170-71. His another comment to Barkur's "Does which nation's greatness 
go back to the unknown deepness of history as much as that of Turks? 
And, at last, does which nation have resurrected while dying through 
killing Azrael? Is there a superior honour more than being a Turk in the 
World? And is there a religion as much as being a Turk?" is "Bravo, 
bravo!" According to Mustafa Kemal, "individuals are wily nilly 
mortal;but nations, if they wish, may become immortal," an indication of 
the classical nationalist myth regarding the ahistorical character of 
national existence. Ibid., 172-73. Barkuri's book was written in 18 October
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Feyzioglu, a Kemalist politician-academician, Kemalist nationalism 
attests great importance to national unity and territorial integrity.12 It 
rejects racism and has nothing to do with the fictional idea of superior 
race. It is civilising as well as modernising. It is secular, and therefore, 
disproves sectarian discriminations. It preaches social justice and 
national solidarity, and as a consequence, rejects class conflicts. Its has a 
definite limited territorial boundary linked to the notion of patriotism. 
Its interests with outside Turks is purely cultural and does not relate to 
politics. Based upon the idea of popular sovereignty, it rejects the dynastic 
and theocratic rule.13 It is humanitarian and peaceful and against
1926 and is located in the Presidential Library in Çankaya. Regarding the 
fact that Kemalism substituted nationalism for Islam and considered it as 
a kind of secular religion see, Orhan Türkdoğan, Atatürk'te Milli Devlet 
Anlayışı (Atatürk's Nation-State Understanding) (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası 
Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1981), 113-114; Kohn, Türk Milliyetçiliği, 74; Mete 
Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 
(The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey) (Istanbul: Cem 
Yayınevi, 1989), 213-215; 220;323-25; 327-28. For a view considering 
Kemalism as "yaşamak dini" (the religion of living), see Şeref Aykut, 
KamâlizmfC.H. Partisinin Programının İzahı) (Kemalism: The 
Explanation of the Programme of the Republican People's Party) 
(Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitabevi, 1936).
Interestingly enough, in criticising "tarikat" (the sufi orders), 
Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, asserts that "the only rightful 
path and tarikat for Turks is nationalism based on positive sciences. To 
follow this path is the greatest strength for the material and spiritual life 
of the Turk." See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period V, vol.16, 1937, 61.
Another deputy, Muhittin Baha Pars (Ordu), calls the six arrows "the holy 
book" of Turks. See ibid., 69.
12Turhan Feyzioglu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik" (Atatürk and 
Nationalism), in Atatürkçü Düşünce (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil Tarih 
Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1992), 297-300.
13In a comparison of the Ottoman past and the Republican present, 
Mustafa Kemal argued: "Today we are more powerful than the past. 
Today we have a greater capability and power of living (certainly). What 
has caused this supremacy?... The genuine reasons for this are inherent in 
the two principles. The first principle is the National Pact, the second one 
is our Fundamental Law, which ascribes sovereignty to the nation with 
no reservation and condition(acclamations).... The value and importance
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of the decision of 1 November 1992(the decision as regards the abolition 
of the sultanate) is no different from the National Pact. Just as the 
National Pact is an holy rule determining the state and place of the 
homeland vis a vis the external enemy, the decision of 1 November 1922 
is an holy weapon directed to the personal rule, which has been, for 
centuries, the protector of ignorance and corruption, the source of 
misfortune and evils, and an evil way of government represented by it 
(strong acciamations). Those who dared to surrender an homeland 
which has become a place of manifestation for a brave and heroic zeal for 
centuries and centuries, have found that boldness only in the spirit, form 
and nature of that government (the voices of 'very true'). ...Turkish 
National Assembly and its form of government are not and cannot be 
limited with time." "Dördüncü Toplanma Yılını Açarken"(Opening the 
Fourth Meeting Year), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 March 1923, 325-326. From 
the eyes of a certain Ramazan agha, Mustafa Kemal attests the breakdown 
of the Ottoman Empire to the sultanate and its evil way of government: 
"The old Ottoman government held the stick. We worked, they took our 
products from us. We have seen the stick only. There was no hearing 
office. We heard some people own palaces, concubines, on their head a 
sultan. Our all belongings were owned by them. And all the while, it was 
those palaces and sultans who deprived us of everything." " Adana 
Çiftçileriyle Konuşma"(Talk with Adana Farmers), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 
16. 03. 1923, 125. And the concluding evaluation: "Gentlemen, for
centuries, those who have ruled Turkey have thought about many 
things; but they did not consider one thing only: Turkey. We may 
compensate the damages the Turkish homeland and the Turkish nation 
have been afflicted due to this heedlessness only in one way: Not to take 
into consideration anything other than Turkey in Turkey." 
"Dumlupinar'da Konuşma" (Speech in Dumlupınar), Söylev ve 
Demeçler II, 30.08.1924, 186. For other exemplary opinions of Mustafa 
Kemal regarding the delegitimisation of the ancient way of government, 
i.e., the sultanate, see "Tevfik Paşa île Muhaberatı Hakkında" (About His 
Correspondence with Tevfik Pasha), Söylev ve Demeçler, 29 01.1921, 159, 
and "İkinci Dönemi Açarken" (Opening the Second Period), ibid., 1 April 
1923, 338-39.
The delegitimisation of the past was also made through the 
criticism of the institution of the caliphate. According to Mustafa Kemal, 
"The caliphate, which was a dream of the past, had no raison d'être in 
our time. Tunisians, Egyptians Indians and the other Muslims are in fact 
either under the British oppression or are French subjects." Upon this 
remarks, the French journalist madam Titaniya asks him: " But at any 
rate, Turkey should definitely have cut her ties with her religious past 
and begin to work free of all kinds of obstacles. Your understanding is a 
great thing." To this, Mustafa Kemal replies: "Yes, you are one of the rare 
persons who have sensed about that." "Maten Gazetesi Yazarı Madam 
Titaniya 'ya Demeç" (Statement to the Madam Titaniya, a Writer to the 
Newspaper Maten), Söylev ve Demeçler III, 25.11.1924, 105.
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territorial expansionism.14 This national humanism is expressed by 
Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior at the time, during the 
deliberations of the inclusion of the principle of nationalism into the 
constitution in 1937 as follows:
To be national is our necessary watchword. But our national motto 
is not parochial and restrictive. Oür national partisanship, within 
the civilised humanity and as its essential part, is directed to the 
exaltation of humanity and make the whole world to live within 
happiness and welfare.15
According to Feyzioğlu, Kemalist nationalism is rational, modern, 
civic, progressive, democratic, unifying, honouring, humanitarian and 
non-aggressive. It cannot therefore be reconciled with racism, fascism, 
communism and theocratic regimes. 16 Mainstream Kemalist writers 
insistingly emphasise that Kemalist nationalism is thoroughly a civic-
14Ibid., 300-320. This mainstream account of Kemalist nationalism 
is supported by Abadan's view that "in the Turkish regime nation is a 
socio-political integrity composed of citizens. The binding ties among 
citizens are language, culture and unity of ideal." Yavuz Abadan, 
Hukukçu Gözü ile Milliyetçilik ve Halkçılık (Nationalism and Populism 
in a Jurist's View) (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayım, 1938), 10. To 
Abadan, this conception is not the same with the mythological 
understanding of nation searching for microbiological features in the 
blood , which suggests the relation of these features to the intellectual 
and spiritual quality. On the contrary, Kemalist idea of nation is 
positivist. But since it attests importance to not only material and 
economic ties of nation, but more than that, to the intellectual and 
spiritual needs, it is not materialist but can be described as idealist 
positivist. Kemalism derives its idealism from its faith to the national 
ideal, and positivist aspect from its comprehension of the national self­
hood. See, ibid., 11.
15TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Period V, vol. 16, 5 February 1937, 60.
16Feyzioğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik," 293. Another adherent of 
Kemalist nationalism, Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, hints the incorporation of the 
theory of national character into Kemalist nationalism. According to 
him, Kemalist nationalism is based on the national character and 
considers national culture as its essential. See Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, 
"Atatürk'ün Milliyetçiliği" (Atatürk Nationalism), in Atatürkçü Düşünce 
( Ankara: Atatürk Dil Tarih Kültür Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma 
Merkezi, 1992), 332.
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political nationalism and does not have an ethnic-genealogical 
component. 17 They disregard the ethnicist/racial outlook of Kemalist 
nationalism.
This stance might be motivated by the prevailing domestic political 
conditions as well as by the belief that the recognition of such a thing can 
be detrimental to the public image of Kemalism. Their adherence of 
Kemalism is total and reflects a religious type of allegiance, which may 
not admit anything that may seem as unwanted and bad. Everything they 
considered good should have been covered by their belief system, i.e., 
Kemalism.
The ethnicist conception of Kemalism prescribed ethnosecular 
Turkishness as a necessary condition of being a Turk, which was radically 
different from being a Turkish citizen. The use of citizenship rights were 
inevitably linked to the meeting of the newly defined conditions of being 
Turk, despite the claim that "the people who established the Republic of 
Turkey is the Turkish nation." Accordingly, religious Muslims, non-
17See, among others, Toktamış Ateş, Türk Devrim Tarihi (History 
of Turkish Renovation) (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1984), 278-79. According 
to Ateş, "Kemalist nationalism is not chauvinistic, nor is it based on the 
bases of language, race and religion. It is a nationalism based on the 
principle of territory. It embraces all citizens living in the territory of 
Turkish Republic and consider them as Turk regardless of language, race 
and religion and tries to melt them within the same pot of culture." See 
Toktamış Ateş, Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz. Atatürkçülük ve Sosyal 
Demokrasi Üzerine Düşünceler (We Love the Revolution Too Much. 
Thoughts on Atatürk and Social Democracy) (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 
1992), 61-62, and Ateş, "Nasıl Bir Milliyetçilik"(What Type of a 
Nationalism?) Milliyet, 10 March 1993, 17. Also see Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, 
Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği (The Unbearable Lightness 
of Attacking Atatürk), 10th ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1996), 57. 
According to Kışlalı, Kemalist nationalism is a non-racist, pluralist 
nationalism. Ibid.
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Turkish Muslim ethnies, and non-Muslim minorities emerged as the 
ones discriminated against.18
18Karpat claims that "one's religiosity, as long as it was not imposed 
on others, never became a hindrance to acquiring position in the 
Republic. The Grand National Assembly had over a dozen well-known 
clericals throughout the years from 1920 to 1950. Marshal Çakmak, who 
was very pious and pro-Islamist as proven during his chairmanship of 
the Millet Partisi (Nation Party) in 1948-50, remained as Chief of Staff 
throughout Atatiirk's lifetime.(...) Throughout the Republic mosques 
remained open, and the two religious holidays (Bayrams ) were officially 
recognised. (...) "The Republic did not want to depart from Islam and 
accept a new faith but wished to rid of Islam of those features thought, 
rightly or wrongly, to contradict the modernistic view of the new regime; 
that is dogmatism, exclusiveness, primiteveness. The Republic sought a 
purified, reformed Islam which was both modem and Turkish." Karpat, 
Turkey's Politics, 60.
The First Assembly was not under the personal control of Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha. The election of deputies were held under "extraordinary" 
(war) conditions. There was an important opposition group called "İkinci 
Group "(Second Group) headed by a liberal, Hüseyin Avni (Ulaş), deputy 
from Erzurum, against "Birinci Group " (the First Group) headed by 
Mustafa Kemal. The main reason to hold new elections in 1923 was this 
independent, non-controlled character of the First Assembly(1920-1923). 
In the Second Assembly(1923-1927), however, there were only negligible 
numbers of the opponents of Mustafa Kemal and his political 
programme. In the following Assemblies., there occurred no ideological- 
political discussion on the bills of law submitted by the government, and 
all votes were taken unanimously. There remained no "clericals" in the 
assemblies of one party years except for those who underwent a radical 
transformation to the degree of being the fierce advocate of Kemalist 
Revolution and rejecting their Islamic faith and way of life, such as 
Şemsettin Günaltay, Rasih Kaplan, Rıfat Börekçi, and many others. The 
Kemalist novelist Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu makes a striking 
satirising of such "clericals", which Karpat refers to, symbolised in the 
character of Skheih Emin in his novel A nkara. See Yakup Kadri 
Karaosmanoğlu, Ankara (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1964). Therefore, 
Karpat’s claim that religiosity was no obstacle to "acquiring position in 
the Republic" is totally without ground given the ideological character of 
the Kemalist state, which was totally monolithic in nature.
Marshal Çakmak's case is an exception which proves the rule. 
İsmet İnönü and Marshal were two key figures in preserving the 
Kemalist cadre in power. As the only person other than Mustafa Kemal 
who had the title of "Marshal", Çakmak guaranteed the support of the 
army to the Kemalist Revolution. He made no objection to any of the 
secularising reforms of Atatürk. And he was a real hard-liner as regards 
the "Kurdish question." The personal piety of Çakmak, which remained
262
5. 2. T w o R oots of K em alism : N ation alism  and C ivilisationism
Kemalist nation-building came after a long period of dynastic state­
building followed by the period of the development of bureaucratic/state 
dites.19 The process of nation-building is an overall continuos process of 
social and political integration directed at socio-political groups under the 
engineering of bureaucratic-intellectual elites.20 Its aim is to integrate 
divided sections of a people in social, regional or political terms. Shaped 
by politico-historical conditions, as an ideology and political movement 
nationalism itself forms a significant part of the nation-building process. 
Its success depends primarily on the establishment of a consciousness that
particular to him, makes no sense in teleological terms in this regard. 
This case seems to be thoroughly related with power concerns rather than 
ideological prescriptions. The retainment of Bayrams together with no 
legal ban on veiling (tesettür) can be explained with Mustafa Kemal's 
strategy of "doing right things at right times" that he expressed in his 
renowned Speech. Given that Atatürk rejects religion as a component of 
Turkish national identity thoroughly, one cannot assume that the 
toleration of such religious symbols (şeair-i İslamiyye) can be related to an 
ideological position. Rather, these are considered as things that are to be 
resolved in time. What is in question is not an ideological but power- 
based approach. Thus there was no person who performed pilgrimage to 
Mecca with official permission in this period, for example. The position 
of Kemalist Revolution vis a vis Islam can best be evaluated from both 
an ideological and powerwise perspective. This was well identified by 
Allen: "The truth of the matter seems to be that (the state policy) is 
distinctively opportunist in its attitude: that it is favourable to whatever 
in Islam is consistent with the republican ideals, relentlessly opposed to 
anything which might endanger Kemalist success, and, for the rest, more 
or less neutral." see Henry E. Allen, The Turkish Transformation 
(Chicago, 1935); quoted by Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 61.
19For the general highlights of the Kemalist nation-state founding 
see Dankwart A. Rustow, The Founding o f A Nation-State: Atatürk's 
Historic Achievement (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981). 
Kemalist nation-building is based, first and foremost, on the 
delegitimisation of religious and dynastic past.
20Peter Alter, Nationalism trans. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991),
21.
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can bind a cluster of exalted values or political cause to a specific nation 
and define its uniqueness as the substance of a national ideology.21
Theoreticians of nation-building process, due to their 
developmentalist biases, generally tend either to ignore the question of 
ethnic identity or to treat it merely as a minor impediment to national 
integration. However, no particular multiethnic state has proven 
immune to the divisive impact of ethnicity, in view of the increasing 
ethnic consciousness all over the world, regardless of the form of 
government or the level of economic development. Despite the fact that 
the increased social mobilisation and communication catalysed ethnic 
tensions , the leading theoreticians of the nation building could not admit 
that until recent times.22 Because nation-building is directed at the 
achievement of national integration, it is necessarily biased toward 
"ethnic demands".
The creation of political power structures claiming sovereignty 
over communities of ethnically distinct people and the formation of 
cultural identity expressed in shared culture constitute part and parcel of 
the process of nation-building. Nation-building process is always time 
and place bound, however. Each process possesses its own peculiarities. 
Consequently, various models of nation-building can be identified, most 
of which are structured on the European historical experience. 23
21Ibid., 22.
22Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," in 
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism:The Quest fo r  Understanding 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29-39.
23For this models see, for example, Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Kemalism and 
the Models of Nation-Building," in I. Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu 
(Açılış Konnşmaları-Bildiriler) 21-23 Eylül 1987 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür 
Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1994), 568-572. 
Wiatr’s taxonomy identifies six models of nation-building: the West
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All nations are formed out of historical heritage accumulated over 
centuries. No nation-building begins with an empty record of past 
development. Y e t, all patterns of nation-building own their specific road 
of evolution. In this regard, Kemalist model of nation building, as Wiatre 
observed, represents a synthesis of nation-building models. 24
In the case of Kemalist nation-building, the most important 
historical determiner was the novelty of national identity and its slow 
pace of development. The slowness of national development brings the 
Kemalist nation-building process close to the model of a retarded nation 
building. Given that it was a process occurred after the War of 
Independence, it approximates the national liberation model. Because it is 
structured on the premise of total westernisation with emphasis on 
secularism and idealist positivism, it includes some elements from 
Western European bourgeois democratic model, particularly in its 
political-territorial aspect.
To be sure, the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nation-building 
shares certain resemblances with integral nationalisms of the 1930s. 
Finally, there are some elements of the transformation of the old culture 
model in the Kemalist national endeavour. It was, however, a 
transformation in which emphasis put on discontinuity rather than 
continuity. In their creation of the ethnosecular boundaries of the new
European bourgeois democratic model (France, England), the model of 
retarded nation-building (Italy, Germany, Russia), national liberation 
model (East-Central European states, Poland, Ireland, Greece, etc.) , the 
settlers nation model (USA, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, 
Israel), the transformation of old culture model (China, Japan, India), and 
finally the post-colonial development model (Sub-Saharan Africa). See 
also Rustow, The Founding o f A Nation-State, 21-23.
24Wiatre, ibid., 573.
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Turkish national identity,' Kemalist bureaucratic-inteliectual elites
stressed the deepness of their break with the Ottoman-Islamic past. 25
The most fundamental achievement of Kemalism is the building
of a modem nation-state. As Eisentadt observed,
In one generation, not only the Turkish intellectual elite but a 
great part of the society at large has become national in the western 
meaning of this term.... The redefinition of the political 
community took place in a unique way the society withdrew from 
the Islamic framework into that of the newly defined Turkish 
nation. While this process appears similar to the path followed by 
the European nation-states, it in fact involved the negation of a 
universal framework: Islam.26
This negation had two roots: "milliyetçilik"(nationalism) and 
"medeniyetçilik"(civilisationism). In other words, there were(are) two 
basic premises of Kemalist'revolution: the will to nationalism, and the 
will to civilisationism. The premise of civilisation leads to the European
25Ibid., 572-573. According to Wiatr, the way Kemal Atatürk 
succeeded in building a modern nation deserves special attention for at 
least three reasons: 1) It demonstrated for the first time the possibility of 
alternative models of nation-building , influenced by the earlier 
European experience but not identical with it; 2) It showed the 
importance of political and ideological factors in nation-building, 
relatively more important in the Turkish case than the long run socio­
economic factors; 3) It showed that, although nation-building stems from 
the accumulated heritage of the past, it can constitute a qualitative jump 
See ibid., 568.
26S. N. Eisentadt, "The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative 
Perspective," in Atatürk Founder o f a Modern State , eds., Ali Kazancigil and 
Ergun Ozbudun (London: Hurst & Co. 1981), 135. Mardin has the same 
observation that in the make up of the new national identity Islam was denied 
a role. Sharing the Berkesian view regarding Kemalist secularisation, he 
asserts that the aim of Kemalist secularising reforms was "to liberate the 
individual from the idiocy of traditional, community oriented life." See 
Mardin "Religion and Secularism," In Atatürk Founder o f a Modern State, 
eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 
213. For Mardin, the consistency in Kemalist secularising reforms can be 
explained by the fact that "these secularising reforms are linked by the 
underlying common denominator of the liberation of the individual 
from the collective constraints of the Muslim community." Ibid.
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way of life and western thought. The premise of nationalism, on the 
other hand, makes an avenue to the Central Asian origin of the Turks, 
and the unity in terms of history and language. Any attempt at analysing 
Kemalist revolution needs to take into consideration these two 
premises.27
Islamism and Turkism crystallised in accordance with the Ottoman 
imperial imperative were thrown away into the dustbin of history , and 
instead, the premises of nationalism and civilisationism were substituted 
in the making of the boundaries of the new individual and collective 
identity. 28According to Safa, all the Kemalist reforms were emanated 
from these two premises. The establishment of national sovereignty and 
the setting up of the Grand National Assembly, the abolition of the 
sultanate and caliphate, the policy of national economy, the extension of 
Turkish history into its origins in Central Asia with the exclusion of the 
Ottoman-Islamic past, the Sun-Language Theory and the Law of Family 
Names, the Turkification of the call to prayer {ezan) were all sprung from 
the Kemalist principle of nationalism. 29
The Kemalist reforms stemming from the premise of 
civilisationism on the other hand were the ones related to the mission of 
secularisation, i.e., the separation of life from religion, namely, the 
abolition of the office of Sheikhülislam, the closing of the religious 
courts and colleges, the prohibition of dervish lodges and sufi orders, the 
lifting of the religious courses from school curriculums, the abolition of 
the religious laws and the reception of the European laws instead , the
27Peyami Safa, Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar (Glances at Turkish 
Renovation) ( Istanbul : Ötüken Yayınlan, 1990), 91.
28Ibid., 97-98.
29Ibid., 98.
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abolition of veil and polygamy the acceptance of hat as the national 
headgear, the reception of the Latin alphabet, the prohibition of the 
teaching and playing of ala turca music in public, the encouraging of 
opera, ballet, western polyphonic music and western style painting, the 
erection of the statutes of Kemal Atatürk, the acceptance of the western 
Christian calendar and the officialisation of the western clothes and 
manners. 30
All the Kemalist reforms fall within either of the aforementioned 
two premises intended to provide the new Turkish man with a new 
world view freed from Islam and Islamic culture. Kemalism created a 
new Turkish nationalism located within the western/Christian 
international, a reflection of the equation of civilisationism with 
westemism and civilisation with the west. 31
5.3. K em alist D eterm inants of Individual and C ollective Identity
Kemalist redefinition of the new Turkish individuality and 
collectivity is more striking than its ability to bring about westernising 
reforms. 32 As a radical reorganisation of the remnant of the Ottoman 
Empire, the watershed in the Kemalist revolution is the making of a non­
existent, hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, a genuine one, with the 
assumption that a Turkish nation has already existed.33
In formulating a means of creating social consciousness and 
devising a new principle of social cohesion, Islam was thoroughly
3°Ibid., 99.
31Ibid., 101.
32Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," 208.
33This assumption is the clear manifestation of utopian, change- 
oriented character of Kemalist thinking See Mardin, ibid., 209.
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rejected. The consciousness of the new Turkish man was to be rooted in 
positive science, i.e., western civilisation, a recurrent theme of Kemalism 
preaching science as the source of all valid knowledge and behaviour.34 
Yet, consciousness raising for the creation of the new Kemalist national 
man required the adoption of a new set of values and ideals necessary for 
the building of the new national identity to which sciepce could afford 
nothing. Values, ethical prescriptions and emotional stimuli cannot be 
derived from scientific formulas of any kind, and therefore, the 
emergence of the new individual and social identity was bounded to a 
new axiology conditioned .by the Kemalist epistemology of scientific 
dogmatism and absolutism. The increasing use of ethnic-genealogical 
and racial themes in the 1930s, the manifestation of which were Turkish 
history thesis and the sun language theory was the recognition of the 
helplessness of science in the building of national identity
According to Mardin, in the Kemalist nation building, solidarism, 
the official ideology of the French Third Republic, alongside Turkish 
history thesis and the sun language theory, was the most important
34According to Mustafa Kemal, "The most genuine guide for 
everything in the world, for civilisation, for life, for success is science. To 
look for a guide other than science is heedlessness, ignorance, going 
astray." "Samsun Öğretmenleriyle Konuşma" (Talk with Teachers in 
Samsun), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 22. 09. 1924, 202. The conformity of 
social life to the needs and modem requirements is the gist of this crude 
scientism. See "Öğretmenlere" (To Teachers), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 27. 
10. 1922, 48. The equation of science and civilisation with the West is 
another classical reflection of the "native" orientalism. For Mustafa 
Kemal, "Countries are many but civilisation is one. It is necessary for a 
nation to join this single civilisation in order to progress.... We want to 
modernise our country. Our all efforts are for bringing about a modem 
therefore western government in Turkey. Which nation is it who aspired 
for joining the civilisation but did not turn its face towards the West?" 
"Kültür Hakkında" (About Culture), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 29.10. 1923, 
90-91.
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foundation.35 Kemalist solidarism prescribed a non-conflictual and at the 
same time redistributive scheme of society. 36
The elimination of traditional-Islamic social milieu, the 
embodiment of which was mahalle 37, and thus lifting the folk control 
over individual was the essential point of action in order to create a new 
society based on a new conception of honour, i.e., a society based on rules 
and regulations rather than a network of personalistic ties, the concrete 
embodiment of which was the new co-educational system. 38 The 
devaluation of mahalle and its replacement with the secular school 
environment paved the way to the emergence of a new focus of 
individual's loyalty: "cemiyet-i beşeriye" (society ). 39 Considered by
35Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 211. The solidarist theory 
prescribed that there was no necessary conflict between classes, conceived 
as functionally complimentary professional groupings, in modern 
society. The social equilibrium could be achieved through a social ethics 
of duty (vazife ahlakı) founded on the individual and group 
contributions to society. "Kemalist education propounded a theory of 
citizenship based on these principles. It was the businessman, the 
schoolmaster and the politician who, working together under the shield 
of solidaristic redistribution, were to make up an integrated Turkish 
nation." Ibid., 212.
36The total conformism of Kemalism is well expressed in the 
following line of "Onuncu Yıl Marşı”(the Tenth Year March) by Behçet 
Kemal Çağlar and Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel: "İmtiyazsız, sınıfsız kaynaşmış 
bir kitleyiz" (We are an integrated block with no privileges and classes ). 
See Dursun Yaşa, Kahramanlık Şiirlerimizden Bir Demet (A Bundle of 
Our Heroic Poems) (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1972), 306.
37The smallest community unit in the Ottoman Empire, within 
which the ordinary Ottoman expended his life.
38Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 214; Karpat, Turkey's Politics 
, 59-60. Mustafa Kemal insistingly emphasised that the new education 
should be national because only a national education (milli terbiye) could 
arouse national consciousness. Here "national education" connotes the 
cleansing of education from religion. See "Samsun Öğretmenleriyle 
Konuşma," Söylev ve Demeçler II, 22.09.1924, 206-207.
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Kemalism as the antidote of. mahalle, in which final legitimacy had to be 
obtained from Islam, society took its legitimacy from science and 
therefore was considered to be inventive. Kemalist secularising reforms 
aiming at both nationalisation and civilisation were the means enabling 
the individual to escape from the moral constraints of the folk culture 
perceived as not amenable to creativity.
The formation of a new collective conscience and the liberation of 
individual from the constraints of the mahalle ethos to forge a new 
national identity also required a strong "sensory component"39 40 with the 
ability to arouse feelings. But the symbols of Kemalism assumed this 
function only for a limited number of Turks. Due to the negation of Islam 
in the building of national identity, Kemalism could not provide the 
ontological security insured by Islam to the man's existence in this world, 
and hence could not be successful in creating psychological drives around 
its symbols.41
Kemalist nationalism has changed the collective as well as the 
individual boundaries of personal identity, and consequently, substituted 
the bond of secular Turkish nationality for the old religious and 
denominational allegiances.42 The ultimate frame of legitimacy would 
no longer be religion but the mundane imperatives.43 The characteristic
39Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 215.
40Victor Turner, The Forest o f Symbols (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1967), 28; quoted by Mardin, ibid., 218.
41Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 218.
42"Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinin Açılışında" (At the Opening of the 
Law Faculty), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 05.11.1925, 249.
43"Gentlemen, the nation has considered upon the necessary 
consequence of transformations and renovations which I have 
enumerated that the general administration and all the laws should only 
spring from the worldly needs and a secular mind of governance based
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features of this sui generis nationalism were rationalism, secularism 
and materialism. Yet, the popular imagery of nationalism has always 
remained twin with religion. 44
The determination of a group of the Kemalist bureaucratic- 
intellectual elites who professed adherence to the ethnicist conception of 
Kemalist nationalism to crystallise the new state as an ethnosecular 
Turkish national state in which the Turkish ethnie would assume the 
hegemonic position(unsur-u asli) did not correspond to a real situation 
in the popular imagery. Because the markers of the collective identity of 
the Muslim residents of Anatolia and Thrace including the Turkish 
ethnie did not have a nationalistic component. The axis of both their 
collective and personal identity was purely religious and tribalistic. Being 
Turkish did not mean much to them, apart from its pejorative and 
pastoral connotations in the popular usage. Consequently, the Kemalist 
crusade of building an ethnosecular national identity could not find a 
popular basis of backing and legitimacy. The people of Turkey during the 
Kemalist era described herself Turkish only as an outer expression of 
identity vis a vis other national societies around rather than against other 
non-Turk Muslim ethnies of Turkey.45
on the continuos change in accordance with the needs continuously 
changing end evolving as a vital requirement." Ibid.
44Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 254.
45Ömer Laçiner, "Introduction," in Taner Akçam, Türk Ulusal 
Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu (Turkish National Identity and the 
Armenian Question) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 14. For the 
historical evolution of the meanings of the name of "Turk" and its 
etymology, see Bozkurt Güvenç, Türk Kimliği: Kültür Tarihinin Ana 
Kaynakları (Turkish Identity: The Main Sources of Cultural History), 4th 
ed. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1996), 22.
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5 .4 . T ran sitio n  to the G en u in e P o litica l D isco u rse  o f K em alist  
N atio n alism
Although we cannot identify an exact date of transition from the 
pluralist political discourse of the period of the National Struggle to the 
homogenising-unitarian discourse of Kemalist nationalism, we can duly 
suggest that Turkish nationalism was increasingly emphasised as the new 
regime was consolidated. 46
Kemalist parameters of national identity evolved over three 
distinct periods from predominantly religious toward a predominantly 
ethnic definition. Those who argue that Kemalist nationalism is purely a 
civic-territorial nationalism essentially ignore its overtly recognised 
ethnic-genealogical aspect due to their conception of Kemalism as a 
dogmatic, close system of thought, i.e., an all-inclusive ideology 
incorporating "all good things".
Between 1919-1938 Mustafa Kemal ascribed three distinct meanings 
to Turkishness with varying degrees of emphasis, which can be discerned 
with an analytical perception. The first definition, which dominated the 
period between the years 1919 and 1924, was predominantly determined 
by the Islamic boundary of Turkishness suggesting that "the Muslim 
peoples of .Ynatolia and Thrace are Turk".47
46Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadelede ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi 
Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu" (The Question of Citizenship 
and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the 
Republic), Unpublished Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996), 5.
47The statements acknowledging ethnic and cultural pluralism in 
the Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses are the evident 
manifestation of the religious boundary of Turkishness. The first article 
of the Declaration of the Congress of Erzurum (7 August 1919) reads: "The 
province of Trabzon and the city (sancak) of Canik, together with 
Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Mamuretülaziz, Van, Bitlis, which are called
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Following the promulgation of the republic(1923) and especially 
"the year of destruction" (1924), 48 the political definition of Turkishness, 
which considered everybody being citizen of Turkish Republic and 
embracing Turkish language, culture and the Kemalist national creed as 
Turk became more pronounced. Toward the end of the 1920s, the ethnic- 
geneaological boundary became increasingly dominant in the Kemalist
Vilayat-i Şarkiye (Eastern Provinces), and elviye-i müstakille (Kars, 
Ardahan, Batum) within this region is a whole which cannot be 
conceived to be separated from one another and from the Ottoman 
Community. They accept to fully share happiness and calamity, and 
espouse the same goal as regards their destiny. All the Muslim elements 
living in the said territories are genuine brothers filled with mutual 
sentiments of sacrifice and respectful for their social and racial 
conditions "The article 9 stipulates the conditions of membership to the 
Şarkî Anadolu Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti (Eastern Anatolian Society for 
the Defence of Rights) and limits it with Muslims: "... All Muslim citizens 
are natural members of our Society." These provisions are reiterated in 
The Regulation of the Society. For the text of the Declaration and the 
Regulation see Mazhar Müfit Kansu, Erzurum'dan Ölümüne Kadar 
Atatürk'le Beraber (Together with Atatürk from Erzurum to His Death) 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1966), 113-125; also see Mahmut 
Goloğlu, Erzurum Kongresi (Erzurum Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu 
Yayınlan, 1968), 109-111. The 1st and 9th articles of the Declaration of the 
Congress of Sivas ( 9 September 1919), which covers not only the Eastern 
Anatolia but all of the Anatolia and Thrace, repeats the same points. 
Likewise, the same provisions included within the Regulation of 
Anatolian and Rumelian Society for the Defence of Rights. See Kansu, 
ibid., 221-230, and Mahmut Goloğlu, Sivas Kongresi (Sivas Congress) 
(Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınlan, 1969), Appendix 1, 219-226.
48In one of his article titled "Türkiye'nin Siyasi Tarihi" (Political 
History of Turkey), M. Zekeriya (Sertel), the Director of the Press and 
Information at the time, asserts that "The past 1924 has been a year of 
destruction for Turkey. In order to complete the revolution which began 
with the battle of Sakarya two years ago , the last year was expended with 
the demolishing of the old institutions inherited from the former era. 
Our fundamental law was pulled down. Educational, judicial and 
familial institutions were demolished. In short, the established order of 
the society was routed from bottom to the top....Within a week the 
country witnessed an enormous revolution. All institutions that can be 
considered religious were overthrown within one week" ; quoted by 
MeteTunçay, Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması(1923-1931) 
(The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey, 1923-1931), 2nd ed. 
(Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 121-122.
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definition of national identity, which stated that the native people of the 
Central Asia is Turkish (1929-1938).
The religious definition was the inescapable consequence of the 
National Struggle because this struggle was justified as an holy war and 
the people were rallied around the cause of liberating the sultan-caliph 
from the captivity of the Christian invaders. The political definition 
therefore represented a radical rupture in ideological terms. The third 
definition, inspired by the urge to disprove the bad image of Turks in the 
western historiography, and crystallised by the historical studies in which 
Mustafa Kemal himself and his close associates were personally 
involved, was officially sanctified in the 1932 Turkish History Congress. 
As a matter of fact, racial views were present since the outset of the 
Republic, at least in the form of preoccupation with eugenics, but its 
transformation into the dominant determiner of Turkishness in the 
public discourse took place in the 1930s, with the continuing efforts to 
reconcile the racial and political boundaries.49
5.5. The R eligious B oundary of Turkish N ational Identity  (1919
1924)
The subject of the National Struggle was the Muslim people of 
Anatolia and Thrace. The basic charter of the National Struggle, the 
Declaration of the National Pact, defines the indivisible territory as those 
parts of the Empire inhabited by the Ottoman-Muslim majority except for 
the parts populated by the Arabs, due to their former secession.50 The
49 Sevan Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Milleti Kavramı" 
(The Concept of Turkish Nation in Kemalist Thought), T ürkiye  
Günlüğü, 33(March-April 1995), 130.
50For the full text of the National Pact, see Appendix C.
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le itm otif of Muslims as 'the "unsur-u asli" (the principal ethnie) 
provided the determining framework of the Pact. Non-expression of the 
appellation "Turk" in it is striking in this regard. The definition of 
national boundaries on the basis of religious affiliation with the exclusion 
of ethnic appellations is the core formulation of this period.
The regulation of the organisational core of the National Struggle, 
the Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, is no 
different in its definition of national boundaries from the National Pact: 
"Muslim elements loaded to one another with mutual respect and feeling 
of sacrifice, and respectful of their racial, social and environmental 
conditions are genuine brothers and constitute an indivisible 
whole."51
The Ottoman notion of the Muslims as the principal ethnie 
(unsur-u asli), which was fervently embraced by the Young Turks as well, 
was the dominant current also in the First National Assembly. The later 
proponents of the Kemalist nationalism were among those deputies who 
passionately propounded this notion.52 The nation spelled out in the
51 See the first article of "Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk 
Cemiyeti Program ve Nizamnamesi"(The Programme and Regulation of 
Anatolia and Rumelia Defence of Rights Society), in Tarık Zafer Tunaya, 
Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 (İstanbul, 1952), 514. The third 
paragraph of the seventh article titled "Teşkilat" (organisation), 
accordingly, states that "all the Muslim citizens are the natural members 
of the organisation." See ibid., 516. Nevertheless, the second article of the 
regulation has no objection to the co-living with "the all non-Muslim 
elements that we have lived heretofore" but makes clear that they are 
not covered by the boundaries of the same national identity. Ibid., 514.
52During the floor debates over the fourth article of the 1921 
constitution, which regulated professional representation, Mahmut Esat, 
deputy from Izmir, answered the worries that professional representation 
may yield to the representation of non-Muslims collaborating with the 
invasion forces as follows: "Maybe it might not be proper to speak against 
Christians in the Ottoman Parliament. But I do not suppose myself to be 
in the Ottoman Parliament in the old sense, and speak in the capacity of a
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Circular Letter of Amasya,53 the communiqué about the election of the 
new Assembly,54 and all the laws and regulations passed in this period is 
the Muslim nation of the Ottoman Empire with the exclusion of Arabs.55
In fact, the period of the National Struggle reversed the process of 
secularisation in progress since the Tanzimat (Reform Edict). Thus for the 
first time there was no non-Muslim parliament in the First National 
Assembly. Islamic nationalism was directed at the Christian insult against 
the Muslim denizens of Anatolia and Thrace. Islam was considered as 
the basic frame of the political legitimacy and of social cohesion. The 
common denominator of such diverse ethnies as Turks, Arabs, Kurds,
person who hold that there is no right of the Christian stratum over this 
country. They (Christians) have resigned from the citizenship of this 
country . They are ungrateful children of the Ottoman history, and there 
is no right left for them over this country. In this country striving for the 
defence of her rights, they are the spies of imperialism and the 
treacherous children of this homeland. There is no room for them in 
this Assembly, gentlemen." TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 5, 99th meeting,
3rd session, 18.11.1336(1920), 390.
53For the Circular Letter of Amasya see Suna Kili, Kem alisin  
(Istanbul: Menteş matbaası, 1969), 11-12.
54The communiqué prescribes the exclusion of the Christian subjects to 
participate in the elections for the new Assembly. See "Ankara'dan Derhal Bir 
Meclisin Toplanmasına Dair"(About the Immediate Sitting of an Assembly in 
Ankara), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve 
Beyannameleri, IV (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu 
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1991), 18 March 1920, 272-274.
55The same definition acknowledging the religious unity on the 
basis of the recognition of ethnic diversity was reiterated in various 
occasions by Mustafa Kemal as well. To illustrate, see "Mütarekeden 
Meclisin Açılmasına Kadar Geçen Zaman Zarfında Cereyan Eden Siyasi 
Olaylar Hakkında" (About the Political Events in the Period Between the 
Armistice and the Opening of the Assembly), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve 
Demeçler I (The Speech and Statements of Atatürk, I) (Ankara: Atatürk 
Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 
24 April 1920, 30. Also see "Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Müslüman Öğeler 
Hakkında"(About the Muslim Elements Comprising the Turkish 
Nation), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 May 1920, 74-75.
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Circassians and Lazes was Islam. 56 No legislation contradicting Islamic 
injunctions was passed in this period.
What is striking in this period is the duality observed in the 
political discourse of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. As of the Opening Speech of 
the Erzurum Congress (23 July 1919)57, he founded his public discourse on 
the themes of "homeland" (vatan ), "nation" (m illet) and "national" 
(milli) The key words of this discourse were "millet "(nation), "milletdaş 
(co-national), "dindaş "(coreligionist), "metalib-i milliye "(national 
demands), "kuvay-ı milliye "(national forces), "milli meclis "(national 
assembly), "milli kader "(national destiny), "irade-i milliye "(national 
W\M)"hakimiyet-i milliye "(national sovereignty)," and hudud-u milli" 
(national boundary).58
Mustafa Kemal continuously used both the term "Turkey" and 
"Turks" more or less interchangeably with the view that these terms 
incorporates all other Muslim elements. 59 Especially in his speeches
56Tunçay, Tek Parti Yönetimi, 212.
57"Erzurum Kongresini Açarken" (In the Opening of Erzurum 
Congress), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 23 July 1919, 1-5.
58See Söylev ve Demeçler I , passim.
59For the interchangeable use of the terms "Türkiye milleti"(nation  
of Turkey) and "Türk milleti" (Turkish nation), the following is a good 
example: "The acquisition of the nation of Turkey of the rights of 
independence and life in administrative, financial and economic terms is 
an eternally acquired right harmful to no nation (voices of "no doubt"). It 
is adequate for the world peace to accept such a natural reality. But, as is 
the case for the years, whatever the result of the insistence to reject its 
right of existence by closing it in any form in spiritual and de facto terms 
in the present state of the world, Turkish nation does not accept and will 
not accept such a result with peace of mind and ease of conscience." 
"Dördüncü Toplanma Yılını Açarken" (Opening the Fourth Year of 
Meeting), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 March 1923, 319. His use of the terms 
"Türkiye halkı " (people of Turkey) and "Turk" the following quotations 
may give some idea: "Gentlemen , the people of Turkey are the children
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delivered on the occasion of Third Year of the Opening of the Assembly, 
Mustafa Kemal underlined the religious basis of nationality and the 
respect for ethnic heterogeneity, which seems to be a minimal definition 
of nation including the recognition of the rights of non-Muslim 
minorities on the basis of bilateral agreements provided that the same 
rights be given to the Muslim minorities elsewhere.60
The Islamic-national public discourse in the period of the National 
Struggle is a clear rupture from the ideal of Ottoman nation. The 
conversion of the term "Turk" into an expression of common national 
identity and solidarity based on the Islamic allegiance from a mere 
ethnographic, linguistic and historical fact became realised during this 
period. As stated before, the appellations of both "Turk" and "Turkey" are 
of European origin. Turkey was the name given to the parts of Anatolia 
and Thrace under Muslim rule by the Europeans since the 11th century. 
The secession of Arabs from the Empire during the First World War 
made the need to name non-Arab Muslim elements urgent, the result of 
which was the coining of the name "Turk."
In February 1920, three weeks after the declaration of the National 
Pact, a floor debate occurred in the last Ottoman Parliament on the 
occasion of the approval of the draft text of the Assembly's Reply(Anza-/ 
Cevabiyye) to the Sultan's Speech (Nutk-u Hümayun) of the opening of 
the National Assembly (Meclis-i Mebusan) regarding what is meant by 
the terms "Türk" and "millet". Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi, a deputy from
of a brave ethnie , which has lived free and independent, and viewed 
independence as a corollary of life.... "the nobility and innocence of 
Turks." "Claude Farrere Şerefine Verilen Çay Ziyafetinde" (Tea Party 
Given for the Honour of Claude Farrere), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 18. 
06.1922, 38 and 39-40. For the separate use of these terms also see Söylev 
ve Demeçler I, 168, 200 and 344-346.
60"tJçüncü Toplanma Yılını Açarken" (Opening the Third Year of 
Meeting)SöyZez> ve Demeçler I, 1 March 1922, 236-37.
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Karesi, demanded the clarification of the meaning ascribed to the term
"Turk" in that it causes misunderstandings
Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi (Deputy from Karesi): "...What is meant by 
Turk is various Muslim elements like Turks, Kurds, Circassians, 
Lazes. Is that so? If this is not meant by the name "Turk", then I 
request that instead of the term "Turk", the orators should use the 
term "anasir-i Islamiye" (Muslim elements).
Riza Nur Bey (Deputy, from Sinop): It is so.
Hiiseyin Bey (Deputy from Erzurum): Even Jews are included. 
Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi(going on): Those who consider 
themselves as Kurd would no longer misunderstand it after this 
way of the interpretation of the word "Turk" by the Assembly, 
which made it public. Or, in order to avoid putting dust to their 
consideration, let us use such terms as Turk, Kurd, Lazes, 
Circassians or Muslim elements (anasir-i Islamiye).
Tunali Hilmi Bey (Deputy from Bolu): Muslim Ottomans.61
Upon this, Abdulaziz Mecdi Bey’s another motion as regards the
adoption of the term "Millet-i Osmaniye" instead of the term "millet" in
that the country hosts Christian elements (anasir-i Hristiyaniyye) as well
was readily approved by the Assembly.62
Another interesting motion in this regard was taken up in the first
session of the 35th meeting of the Second Legislative Period in
12.01.1341(1924): The reporf of the Constitutional Committee regarding
the motion of Mustafa Fehmi Efendi (deputy from Bursa), and his friends
concerning the determination of whom the term "Tiirkiyeli" (those from
Turkey) would be used, and the decision that there is no place for any
proceeding
Speaker- It (the motion) will be read out.
"To the High Presidency
The motion, dated 22 September 1339 (1923), and given by Mustafa 
Fehmi Efendi and his friends concerning the determination of 
whom the term ''Tilrkiyeli'' (those from Turkey) would be used,
61Meclisi-i Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi, igtima-i Fevkalade The Journal 
of Register of Medis-i Mebusan, Extraordinary Session), vol. 1, 12th 
meeting, 2nd session, 19 February 1336(1920), 171. For the all discussions 
on the issue see, ibid., 170-172.
62Ibid., 172.
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which was referred to our commission by the High Presidency was 
discussed and negotiated. Since it has been determined of whom 
the term "Türkiyeli" would be used by 88th article of the (1924) 
Constitution, there is no need to take any other decision on this 
matter. Therefore, it was unanimously agreed to the returning of 
the motion to the Presidency."63
The term Turkey appeared in the official documents for the first 
time in the 1921 Constitution. The declaration of Mustafa Kemal about 
the Great Victory in 1 September 1922 addressed for the first time "the 
noble Turkish nation,"64 but the dual content of the term persisted. In the 
second principle of the declaration of the "Dokuz Umde (Nine 
Principles), which hinted the establishment of "Halk Fırkası" (People's 
Party), the term "Türkiye halkı" (People of Turkey) is used.65 This 
waving between the terms "Türkiye halkı” and "Turk"66 was finally 
resolved on behalf of "Türk" and "Türk milleti" in conclusive terms 
with the 1924 constitution.
63TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period II, vol. 12, session 2, 89. The report 
of the committee was approved by the National Assembly.
64The phrased used in the beginning of the declaration is "the great, 
noble Turkish nation." See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "Dumlupmar Zaferi 
Üzerine Türk Milletine Beyanname"(Declaration to Turkish Nation 
upon the Victory of Dumlupinar), Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve 
Beyannameleri, IV 1 September 1922, 474.
65Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, 580. For the full text of the declaration of 
"Dokuz Umde," dated 8 April 1339(1923), see ibid., 580-82.
66In the decision of the Council of Ministers as regards the fact that 
TGNA is the genuine representative of the right of sovereignty, dated 1/2. 
11. 1338(1922), the terms "Türkiye halkı" and "Türk milleti" were used 
together. This was the indication of the persistence of ambivalence and 
the need to know the direction the new regime would take.
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5.5.1 The Religious Boundary and. Exchange o f Population 
The Convention of 30 January 1923 Concerning the Exchange of 
Greek and Turkish Populations is part of the peace settlement signed 
between Turkey and the allied powers at the Lausanne Conference. It 
consists of nineteen articles. The first article lays down the principle of 
compulsory exchange: "As from the first May 1923, there shall take place a 
compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox 
religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the 
Muslim religion established in Greek territory."67
The Convention defined in its first article the persons to be 
subjected to the compulsory exchange as stated above. In the following 
articles the two populations to be exchanged are shortly defined as the 
"Greeks" and "the Muslims", which standed for the terms "of the Greek 
orthodox religion" and "of the Muslim religion." The clear implication 
of this appellation in the first view is that religion was seen as a safe 
criterion in that racial and linguistic criteria simply did not apply. 68A
67Stephen P. Ladas, Exchange o f Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and 
Turkey (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), 345. Article 2 defined 
the persons not to be included in the exchange. These were the Muslims 
of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul. Population exchange 
between Turkey and Greece took place between October 1923 and the end 
of 1924. In this period, 130 000 Greek orthodox Turkish nationals 
emigrated to Greece while 384 000 Muslim Greek nationals came to 
Turkey and acquired citizenship in accordance with the article 7 of the 
Convention. Ibid., 711. See also Hicri Fişek, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku 
(Turkish Law of Citizenship) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk 
Fakültesi Yayınlan, 1959), 108.
68During the debates in the Sub-Committee of the Minorities, the 
second Turkish delegate to the Lausanne Conference, Rıza Nur, refused 
the use of the terms "racial and linguistic minorities" in a determined 
way, and put forward that there is no racial minority in Turkey. 
Linguistic minorities could be ignored, and therefore the term minority 
in the Turkish context could mean only religious, i.e., non-Muslim 
minorities. In the end, the Turkish suggestion was accepted by the Greek
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very large majority of the Muslims in Greece spoke Greek and racially 
had nothing in common with the Muslims of Turkey. Likewise, the 
Greeks of many parts of Turkey spoke Turkish and did not belong to a 
single ethnic origin.
The criterion of the determination of those who would be subject 
to the population exchange was thoroughly religious-based, which was 
the most important step in the formation of the new national identity on 
practical grounds. The religious criterion is so much overt that Turkish 
speaking orthodox population in Karaman and Pontus, who were 
writing in Turkish with the Greek alphabet and making their prayer in 
Turkish, was considered as orthodox Greek, and therefore, subjected to 
the forced exchange process despite their protests. Accordingly, the 
Muslim people of Crete island and Rumelia was considered "Turk" 
irregardless of their ethnic origin by the Turkish government and was 
accepted into citizenship.
The implication of the criterion of religion was different to the 
respective parties, however. When the case of the Arabians of Cilicia of 
the Greek Orthodox religion arose, the Turkish delegate in the Mixed 
Commission set up for the monitoring of the emigration process 
contended that the term of "the Greek Orthodox religion" in the 
Convention referred only to religion, and not to nationality, and that it 
comprised all those who shared the faith of the Greek Orthodox religion. 
The Greek delegation, on the other hand, asserted that in order a person 
to be included in the exchange, he/she should be Greek as well as 
Orthodox. Against these opposing views, which motivated by the urge to 
expel all adherents of the Orthodox religion who may not have an 
Hellenistic consciousness whatsoever to Greece on the side of the
delegate, Venizelos. See Mahmut Goloğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 1923 
(Turkish Republic 1923) (Ankara: Beşnur Matbaası, 1971), 24.
283
Turkish government, and to embrace only Orthodox adherents of Greek 
consciousness on the side of the Greek government, the Mixed 
Commission adopted two decisions on 31 May 1927. First, that the terms 
"Greek Orthodox religion" should be interpreted and applied as they 
have been with regard to Muslims in Greece, without regard to race, i.e., 
the ethnic origin. Secondly, that the term "Greek orthodox religion" of 
the article 1 of the Convention should not be applied to all the Eastern 
Orthodox religions.
At a later meeting, in December 1927, the Commission decided, 
over the protests of the Turkish delegation, that the term "Greek 
orthodox religion" could not be applied to 1) the Patriarchates other than 
the Ecumenical Pathriarchate of Phanar; 2) the auto-cephalus churches, 
such as the Church of Cyprus, the Serbian Church, the Rumanian 
Church, the Russian Church, the Albanian Church, and the Exarchist 
Church of Bulgaria. Hence, with the exclusion of the Patriarchates of 
Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria, the Orthodox Arabs were exempted 
from the exchange, who had nothing in common with the Greeks of 
Greece. Naturally, Greeks of Protestant and Catholic religions also were 
excluded.69
The intended purpose in compulsory population exchange for 
Turkish government was the elimination of the threat of Greek 
irredentism in Turkey, which was the case during the National Struggle.
69For the problems and the opposing views as regards the criteria 
of exchangeability see Ladas, Exchange o f Minorities, 377-384. It should be 
noted that Muslims in Greece of whatever origin (with the exception of 
Albanians) had an Islamic-Turkish consciousness , whereas the same was 
not true of all followers of the Orthodox religion in Turkey. This makes 
the logic behind the immigration policy of the Kemalist regime clear, 
which combined religion and ability and willingness to be assimilated 
into Turkishness. Despite the exclusion of religion from the national 
identity, it was religion proper that became a mainstay for the making of 
it.
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But in the meantime this purpose was accompanied by the need to host 
the new population, due to the lack of population in proportion to the 
land owned, who are Muslim and ready to accept the new Turkish 
identity. As a result of exchange both Turkey and Greece acquired an 
ethnical homogeneity, a genuine source of strength and stability to 
them.70
According to Lewis, the Greco-Turkish population exchange is a 
reflection of the confusion in terms of basic loyalties in the early 
Republican era because it was the religion that conditioned the exchange. 
What took place was not an. exchange of Greeks and Turks,, but rather an 
exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims.71
Interestingly enough, despite the total exclusion of religion from 
the make-up of the national identity later, religion still remained as a 
means of promoting nationalistic goals. To be sure, this policy was not 
sanctified in de jure terms; it was just stemmed from practical 
considerations and reflected a de jure logic. The striking example of this 
relates to the emigration policy of the Kemalist regime. Thus, the Turkish 
speaking Christian Gagauzes were not accepted as the émigré (muhacir) 
en masse. Despite Hamdullah Suphi's insistent efforts to accept Gagauzes 
to Turkey, only a number of individual Gagauzes were able to come to 
Turkey under a scholarship program during the 1930s. On the other hand, 
Bosnians and Bulgarian Pomaks who spoke no Turkish and were not 
ethnic Turks, migrated freely to Turkey, for they were Ottoman Muslims,
70For an evaluation of the results of population exchange from the 
Greek viewpoint, which put the blame on the Ottoman Empire, see 
Ladas, Exchange o f Minorities, 726-728.
71 Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey , 348-49.
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and unlike Albanian Muslims who rebelled against the Empire, had 
remained loyal 72
5.5.2. The Religious Boundary and the Definition o f Minorities in 
Turkey
The religious affiliation was taken as a basic criterion in the 
definition of the legal status of minorities in Turkey as prescribed by the 
Lausanne Treaty. 73 Thus, while Anatolian Armenians whose mother 
tongue were Turkish were considered belonging to the Armenian 
minority in Turkey, the Muslim Hemshinians who spoke Armenian 
were accepted as Turk. Being Turkish citizen did not automatically secure 
being Turk because, despite the radically secular nationalism of Kemalist 
regime, the older idea that Muslim equals Turk, and non-Muslim equals 
non-Turk persisted, particularly in the public consciousness. Religion and 
denomination went on appearing on identity cards and other official 
documents, and the designation Turk in popular usage was restricted to 
Muslims. Non-Muslim minorities were "constitutional Turks" (Kanun-i 
Esasi Türklüğü ), not "genuine Turks," (hakiki Türklük) as they were 
called in the national press of the time. 74
72Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 62-63.
73The Third Section of the Lausanne Peace Treaty titled "The 
Protection of Minorities" (Art. 37-45) consistently uses the term "non- 
Muslim minorities" when it mentions the minorities in Turkey. See 
Ismail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları 1920-1945 (The Political 
Treaties of Turkey), vol.l. (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil Tarih Yüksek 
Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989), 95-98.
74 According to Necmettin Sadık, the writer of the sociology 
textbooks in the Kemalist era and also journalist, the minorities " have to 
integrate into the society they live, or they have to leave the country. In 
the case of failing to meet either of these alternatives , the urge of 
"preserving life" may lead them to treason, to very dangerous 
interminglings. Therefore, it is not enough for the minorities living
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The religious definition which was dominant in the early years of 
the Republic did not lose its hold in the national consciousness at popular 
level even after the secularising reforms of 1924 and after. Non-Muslim 
Turks still are not considered Turk despite the official rhetoric of 
Turkishness independent of religion. Similarly, Muslim Bosnians and 
Circassians could easily be absorbed into native Turkish society despite 
their aloofness to Turkishness in terms of descent and language. The fact 
that political participation of minorities decreased almost to none in 
comparison to their status in the Ottoman Empire and their almost total 
exclusion from public sphere together with their inexistence in civil and 
military bureaucracy, are related, to some extent, with this popular 
imagery of Turk as being necessarily Muslim. Kemalist nationalism could 
not escape from this historical imperative.
5.6. R epublican D efinition: R ejection of W hat is R eligious
A unitarist-monolithic conception of Turkishness based on the 
politico-legal definition that "everyone tied to the Turkish Republic via
within the Turkish society to hold only the Turkish citizenship officially. 
If they wish to live in this country, they have to be genuiously Turk." See 
Tekin Alp, Türkleştirm e, 79-80. Another press comment is more 
instructive in this regard:
"No oppressive measures have been taken for the minority groups 
in the Turkish Republic. But it is up to them to assume the natural 
privileges stemming from being embraced by the Turkish majority 
through joining to that majority as a pure citizen. A man which do not 
think and feel like me may be a person that I observe his rights, but how 
can such a person be my citizen in its full sense?... " The genuine 
citizenship is composed of citizenship involving unity in language, ideal 
and interest. Uniting in everything, and differing while going to temples, 
is not something that may cause foreignness and separation in civilised 
societies." See "Evamir-i Aşere" (Ten Commandments), M illiyet, 15 
March 1928. These interpretations regarding the nature of Turkish 
citizenship reveals that the political component of the Republican 
definition of Turkishness is much more powerful than its legal 
component, and that legal component by itself does not make sense.
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citizenship, and embraced Turkish language, culhire and the national 
ideal is Turk" constituted the dominant aspect of the Republican 
definition of the Turkish national identity. The Republican definition as 
a rupture from the old religious definition came to the fore basically after 
the radical reforms of the 1924, which abolished the Caliphate, the old 
institutions of education, suft orders and the Ministry of §er'iyye  
(Religious Affairs) and E v k a f  (Religious Foundations). The 
disestablishment of Islam from the new Turkish polity paved the way for 
the redrawn of the boundaries of Turkishness, and hence Islam ceased to 
be the state religion in 10 April 1928.75
The Republican definition of the Turkish national identity had two 
components: legal (objective) and political (subjective). The political 
component was determinative, and in a sense embodied the Kemalist 
creed. The legal component was purely legal and essentially secondary to 
the political component. The official expression of the legal component of 
the Turkish national identity was the article 88 of the 1924 constitution: 
"Everyone who is tied to the Turkish Republic via citizenship is Turk."
The prevailing definition in the Kemalist literature however, is 
political and the distinction between the two components is of vital 
importance in the construction of the Kemalist ethno-secular Turkish 
identity. The legal aspect of Turkishness is to a certain extent the 
consequence of a "forced" condition. It is a necessary corollary of the 
Lausanne Treaty (1924) obliging the Turkish Republic to protect the rights 
of its non-Muslim minorities. That is why, as we shall see, Kemalist 
policies of assimilation(temsi7) in many cases were administered through
75See TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, period III, session 1, vol. 3, 09. 04. 1928,
115.
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administrative and de facto  measures rather than formal legal 
regulations.
Republican definition never considered the legal component as an 
adequate basis for being Turk. 76 As a result, those citizens whose mother 
tongues were not Turkish were forced to speak Turkish in private as well 
as in public usage. Such campaigns as "Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş !"(1927) 
(Citizens, Speak Turkish!) was officially supported. During the late 1920s 
and 30s, the generalisation of Turkish (Türkçenin Umumiliği ) was an 
important public concern. Those who do not speak Turkish in public 
became the subject of public harassment. The coining of pure Turkish 
names for children apart from speaking Turkish was considered a vital 
indication of the allegiance to the Kemalist creed.
Strikingly interesting, as will be elaborated later, the law no. 2510 
titled "İskan Kanunu" (The Law of Settlement) (1934) overtly made a 
distinction between "Turks’ that are not Turkish citizen" and "Turkish 
citizens that are not Turk." It prescribed discrimination between 
emigrants and refugees of Turkish stock and the ones that are not of 
Turkish stock in terms of acquiring citizenship. In the recruitment of 
public employees, civil as well as military, the established distinction was 
between being Turk and being Turkish citizen. There has never been a 
one-to-one correspondence between Turkish citizenship and Turkish 
national identity. Therefore, Turkish citizenship could not constitute a 76
76Yet, it must be admitted that non-Muslims ( including Jews, 
Greeks and Armenians) faced no difficulty in acquiring or losing the 
Turkish citizenship when they demanded so. The 1935 decisions of the 
Council of Ministers as regards the acquisition and loss of Turkish 
citizenship present an apparent manifestation of this fact. For these 
decisions, see Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), No: 2922, 05. 02. 1935; ibid., 
No: 2942, 28.02. 1935; ibid., No: 2962, 27. 03. 1935; ibid., No:2969, 04. 04. 
1935; ibid., No: 2971, 07. 04. 1935; ibid., No: 2979, 16. 04. 1935; ibid., No: 
3051, 11. 07. 1935; ibid., No: 3105, 13. 09. 1935; ibid., No: 3107, 16.09. 1935; 
and ibid., No: 3105,13. 09.1935.
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sound basis for a unifying national identity, unlike American or French 
citizenship.77
5.6.1 Political Component
In many of the official and political documents in the post-1924 
period, many markers of Turkishness were underlined in addition to 
citizenship. In view of these markers, while part of Turkish citizens 
considered as "Turk" or "öz-Türk" (pure, genuine Turk), other citizens 
were qualified either as "Kanun-ı Esasi Türkleri" (constitutional Turks) 
(non-Muslim minorities) or simply inexistent (Muslim ethnies other 
than Turks, particularly Kurds) in rhetorical-legal terms. The political 
will expressed in the form of loyalty to the Republican cause replaced the 
"kelime-i şahadet”(Islamic confession of faith) of the Ottoman times.78
77Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Kavramı," 128. According 
to Nişanyan, both in the European and Anglo-Saxon countries, the 
correspondence between citizenship and national identity is one-to-one 
and conclusive. Once you acquire citizenship, no one can question your 
national identity. In the American case, the maxim that "Those who are 
not American citizen is not American" is thoroughly valid. But in the 
European context, this may not necessarily be so. As a matter of fact, 
there are Germans or Frenchs that are not German or French citizen. 
Nevertheless, in no case one can point to a situation in which one's 
rights of citizenship are denied due to his/her refusal to adopt the 
dominant/state language, culture or national ideal. The assimilation 
policies of the states never reach to the point of the denial of citizenship 
rights of those citizens who refuse to integrate into the national creed. 
See ibid., 129. In the Kemalist conception of national identity, no citizen 
could use the rights and liberties stemming from citizenship unless 
he/she adopt the ethno-secular Turkish identity
78Entrance to Turkishness was bounded to the confession of a 
political credo titled "Türk'ün Yeni Amentüsü" (The New Credo of the 
Turk) in word as well as in deed: "I believe in Mustafa Kemal, who is the 
symbol of heroism and the creator of the independence of the fatherland, 
in his warrior army , his high laws, his combatant mothers , and the fact 
that there is no day of resurrection for Turkey. I confess with my all purity 
of heart that both the good and the bad spring from men; that my great 
nation will attain the best position in the civilised world, and bear
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The political component of the Republican definition of 
Turkishness is best expressed in the programmes of the Republican 
People's Party. 79 The article 5 of the 1927 Statute lays down the unity in 
language and feeling among citizens as the most important ties and 
therefore lends emphasis on the promotion of Turkish language and 
culture. According to the • 1931 programme, "nation is a political and 
social community (heyet) comprised by the citizens united in language, 
culture and ideal."80 This definition remained the same in 1935 and 1939 
party programmes. 81 In general, party programmes testify to the view of 
nation as the unity of will and feeling and hence reflects a solidarist 
authoritarianism. Purely ethnic elements do not have any reference.
The conditions of membership to the RPP in this context may give 
us some important clues. According to the article 3 of 1923 Statute of the 
RPP, "every Turk and every person emigrated to Turkey and accepted
witness to the unity of the mighty Turkish army, which filled the history 
with its heroism, and to the fact that Ghazi (Mustafa Kemal) is the best 
servant of Allah" This credo appeared in 1928 in a book titled "Türkün 
Yeni Amentüsü" This credo well reflects the ethno-secular character of 
Turkishnesss. See Abdurrahman Dilipak, comp., Cumhuriyetin Şeref 
Kitabı (The Honour Book of the Republic) (Istanbul: İşaret Yayınları,
1993), 5.
79Qualifying the 1931 programme as the ideology of the Turkish 
Revolution, Alaattin Bey(deputy from Kütahya) calls it as "İnkılabın 
Amentüsü" (the credo of the Revolution). See CHF Üçüncü Büyük 
Kongre Zabıtları (10-18 May 1931) (The Minutes of the Third General 
Congress of the Republican People’s Party) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 
1931), 229.
80Tunçay, T.C.’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931),
447.
81For the definition of nation in the 1935 programme, see CHP 
Programı (The Programme of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, May 1935),
3. For the definition in 1939 programme, see CHP Programı (The 
Programme of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939), 4.
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Turkish nationality and culture can join the People's Party."82 This is a 
clear reflection of the politico-legal Turkishness. The article 8 of the 1927 
Regulation of the RPP stipulates the embracement of Turkish culture and 
all the principle of the Party as conditions for membership. 83 The 1931 
regulation stipulates the speaking of Turkish an additional condition.84 
The 1935 and 1939 programmes are the same with that of 1931. 85
82Tunçay, ibid., 362. See also Parla, Kemalist Tek Parti, 25.
83Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi (The Regulation of the 
Republican People's Party) (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1927); cited by 
Tunçay, ibid., 383. The paragraph D of the article 8 of the Regulation 
carrying the title of "Fırkaya Suret-i Kabul" (Form of Acceptance to the 
Party) is as follows: "Every Turkish citizen can join the Party provided 
that he accept the Turkish culture and all the principles of the party." A 
debate occurred in the Second General Congress of the RPP in 1927 over 
this paragraph.
"Talat Bey (Çankırı): Does the intended meaning by the phrase 
"every Turkish citizen" refer only to Turks? Are non-Muslims (anasir-i 
saire) included in this phrase? Are women included?
Celal Nuri Bey (Tekirdağ): Talat Bey asked: What is meant by the
phrase "Turkish citizenship?" This has been registered in the 
Constitution (Voices of "true").
Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey (Kars): In my opinion, the party is a
national party. It is a party inclusive of all the government and all the 
country. Therefore, the first thing to be devised as a principle is that 
everybody holding the attribute of Turkish citizenship (Tü r k  
hemşehrilik sıfatı) can join the party (noises). It can be said that so and so 
are excluded after having devised the rule." See CHF İkinci Büyük 
Kongresi (The Second General Congress of the Republican People’s Party) 
(Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1927) 11-12.
85CHF Nizamnamesi (The Regulation of RPP) (Ankara: TBMM 
Matbaası, 1931), cited by Tunçay, ibid., 429-430. In the Third General 
Congress of the RPP held in 1931, Alaattin Bey, a deputy from Kütahya 
vehemently opposed to the article regulating the conditions of the 
entrance to the RPP on the ground that the party is a revolutionary party 
undertaking the mission of civilising the nation. Hence, it has to exclude 
the religious people from among its ranks in that although they joined 
the national struggle together, this was a normal occurrence because it 
was a matter of honour (namus) for those who carry the Turkish blood in 
their veins. However, the revolution (inkılap) was a matter of ideology, 
and therefore they should not have any say in the present and future of 
the country. According to him, no one could claim that those who
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The principle of nationalism is reflected in many articles of the 
1931 and the following programmes. The education policy of the Kemalist 
regime is one of them. The raising of "strongly republican, nationalist 
and laic citizens" is considered as the most important, compulsory point 
of interest in every stage of education. The elevation of the national 
character as inspired by "the long Turkish history" is considered as a "big 
aspiration" The Party attests great importance to the teaching of "the long 
Turkish history" Because that knowledge is "an holy substance 
nurturing the capability and power of the Turk, his self-confidence and 
will to resist against all the movements that may be harmful to the 
national existence."* 856 The use of history as one of the constitutive 
element of the new Turkish national identity, as is clear from the 
preceding prescriptions, is always founded on the ethnocultural themes 
as can be inferred from the reference to the notion of an immutable, 
natural construct "national character" (seciye-i millî) and "the capability 
and power of the Turk" (Türk'ün kabiliyet ve kudreti ). 87
voluntarily died for the Turkish fatherland can do the same thing for the 
Turkish Revolution (Türk İnkılabı). See CHP Üçüncü Büyük Kongre 
Zabıtları( 8-10 May 1931) , 229-233. This understanding shows that the 
phrase "Turkish culture" have essentially an ideological character, and 
thus the cultural content of Turkishness consists of adherence to the 
principles of the Kemalist revolution. As a corollary of this, religious 
Muslims, though held the status of citizenship and therefore were legally 
considered Turk, were not seen as Turk in the political sense, the result 
of which was the denial of basic rights and liberties that may spring from 
the status of citizenship.
85For the Regulation of 1935 see CHP Tüzüğü (The Regulation of 
RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935). For 1939 programme see CHP  
Nizamnamesi (The Regulation of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939).
86Tunçay, Tek Parti Yönetimi, 451-452.
87Parla,Tefc Parti İdeolojisi, 79-80. Speaking about the 1931 
programme, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey (deputy from Istanbul)," after 
praising the pragmatic, a posterior character of the programme, expresses 
his particular admiration for the definition of the homeland (vatan) in
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The six arrows of the RPP entered for the first time into the 1931 
programme as the main features of the RPP. The second section of the 
programme lists these principles and their definition. The first paragraph 
of the first article of this section points out that "The Republican People's 
Party is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, laic and revolutionary."88 
The 1935 and 1939 programmes incorporated the same principles.89 The 
six arrows are the concise formulation of the RPP's political ideology.
the programme: "The homeland is a country within the present 
boundaries on which Turkish nation lives with its old and high history 
and traces (eserler) preserving their existence in the depth of its lands. " 
See CHF Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Zabıtları, 25. For the definition of 
"vatan" in the RPP programme see 1931 RPP’s programme. Tunçay, Tek 
Parti Yönetimi, 447. One of the striking points in this definition is that 
unlike Ziya Gökalp, which saw the Central Asia as the native homeland 
of Turks, Mustafa Kemal sees Anatolia as the native Turkish homeland 
since pre-history times. Therefore, Kemalist conception of history 
considers all the ethnies living in Anatolia and their remainings as 
Turkish. The dire need for identifying a secular national root thus became 
fairly easy. Atatürk’s consideration of the western dressing as Turkish and 
therefore pointing that there is no need for "Turan" way of dressing 
reflects this escape to the discourse of the Turkishness of Anatolian 
civilisations together with that of the West. The corollary of this way of 
reasoning is that Turks is a great blessing for the mankind. "Without 
Turks, there might not be history and there would not be civilisation. An 
history without Turks would be dark and chaotic. " See Şükrü Kaya's 
Speech on the incorporation of the RPP's six arrows into the constitution, 
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period V, meeting 2, vol. 16, 1937, 59. The 
corollaries of this understanding may be this: without Turk, there would 
not be any history, and without Atatürk(Father of Turks) there would be 
no Turks. Thus Atatürk becomes the constitutive cause of Turkishness. 
Adherence to his Principle is identified with allegiance to the Turkish 
national identity, the principles preached by Atatürk are Turkist and 
Turkish, i.e., they are the manifestations of the national character. 
Therefore the incorporation of his six arrows from the RPP's programme 
into the Constitution becomes an expression of national loyalty. See ibid., 
60. Kaya do not decline to add that their nationalism is not parochial and 
that it aims at being an integral part of the civilised world in order to 
contribute to the happiness of the whole humanity. Ibid.
88Tunçay, ibid., 448.
89See 2935 CHP Programı, 6-12, and 2939 CHP Programı, 5-8.
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These principles were in fact in evolution since the National Struggle. 
Many of them were expressed before, though with important differences, 
by many Young Turk ideologues, particularly by Ziya Gokalp.90
In these programmes nationalism emerges as a defensive and 
modernising principle. It prescribes the preservation of the special 
attributes cf the Turkish nation on the one hand, and being in harmony 
with other nations in the path of progress and development with other 
nations in the international arena, on the other. 91 This approach is a clear 
manifestation of the political (subjective) boundary of Turkishness 
crystallised after 1924.
To be sure, all remnants of the religious definition were tried to be 
eliminated in this period. The removal of the caliphate was a clear 
expression of the denial of any role to Islam even as an instrumental 
means of social cohesion. The caliphate could be a means of social 
cohesion as was the case during the period of the National Struggle given 
the existence of other Muslim ethnies, namely Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, 
Georgians, Lazes, Bosnians, Albanians, etc. In the eyes of these ethnies, 
Islam and hence the caliphate was the most important source of socio­
political legitimacy. But aspiring for total westernisation, Mustafa Kemal 
made an ideological choice, and ascribed the function of creating social 
cohesion to the new ethnosecularism.92
The widely-held assertion of the Kemalist writers that Kemalist 
nationalism is a cultural nationalism, in fact, refers to the political 
component of the Republican definition, and expresses the claim that it
90Parla, Tek Parti ideolojisi, 39-40.
91 See the second paragraph of the the first article of the Second 
Section of the 1931 RPP programme, cited by Tungay, ibid., 448.
92Tungay, Tek Parti Yonetimi, 69-71.
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has no relation with race. As a matter of fact, one can distinguish three 
aspects of the political component as defined above:
a) L ingu istic A spect: This aspect is an important indication of the
Kemalist definition of the public realm as including private realm, or its
rejection of the distinction between the public and private. As a total
ideology, the linguistic aspect of the Kemalist nationalism requires the
adoption of Turkish as mother tongue as well as official language. It is
necessary to speak Turkish not only in official and public places but also at
home in order to achieve the genuine Turkishness. 93 The compulsory
measures taken for the encouragement of speaking Turkish aiming at
non-Muslim minorities contrary to the provisions of the Lausanne
Treaty regarding the protection of the minorities and non-Turkish
Muslim ethnies by way of administrative and de facto measures must be 
#
seen from this perspective.94
b ) C ultural A spect: It is not clear what is meant by culture when its 
most important popular element, Islam and hence traditions related with 
it, were excluded from its content. Overall, however, given the rejection 
of all the popular cultural elements from musics to the way of dressing, it 
can be said that culture connoted purely "standard" secularised western
93As Mustafa Kemal observed, The scholars who do not accept 
language as the basis for race are not totally inexistent in the 
contemporary world of science. This basis(i.e., the rejection of the 
consideration of language as the basis of race) may be true for some 
communities, but never for Turks."Afet İnan, Atatürk Hakkında 
Hatıralar ve Belgeler (Memoirs and Documents A b o u t  A t a t ü r k )  
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayım, 1968), 210-211. Apart from the racial 
circumference used for national identity, it is clear that Turkishness 
necessarily demands the speaking of Turkish as the mother tongue. 
Ethnicisation of culture is a characteristic feature of Kemalist 
nationalism, and therefore culture by itself is not a determinative 
variable.
94For these measures, see Chapter VIII.
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culture other than coining names of Turkic origin and speaking Turkish 
which was thoroughly secularised via the so-called "process of 
purification."
c) The Aspect of Ideal(lilkü): The manifest ideal is a political one 
the concrete embodiment of which being the Turkish Republic. The key 
concept of the Republican credo is the concept of ideal. The ideal is 
assumed to be the main source of inspiration for people to learn Turkish 
and serve the Republican cause with enthusiasm. In this regard, the ideal 
embodies the linguistic and cultural aspects of the political component as 
well. The reference point covering all these elements of the national 
identity has become crystallised as the Turkish Republic itself.
The key expression in the definition of Mustafa Kemal that "the 
Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic is called Turkish 
nation"95 is the phrase "who founded". He did not use such terms as 
"residents within the frontiers of the Turkish Republic," or citizens. 
Because non-Muslim minorities, except for Jews, participated the War of 
Independence in alliance with the invasion forces. Therefore they are 
excluded from this definition. They are not the co-founder of the Turkish 
Republic and hence are not considered part of "Turkish nation" Nation, 
according to Mustafa Kemal, is not a randomly gathered community 
residing within a certain boundary. On the contrary, it is "a unity of will 
and ideal." It is a special entity united first and foremost in aspiration. 
The fundamentals of this unity for Turks are the ideal of political 
independence, solidarism, nationalism, secularism, contemporary 
civilisation etc., epitomised in the Turkish Republic and its founder, 
Mustafa Kemal as the constitutive principle.
95Afet İnan, Medenî Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El 
Yazılan (Civics and the Handwritings of M. Kemal Atatürk) (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlan, 1969), 18.
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As a matter of fact, all the constitutive concepts and symbols of 
Turkishness, e.g., the National Struggle, Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, Ankara, Sakarya , Dumlupinar, the victorious army, 19 May, 23 
April, 30 August, 9 September, 29 October, the abolition of the sultanate, 
and caliphate, the acquisition of the Latin alphabet, secularism etc., have 
a common historical subject: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. According to 
Nişanyan, it is not coincidental that he has been called "Atatürk" (Father 
of Turks) instead of, for example, "UluTilrk" (the Grand Turk) 
"Yiicetiirk" (the Great Turk), or "Kahraman Türk" (the Heroic Turk). The 
founder of the Republic is considered not only the leader, the guide, the 
greatest of Turks: he is an active principle constituting the Turkish 
nation. The amorphous embryo in the womb of Anatolia came into 
existence thanks to his action. Therefore, Turkish nation deserves 
existence to the extent it obeys him and the principles devised by him.96
Everybody who adopts the ideal of Republic and its corollaries, i.e., 
Turkish language and culture, regardless of religion and descent, could 
call himself/herself Turk. Mustafa Kemal’s famous saying that "Ne 
mutlu Türk'üm diyene!" (How fortunate is he who declares I am a Turk) 
can be viewed in this context. Those who wilfully accept the Kemalist 
credo may acquire Turkishness without any obstacle. A Turk by definition 
has to be Kemalist. Non-Kemalists could acquire only legal Turkishness 
without any real correspondence in terms of basic rights and liberties, 
however.
The proximity of the concept of "Atatürk" as the "Büyük Şef' (the 
Great Chief)97 to the fascist-corporatist theories of nation, widely-held in
96Nişanyan, ibid., 133.
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the 1920s and 30s is striking. The political movements crystallised around 
Duce in Italy with the symbolism of the Roman Empire, the crown of St. 
Isztvan in Hungary, Esta do Nove in Portugal, Falanges in Spain and 
Action Française in France,, and of course Führer in Germany were all 
sprung from the notion of nation fulfilling its historical mission united 
around a State and its Leader ornamented with mystical faculties. The 
life-breather of nation is the Leader himself. The esteemed member of 
nation are those who fully submitted themselves to the Leader. Owing to 
this mystical identification of the Leader and nation, the Jews in Italy 
could occupy the highest positions in the Fascist state organisation. The 
racist dimension of this understanding was not the dominant element.
Given the spiritual crisis all over the World in the wake of the 
First World War, it does not seem too odd that this theory gathered so 
wide sympathy. The structural weakness of the theory was that if the 
condition of belonging to a nation is to embrace a national ideal and the 
political alternatives identified with that ideal, then those refusing that 
ideal acquire automatically the status of "traitor" or lose their rights of 
citizenship. Because the basic rights of citizenship are tied to the 
condition of loyalty felt to a certain political ideal and the preacher of that 
ideal. However flexible the boundaries of the national ideal to be drawn, 
everybody whose loyalty to the ideal and the Leader is under suspect, in 
the last analysis, is subject to the accusation of "treason"
5.6.2. Legal Component
The term "nationality" denotes the affiliation of both the real and
legal persons to state. Citizenship refers only the attachment of real 97
♦ 9
97For the use of this title see, for example, İkinci Türk Dil Kurultayı 
Müzakere Zabıtları, Tezler (Discussion Minutes and Theses of the Second 
Turkish Language Congress) (Ankara; 1934), 10.
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persons to state and their political rights.98 In the present nation-state 
system, the right of nationality is determined by states. In these 
determination, states in general resort to two criteria: 1) the principle of 
birth place (territory /jus soli); 2) the principle of genealogy (blood/ jus  
sanguinis ).
In the criterion of birth place, the acquiring of citizenship is tied to 
the birth place of the father and mother or either of them of the person 
concerned. What is important is the place of birth. Independent of the 
nationality of parents, the person assumes the citizenship of the state in 
which he was born. The United States is the most classical example of 
this principle.
In the blood principle, citizenship is acquired through genealogy. 
The person assumes the nationality of his/her parents or either of them 
regardless of his/her birth place. According to the article 88 of the 1924 
Constitution, the children springing from the loins of Turkish father, are 
considered Turkish citizen regardless of the birth place.
Most of states use both principles in the acquisition of the original 
citizenship, i.e., citizenship gained through birth or circumstances related 
to birth, due to the difficulties of the total rejection of the either 
principles. Yet, states that host emigrants place emphasis to the principle 
of territory, while the states that send emigrants give priority to the blood 
principle. In the Turkish legal system in the Kemalist era, the acquisition 
of original citizenship was done in accordance with both principles. 
Nevertheless, the main rule in this regard was the preference of blood
98Hicri Fişek, Anayasa ve Vatandaşlık (The Constitution and 
Citizenship) (Ankara: Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1961), 1. In time, 
however, with the development of the ideas of nation, national 
sovereignty and nation state, the term nationality acquired the same 
meaning with citizenship. See ibid., 2.
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principle to that of territory. The principle of territory was applied in 
exceptional situations only. 99
Acquired citizenship, unlike from original citizenship, is the 
acquisition of citizenship through various reasons and legal regulations 
other than circumstances related to birth. 100
5.6.2.1 The Legal Frame o f Citizenship in Turkey
A general scrutiny of the historical background and evolution of 
the legal framework of citizenship in the Ottoman-Turkish context is 
essential for the comprehension of Kemalist crystallisation of the legal 
Turkishness.
5.6.2 1.1 The 1878 Fundamental Law(Kanun-ı Esasi)
According to the article 8 of the 1878 Constitution, All persons 
being under the nationality of the Ottoman State, regardless of their 
religion and denomination, are called, with no exception, Ottoman. The 
attribute of "being Ottoman" are acquired and removed in accordance 
with circumstances specified by the law."101 This article rejects all the 
religious distinctions among the subjects of the Ottoman State in the 
acquisition of citizenship, but does not specify which principle it adopts
"Ibid., 23-24.
100The acquired citizenship occurs sometimes on the demand of a 
certain person to acquire the citizenship of a certain state (telsik), and in 
some occasions wing to the situations related the civil(marital) status of 
the persons concerned. Ibid., 5.
101Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübıyık, Sened-i İttifak’tan Günümüze 
Türk Anayasa Metinleri (Turkish Constitutional Documents From the Deed of 
Alliance up to the Present) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 
1985), 32.
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in the ascription of citizenship. This had been done by the law 
"Tabiiyyeti-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi) (Ottoman Citizenship Law) dated 
23 January 1869. The acquisition of the original citizenship through the 
principle of blood is basic to this law. But in certain, quite limited, 
circumstances, the principle of birth was also acknowledged.102
The 20 January 1921 Fundamental law is an incomplete 
constitution. It is the product of a transient period in which Ottoman 
State still was not replaced by a new state. Its most important feature was 
the legal expression of the principle of national sovereignty. But the 
principle of nationalism still did not find a clear expression. 103 Therefore, 
it can be assumed that the regulations devised by the 1878 Constitution 
and 1869 Law of Ottoman Citizenship were in force.
5.6.2.1.2 1924 Fundamental Law
The constitution of the new Republic brought about new 
regulations as regards citizenship. The renown article 88 introduces 
novelties differing from the article 8 of the 1878 constitution regulating 
the Ottoman citizenship. The article 88 reads: "The Turkish people, 
regardless of religion and race, is called Turk as regards citizenship.104" 
The most important element in the article, other than the principle of 
birth place and blood in the acquisition of original and acquired 
citizenship, pertains to the question of naming citizens.
1878 constitution calls the Ottoman subjects as "Ottoman." The 
1924 constitution introduces the name "Turk" for the citizens. 105It was
102Nihal Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Turkish Law of 
Citizenship) (Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1984), 20.
103Eroğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik," 368.
104Kili and Gözübıyık, Türk Anayasa Metinleri, 111.
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this question of naming that aroused the most heated discussions during 
the debates regarding the new constitution in the National Assembly. The 
starting point for the objections raised was the naming of non-Turkish 
Muslim ethnies and non-Muslims as "Turk." Some deputies like Ahmet 
Hamdi and Hamdullah Suphi) argued that the term "Turk" may be used 
to express only nationality, not citizenship. Hamdullah Suphi claimed 
that it would be dangerous to call minorities "Turk" in religion and 
race .* 106 Upon the agreement of the Commission, the motion of 
Hamdullah Suphi Bey's was’ approved. 107 In this way, the Turkishness of 
minorities was reduced to legal Turkishnesss (Kanun-ı Esasî Türklüğü ) 
only.
lOSThe statement of reasons for the article 88 reads: Since the
Ottoman Empire had been obliterated and perished, the members of the 
nation could no longer be called "Ottoman". National self-honour cannot 
accept belonging to a dynasty. Our state is a national state, not an 
international or supra-national one. The state can recognise no nation 
other than the Turk. It is not proper to consider racial differences as an 
obstacle to nationality since there are peoples of different origins in the 
country who possess equal rights. Likewise, since the freedom of 
conscious is certified, religion has not been considered as an hindrance to 
nationality as well. Turkish nation too, like all the new nationalities, 
could embody peoples of different races. But it is the community of the 
Turks (Türklük camiası) that has the capability of bringing together all the 
races. " See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period II, meeting 2, vol. 7, 09.
03.1340(1924), 216.
106In this regard, the following suggestions were made:
- Ahmet Hamdi Bey (Deputy from Yozgat): Those who belong to Turkish 
people and accept the Turkish culture (hars) are called "Turk"
- Feridun Fikri Bey (Deputy from Dersim): The Turkish people is called 
"Turk" as regards citizenship irregardless of religion and race."
Naim Hazım Bey (Deputy from Konya): Turkish people is called 
"Türkiyeli"(those from Turkey) without difference of religion and race.
- Hamdullah Suphi Bey (Deputy from Istanbul): Turkish people is called 
"Turk" as regards citizenship with no distinction of religion and race." 
See, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period II, meeting 2, vol. 8/1, 911; also Fişek, 
Anayasa ve Vatandaşlık , 22-23.
107For the discussions on the article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, 
see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period II, meeting 2, vol. 8/1, 908-911.
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These discussions make clear that Turkishness as citizenship was 
considered thoroughly different from Turkishness as nationality. A clear 
demarcation line was drawn between being Turk and Turkish citizen. 
Later, this state of affairs would lead to the limiting of the use of 
citizenship rights to those who accepted to enter into "Turkish 
nationality."
The 1924 constitution accepts the principle of blood for the original 
citizenship. 108As to the acquired citizenship, it implies the principle of 
territory. But this provision would be violated by the 1928 Citizenship 
Law.
It is interesting to note that the 1924 constitution uses insistingly 
the term "Turk" instead of such possible terms as "/erf" (individual), 
"kişi" (person) or "vatandaş" (citizen). To illustrate, "Every Turk has the 
right to elect deputies" (Art. 10). "Every Turk may be elected as deputy" 
(Art. 11). The title of the Fifth Section is "Türklerin Hukuk-u Ammesi" 
(The Public Rights of Turks).' "Every Turk is bom as free"( Art. 68). "Every 
Turk is legally equal" (Art. 69). Many other examples can be added to this 
illustration. According to Abadan, despite the fact that all Turkish citizens 
are legally equal, the constitution's preference of the term "Turk" aims to 
confirm the fact that equality in democratic rights and duties is due to 
Turkishness and citizenship. Equality based on citizenship is a corollary 
of the Kemalist principle of populism. 109Because "Turkish individual is 
the essence of the Turkish people; Turkish nation is the whole of Turkish 
citizenship."110
108Fişek, Anayasa ve Vatandaşlık, 27.
109Abadan, Milliyetçilik ve Halkçılık, 8.
110Ibid., 10.
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The crucial distinction between citizenship and nationality
remains, however. In the daily usage and some writings , the definition
of Turkishness by religion and race , despite the contrary provision of the
1924 constitution, has remained. Thus one may talk of Bulgars who are
Turkish citizen, or Muslim emigrants from Balkan states, particularly
from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were called "Turk" owing to their
adherence to Islam as religion, and sometimes due to their Turkic
origin.111 Despite, the politico-legal rhetoric that Turkishness is free of
religious and racial distinctions, this has not been so in practice. 112
The final regulation regarding the legal aspect of Turkishness was
the Turkish Law of Citizenship (1928)113 replacing that of 1869. The bill
0
was legislated in 23 May 1928 after important changes made in the 
Interior, Foreign Affairs and Justice Commissions, and was put into force 
in 1 January 1929. The law incorporated no statement of reasons and no 
discussion was made in the Floor on it. Therefore the underlying 
motives of the law are not possible to identify. The most important 
novelty it brought is the elaboration of the principle of birth place. 114
m Fişek, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku 11-12.
112Kemalist refusal of recognising the public-private distinction 
makes its conception of citizenship unsuitable for the recognition of 
ethnic identities other than the Turkish one under the unifying umbrella 
of Turkish citizenship, which is an apparent demonstration of the ethnic 
character of Kemalist construction of Turkish national identity. For a 
parallel view, see Nora Şeni, "Kin ve Dışlama Hala Mevcut"(Hatred and 
Exclusion Still Persist), Interview by Şahin Alpay, Milliyet, 20 February, 
1995, 20.
113In 27 November 1926, Tevfik Kamil (Koperler), deputy from 
Istanbul, presented a bill of law to the Presidency of The National 
Assembly on the ground that "the law dated 24 January 1969 did not pay
due attention to the principle of birth place in the acquisition of the 
original citizenship". See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 3rd period, 1st meeting, 
session 80, vol. IV, Sequence Number (Sıra Sayısı), 185.
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Turkish Law of Citizenship introduces special measures for 
exceptiona1 citizenship in order to ease those who want to acquire 
Turkish citizenship. According to the law, among those who may take 
the advantage of this provision, those who are of Turkish origin, their 
mates and adult children are included. (Art. 7/c). This is not particular to 
Turkey. Most states provide similar easy circumstances in acquiring 
people who are of the same'descent, language of culture into citizenship. 
Thus "to be of Turkish descent" is accepted as a reason for inclusion to 
the status of "exceptional citizenship" Both the Law of Citizenship and 
The Law of Settlement(iskan Kanunu)14 15 embody such a clause But the 
Law of Settlement differs from the Law of Turkish Citizenship in that it 
makes distinction between "those from Turkish origin" and "those who 
are adherent of Turkish culture" and calls them "m uhacir"  
(immigrant).116
There is no clarity, however, in the laws as regards according to 
which bases the attachment to Turkish culture and being from Turkish 
origin (descent) would be determined. The Law of Settlement states that
114The third article of the law in which the conditions to be 
fulfilled in order to acquire Turkish citizenship for reasons other than 
those related with birth are stated, violates the article 88 of the 
Constitution in that it puts forth that those people who are born in 
Turkey from foreign parents and residing in Turkey can demand to 
acquire Turkish citizenship provided that the Council of Ministers 
decides so within three years after their age of puberty. The constitution 
considers the personal application adequate, however. See Fişek, Anayasa 
ve Vatandaşlık , 35.
n5Resmi Gazete, 21. 06.1934/2733. The law no. 2510 and it is dated 
14 June 1934.
116Since the article 4 of the same law stipulates the condition of 
being adherent of Turkish culture in order to be accepted to Turkey as 
immigrant, unlike, the Turkish Law of citizenship, in the Turkish legal 
doctrine, it was accepted those who meet both conditions can make use of 
the Law of Settlement. See Uluocak, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku, 58, 
footnote, 129.
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whom and people of which countries would be considered as devoted to 
Turkish culture would be determined by the decision of the Council of 
Ministers (Art. 3)2). 117
The following statement of Mustafa Kemal is the concise statement
of the politico-legal components of Turkish national identity:
We are directly patriots (milliyetperver) and Turkish nationalists. 
The basis of our Republic is the Turkish Community (Türk 
Camiası). However much the members of this community is 
saturated with Turkish culture, the Republic would be so much 
powerful.118
As Üstel succinctly concluded, drawing upon the textbooks used in 
civic education during the Kemalist era, the Kemalist official conception 
of citizenship does not make any distinction between public and private 
realms. It is based on a specific life style called "modern"(flsn ) and 
sharing of a paternally-defined common good. Ethnocultural sense of 
belonging characterises the'social ties between individuals.119 Thus the 
ethnic/racial elements characterising the ethnicist conception of Turkish
117Accordingly, "Pomaks and those settled Muslims who are from 
the peoples of the countries seceded from the Ottoman Empire and did 
not have their separate, independent states, and speaking Turkish" are 
considered as being of Turkish descent. See "İskanlı ve Serbest Göçmen 
Kabulüne Dair Talimatname," in ilhan Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku 
(Metinler, Mahkeme Kararları) (Turkish Citizenship Law: Texts, Court 
Decisions) (Ankara, 1960), 159. The inescapable imperative of the 
Ottoman past seems to be one of the main qualifier of the Kemalist creed 
in despite the fierce rhetoric that Kemalism cut all the ties with the 
Ottoman-Islamic past. As it is seen, common history, religion and 
language emerge as the main markers of Turkish descent according to 
this decision. Another striking point is the definition of descent in terms 
of concrete cultural markers instead of biological features.
ii8"1urk Ocakları Delegelerine" (To the Delegates of Turkish 
Hearts), Söylev ve Demeçler III, 26. 04. 1926, 118. According to Mustafa 
Kemal "Turkey is for Turks," the common motto of all nationalists. See 
"Türkiye Türklerindir"(Turkey is for Turks), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 
August 1921, 38.
119Füsun Üstel, "Cumhuriyetin Yurttaş Profili" (The Citizen Profile 
of the Republic), Yeni Yüzyıl, 24 April, 1994, 18.
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national identity in the Kemalist era now may be analysed through a 
closer scrutiny.
308
CHAPTER VI
SEARCH FOR THE DELIMITATION OF THE ETHNIC 
BOUNDARY OF TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY
6.1. Introduction
The political component of the Republican definition shaped
essentially the secular contours of Turkishness. The last decade of the
Kemalist era (1929-1938) witnessed the crystallisation of the ethnic aspect
of Turkishnesss in addition to its already formed secular nature.
As mentioned before, only the name of the new Turkish state had
an ethnic connotation among the states established in the Middle East in
the wake of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore the idea
of Turkishness was not only the name of a political ideal but also that of
an ethnic construct. The distinction between the ethnic and political
senses was not clear-cut however, and it was this vagueness that was
deliberately exploited by the Kemalist nationalist elites according to the
requirements of the political expediency. A graphic example of this usage
can be seen from the following words of İsmet İnönü, the long time
prime minister of the Kemalist era:
We will crush those who do not respect the Turk and Turkishness. 
The first and foremost thing we will require from those who want 
to serve the country is to be Turk and Turkist.1
1Bilal Şimşir, İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de "Kürt Sorunu" 1924- 
1938: Şeyh Sait, Ağrt ve Dejsim Ayaklanmaları ("Kurdish Question" in 
the English Documents 1924-1938: The Revolts of Sheikh Said, Ağri and 
Dersim) (Ankara, 1975), 56. The speech was made in the headquarter of 
the Turkish Hearts in 27 April 1925.
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Given that this speech was made in the wake of the Sheikh Said 
rebellion, it seems that it has an ethnic reference to the non-Turkish 
ethnies, in this case Kurds. Therefore, as would be substantiated in what 
follows, we may rightly conclude that the boundaries of the Turkish 
national identity are determined not only by legal-political, or to adopt 
the Smithian appellation, civic-territorial component combining 
citizenship and loyalty to the Republican cause as the criteria of 
nationality, but also by an ethnic-genealogical aspect including the racial- 
ethnic boundary, which defines Turkishness as having common Turkish 
ancestry or "blood", and as a matter of culture, i.e., values or life style to 
which one adheres, defined on the basis of Turkish ethnicity.
According to Atatiirk, "culture is the basis of the Turkish 
Republic." 2 Defined by him in the ordinary sense of daily usage,3 culture 
here in fact implies the political component of the Republican definition 
of Turkishness. The fact that this "culture" was overwhelmingly 
racialised and ethnicised in the last decade of the Kemalist era (1929-1938) 
is generally unnoticed or rejected in the Kemalist literature.4 For the
2Utkan Kocatürk, Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri (The Ideas and 
Opinions of Atatürk) 3rd ed. ( Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1984), 112.
3Ibid. Apart from this meaning, culture is identified with 
civilisation, defined as the totality of the things done in political, 
intellectual fields, i.e., positive and social sciences and fine arts, and in 
economic life, i.e., agriculture, artisanship, commerce and transportation. 
See ibid., 64.
4Meta-historical perspectives and conceptual vagueness rather 
than Kemalist inclinations may yield to the same conclusion. See, for 
example, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, "Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Hakim Millet 
Kodunun Dönüşümü" (The Transformation of the Code of the 
Dominant Nation in Turkish Nationalism), in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi 
ve Kimlik (Republic, Democracy and Identity), ed.,Nuri Bilgin (Istanbul: 
Bağlam Yayınlan, 1997), 207-230; and Metin Heper, "Devlet Kürtlerin 
Haklarını Tanımıştır" (The State Has Recognised the Rights of Kurds), 
Milliyet, 7 February 1995.
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Kemalists, the Turkification, i.e., westernisation, of the whole polity 
including Islam and Kurds on the one hand, and every day life on the 
other, cannot be considered as ethnicisation of culture. This is partly 
because of the fact that to the term "ethnic/racial" was ascribed a 
pejorative, "reactionary" meaning ex post facto by them in the present 
political usage. The construction of Turkish ethnicity without 
incorporating anything that, may denote "difference" from Kemalist way 
of life and style of thinking, particularly, religion and markers of the 
existence of ethnies other than Turks is basic to the ethnicist conception 
of Kemalist nationalism, however.
As Cizre concisely observed, taking the construction of a nation­
state and national identity as its primary goal, Kemalist nationalism 
refused to confer any recognition to "Islam, sectarianism, social classess,
and to a lesser extent, ethnicity. "5 In Cizre's own words:
Islam was thought of as an impediment to the modernisation of 
the country on Western lines. Sectarianism was ruled out for its 
divisive impact on the populace which was predominantly of 
Sunni sect but had lived for centuries side by side with the 
minority sect of Alevi's of both Turkish and Kurdish stock. In line 
with and under the influence of the solidarist and corporatist 
doctrines of Italian fascism, the Kemalist populism denied class 
conflict and conceived the nation as "the people," the RPP as "the 
people's party.(...)the Kemalist ideology of nationalism, in its effort 
to create a new national consciousness in place of Ottomanism, 
did assign a central role to Turkish ethnicity. 6
The gap of romanticism, the need for a new mainstay of social
cohesion to replace Islam, and the programme of militant secularisation
which opted for the complete non-visibility of religious allegiancies
5Ümit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "The Ideology and Politics of the 
Nationalist Action Party of Turkey,"C.E.M.O.T.I. 13 (January-May 1992),
142.
6Ibid., 143.
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constituted the justification for the encouragement of ethnic nationalism 
in the eyes of Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites. 7
6. 2. Shift to the Latent R acialism /Ethnicism
One of the leading ideologues of the Kemalist nationalism, 
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, after having emphasised the nationalist priority of 
the Kemalist nationalism to Islam and humanity,8 points to the respect of 
Kemalist nationalism to the principle of national self-determination for 
every nation in the world and its rejection of imperialism. 9 When 
comparing Kemalist and Nazi nationalisms, he makes a crucial point as 
regards the racial character of Kemalist nationalism. According to him, 
"both regimes are nationalist with a minor difference between them: 
National Socialism is racist while Turkish regime is not. The Turkish 
regime attests more importance to culture and language than to blood. 
Nevertheless, Atatürk in his Great Speech (Büyük Nutuk) pointed out 
that 'do not believe in those who are not of your blood.' T his  
recommendation, in practice, took the form o f culture and language 
unity.''10
Bozkurt lends emphasis on the non-imperialist character of 
Kemalist nationalism when he compares it with two other contemporary 
ideologies, namely Nazism and Fascism. What can be inferred from these
7Ibid. Nevertheless, Cizre-Sakallioglu is cautious to emphasise that 
"the priority placed by the RPP elite on promoting a Turkish identity and 
unity primarily aimed at nation-building, but not on chauvinism." Ibid., 
143.
8Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Atatürk ïhtilali (Atatürk Revolution), 2nd 
ed. (Istanbul: Altm Kitaplar Yayinevi, 1967), 298.
9Ibid., 299.
10Ibid., 300. ( Emphasis added).
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observations is that despite the racial character of Kemalist nationalism, 
racism did not take the form of a systematic state policy in practice, as far 
as "the blood criterion" is concerned. Interestingly enough, however, 
Kemalist racialism expressed itself particularly in the fields of culture and 
language, i.e., it took the form of ethnicism—the discrimination based on 
linguistic and cultural distinctions — the practical manifestations of 
which will be dealt with below.
In this chapter, I shall try to emphasise that ¿he ethnicist conception 
of Kemalist nationalism had a strong racial /ethnic colouring, the major 
manifestation of which being the racialisation/ethnicisation of objective 
as well as subjective cultural markers. This state of affairs did not lead to 
the adoption of a systematic policy of racism, however. Nevertheless, 
the ethnicisation of culture took a sporadically racist dimension under 
the influence of racist movement in Turkey and abroad, and Kemalist 
nationalism's own inner ideological dynamics.
The underlying causes of drifting to a racial understanding of 
Turkishness are revealing in terms of the better recognition of the 
structural nature of the Kemalist nationalism. As Kadioglu observed, by 
1930s, the Kemalist elites noticed the imminent need for further 
"reforms" in order to stabilise the Kemalist revolution by creating a new 
Turkish identity, through *a process of engineering, which gave the 
emerging Turkish identity a wholly manufactured character. 11 Kemalist 
nationalism rested on the new space of secular legitimacy. The failure of 
Kemalist secularism proper to form a comprehensive basis of individual 
as well as collective identity led the Kemalist nationalism to assume a 
racial colouring.
11Ay§e Kadioglu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the 
Construction of Official Identity," Middle Eastern Studies, 32:2(April 
1996), 188.
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The secularists in Turkey were the advocate of militant laicism 
inside but had "Muslim instincts" against the "Christian West" outside. 
Kemalist laicists conceived of the West as being the representative of 
modernity/secularity inside, and the Christianity outside. Owing to the 
weakness of Kemalist secularism and the Turkish Republic as a political 
ideal to fix a new collective identity at popular level, Kemalist 
nationalism with its bifurcate, Janus-faced character, drifted toward a 
defensive, latently racist position in the 1930s.12 As Bozkurt observed, 
telling the people "be republican and love the revolution" was not 
enough. It was necessary to provide a new ideal which could compete 
with the ideal of Şeriat and replace it. Only then the republic could be 
said to be in the safe hands.13
Thus emerged the ideal of supreme Turkish race being the mother 
of all civilisations in the late 1920s and early 1930s, with the development 
of Turkish History Thesis and the Sun-Language Theory. According to 
Sevan Nişanyan, the causes of this drift from the Republican political 
ideal to that of racial/ ethnic one can be explained at two planes: 
ideological and political.14
6. 2.1. Ideological Causes o f the Drift to the Racial Ideal 
The ideal of the Republic as a unifying as well as mobilising 
political ideal failed to be so at popular level due to its weak emotive and
12Etyen Mahcupyan, "Laik Kesim ve Bastırılmış Irkçılık"(La ic 
Segment and the Latent Racism), Yeni Yüzyıl, 16 September 1995, 14.
13Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, "Mefkure îhtiyacı"(The Need for an Ideal), 
Milliyet, Editorial, 14 February 1931, 1-2.
14Sevan Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Milleti 
Kavramı"(The Concept *of Turkish Nation in the Kemalist 
Thought),Türkiye Günlüğü, 33(March-April 1995), 137.
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spiritual content vis a vis the perennial power of folk Islam. It lacked the 
comprehensiveness, emotional depth and political flexibility of Islam it 
tried to replace as a new basis of fraternity and solidarity among co­
nationals, hence the inexistence of the sense of "oumess" formed around 
that ideal. As a project of political engineering, it could not provide a map 
of ethical guidance for everyday conduct except such "cold" official 
ceremonies such as the ones held in official holidays. Due to the cut of 
ties with the war-time basis of legitimacy, i.e., Islam, Kemalist 
nationalism was in severe need of a new ideal that could win over Islam 
at popular as well as intellectual level.
As Nişanyan observed, the ideal of the republic was based on the 
glorification of Mustafa Kemal and the principles devised by him. 15 Since 
Kemalist nationalism could not make a bridge between the National 
Struggle and the Kemalist republic due to its rejection of Islam as the 
main frame of legitimacy, the republic had to remain as a self-referential 
ideal. 16
The most concrete change that the Republic brought about was the 
claim that "We are Turk. Therefore, we should be governed by Turks," 
the main political premise of the nationalist doctrine. But the word 
"Turk" had no positive connotation and appeal at the mass level. It made 
positive sense only to the ruling bureaucratic intelligentsia. It is difficult 
to argue that the cult of personality formed around Mustafa Kemal, the 
most concrete embodiment of which being the ascription of the 
appellation "Atatürk" (father of the Turks) to him, pleased traditionally 
religious masses, which would not readily embrace such a kind of secular
15Ibid.
16Ibid., 138.
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glorification. In the popular image, the founder of the republic was not 
"Atatürk" but "Mustafa Kemal Pasha."17
The resistance to the language policy of the Kemalist national ideal 
is striking in this respect. The Kurdish ethnie insisted in refusing to 
change its mother tongue and considered the efforts directed to that aim 
as "gavura reva görülen eziyet" ( suffering that may be deemed suitable 
only to the infidels). What is more revealing in this respect was the 
rejection of the non-Muslim minorities to adopt Turkish as their mother 
tongue despite the fact that those who have emigrated to, for example, 
United States, readily accepted English as their mother tongue, a matter of 
constant complaint for Kemalists. These emigrants were more akin to 
the Turkish way of life rather than that of Anglo-American, which 
implies that this preference was related to the weakness of the political 
ideal that forced them to change their language rather than cultural 
sympathy/antipathy. Likewise, the Kurdish and religious series of 
rebellions were the apparent manifestations of dissatisfaction with the 
republican definition of the "happy Turkishness."
Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites met this dissatisfaction, 
among others, with the inaüguration of a new unfolding of the Turkish 
national identity. Apparently, there could be no possibility of returning to 
the old, Islamic definition. Thus the most reasonable option to establish 
national feeling of solidarity and fraternity for Kemalists emerged as the 
racial/ethnic theory which suggested that Turks are a super-family on the
17The hero of the people in the popular songs (türkü) is Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha, not Atatürk. See, for example, a türkü from Kars, "Hoş 
Gelişler Ola/Mustafa Kemal Paşa." For a good example of this distinctive 
appellation, see Ali Kırca, "Kemalo," Yeni Yüzyıl, 28 November 1997, 3. 
Conversely, the state institutions and intelligentsia have always preferred 
"Atatürk" to "Mustafa Kemal Pasha". For example, A. Adnan Saygun's 
vocal work "Atatürk ve Anadolu'ya Destan" is a case in point.
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basis of kinship ties. In their view, such a theory might be more successful 
at least in gathering the support of the "the dominant ethnie" ( Turks) at 
the popular level against the unassimil.ated "threats".
6. 2. 2. Political Causes o f the Drift to the Racial Ideal 
The closing down of the Turkish Hearts and its joining to the RPP 
is a parallel development to the change in the political discourse and 
political cadre necessitated by the republican ideological impasse. 18 The 
task of developing the new theory of Turkish History Thesis was 
assumed by Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti (The Society for the Study of 
Turkish History), a committee already formed within the central 
organisation of the Turkish Hearts. The history textbooks and the History 
Congresses of 1932 and 1937 were prepared by this Society, nearly all the 
members of which consisted of the former members of the defunct 
Turkish Hearts. The key political figures of the period 1931-1936, in which 
the one party state completed its establishment, were the ex-members of 
the Hearts including Recep Peker, the Secretary General of the RPP, 
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the Minister of Justice, Dr. Reşit Galip, the first 
head of the People's Houses, Samih Rifat, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, Yusuf 
Akçura, Yusuf Ziya Özer, M. Fuat Köprülü, Şemsettin Günaltay, Şükrü 
Saraçoğlu, Vasıf Çınar, and many others. 19
18The Turkish Hearts were the only organisation that kept open
alongside the RPP in the one party period. It was a Turkist organisation 
founded in 1912, which adopted itself to the Kemalist nationalism after 
the Republic. It was nominally closed down but its cadre and 
organisational branches were kept intact under the new name of "Halk 
Evleri " (People's Houses) and was organically linked to the RPP. For the 
reasons for the closing down of Turkish Hearts, see Chapter V, footnote 
123.
19Nişanyan, ibid., 139-141.
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There were basically two underlying reasons of the official 
adoption of the new racial "Turkish History Thesis," the aim of which 
was to compensate for the inherent weakness of the republican ideal. 
These were to gain Turkish national self-confidence and respect, and the 
fixing of Anatolia as the Turkish national homeland. The question of 
gaining national self-respect was crucially important. The word "Turk" 
was a term of abuse in the English dictionaries together with the Jew and 
Welshman. The European travellers characterised the Turks in their 
writings as barbarian, cruel and ignorant.20 The Kemalist revolution 
could not change this "negative image The passing of the Empire and 
the coming of the militantly secular nationalism proved to be no 
healing, however. The Turks still were viewed by most westerners as a 
barbarian, uncivilised and mongoloid race incapable of anything "good" 
and "progressive," a reflection of the racist image of the East. Thus 
emerged the use of race as an instrument of self-defence by Kemalist 
nationalism.
In the nineteenth century dominated by the premises of scientific 
racism, Western European historians and geographers classified Turks 
within secondary class (yellow) race. It might be possible to change this 
judgement by limiting it to the Ottoman Turks after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire.21 Thus the thesis that Turkish nation is brachycephalic
20 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961), 353-54.
21Saint-Exupery's Küçük Prens (Little Prince) is a striking 
example of this extremely biased image of the Turks in the West. A 
Turkish astronomer discovers a meteor named B-612 in 1909 and 
presents his finding in the International Congress of Astronomy. But he 
was not deemed as reliable due to his style of dressing. Fortunately, an 
absolute Turkish ruler appears and force his people to embrace the 
European style of dressing by threatening them with death. Only then, 
the discovery of the Turkish astronomer dressed in the new style was
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and belong to the race which had built great civilisations in Egypt, 
Anatolia and Mesopotamia was put forward. New generations would be 
indoctrinated with this thesis as a source of inspiration and strength. It 
was a national and historical duty to conduct historical researches with 
the purpose of contributing to the formation of national consciousness. 
The creation of a strong feeling of national consciousness through 
leaning on the pre-Ottoman times, and to present the backbone of this 
consciousness as " laws of nature", such as archaeology and anthropology 
were two goals prescribed for the history teaching in the First History 
Congress (1932).22
In this vacuum of national self-confidence, Kemalist nationalism 
assumed a defensive character. Atatiirk's such sayings as "the noble blood 
flowing in the veins", how fortunate is he who says I am a Turk", 
"intelligent and hard-working nation," the sequence followed in "Turk! 
be proud of yourself-work-trust"23 can be accounted for with the aim of 
refreshment of collective self-confidence rather than naive chauvinism.24 
Atatürk spent great effort for making Turkishness a thing to be proud of: 
"My sole honour and wealth in life is nothing else than being Turk."25
unanimously approved in the Congress held in 1920. See Antoine De 
Saint-Exupéry, Küçük Prens, trans. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1988), 18-20.
22Büşra Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih. Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih 
Tezinin Oluşumu(1929-1937) [Power and History: The Formation of The 
Official History Thesis in Turkey (1929-1937)](Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 
1992), 12.
23Afet İnan, Atatürk'ten Hatıralar ve Belgeler (Memoirs and 
Documents from Atatürk), 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1968), 318; Kocatürk, 
Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri, 168.
24Taha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: 
Atatürk'ün Nutuku (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: 
The Speech of Atatürk), vol.l. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 49.
25Kocatürk, Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri, 168.
319
History and language theses were the concrete epitomisation of his 
undertaking to change the "backward, rude and barbarous" image of the 
Turks held by most westerners and even some Turkish intellectuals. 
According to Atatürk, "the Turkish nation who founded the Republic is 
civilised. She is civilised in history and in reality." 26 "We lack nothing 
from other nations: we are brave, intelligent, hard-working and know to 
die for the higher goals."27 The conclusion is the peak of irrational 
national proud: "Bir Türk dünyaya bedeldir\"{A Turk is worth the whole 
world)28
To repair the negative image of the Turks in the eyes of Europeans 
and to demonstrate that the historical legacy of the Turks to the World is 
not composed of conquests Qnly, that their traces in history carry also the 
signs of civilisation all over the World, including Europe, constituted the 
mainstay of the Kemalist nationalist endeavour. 29
26Atatürkçülük L Atatürk'ün Görüş ve Direktifleri (Atatürkism I. 
The Views and Directives of Atatürk) (Ankara, 1983), 51.
27 Kocatürk, Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri, 170.
28Ibid., 168. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, an ardent Kemalist 
novelist and journalist, points to this irrational praise of the national ego 
by Kemalist nationalism when he qualifies it as "an infinite pride, an 
infinite self-respect." See Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Atatürk: Bir 
Tahlil Denemesi (Atatürk: An Attempt of Analysis), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: 
Remzi Kitabevi, 1971), 87.
29Karaosmanoğlu, Atatürk, 91. Karaosmanoğlu asserts that Mustafa 
Kemal, through history thesis, "wanted to make a comprehensive 
account of the Kemalist revolution to the deepest layer of the soil on 
which we live and to prove the nobility of the Turkish nation with an 
authentic pedigree.(...) The fact that Turkish nation, whose nobility, 
virtue, morality, intelligence, capability and energy he considered to be 
greater than the spiritual values of all other nations, was not among the 
leading states of the world has determined his all thoughts." Ibid., 92 and 
94. Karaosmanoğlu wonders if Atatürk ever thought of turning his 
nationalism into a sect or religion. "Even if not," he says, "We know that 
he loved Turkishness and everything that are Turkish with a religious
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6.3. R acial/E thn icist D efinition of T urkishness
In the late nineteenth century, a period when the pseudo-scientific 
claims that civilisations are particular to the white-brachysephalic Arian 
communities, and the Turks were despised as "barbarians," in line with 
Gobineau's renown work Essays on the Inequality o f Races were 
prevalent, the efforts to prove that Turks are belong to the "supreme" 
race became a major concern for such Turkists as Mustafa Celaleddin and 
Ali Suavi. Mustafa Celaleddin in his book Les Turcs Anciens et 
M odernes (1870) linked Turks to the Arian race. In the newspapers 
M uhbir and Ulum Ali Suavi wrote that Turks are not a military 
community only; on the contrary, they are a race having served the 
World civilisation, and that some ethnies in history were of Turkic 
origin. 30
The idea of scientific racism was espoused as a state policy in the 
1930s in Germany, Japan and Italy, with varying degrees of emphasis on 
the purity of race. This state of affairs had a part in the formation of the 
Turkish History thesis, apart from predominantly internal causes. The 
question of race and related issues were the main focus of the papers 
presented in the First Turkish History Congress (1932). 31
zeal, and are certain that when he closed his eyes to the World he had the 
belief in melting into the eternity of the noble descent." Ibid., 100. For the 
inculcation of the leitmotif of national self-confidence, which 
characterises the whole Kemalist era, in the War College (Harbiye) in the 
early years of the Republic, see Cemal Madanoğlu, Anılar (Memoirs), 
vol.l. (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınlan, 1982), 40.
30Şerafettin Turan, Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, 
Düşünürler, Kitaplar (Incidents, Thinkers and Books That Affected the 
Structure of the Thought of Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Yayınlan, 1982), 43.
31 See particularly the papers of Dr. Reşit Galip, "Türk Irk ve 
Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış"(A General Glimpse to the History 
of Turkish Race and Civilisation), T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, Birinci Türk 
Tarih Kongresi Konferanslar Müzakere Zabıtları (First Turkish History
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In this regards, among the books read and commented by Atatürk, 
J. A. Gobineau's Essai sur I'inegalite des Races Humaines , A. C. Haddon's 
Les Races Humaines and Edward Pittard's Les Races et V Histoire are 
striking. Atatürk espoused Pittard's views as regards the question of race, 
which considered race as a physical type of continuity setting natural 
dispositions connected to blood kinship, and the artificial classifications 
like nationality, language and tradition, not as an anthropological 
concept. The adulteration of the Turkish race through such means as 
mixed marriages was considered by Pittard as 'a few drops to a big vase" 
Therefore he refused Gobineau's assertion that Turkish blood was 
adulterated during Seljukî and Ottoman times. 32
In view of Pittard's conception of race and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's 
observation regarding the racial/ethnicist character of Kemalist 
nationalism, one can say that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's discourse of race 
incorporated a duality which described race both as a set of physical 
attributes and a feature ascribed to peoples who share a common culture 
and language. In other words, in Atatürk's discourse, race expresses both 
physical attributes and the idea of national character. 33
Congress: Conferences, Discussion Minutes), 99-165; Şevket Aziz (Kansu), 
"Türklerin Antropolojisi"(The Anthropology of Turks), ibid., 271-278, 
and Sadri Maksudi Arsal, "Tarihin Amilleri"(The Agents of History), 
ibid., 339-364.
32Turan, Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, 
Düşünürler, Kitaplar , 46-47.
33The same point is revealed by Necip Ali, a deputy from Denizli 
and a member of Atatürk's close circle, in his speech in Ankara Halkevi 
"Although we appreciate the great importance of race as regards milli 
seciye (national character) and milli kudret (national strength), in our 
conception of education and culture, we consider man as a social creature, 
and nationality as hars birliği (unity of culture)." See "Denizli Mebusu 
Necip Ali Beyin Ankara Halkevinde Söylediği Nutuk"(The Speech 
Delivered by Necip Ali Bey, Deputy from Denizli, at Ankara People's 
House), Ayın Tarihi, 3( March 1934), 24-25.
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How can the racial/ethnicist aspect of Kemalist nationalism be 
identified? As discussed before, the RPP's programmes do not mention 
race among the components of Turkish national identity. In his 
definition of nation, however, Atatürk cites "the unity of race and origin" 
among the natural and historical elements contributing to the formation 
of Turkish nation.34
The supporters of racist movement in Turkey argued that Kemalist 
nationalism is racist by drawing upon the literal reading of the various 
speeches of Atatürk. They claimed that racism in the sense of linking the 
causes of social events to anthropological foundations could be discerned 
in Atatürk's six-day Speech of 1927 (Nutuk), which declared that The 
Turkish Youth!... The strength that you will need for this is mighty in the 
blood which flows in your veins". 35 The prevention of the entry of those 
who are not of Turkish stock into the military schools in the 1930s 
constitutes the apparent manifestation of the Kemalist racism in the
34înan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları, 
371-372; Kocatürk, Atatürk’ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri, 183. Atatürk notes 
that race might be a secondary factor in the formation of other national 
identities. Ibid.
35According to Karpat, the racists make use of such statements of 
Atatürk without due regard to its contextual background. Thus, the word 
"kan" (blood) Atatürk uses, in every day language denotes that one has 
good upbringing and comes from a good family In his appeal to the 
youth, Atatürk tries to stir emotion and nourish their national pride and 
confidence. See Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a 
Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 262-63. 
Karpat's interpretation seems to be too sympathetic with Kemalism and 
appears ex post facto , however. But, Karpat rightly points out that "At no 
stage did Turkey have a well-formed theory of racialism, except for 
German racialist ideas which penetrated the country in one way or 
another after 1935." Ibid.
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sense of the exclusion of those who are not of Turkish stock from state 
positions, according to Turkish racists.36
Atatiirk's saying that "A Turk is worth the whole world" is 
considered by them a clear-cut example of the conception of the Turkish 
racial supremacy. For Turkish racists, it was Mustafa Kemal himself who 
claimed the Turkishness of many famous people whose origins are not 
certain, as revealed in Giinaltay's paper presented in the First History 
Congress.37 The emphasis on the high capability of Turkish people to 
form civilisation, a recurrent theme in the textbooks of the era, refers to 
the same idea of racial supremacy.38
The position of Turkish racists cannot be said to be wholly 
unjustified. RPP's conferences as regards the importance of race and 
heredity, and many translated articles concerning eugenics in Ülkü, the 
publication organ of the Ankara Halkevleri , are the apparent examples
36Yalçın Toker, Milliyetçiliğin Yasal Kaynakları (The Legal Sources 
of Nationalism)(Istanbul: Toker Yayınlan, 1979), 383.
37See Şemsettin Günaltay "İslam Medeniyetinde Türklerin 
Mevkii"(The Place of Turks in Islamic Civilisation), in Birinci Türk Tarih 
Kongresi, Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları (Ankara, 1933), 289-306.
38For these and many other arguments put forward by the 
adherents of the racist movement in Turkey, see Hocaoğlu S. Ertürk, 
"Irkçı-Turancı Atatürk"(Racist-Turanist Atatürk) Orkun , No. 41, 13 July 
1951, 3-5. The magazine Orkun , the publication organ of the racists in 
Turkey at the time makes an interesting addition to Ertürk's article by 
calling attention to the studies conducted about Turkish racial condition 
in the Atatürk era, including that by Afet İnan. Many of these studies 
were presented in the History Congresses. To cite a few example: Prof. Dr. 
Şevket Aziz Kansu, Kız ve Erkek Çocukları Üzerinde Antropometrik 
Araştırmalar (Anthropometrical Studies on Girls and Boys) (Ankara: Dil 
ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Türk Antropolojisi ve Etnoloji Enstitüsü 
Neşriyatı, 1939); Şevket Aziz Kansu, Anadolu’nun Irk Tarihi Üzerinde 
Antropolojik Bir Tetkik (An Anthropological Study on the Race History 
of Anatolia) (Ankara: Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Türk Antropolojisi 
ve Etnoloji Enstitüsü Neşriyatı, 1939);'Assoc. Dr. Nermin Aygen, Türk 
Beyinleri Üzerinde ilk Antropolojik Araştırma (First Anthropological 
Study on Turkish Brains) (Ankara: Ideal Basımevi, 1941).
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of the impact of the theory of race on the Kemalist elites. In particular, the 
impact of the thesis of national eugenics was so powerful that many 
books, articles and scientific conferences were held in order to develop 
the national policies of eugenics with the aim of having an healthy and 
high quality Turkish population.39
The 1938 Law o f Physical Education is in some respects the 
policywise reflection of eugenics. In their papers presented in the First 
History Congress, Afet İnan, Fuat Köprülü and Şevket Aziz Kansu 
emphasised the beauty of Turkish race, an eugenic-based consideration.
39See, for example, Prof. Dr. Ali Esat Birol, Yedinci Milli Türk Tıp 
Kurultayı Öjenik Tatbikatı (The Eugenical Practice of The Seventh 
National Turkish Medical Congress) (Ankara, 1938). Also see the 
following articles as illustration dealing with the issue of eugenics in the 
official periodical Ayın Tarihi (The History of the Month): "Oswald 
Spengler ve Hitler"(Oswald Spengler and Hitler), Ayın Tarihi, 1( January 
1934), 305-309; and "Hitlerin Fransız Üstadı: Vacher de Lapoge"(The 
French Master of Hitler: Vacher de Lapoge), Ibid., 309-310. Eugenics, i.e., 
the policies of the betterment of race aims at creating more perfect and 
superior human beings. The protection of the purity and strength of race 
through such policies as sterilisation, sexual intercourse between selective 
people and the discouraging of marriages with foreigners is the essential 
feature of eugenics. It should be remembered that eugenics was 
considered to be a science and those who had allegiance to science as the 
source of absolute truth, a haive premise of "rude" positivism, believed 
also in eugenics as a corollary of their belief in science as they conceived. 
Because a thing could not at the same time be scientifically true and 
ethically wrong. That is why Marxist socialists who considered 
themselves to represent the political wing of science were all ardent 
adherents of eugenics as a scientific fact, including Fabian socialists. This 
was true for Atatürk as well. Because he was a firm believer of science and 
biological materialism, and therefore could not remain outside the 
"scientific prescriptions" of eugenics. He observed, for example, that " 
Nature created human beings and have them to worship to itself." See 
"Havacılık Hakkında Konuşma," Söylev ve Demeçler II (The Speechs and 
Statements of Atatürk, II) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek 
Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 3 May 1935, 322. Therefore, 
there could be no escape from the laws of nature, including those related 
to eugenics. For a good evaluation of eugenics, see Jonathan Freedland, 
"Irk Islahı Fikri Londra'da Doğdu"(The Idea of Eugenics Emerged in 
London) trans. M illiyet, 24 September 1997. The original article is 
published in Guardian , 30 August 1997.
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Accordingly, Mustafa Kemal's assertion that "Turkish race is the most 
beautiful race in the World", which pointed to the "noble beauty of 
Turkish race", and advising the protection of this beauty "in scientific 
manner" (fenni tarzda) upon the occasion of the selection of a Turkish 
girl, Keriman Halis, as the world's most beautiful girl also reflects the 
official espousal of eugenics.40
6 .4 . P se u d o -S cie n tific  Ju s tif ica tio n  o f "H u m a n is t-In c lu sio n a ry  
R acism "
The discovery and development of national identity through the 
use of historical studies manifested both an anti-historicist, the 
consideration of the Ottoman past as a dark period, and 
historicist/scientific character by relegating history to the very ancient 
roots, "real" and "perceived."41 The Turkish history thesis, which 
evolved as the twin of the idea of nationalism, was aimed to be the most 
important means of forming Turkish national self-hood and a glorious 
ideal in the eyes of future generations. 42
40"Keriman Halis’in Dünya Güzeli Seçilmesi"(The Selection of 
Keriman Halis as the world's Queen) Söylev ve Demeçler III (The 
Speechs and Statements of Atatürk, III) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve 
Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 3 August 1932,
132-133. Özbudun argues that such statements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
is too "marginal" to conclude that Kemalist nationalism is racist. See 
Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde 
Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu"(The Question of Citizenship and Identity 
in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the Republic), 
Unp. Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996), 14, footnote, 18. It is true 
that all this may not denote the existence of a systematic conception of 
racist nationalism; but it definitely denote the sporadic existence of 
racialism in the policies and* discourse of Kemalist nationalism.
^Ibid., 89.
41 Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih , 158.
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The main purpose of the history thesis was to disclose the pre-
historical remnants of the Turks in Anatolia by using archaeological
findings, and thus to reach the conclusion that Turks as a nation
possessed a great civilisation. Turks were considered as the main race of
humanity and the Adam and Eve of all the races worthy of note. To
widespread this "scientific" belief by means of education and thus to
identify the Turkish national self-respect with the pre-historical
remnants of Turks in Anatolian lands confined nationalism both as a
concept and a reality of the republic to Turks of Turkey. 43
As a matter of fact, what Mustafa Kemal and Kemalist bureaucratic-
intellectual elites intended to do with the history thesis was to fill in the
vacuum created by the denial of religion any part in the construction of
the national identity. As Başar aptly observed, Atatürk wanted to
strengthen nationalism with Turkism in order to remove the empty
space left by religion in socio-political life.44 According to Başar,
the Turkism of Ghazi was not parochial and disintegrative but 
widening and inclusive. That is why he argued that Arabs, Syriacs, 
Kurds, and so on, are Turks that have forgotten their Turkishness 
due to miscellaneous events.45
43Ibid., 192-93.
44Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Atatürk'le Üç Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra 
Türkiye (Three Months with Atatürk and Turkey After 1930), 2nd ed. 
(Ankara: İktisadi Ticari İlimler Akademisi Yayınları, 1981), 113.
45A paragraph underlined by Mustafa Kemal in Mustafa 
Celaleddin's Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes (1870) refers to the same 
point: "With some exceptions, all the Christian and Muslim population 
in Turkey are of Arian stock, and most of them, or nearly all of them are 
of Turkic origin." See Gürbüz Tüfekçi, Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar 
— Yabancı Dillerdeki Kitaplar— (Books Read By Atatürk-Books in 
Foreign Languages) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 
264. Celaleddin's book rejected the idea that Turks are a non-civilised 
ethnie. Turks had a higher standard of life than that of Arabs at the time 
of Latin crusades. See Turan, Atatürk’ün Düşünce Yapısı, 25-27.
327
To bring the people together around a common idea, to save not 
only the materiality but also spirituality of the nation was an 
evident necessity. Ghazi attested the priority to this point and 
claimed the ancientness and strengthfullness of Turkism and 
Turkish history.
... For the tendency to unite the nation with the strength emanating 
from its self-hood and history, there is need for the knowledge of 
history. To be a glorious nation which is the builder of civilisations 
is an honourable thing. But we must avoid going extreme in this. 
When I expressed my doubt to Ghazi in an occasion in the travel, 
he warned me that 'the understanding which presents Turks to the 
World as a backward nation has entered among us as well. The 
Turks in the imperial time had the same conception by starting 
the history of an empire and nation from a nomadic tribe of four 
hundred tents. 46
In the first place we must teach the nation that she is a noble 
nation, that she is the children of a nation that are the mother of all 
civilisations .47
The observations of Başar, an intellectual bureaucrat of the time, 
written after Mustafa Kemal's country-wide travel of 1930 for disclosing 
the general state of the nation in the wake of the closing down of the 
growing opposition party, Serbest Fırka (Free Party) well discerns the 
Kemalist drift toward ethnic nationalism. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
rejected the possibility that the Turkic character of Kemalist nationalism
46This phrase is a key one explaining the underlying leitmotif the 
history thesis. Accordingly, "The present-day Turkish children who 
exposed their mind and conscious to the newest flashes of progress, know 
and would make known that they are a nation of high capability 
originated from a ten thousand year Arian, civilised supreme race, not 
from a tribe of four hundred tents(continuos cheers).
We must also know that the ancient Hitits, our fathers, are the first 
and autoctonous (native) inhabitants and owners of our present 
homeland. They have made this place a genuine land a thousand years 
ago. They carried the centres of Turkishness from Altays to Anatolia- 
Thrace. Tht unshakeable foundations of Turkish republic lies in the rocks 
of this genuine land (öz yurt ) .” "Yılbaşı Gecesi Bir Konuşma" (A Speech 
in the New Year's Day), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 01. 01. 1933, 308. This is in 
fact a quotation from Afet inan,"Tarihten Evvel ve Tarihin Fecrinde" (In 
Pre-History and Dawn of History), in Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, 
Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları (Ankara:T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, 1933), 41.
47Başar, Atatürk’le Üç Ay , 114.
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may "go extreme", i.e., pan-Turkism and made his goal clear, which is 
strictly territorial.48
The rewriting of history "to enhance Turkishness and to minimise 
Ottoman and Islamic identity"49 created the oppressive impact of an 
ethnic hegemony; but more importantly, it provided legitimacy for a 
conception of history confined with political power. Historians were 
considered as nation-builders during the Republic,50 and therefore their 
political missions have always had priority to their scientific concerns.51
The intellectual roots of the Turkish history thesis goes back to the 
19th century Turkism. Gokalp's writings incorporates the traces of the 
thesis. When it was spelled out for the first time in the press of one party
48In fact, the first seeds of the history thesis emerged in 1928 when 
Afet (İnan), the adopted girl of Mustafa Kemal and an important 
contributor to the crystallisation of Kemalist nationalism, by showing to 
Mustafa Kemal a French book claiming that Turks belong to yellow 
(mongoloid) race and therefore are second class human beings, asked 
him, "Is that true?" Mustafa Kemal replied: "No, there can be no such 
thing, we must dwell upon this. You work !" See Afet İnan, "Atatürk ve 
Tarih Tezi" (Atatürk and the History Thesis), Belleten, vol. Ill, 1 April 
1939, 243. Upon this directive, Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (The Main 
Lines of Turkish History) was written in 1930, which spelled out for the 
firs time the Turkish history thesis. See Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 
126. For the underlying causes of the drift to racial/ethnicist nationalism 
through the formulation of the pseudo-scientific Turkish history thesis, 
see Peyami Safa, Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar (Glances at Turkish 
Revolution) (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1990), 209; Mahmut Goloğlu, 
Tek Partili Cumhuriyet (1931-1938) (One Party Republic) (Ankara: 
Goloğlu Yayınları, 1974), 69-70; and, "Ankara Tarih ve Dil Fakültesi 
Atatürk’ün Huzuru İle Dün Açıldı," (The Speech by the Ministry of 
Culture, Saffet Arıkan), Cumhuriyet, 10 January 1936.
49Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist 
Action Party of Turkey," 143.
50For the role of historians as nation builders, see Anthony D. 
Smith, "Nationalism and The Historians," in Ethnicity and Nationalism , 
ed. Anthony D. Smith (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 58-80.
51Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 13.
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period by Yusuf Ziya Özer, the main premises of the later history thesis, it 
was ridiculised by the majority of the press writers, including M. Fuat 
Köprülü, a scholar of Turcology who actively involved in the studies of 
the Turkish history thesis later on. 52
The history thesis was the product of an "historical reconstruction." 
Its main premises were immuned against any serious criticism, as 
happened in the First History Congress. The criticism that may be levelled 
against it was considered as objection to the gods of era, i.e., science and 
nationalism. Therefore all the criticisms had to be "constructive" and in 
apologética! style.53
The thesis incorporated all the essential premises of cultural pan- 
Turkism. The core argument was that peoples who have lived in 
Anatolia throughout history were of Turkish origin because Turks 
coming from the Central Asia were the first dwellers of Anatolia. Thus all 
the peoples of Anatolia, from Hittites to Romans were considered as the 
descendants of the first comers, i.e., Turks. The Turkification of Anatolian 
homeland throughout history thus served the purpose of rejecting any 
non-Turkish claim over Anatolia on the basis of "historical rights" 
Anatolia was Turkish from the time immemorial. The first settlers of 
Anatolia brought with them the essential techniques and innovations 
which gave birth to the present level of European civilisation. Therefore,
52For the press discussions as regards the core formulation of the 
later history thesis, see Mete Tunçay, T.C.'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin 
Kurulması 1923-1931) (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey,
1923-1931), 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 302. The history thesis 
crystallised between 1929 and 1932. In order to officially publicise the 
Turkish history thesis, a congress was held in 2-11 July 1932 with the 
support of the Ministry of Education. For the Congress, see Goloğlu, Tek 
Partili Cundıuriyet, 1974, 67.
53Ersanli-Behar, ibid., 122.
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Turks were alleged to be a race with an high capability for civilisation, not 
a second class, mongoloid race. 54 The use of inclusionary racism as an 
integrative element and territorialism defined with the frontiers of the 
present Turkey were the two qualifying features of the thesis. 55
6.4.1. Turkish History Congresses and Inclusionary Racism
The First Turkish History Congress (2-11 July 1932) made apparent 
that the Kemalist leadership decided to base the national identity on racial 
elements, including the notion of language linked to race. Although 
Gobineau's theory of race was criticised, the studies of certain 
anthropologues, particularly those of Edward Pittard were considered as 
the saver of the Turkish national identity defined by racial/ethnic criteria. 
Pittard's anthropometry and studies of skull strengthened the distinction 
of brachysephalic and dolichosephalic races, the first representing the 
superior one. What the Turkish men of science did was to bring together 
pieces of the views of these anthropologues together to draw a "scientific" 
framework for the national history thesis. 56
All papers and conferences in the Congress dwelled upon the 
question of race as the determining factor of history and emphasised with 
an explorer's zeal the supremacy and distinction of Turkish race and its 
high capability of forming new civilisations. The features of Turkish race 
and the matters related to biological and spiritual heredity were 
particularly dealt with. Afet (İnan), for example, put forward the question
54Ibid., 89, footnote 2. Also see Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver), 
Günebakan (The Sunflower) (Ankara: Türk Ocakları İlim ve Sanat Heyeti 
Neşriyatından, 1929), 192-194.
55Tunçay, Tek Parti Yönetimi, 300.
56Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih , 159-160.
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"Who is the authocthonous^ (native) people of Anatolia?". in her paper 
"Tarihten Evvel ve Tarihin Fecrinde"(Before History and at the Dawn of 
History). She tried to refute the thesis that Turkish race is mongoloid and 
belongs to the category of yellow race. According to her, When Turkish 
race attained a high cultural level in its homeland, the peoples in 
Europe endured a thoroughly wild, ignorant life."57 In their discussion of 
tnan's paper, both Şevket Aziz Kansu and M. Fuat Köprülü expressed 
their gratitude and lent emphasis on the beauty of Turkish race, free from 
any kind of ugliness. 58
The lengthy paper of Dr. Reşit Galip, the Secretary General of the
Society for the Study of Turkish History, carried the title of "Türk Irk ve
Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış "(A General Look at the History of
Turkish Race and Civilisation). In parallel to the İnan's paper , Galip tried
to refute the European allegations about Turkish race. He described the
racial features of a characteristic Turk as having long height, long-white
face, flat or girdled nose, tidy lips, predominantly blue eyes and
horizontal opening eyelids. With these features, the Turkish race is
"one of the most beautiful examples of the white race".59 His concluding
remarks reflected the ardent zeal of an absolute believer in Turkish racial
superiority, however culturalised it be:
Dear, distinguished teachers of universities, teacher schools and 
secondary schools! The truth is apparent in your and our opinions. 
Those who carry the Turkish blood ... can feel no doubt about this. 
Our cause is to make our truth the truth of all humanity. The
57Afet (İnan), "Tarihten Evvel ve Tarihin Fecrinde," 41.
58T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Konferanslar, 
Müzakere Zabıtları (Ankara, 1933), 47.
59Dr. Reşit Galip, "Türk Irk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir 
Bakış," (A General Look at The History of Turkish Race and Civilisation), 
in Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları 
(Ankara, 1933), 159.
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lightnings of knowledge and enlightenment of yours and the 
international authorities of Turkish history that you would bring 
up would break into pieces the native and foreign clouds of bigotry 
raining tar into Turkish history for centuries. From Ergenekon 60 
would emerge Turkish history. That will be the victory of not only 
our history but also that of the eternal 'truth'. 61
The Turkish history thesis was rediscussed in the Second Turkish
History Congress held in 20-25 September 1937. The majority of the
participants composed of university professors. Unlike the first one, it
was international. Archaeology, linguistic and anthropology were the
main subjects of discussion. The time period to be studied was
determined as the period of pre-history. The conception of "history of
civilisation" was the underlying study approach. No discussion, however,
occurred on the papers submitted. The Congress ended with the
declaration of the confirmation of the conclusive truthness of the
Turkish history thesis. 62
60The legendary story of the appearance of Kök Turks in the scene 
of history.
61 Dr. Reşit Galip, "Türk Irk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir 
Bakış," 161. Other papers submitted in the Congress basically dealt with 
the core premises of the Turkish history and language thesis. Among 
these are Samih Rıfat, "Türkçe ve Diğer Lisanlar Arasında 
İrtibatlar"(Linkages Between Turkish and Other Languages), in Birinci 
Türk Tarih Kongresi. Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları, 52-78; Hasan 
Cemil Bey, "Ege Medeniyetinin Menşeine Umumi Bir Bakış" (A General 
Look at the Origin of the Aegean Civilisation), ibid., 199-214; Yusuf Ziya 
(Özer), "Mısır Din ve İlahlarının Türklükle Alakası"(The Connection of 
Egyptian Religion and Gods with Turkishness), ibid., 243-260; Dr. Şevket 
Aziz (Kansu), "Türklerin Antropolojisi"(The Anthoropology of Turks), 
ibid., 271-278; Prof. Şemsettin Günaltay, "İslam Medeniyetinde Türklerin 
Mevkii" (The Place of Turks in Islamic Civilisation), ibid., 289-306.
62For the Second History Congress, see T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, İkinci 
Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin Çalışmaları ve Kongreye Sunulan 
Tebliğler (Second Turkish History Congresses: The Activities of the 
Congress and Papers Submitted in the Congress) (Istanbul, 1943).
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Many papers presented in the Congress focused on Turkish race 
and genealogy. For example, Hasan Reşit Tankut, in his paper " Dil ve Irk 
Münasebetleri Hakkında" (On the Linkages Between Language and Race), 
linked language to race in order to draw Turkish language thesis from the 
history thesis. To Tankut, Turkic languages were the products of the 
Turkic races. 63
Dr. Nurettin Onur's paper, "Kan Grupları Bakımından Türk 
Irkının Menşei Hakkında bir Etüd"{ A Study on the Origin of Turkish 
Race As Regards Blood Groups) suggested a new classification as regards 
the relation between races and blood groups. According to this 
classification, the distribution of 0, A and B blood groups all over the 
World was as follows: 1) The percentage of blood group 0 was high 
among primitive ethnies living in the limited regions of the World 
without intermingling with other ethnies. Its percentage among 
American Indians was %91, and among Yukateks in Mexico %97. 2) The 
rate of blood group A increased from the middles of Asia toward Europe 
and reached %47 in Norway , %52 in Portugal, and %56 in Central Asia. 
3) The percentage of the blood group B reaches its peak in India and 
Southern China: it is %28 in Indochina, and %40 in Birmania. 64
According to Onur, it can be assumed that in the primitive period 
of mankind when only Asia was populated, there were only two blood
63Hasan Reşit Tankut, "Dil ve Irk Münasebetleri Hakkında," ibid., 
223. Tankut was one of the regular participators of the Atatürk's renown 
Çankaya Sofrasi(Dining Table of Çankaya) and the most important 
contributor to the Sun-Language Theory.
64Dr. Nurettin Onur, "Kan Grupları Bakımından Türk Irkının 
Menşei Hakkında Bir Etüd" (A Study on the Origin of Turkish Race in 
Terms of Blood Groups), in İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi.Kongrenin 
Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Yayınları, 1943), 849.
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groups, A and B. Those who lived in the North and inhabited Europe 
belonged to the group A while those who lived in the South called 
"Negro" belonged to the group B. 65 This meant that the original blood 
group of white race was A while that of coloured race was B. The present- 
day mixed races emerged through interminglings by such reasons as 
migrations over long periods of history. According to Onur's findings, 
the percentage of the blood group A among Turks was 46, revealing the 
dominance of this blood group among Turks. Conversely, the percentage 
of the blood group B among Turks was only 17.2, which showed the 
scarcity of this group among Turkish population. The percentage of the 
group A ircreases from Anatolia(%40) toward Thrace (%41) as was the 
case from Asia toward Europe. Onur's concluding remark was: The
Turkish race is the main root bringing the blood group A to Europe", a 
finding wholly coherent with the core premise of the Turkish history 
thesis.66
Similarly, Eugene Pittard’s paper, "Neolitik Devirde Küçük Asya 
ile Avrupa Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler," ( Anthropological 
Relations Between Asia Minor and Europe in the Neolithic Age) 
provided a pseudo-anthropological basis for the Turkish history thesis. 
Pittard asserted that Turks belonged to the brachysephalic Homo-Alpinus 
race who emigrated to Europe from Central Asia through the route of 
Bosphorus and Danube. It was these emigrants that taught European 
dwellers to seam wheat and to domesticate animals. 67
65Ibid., 850.
66Ibid., 851.
67See Eugene Pittard,. "Neolitik Devirde Küçük Asya ile Avrupa 
Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler" (Anthropological Relations 
Between the Asia Minor and Europe in the Neolithic Age), İkinci Türk 
Tarih Kongresi, 65-84. Among other papers presented in the Congress
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Atatürk attested great importance to the identification of the 
features of Turkish race but personally dwelled upon particularly such 
issues as national education, national culture, language and history with 
a racial/ethnic perspective.68 In ideal terms, his racialism/ethnicism is
were Sadri Maksudi Arsal, "Beşeriyyet Tarihinde Devlet ve Hukuk 
Mefhumu ve Müesseselerinin İnkişafında Türk Irkının Rolü"(The Role 
of Turkish Race in the Development of the Concepts and Institutions of 
State and i a^w in Human History), ibid., 1062-1093; Ibrahim Necmi 
Dilmen, "Türk Tarih Tezinde Güneş-Dil Teorisinin Yeri ve Değeri"(The 
Place and Value of Sun-Language Theory in the Turkish History Thesis), 
ibid., 85-98; Sadi Irmak, "Türk Irkının Biyolojisine Dair Araştırmalar: Kan 
Grupları ve Parmak İzleri" (Studies Concerning the Biology of Turkish 
Race: Blood Groups and Fingerprints), ibid., 841-845. In his paper, Irmak 
relates blood groups with races and concludes that "According to the 
general state of the blood groups, there is resemblance between Turks and 
races called Northern type.* Southern races exhibit an entirely different 
configuration." Ibid., 844. Both in terms of fingerprints and blood groups, 
"our nation differs from southern and eastern Asian nations, and exhibits 
resemblance to the Northern type nations." Ibid., 845. The paper of W. 
Koppers strikes attention with its title "Halk Bilgisi ve Cihanşümul Tarih 
Tetkiki Karşısında Öz Türklük ve ö z  Indo-Germenlik"(Pure Turkishness 
and Pure Indo-Germanness in View of Folklore and World History 
Studies), ibid., 645-665. It must be noted that all papers presented in the 
Congress were read by Atatürk beforehand and got his appreciation. See 
ibid., xxxvni. Marguerite Dellenbach's paper, "Türklerin Antropolojik 
Tarihlerine Dair Vesikalar"(Documents As to the Anthropological 
History of Turks) defended the thesis that Turks belong to brachysephalic 
race. Şevket Aziz Kansu argued in his paper that in terms of racial 
features, past ethnies lived in Anatolia shows continuity and claimed 
that Turkish race has preserved its purity in Anatolia. According to 
Kansu, "Seljukis belonged to the Alpin subgroup of white race in terms 
of their physical features. Alpins who are of central Asian origin are 
proto-Turks." See, Şevket Aziz Kansu, "Selçuklu Türkleri Hakkında 
A ntropolojik Bir İlk Tetkik ve N eticeleri" (A Prelim inary
Anthropological Study AbQut Seljuk Turks and its Conclusions),ibid., 
440-456.
68Atatürk's adherence to the racial/ethnic perspective is 
exemplified in his many speeches. The following is only a representative 
example: "One should not forget that however differ Balkan nations from 
one another in socio-political terms, they possess a common grandfather 
having the same blood and close lineage extending back to the Central 
Asia.
Human masses following one after another successively for 
thousands years via the northern and southern routes of the Black sea
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defined by affection and confidence to one's race and lineage, i.e., 
racialisation/ethnicisation of culture in the wide/loose sense.
Despite the great support lent by the state to the Turkish history 
thesis, it proved short-lived. According to Behar, this was due to the 
prevalence of a revolutionary and impatient political climate, the non­
use of primary resources when it was necessary, and the fact that the 
conceptual integrity of the thesis required a more comprehensive 
explanation. The history thesis did not have a consistent time continuum 
from the pre-history to the present. The manipulation and supervision of 
historiography by politicians, and the absence of scientific autonomy 
were the underlying causes of the pseudo-scientific character of the 
thesis.69
6.4.2. Sun-Language Theory
Another aspect of the cooption of Pan-Turkist elements into 
Kemalist nationalism was the Turkification of language. 70 The 
Latinisation of the alphabet, Turkification of the language of prayer, 
including the call to prayer (ezan), and the expelling of the words of
like sea waves are in fact brother ethnies springing from the same cradle. 
In their veins circulates the same blood, though they carry different 
names.
As you see, the Balkan nations can be connected to one another 
with unbroken steel links of distant and deep past rather than the near 
past. We entered into a new humane period in which it would be 
indispensable and useful to revive the real ties which are made forgotten 
and diminished in the past due to all kinds of human greeds, religious 
differences, and cross traces caused by historical events." See "Balkan 
Konferansı Üyeleriyle Konuşma"(Talk with the Members of the Balkan 
Conference), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 25. 10. 1931, 272-73. To interpret the 
word "blood" here in non-biological sense appears to be a "forced" one.
69Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 107.
70For a short description of the Kemalist language reform, see 
Goloğlu, Tek Partili Cumhuriyet, 139-142.
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Arabic and Persian origin from Turkish were the most important aspects 
of this reform, legitimised on the ground of the corollaries of "the 
national ideal".71 The Turkification of language was considered by the 
Kemalist elites as a matter of vital importance for the protection of the 
future of Turkish race.72
As part of the process of "Turkification via Westernisation", a 
language congress was held in 23 September 1932, called the First 
Language Congress. In this Congress, a theory entitled the Sun-Language 
Theory was proposed which suggested that Turkish is the mother of all 
languages in the World as a corollary of the Turkish history thesis on the 
basis of pseudo-scientific findings. In the Third Language Congress held 
in August 1936, this theory was officially sanctified. 73 According to this 
theory, the first man worshipped the Sun. Therefore the first language 
should have originated from a main root related to the Sun. It views the 
Sun as the main root concept and attaches the emergence of all other 
concepts to that. Needless to say, this root language was proto-Turkish. 
All other languages are considered to be the derivatives of the primitive
71During the floor debates on the Law of Settlement (İskan  
Kanunu), Şeref Bey, a deputy from Edirne, declared that "The children of 
a nation whose history started with glory and who brought civilisation to 
the whole world cannot use the words of Arabs and Persians which have 
fixed and arrested us in the same place. Turkish nation have expelled 
these words, these languages, which intruded as far as our religion, our 
faith..." See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, legislative period 4, session 1, vol. 23,
07. 06. 1934, 72. This image of "backward and ignorant Arabs and 
Persians" still dominate the perception of the Kemalist elites.
72See Sadri Maksudi Bey (a deputy from Şebin Karahisar)'s speech 
in the same session referred to in the preceding footnote. Ibid., 71.
73For the Sun-Language Theory, see Prof. Hasan Reşit Tankut, "Dil 
ve Irk Münasebetleri Hakkinda"(About the Relations Between Language 
and Race), in İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin Tebliğleri, Kongreye 
Sunulan Çalışmalar (İstanbul, 1943), 221-223.
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root language. In accordance with such premises, many "scientific" 
articles were issued to show the Turkishness of Arabic, Persian, French, 
and so on, words. 74
This materialistically constructed language thesis had the same goal 
with the history thesis: to regain the national confidence and self-respect. 
The claim that all languages are the metamorphic versions of the root 
Turkish incorporated a tautological logic.75 By Turkifying all languages, it 
ascribed Turkish the status of being the owner of all languages of 
civilisation including French and English, alongside Arabic and Persian.76
The other basic component of the language reform alongside the 
Sun-Language Theory, the purification of Turkish through the derivation 
of new Turkish words to substitute for Arabic and Persian ones, was 
geared toward the goal of diminishing the language differences between 
elites and masses, and hence, contributing to the national integration. 
The removal of the Arabic-Persian words also provided for the 
elimination of the Ottoman-Islamic politico-cultural tradition.
74See Prof. Ibrahim Necmi Dilmen, "Türk Tarih Tezinde Güneş Dil 
Teorisinin Yeri ve Değeri,"(The Place and Importance of Sun-Language 
Theory in Turkish History Thesis), in İkinci Türk Tarih 
K on gresi.K on gren in T eb liğ leri, K ongreye Sunulan Ç alışm alar  
(İstanbul:Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1943), 87. Ironically, this theory 
reversed the process of the purification of Turkish via the expelling of 
Arabic and Persian words in that many of such words were accepted to be 
Turkish for the sake of consistency.
75For the Atatürk's views as to this subject, see Orhan Türkdoğan, 
Atatürk'te Milli Devlet Anlayışı (Atatürk's Nation-State Understanding) 
(Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1981), 90-91.
76The Sun-Language Theory served the claim that Turkish is a 
civilisation language like French, Arabic and English. See Atay, Çankaya 
Atatürk 'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar (Çankaya. From the Birth of 
Atatürk to His Death) (Istanbul, 1969), 468-69.
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Overall, the Latinisation of the alphabet, the purification of 
language and the Sun-Language Theory formed the main contours of the 
language reform, considered to be a pillar of the new national identity, as 
Mustafa Kemal observed:
One of the very manifest attributes of a nation is language. A man 
who says that I am from Turkish nation, in the first place, should 
absolutely speak Turkish. It is not true to believe in a man's claim, 
who does not speak Turkish, that he/she is loyal to the Turkish 
culture and society.77
6.5 . T he L e itm o tif  o f N atio n al C h aracter  as P art o f  K em alist  
R acialism
Contrary to Ernest Renan's renown definition that a nation is a 
daily plebiscite", nation may also be defined through "national 
character". According to this approach, a nation is an ethnie possessing a 
common character particular to itself thanks to an high and unique 
culture. This character is transmitted from one generation to the next 
over a wide territory.78 This view is wholly embodied in Kemalist 
nationalism.
The problem with this definition relates to the question of the 
existence of the so-called "national character"(milli seciye), an equivalent 
of the notion of the common will (maşeri vicdan ). Nevertheless, it 
proves useful in discerning the dual faces of national life, both as an ideal 
and a reality. According to the national character approach to the national 
identity, a nation can be free to the extent that it acts in accordance with its 
national character. The duty of national man is the realisation of national 
character in his/her life. The national allegiance assumes the meaning of
77Kocatürk, Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri, 193.
78Mehmet İzzet, Milliyet Nazariyeleri ve Milli Hayat (Theories of 
Nationalism and National Life), 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınlan, 1981), 
148.
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the sentimental and practical affiliation and loyalty to the national 
character. Hence, national character is a thing which exists in relation to a 
nation and the national man. The nationalist endeavour aims to create it 
at individual level as well. The realisation of what is national occurs 
through the translation of what exists to what should exist, which 
accounts for the differences among nations.
The belief in the existence of national character was preached by the 
philosophers of law in the first half of the nineteenth century. To these 
philosophers, the legal-political institutions of every nation were the 
product of a unique national character common to all the members of a 
nation, and therefore cannot be recepted or imitated by another nation. 79 
The presumption of the national character requires to answer many 
questions. In the first place, it is not the consequence of historical 
coincidences. It explains and therefore creates the history, living 
conditions and material-spiritual life of a nation.
The national character is thoroughly personal and subjective. It 
does not reflect the reality of national existence but demonstrates the 
fancies of national pride. Yet, it is usual to ascribe a nation such (generally 
positive) attributes as hospitality, heroism, compassion, modesty, self- 
sacrifice, and so on. However , such attributes are not particular to any 
nation, nor are they shared by every member of a nation. Moreover, they 
may not remain secular throughout history. The opinions of western 
travellers as regards the attributes of Ottoman "Turks" before and after 
nineteenth century are diametrically opposite to one another. 80 The 
differences between peoples of southern and northern parts of Italy are 
another graphic example. Contrary to the South's emotional, passionate
79Ibid., 148.
«Ibid., 157.
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and dreamy character, the northerners are more prone to rationalism and 
positivism which shows that national unity and the unity of national 
character are two different things.
The national character thesis suggests that every nation reveals its 
own national character. Accordingly, every nation has the genius of its 
own, which constitutes its unity and strength. The breakdown of this 
genius leads to the demolition of a nation; its revitalisation causes its 
progress, a recurrent theme of the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
The national character approach explains national differences 
through differences of national character. Thus, a French is assumed to be 
fond of social life, friendly, revealing his/her inner feelings and easily 
motivated. He/She is brave, prone to criticism and irony and enjoys 
simple ideas. Despite his/her brevity, he/she is neither steadfast nor 
determined. An English, on the other hand, is believed to be seemingly 
indifferent, independent, original and possessing self-control. He/she 
trusts only his/her power and looks after his/her interest with 
determination. He/she pays importance to the substance rather than 
appearance of things. He/she likes comfort and lends importance to 
empirical observations instead of philosophical speculations. He/ she is a 
utilitarian. In short, the characters of nations are held to be the real 
determiners of the material and spiritual products of their national life. 81
As a matter of fact, the idea of national character has functioned as 
an instrument of national ambitions and political interests. For example, 
the Frenchs claimed that the inhabitants of Ren Lander were akin to 
"delicate Frenchs" rather than "rude Germans" in terms of their 
dispositions in order to legitimise their holding of the region. 82
81 Ibid., 171.
82Ibid., 160-61.
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The question to be asked here is what are the distinguishing, 
immutable markers of national character if it is the predominant 
determiner of national history, the main basis of national feeling, and 
the essence of national differences? The perspective of the "average type" 
constitutes the mainstream view in this regard. According to this view, 
the character of a social group should be sought in the common attributes 
of individuals forming the group. There is a qualitative difference 
between a genius and an average man, however. If national character is 
the average of the attributes of the members of a nation, then the genius 
members must be left outside the scope of the national boundary of that 
nation. If a claim is put forward that nations reveal their genuine 
character through the geniuses it has, then the majority have to be 
sacrificed for the minority.
The national character is the product, not the cause of national life. 
If it was the motor force of history, it should not undergo any change and 
possess an uninterrupted continuity. Social conditions, customs and 
habits however, may overwhelm "this character" It is not proper to 
explain the life, history and ideal of a nation with the national character 
approach. We infer the constituent elements of national character from 
history as much as possible. Historical development is not the 
consequence of an hereditary national character. One cannot accept that 
enduring customs and ways of life, which history attests to their 
existence, each by itself can. dominate the national life as the essential 
substance given the imperative of continuos changes and alterations. 83
Before dwelling upon the Kemalist conception of Turkish national 
character as part of the racial/ethnic character of Kemalist nationalism, it 
would be illuminating to have a short look at the conceptualisation of
83Ibid., 165.
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Turkish national character as having evolved since the nineteenth 
century. Taking national identity as the forming element of the process 
of nation-state building, Akgam identifies the features of Turkish 
national identity as follows:
1. The late development of Turkish national identity, and as a 
consequence, the aggressiveness caused by the urge closing the gap 
emerged;84
2. A reaction against continuos degradation: The inner aspect of 
this degradation was the use of the word "Turk" in the pejorative sense 
of rude and ignorant nomad in the Ottoman polity. The Ottoman ruling 
class considered the use of the name "Turk" for themselves as an insult.85 
This pejorative use dominated the European historiography both in the 
middle and new ages. Turks were described as "barbarian and aggressive 
creatures by the European travellers of the 19th century, which 
suggested the expelling of Turks from the civilised Europe.
This negative imagery of "Turk" in the Ottoman and European
historiography led to the emergence of defensive Turkist literature, the
pioneering study of which was Necip Asim's Tiirk Tarihi emphasising
the great victories of Turks’ as well as their civilised capability. Young
Turks inherited the same defensive mood. Likewise, one of the
underlying leitmotif of the National Struggle was to present it as a reply
to anti-Turkish biases. Hence Mustafa Kemal stated,
It is claimed that our nation in general is devoid of any capability.
Therefore, whenever she entered places full of gardens, she turned
84Taner Akçam, Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu (Turkish
National Identity and the Armenian Question) (Istanbul: İletişim 
Yayınlan, 1992), 36-43.
85Ibid., 43-46.
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them into places full of ruins. The first claim ascribes cruelty to the
nation; the second one , incapability. Both are sheer slander.86
The accompanying themes of this reaction to degradation is the 
syndrome of being misunderstood and psychology of loneliness. 87
3. Turks conceived as the nation created for ruling; 88
4. The fear of perishing, the concern for survival (beka); 89
5. Enmity felt against Christians; 90
6. The feeling of revenge caused by the massacres of Muslims and 
losses of territory;91
7. The pressure felt owing to being left between a glorious past and 
degradation of the national-self; 92
86Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk Inkilap Tarihi (Turkish Renovation 
History), vol. 2, part IV. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983), 
329-330; quoted by Akçam, ibid., 49.
87Ibid., 46-49.
88Ibid., 51-54. The notion of Turkish nation as the dominant nation 
(millet-i hakime), which is also shared by Kemalist nationalism, is the 
reflection of this belief For an overt statement of this idea, see Hüseyin Cahit 
Yalçın, "Millet-i Hakime" (The Dominant Nation), Tanin, 25 October 
1324(1908).
89Ibid., 55-58.
90Ibid., 58-68. This was mainly because of the joining of the 
Ottoman Armenian and Greek subjects to the War of Independence on 
the side of invasion forces against the National Forces (Kuvay-ı Milliye)
91Ibid., 76. Mustafa Kemal expresses this feeling of nostalgia for the 
lost territories and people left there (Evlad-ı Fatihan) in the 1931 as 
follows: "The emigrees are the national memories of our lost territories."
Bilal Şimşir, Rumeli'den Türk Geçişleri. Belgeler, (Turkish Passages 
Through Rumelia. Documents), vol.l (Ankara, 1970), cover page; quoted 
by Akçam, ibid., 77.
92Ibid., 75.
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8. Spiritual unity and togetherness against internal and external 
enemies.93
Against this historical background of Turkish national identity, 
Kemalist conception of the idea of national character may better be located 
to its proper context.
National character, according to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, is the sine
qua non of the set of elements forming the nation:
It is not adequate for a nation to posses sciences in order to acquire 
an honest entity and respectful position. It should own a property 
above all sciences and above everything. That property is the 
possession of a specific and positive national character. Individuals 
who do not have such- a standing and nations consisting of such 
individuals can never constitute a genuine state. Such nations 
become den of mischief.94
He is eager to claim that "the new state of Turkey has united all the 
characters of Turkishness, i.e., its vigorous, resolute, virtuous motives, in 
herself."95
Atatürk reflects his belief in the hereditary national character of 
Turkishness when he refers to the "national genius" (dehay-i milli)96
93Ibid., 90-91. Living under the danger of continuos threat made 
the creation of common spiritual values and mood to keep nation in 
unity and coherence a continuos motif of the rhetoric of the ruling 
intelligentsia.
94"Konya Gençleriyle Konuşma"(Talks with Konya Youth), 
Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Derrteçleri II (The Speech and Statements of 
Atatürk, I-II-III). Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu 
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 20 March 1923, 146. Atatürk points out 
that "the elevation of the national character, which our history inspires 
us, to the higher levels is one of the great aspirations we have pursued 
with enthusiasm." Kocatürk, Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri, 184.
95"Tarsus'ta Gençlerle Konuşma" (Talk with the Young in 
Tarsus),Söylev ve Demeçler II, 18 March 1923, 137.
96"Öğretmenlere" (To the Teachers),Söylev ve Demeçler II, 27 
October 1922,49.
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and observes th a t" Turks are joyous and gay by birth."97 His belief in the 
highness of Turkishness is very emphatic: "This nation is created to feel 
proud, not to be ashamed."98 His "Onuncu Yil Nutku" ( Tenth Year 
Speech) is the concise expression of his views as to the nature of the 
Turkish national character:
The character of Turkish nation is high. ... It is our national ideal to 
develop the high character of our nation, her hard-workingness, 
her natural intelligence, her attachment to science, her love for fine 
arts, her feeling of national unity through nurturing them in 
continuos way and by every means and measures.99
In the road leading to development, these features, i.e., the
natural / national capabilities of Turkish nation, constituted the main
instruments alongside positive sciences. The underlying basis of this
rhetoric is structured by the premises of the theory of hereditary national
character. It reflects the discourse of the league of "superior nation",
apparently well beyond the limits of defensive mood of self-confidence. It
tends more to the theme of comparative national supremacy. 100
Atatürk's embracing of the theory of national character has
sociobiological connotations in that he is of the opinion that social
attributes may genetically be inherited:
The programme pursued by our party is etatist from the economic 
viewpoint. Because our nation is etatist by birth, she considers
97"Türk Yazı İnkılabı Hakkında Konuşma" (Speech About Turkish 
Alphabet Change),Söylev ve Demeçler II, 9/10 August 1928, 273.
98Ibid., 274.
""O nuncu Yıl Nutku" (The Tenth Year Speech), Söylev ve 
Demeçler II, 29 August 1933, 318.
100Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: 
Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku (The Official Sources 
of Political Culture in Turkey: Kemalist One Party Ideology and the Six 
Arrows of RPP), vol.3 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 172-174. "The 
forgotten great civic capability of the Turks" is a key conception of 
Kemalist modernisation project.
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addressing her demands to the state as a right. In this regard, there 
is a full correspondence between natural dispositions of our nation 
and the programme of our party.101
A famous pan-Turkist, and later, an important Kemalist figure, 
Tekin Alp, considers the existence of the national character as a reality 
and views it as the differentiator of nations from one another: "Like the 
hair colour of bland or dark nations, all nations possess certain peculiar 
attributes the differentiating role of which cannot be denied, and it can be 
comprehend by everybody."102 According to him, " the national spirit (...) 
is more than the genius, the essence, even the culture of a nation. It 
cannot be touched by hands and cannot be explained with our present 
experience and knowledge. It is a thing which exists in the blood, or more 
correctly, in race."103
The consideration of the existence of the national spirit as a 
genuine entity does not amount to the level of adopting racism, however. 
One may believe in the existence of the national spirit without 
acknowledging racial determinism.104 The embracement of culture as the 
main determiner of nationality in Kemalist ideology, on the other hand, 
does not mean that a Turkish national spirit extending back to the Oğuz, 
considered to be the legendary Adam of the Turks, times does not exist. 
National spirit exists in the blood, and as long as it is not adulterated 
wholly, the remainings of the lives of fathers survive with it. But its
101"Izmir'de Fırka Kongresinde Konuşma" (Speech in the Party 
Congress in İzmir), Söylev ve Demeçler II, 27 January 1931, 295.
102Tekin Alp, Türk Ruhu (Turkish Spirit) (Istanbul: Remzi
Kitabevi, 1944), 14.
103Ibid., 25.
104Ibid., 25-26.
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manifestations change in accordance with the impacts of environment, 
culture and education. 105
National spirit as a transcendental and instinctive entity 
crystallised over centuries expresses hereditary tendencies outside the 
will. The instinctive aspect independent of time, environment and 
education is the main dimension of Turkish national spirit. 106 To Tekin 
Alp, "although the new nationalism of Turkey is not a full reflection of 
the spirit of the fathers, it is an undoubted fact that nationalism as 
understood by Kemalism corresponds to the unconscious nationalism of 
the old Turks, which prescribed authority, discipline, and law and order 
(tore and yasa) as the leading instinctive tendencies, the epitomisation of 
which being the god-chief as the national symbol. 107 This atavism is well
105Ibid., 27.
106Ibid., 28-29.
107According to Tekin Alp, dynamism, self-sacrifice, heroism, 
respect to tradition, and the blood circulating in the veins are other 
hereditary Turkic features See ibid., 282-283. Türk Tarihinin Ana 
Hatları, ( The Main Lines of Turkish History), the book which expressed 
the Turkish history thesis for the first time, states that "Turks do not like 
disorder; they want to establish law and order instead." See Ersanli-Behar, 
İktidar ve Tarih, 105. According to the authors of the book , including 
Afet (İnan), "The Turkish nation has revealed and shown her power and 
capability for civilisationism and etatism for the past 50-60 centuries." 
Ibid., 106. Arsal gives us a "more complete" list of Turkic features: the 
power of obedience and command, power of security, feeling of legality 
and justice. According to him, the power of race to form state is the 
manifestation of a characteristic spiritual feature of Turkish individual. 
See Prof. Sadri Maksudi Arsal, "Beşeriyet Tarihinde Devlet ve Hukuk 
Mefhumu ve Müesseselerinin İnkişafında Türk Irkının Rolü"(The Role 
of Turkish Race in the Development of the Concepts and Institutions of 
State and Law in Human History), İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin 
Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Yayınları, 1943), 1078. For another official opinion considering the state 
formation as the natural capability of Turks, see Şemsettin Günaltay, 
Tarih I (History I) (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti Yayınları, 1939), 29. The most 
passionate emphasis of this point with sociobiological implications is 
made by Karaosmanoğlu: "To form states is one of the most national
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reflected in Mustafa Kemal's titles of "Atatürk," (Father of Turks) 
"Bozkurt," (Grey Wolf) and "Başbuğ" (Chief).
This conception of the national character theory led Atatürk to 
adopt the cultural continuity approach in his understanding of history in 
which he assumes that Turks inherited the attribute of state forming 
from their grand fathers. As a result, Turkish history is conceived as the 
cultural pattern of the Turkish national character. This sociobiological 
approach, i.e., geneaological method of inquiring history assumes to 
explain the present through the past.108
6. 6. K em alist R acialism /Ethnicism  and "O utside Influ en ces"
Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk emphasises the uniqueness of Kemalist 
ideology by emphasising its distance to democracy, socialism and other 
ideologies and political systems on the gruond that "We resemble 
ourselves!"109 Nevertheless, Kemalist nationalism is the product of the
functions of Turks. Just as termites builds their nest, bees make their 
beehive, so Turks establish state. This peculiarity of them is a God-given 
faculty, a second nature, an instinct." See Karaosmanoğlu, Atatürk: Bir 
Tahlil Denemesi, 69. For the ascription of the perceived attributes of the 
national character to the blood by İsmet İnönü, then the President, see 
"İsmet İnönü'nün Siyasal Bilgiler Okulunun 84'üncü Yıldönümü 
Münasebetiyle Siyasal Bilgiler Okulunda Yapılan Kutlama Töreninde 
Mülkiyelilere Yaptığı Konuşma," in Kadri Kemal Kop, comp., Milli Şefin 
Söylev Demeç ve Mesajları (The Speeches, Statements and Messages of 
the National Chief) (Ankara: Akay Kitabevi, 1945), 81. The speech is made 
in 04 December 1940.
108Türkdoğan, Atatürk’te Milli Devlet Anlayışı , 110-111.
109"Bakanlar Kurulunun Görev ve Yetkisini Belirten Kanun Teklifi 
Münasebetiyle" (On the Occasion of the Bill of Law Ascertaining the Duty and 
Power of the Council of Ministers), 1 December 1921, Söylev ve Demeçler I , 
212. Parla describes the Kemalist ideology as a corporatism located between 
solidarism and Fascism. See Taha Parla, Kemalizm, Ziya Gökalp ve 
Türkiye'de Korporatizm (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989), 123. Kışlalı points 
to the fact that the Kemalist principles of laicism, nationalism and 
republicanism were borrowed from the 1789 French Revolution while the
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post-war political environment. It emerged in the cannibalistic period of 
imperialism. It took the advantage of refraction within the blocks of 
imperialism: Germany, USSR vs France and Britain. Making use of the 
conflict between Soviet socialism and British capitalism, Kemalists 
registered a success in the game of shifting alliances through isolating the 
French and Italians from the British during the National Struggle and by 
getting political and economic support of the Soviets.110
Kemalist nationalism was part of the process of the breakdown of 
the multinational empires and the emergence of nation states in Europe.
As one of the nationalist movements appeared after the First World War 
political geography of Europe composed of nearly entirely nation states, 
Kemalist nationalism could best be understood in relation to Italian and 
German nationalisms due to their common integral characters.
In the 1930s, the authoritarian Kemalist regime became well 
established. In the period 1933-1939 the RPP declared itself as the party of 
the state. All manifestations of opposition of every kind were suppressed.
The 1937 constitutional amendments made the RPP's six arrows the 
underlying principles of the state. Although the traditional character of 
state-society relations, i.e., the elitist and paternalist grasp of society by 
state obtained in the Ottoman Empire continued, the Kemalist regime 
tried to give the image of being the architect of a radical transformation 
by qualifying the regime as based on national sovereignty.111
principles of Populism, revolutionarism and etatism were inspired by the 1917 
Bolshevik Revolution. Thus Kemalism in fact is a synthesis of liberalism and 
socialism. See Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz 
Hafifliği (The Unbearable Lightness of Attacking Atatürk), 10th ed. (Ankara: 
İmge Kitabevi, 1996), 228-29.
110Baskın Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği. Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir 
İnceleme (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology)
(Ankara: Dost Kitabevi,1988), 15.
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The nationalisms of Nazi and Fascist regimes formed a source of 
legitimacy for the one party regime. 112 The article 50 of the RPP's 1935 
programme is the expression of the admiration for the Nazi political 
organisation:
The Turkish youth will be attached to a national organisation 
which would gathered it around a clean morality, an high love of 
homeland and revolution The branches of the youth 
organization, which will be created, in universities, schools, 
institutes, People's Houses, factories and organisations that use 
workers in aggregate and working and administration unions in 
accordance with above-mentioned purposes will be organised.
The continuity would be taken into account in the physical and 
revolutionary education and sport affairs in the country. 113
During the 1930s, the Republican elites combined conflicting
attitudes in themselves: they adhered both the nineteenth century
conception of naive positivism and German mysticism and state
fetishism. Kohn states that Turkish nationalism as such assumed a fascist
character, and by relieving itself from the constraints of parliament and
democracy adopted itself to the course of European nation states. 114
State capitalism instead of economic liberalism and an
homogenising, authoritarian political regime instead of accomodationist
political liberalism were the two key features of Nazism-Fascism adapted
also by Kemalist nationalism, especially in the 1930s, which explains the
m Ersanli-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 161-163.
112Recep Peker's inkılap Tarihi Ders Notları (Lecture Notes of 
Renovation History) (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1935); Tekin Alp’s 
Kemalism (Istanbul, 1936); Şeref Aykut's Kâmalizm (Kemalism)(Istanbul,
1936) and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's Atatürk İhtilali (Atatürk Revolution) 
(Istanbul, 1940) are inspired, to varying degrees, by Italian and German 
nationalisms of 1930s.
l l3 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı (The Programme of the 
Republican People’s Party) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935).
114Hans Kohn,Türk M illiyetçiliği, trans. (Istanbul: Hilmi 
Kitabevi,1944), 76.
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well-known mottoes of the. period, such as "one state," "one nation,"
"one culture," "one leader," "one doctrine," and "one party." Kemalist
nationalism therefore was not born into an empty space. As Karpat
points out, the Republican People's Party (RPP)'s conception of social
organisation was shaped under the influence of National Socialism. 115 A
parallel observation is put forward by a leading ideologue of the
Kemalism, Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt):
A contemporary German historian suggests that 'national 
socialism and fascism are not things other than slightly different 
versions of the regime introduced by Mustafa Kemal,’ which is 
true.116
Likewise, in terms of political history, Kemalist nationalism 
belongs to the group of revisionist states "unjustly treated" in their peace 
treaties after the First World War by the victorious allied powers. 
Nevertheless, there are important points of differentiation between 
Kemalist nationalism, Nazism and Fascism. In the first place, Kemalist 
state is the first national state emerged from a multinational empire that 
was not irredentist. It has evolved as an anti-imperialist nationalism 
contrary to other post-war nationalisms of imperialist type.
Unlike other nationalist regimes of bourgeois dictatorships, 
Kemalist nationalism aimed at nationhood through preventing the 
formation of a class-based society. Although it is a bourgeois revolution 
like other European nationalist regimes, it kept the bourgeoisie under
115Kemal Karpat,Türk Demokrasi Tarihi (History of Turkish 
Democracy) (Istanbul: Afa Yayınlan, 1996), 265.
116Bozkurt. Atatürk İhtilali , 137. In the opening ceremony of the 
central building of Türk Ocakları (the Turkish Hearts), Hamdullah 
Suphi Tanrıöver, the president of the Turkish Hearts, emphasised the 
degree of the resemblance between Turkish revolution, i.e., Kemalism, 
and fascism before a "distinguished" audience including the Speaker of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, ministers, deputies and 
ambassadors. See Türk Yurdu , 4-24:29-223(May 1930), 10; cited by Oran, 
Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, 16.
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the supervision of state intellectuals. The fact that it did not resort to the 
paramilitary means is another point of distinction. The control of the 
party in power by the state rather than vice versa makes Kemalism 
different, particularly from Nazism.117
6. 7. Ideologues of Ethnicist C onception of K em alist N ation alism
The Turkish Revolution is defined by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a 
revolution which destroyed the institutions responsible for the Turkish 
nation to remain backward in the last centuries and to replace them with 
the new ones, which would secure the progress of the nation in 
accordance with the highest requirements of civilisation. According to 
him, the revolution is made through making the nation and social 
environment ready for it. The point to be noticed in revolutionary 
movement is to have human societies to embrace the novelties 
introduced after diagnosing their aspirations and ideas.118 He calls the 
1922-38 period as the Turkish Revolution.119 In what follows, I am going 
to discern the racial character of the Kemalist revolution through the 
observations of its leading ideologues alongside the "chief ideologue",
117For an overall evaluation of the similarities and differences in 
theory and rhetoric as well as legal-institutional changes between 
Kemalist nationalism and Nazism-Fascism see Oran, Ata t ür k  
M illiyetçiliği, 16-19. Also see Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: The 
Nature of the Ethnonational Bond," in W alker Connor, 
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 196-209. The comparison of Mussolini's approach 
to ethnic plurality with that of Atatürk might be particularly interesting.
118Afet İnan, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım (What I
Have Written Down From M. Kemal Atatürk) (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1971), 35.
119Ibid, 119.
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Atatürk, namely Recep Peker, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Afet înan and Vasfi 
Raşid Seviğ.
In order to explain and indoctrinate the educated elites with the 
revolutionary teaching, Courses o f Renovation History were introduced 
in the Istanbul and Ankara Universities in 1934. The courses were 
composed of four headings: 1. T he m ilitary  and in ternal (dom estic) asp ect 
o f th e revolu tio n : The lecturer of this aspect was Recep Peker, then the 
Secretary General of the RPP, presented as "one of the leading figures of 
the Ghazi's Revolution."120 The course notes of Recep Peker was later 
published in 1935 under the title of ”inkılap Dersleri".121 In these notes, 
Peker emphasised the purity of blood and race as an element of 
nationality; 2. T he leg al asp ect o f the rev o lu tio n : The lecturer was 
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt. The substantial portion of the legal aspect of the 
revolution had occurred during his Ministry of Justice. The course notes 
of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, which dealt with the legal aspect öf the Turkish 
Renovation was published in 1940 with the title of "Atatürk İhtilali"122 
In these notes Bozkurt emerges as a ardent proponent of biological 
racism; 3. T he foreign  affairs aspect o f the revolution : The Lecturer was 
Hikmet Bayur, then the Ministry of Education which had spent long 
times in the Diplomatic Mission of the revolution; 4. T h e  eco n o m ic  
asp ect of the revolution : The lecturer was Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, who 
had a strong affinity with the economic aspect of the revolution. The aim
120Ayın Tarihi (History of the Month), 4(April 1934), 71.
121See Recep Peker, İnkılap Dersleri (The Renovation Lectures) 
(Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1935. Reprint. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1984).
122See Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali.
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was to explore one of the greatest events of the history, the Turkish 
renovation.123
Afet İnan, the third figure that I will study, is an historian and the 
most important contributor to the Turkish History Thesis.124 She is the 
adapted child of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and one of the closest people to 
him and his ideas. She conducted a field research on the anthropological 
character of Turkish people with the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal 
and the support of State Statistics Institute. That is, she may be considered 
the most authentic source as regards the views of Mustafa Kemal.
Lastly, Vasfi Raşid Seviğ is chosen because he is the least noticed but 
one of the most important observer of Kemalist nationalism as a scholar 
of law His Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Hukuku (The Constitutional Law) 
composed of lecture notes given in the High Institute of Police, reflects a 
striking evaluation and manifestation of the racial/ethnicist aspect of 
Kemalist nationalism.
The above-mentioned four political-academic people here would be 
taken as contributors to the racial/ethnic view of Kemalist nationalism.
123Ibid.
124Aktar's claim that Afet İnan’s studies did not make an 
important contribution to the formation of the Turkish History Thesis is 
not a fair and "correct" judgement in that Inan is the main figure together 
with Atatürk in the first formulation of the basic premise of the Turkish 
History Thesis. The scientific value of her studies is not the issue of my 
consideration because the theory in question itself is a pseudo-scientific 
one. For Aktar's view, see Ayhan Aktar, "Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını 
'Doğru' Yorumlamak"(To Interpret the Thrace Jewish Incidents 
'Correctly') Tarih ve Toplum, 155(November 1996), 56, footnote 33.
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6.7.1. Recep Peker (1888-1950)125
Recep Peker held the office of the Secretary General of the 
Republican People's Party during the period of 1931-1936, one of the most 
important posts of the one-party regime. As such, he was empowered to 
speak on behalf of the permanent chief of the party, i.e., Mustafa 
K em al.126 He was one of the leading ideologues of the RPP and 
Kemalism, and the third member of the G enbaşkur,127the Body of 
General Presidency together with Atatürk, permanent chief, and vice 
president, İsmet İnönü, the top decision making organ of the RPP, during
125As an Ottoman officer, Peker participated in the First World War 
and the War of Independence. His first official duty was the Secretary 
General of Turkish Grand National Assembly(TGNA). He was elected as 
deputy from Kütahya in the second legislative period of TGNA and was 
appointed as the Secretary General of the RPP. He was the Ministry of 
Interior in the cabinet of Fethi Okyar. He condemned the "soft" attitude of 
the Okyar's government toward the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) and 
resigned. Subsequently, he became minister in various ministries. When 
he became the Secretary General of the RPP for the third time (1931-1936), 
he attempted to reorganise the party. He advocated the party-state identity 
and ensured the principles of revolutionarism and etatism to enter the 
RPP programme. He had a pioneering role in the introduction of the 
courses of History of Kemalist Renovation in universities and military 
schools. He became prime minister in 1946 but had to resign upon the 
reaction of the opposition (DP) and a group from his party due to his 
harsh way of governance. He died in 1950. For Peker, see Tunçay, Tek 
Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 318-322.
126The second article of the 1931 RPP Regulation reads: "The 
permanent general chief of the Republican People's Party is Gazi Mustafa 
Kemal Hazretleri, the founder of the Party." And the article 23 states that 
"The Secretary General fulfils his duty on behalf of the general chief." See 
CHF Nizamnamesi ve Programı (The Regulation and Programme of the 
Republican People's Party) (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1931), 3.
127For the Body of General Presidency see Tunçay, Tek Parti 
Yönetiminin Kurulması, 429-446. As stated above, according to the art. 23 
of Party Regulation, the Secretary General fulfils his duty on behalf of the 
General President. Art. 22 points out that the decisions of the Body of 
General Presidency (Umumi Reislik Divanı/Genbaşkur) are binding for 
the party members without any reserve and condition. See ibid., 431.
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this period. He was the chief spokesman for the 1931 and 1935 party 
programmes, and a loyal representative of Kemalism. According to Parla, 
just as there can be no difference between Atatürk's views and RPP's 
programmes, so there can be no difference between Peker's program 
explanations and the letter of the ideology espoused in the RPP's 
programmes.128
Peker identifies three types of nationalism:
1. T e rrito ria l N atio n alism : This type of nationalism, the graphic 
example of which being French nationalism, is inclusive of all citizens 
equal to one another. Nationality is identified with citizenship. History, 
race and blood are not included among the factors determining 
nationality.129
2. R ace an d  B lo o d  N atio n alism : It is racist and irredentist. The 
graphic example is Nazi Germany. Racist nationalism does not accept to 
recognise the same rights, dignity and culture for the minorities who are 
not from the same blood. No one can be German unless he/she carries 
German blood.130
3. A n tisem itism : It is related to some extent to blood nationalism.131
In his explanation of the principle of nationalism as embodied in the
1931 RPP programme, Peker refers to nationalism as the most important 
mainstay of Turkey for progress and permanence and lends emphasis to 
its humanitarian, co-operative face by rejecting national ego-centrism. 
Although internationally- oriented movements, particularly
128Parla, Kemalist Tek Parti, 150.
129Peker, İnkılap Dersleri, 73.
130Ibid., 74.
131 Ibid.
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communism, were definitely rejected, this was only for the preservation 
of the special identity of the nation. The insertion of the principle of 
nationalism into the part concerning workers reflects this avoidance. The 
emphasis put on indoctrination through national history relates to the 
same purpose.132
According to Peker, as embodied in the definition of nationalism 
adopted in the programme, Turkish nationalism is politico-legal and 
absolutely territorial. Outside Turks only is a matter of affectional interest 
for us. The kinship of blood and history that we share with them is 
outside the scope of our political concerns, because our nationalism 
covers only people who share the same political destiny. By referring to 
unity in language, culture and ideal in the definition, Peker points out 
that unity in culture expresses attachment to a common past and sharing 
rich and common memoirs of history. In addition, to have a sincere will 
and desire for living together form the aspects of ideal.133
When this definition applied to the present state of Turkish nation, 
Peker notes that he considers those citizens who have become subject to 
such inculcations as Kurd, Cirsassian, even Laze and Pomak, included 
within the socio-political community of Turkish nation. He views this 
state as a remnant of thé past periods of dark oppression, and a 
consequence of long historical transformations. It is the duty of the party 
and state to settle this state of affairs from the viewpoint of the idea of 
pure nationality because the scientific facts of the day indicated that 
communities of five-ten thousands, a few hundred thousands, and even
132Recep Peker, CHF Programının İzahı Mevzuu Üzerinde Bir 
Konferans (A Conference on the Explanation of the RPP's Programme)
(Ankara: Hakimiyet-i Milliye Matbaası, 1931); quoted by Parla, Kemalist 
Tek Parti, 107.
133Ibid, 108.
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one million cannot form a separate nationality. This is the renown liberal 
criterion of "national viability" which was a dominant idea in the second 
half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth 
century.134
In his views as to other groups who have different ethnic origins 
(Kurds, Circassian, Laze, Pomak) Peker makes his ethnic understanding of 
nation and nationalism apparent. While politico-legal rights are 
recognised, differences of ethnic origin and hence ethnocultural plurality 
are rejected. In the first place, these appellations were considered as 
outside indoctrinations and therefore do not have any reality and 
legitimacy. As a matter of fact the definition of national culture leaves no 
space for ethnocultural differences because it espouses a monolithic 
identity of nation-people-culture-ethnie, which turns Turkish cultural 
nationalism into an exclusionary-monist ethnic Turkish nationalism. 
That is, hegemonic understanding of ethnic culture based on absolute 
unity and oneness prevails over the understanding of unity in variety.135
As to the Christian and Jewish citizens, Peker points out that 
provided that they participate in the unity in language and ideal, the RPP 
would consider them as wholly Turkish. Thus, the RPP rejects both the 
policy of umma as well as the mentality of reaya. He also adds that this 
understanding is not the same with the artificial manifestations of 
citizenship in the last years of the constitutional period. That is, it is not 
limited only to citizenship in legal sense.136This statement is in fact the 
clear testimony of the wide discrepancy observed in the Kemalist era
134Ibid, 110.
135Parla, Kemalist Tek "Parti, 119-120.
136Ibid.
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between what is said and what is done. As made apparent before, the 
Turkishness of non-Muslim minorities was limited to Turkishness in 
citizenship, i.e., "kanun-ı esasi Türklüğü" as they call it.
Nationalism forms the spirit of the programme, and diffuses to its 
every part from instruction and education to capital and labour. It 
constitutes a total ideology for the RPP.137 This understanding of 
nationalism as embodied in 1931 RPP programme and explained by Recep 
Peker seems to be wholly assimilationist, strictly territorial and against 
autarchy and chauvinism.
In his explanation of the principle of nationalism as embodied in 
1935 RPP's programme, Peker dwells upon the necessity of turning 
nationalism into a principle of state not only that of party. Just as a non­
republican Turkey cannot be conceived, so a non-nationalist Turkey 
cannot be thought. They are equally important for the security of the 
progressive way of life. He emphasises the integrative character of 
nationalism for Turkey against the insult of such ideologies as anarchism, 
Marxism, fascism, caliphatism and internationalism. The nationalist key 
to close the gates of Turkey to such ideologies and movements in order to 
protect the people of Turkey must be embraced by the state as well as the 
party. The nationalism for Peker must be the faith of both the party and 
the state.138
137Ibid, 111.
138CHP Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker'in Söylevleri (The Speeches of 
the Secretary General of the RPP Recep Peker) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 
1935), 10; From the explanations of Peker's 1935 programme one can 
readily conclude that Kemalism was authoritarian in the sense of 
dominating the realm of politics and totalitarian in the sense of 
oppressively intervening in all social realms epitomised in the 
conception of "state as organised nation." "To be organised nationally," 
alongside state organisations, with the aim of strengthening the internal 
integrity, to be in the vicinity of the state in order to support it are the
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According to Peker, "the bases of the regime of the nationalist
Turkey have assumed the state of dogma in the programme of the
Republican People's Party."139 Peker does not clarify the origin of the
principle of the Kemalist transformation defined by "renovation" and
"independence" He refuses the Ottoman past and refers to Turkish
history only by making reference to the "highness of Turkish nation in
her blood" Thus he suggesis an ahistorical nationalism. The paradoxical
attitude of Peker -which seems not to attest importance to blood
nationalism while continuously emphasising the purity and highness of
the blood of Turkish nation makes apparent that he considers the blood
unity as an important element in the formation of nation. To him,
within the stagnation in the last period of the Ottoman Empire,
...only one thing, the Turkish blood has remained clean among all 
those troubles. The western Turks have protected and maintained 
the purity of their blood within that debris. The highness of the 
Ottoman army which showed the world the example of brevity, 
despite the badness of the state administration, stemmed from the
main motifs emphasised by Peker. See Peker, CHP Genel Sekreteri Recep 
Peker'in Söylevleri , 18-19. The deification of Atatürk, -see for example 
the written document of respect to the "Great Chief" accepted at the end 
of the Third General Congress of the RPP in CHF Üçüncü Büyük Kongre 
Zabıtları (10-18 May 1931) (The Minutes of the Third General Congress 
of the Republican People's Party) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 283- 
284; the consideration of the elimination of socio-political, ideological 
and economic opposition as a national mission,-see Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar 
ve Tarih, 91; one party regime as the special form of political party system 
adopted to dictatorship- see Maurice Duverger, Siyasi Partiler (Political 
Parties), trans. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974), 335; the conception of one 
party embracing all citizens within its cadre, either as a member or 
potential member,- see "Konya'da Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkasında Bir 
Konuşma"(A Speech in Konya at the Republican People’s Party), Söylev 
ve Demeçler II, 28 February 1931, 303; are all apparent manifestations of 
the totalitarian character of the Kemalist one party regime. 
Karaosmanoğlu well admits this: "Turkish Republic is a dynamic and 
totalitarian regime in spirit." See Karaosmanoğlu, Atatürk :Bir Tahlil 
Denemesi, 77.
!39peker, İnkılap Dersleri, 73.
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highness in the blood of the "bay " (rich) Turkish nation which 
created these armies.140
Among the factors that differentiate the English Revolution from 
the French one, Peker cites "the difference of blood between the two 
nations," among others.141 Likewise he cites the "condition of blood," 
among others, as a determining factor which could explain the rise of the 
Turkish nation out of the debris of the Ottoman Empire.142
In his article entitled "Ulusla§ma-Devletle§me,"(Nation and State
Build ing)143 which appeared in the German magazine Europischer
Revue with the title of "Volke und Stat Werdung", he observes that
I want the blood nationalism to leave aside. It is not necessary to be 
pro or against racist-irredentist nationalism in order to write what I 
want to say. Active and passive irredentism manifesting itself in 
the form of expansionism outside and purification inside is a 
matter of daily politics. The real question is the togetherness and 
integrity of those living within a frontier. We have swept out all 
essential elements breaking this togetherness in Turkey and 
removed them from our life out together with the type of state that 
had given birth to them. 144
In this respect, "the boundaries of the conception of religion cannot 
exceed the skin of the body of citizens". Similarly, "class conflicts and class 
privileges are rejected" As regards the nation, he repeats the definition of 
the RPP programme and adds:
We consider the national integrity in the new sense as to be one 
and powerful from within... In order to secure this, we attest an
140Ibid., 16.
141Ibid., 31.
142Ibid., 56.
143See Recep Peker, "Ulusla§ma-Devletle§me" (State-Building-
Nation-Building), Cumhuriyet, 4-5 July 1936. The excepts are taken from 
the part appeared in 4 July. In the time of the writing of the article Peker 
was no longer the Secretary General of the RPP.
144Ibid.
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essential place and importance to the racial quality, and especially 
to having dealt successfully with big difficulties in history, though 
educative and methodical working have an important role to 
play.145
During the floor debates over the bill introducing the RPP's six 
arrows into the constitution, Peker again mentions active and passive 
manifestations of race/blood nationalism and differentiates Kemalist 
nationalism from it and other types of nationalism as it is defined in the 
principles of the RPP, which rejects all internationalist movements, be it 
communism or Nazism.146 Peker’s hesitative attitude as regards blood 
nationalism well reflects the shy racialism of Kemalist nationalism. They 
reject racism on the one hand, but fail to decline to make references to 
racial elements in the construction of Turkish national identity, on the 
other.
6. 7. 2. Mahmut Esat Bozkurttt892-1943)l47
While Atatürk was alive, there emerged a need for an ideological 
doctrine, however pragmatic it might be. For that purpose, an "İnkılap 
Enstitüsü" (Institute of Renovation) was set up the duty of which was to
145 Ibid.
146TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period V, vol. 16, 66; also see Goloğlu, 
Tek Partili Cumhuriyet (1931-38) , 215.
147Mahmut Esat is a doctor of Law. He joined the National Struggle 
in the Kuşadası-Selçuk region and at the same time published fervent 
articles in the Ankara newspapers, particularly the official "Hakimiyet-i 
Milliye" (National Sovereignty). He became the deputy of Izmir in the 
First National Assembly. He was appointed as the Ministry of Economics 
at his very young age and assumed the post of Ministry of Justice in the 
second legislative period (1924). He had a pioneering place among those 
who contributed to the establishment of a new legal order. He was 
professor of law in Ankara Law Faculty and of History of Renovation in 
Istanbul University. He died in 21 December 1943. See "Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt," Türk Ansiklopedisi, vol. 8 (Ankara: Maarif Basımevi, 1956), 10.
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make a doctrinaire formulation of Kemalism.148 Mahmut Esat Bozkurt 
was one of these formulators of doctrinaire Kemalism His book 
"Atatürk İhtilali," (The Atatürk Revolution) is compiled from his 
lectures given upon the directive of Atatürk in this Institute. It is the first 
attempt to systematise Kemalism.
Atatürk İhtilali is particularly important in terms of the fact that 
the ideas embodied in the book were being approved by Atatürk.149 
According to Bozkurt, the doctrine of Kemalism is being formed through 
the reception of the best aspects of all doctrines. The centre of the gravity 
of this doctrine is National Socialism.150 He does not consider Kemalism 
as a frozen, static doctrine, however. As Tanyol points out, Bozkurt is the 
first theoretician of Kemalism in this sense.151
According to Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the regular visitors of
Atatürk's Çankaya Dining Table {Sofra) and long-time Minister of Justice
and professor of the History of Turkish Renovation,
If a revolution is done on behalf of a nation, it must be done by the 
genuine children of that nation and must remain in their hands. 
For example, the Turkish Revolution must stay in the hands of 
genuine Turks (Öz-Türks) with no reserve and condition.152
This is because "The worst of Turks is better than the best of non- 
Turks. In the past, the ill-fortune of the Ottoman Empire in most cases 
resulted from the fact that it was ruled by non-Turks."153
148 Cahit Tanyol, "The Preface", in Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali, 3.
149Ibid., 4.
150Ibid., 5.
151Ibid., 6.
152Ibid., 215.
153Ibid., 216.
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By referring to the efforts of Bekir Sami (Kunduh) for a Circassian 
state in the Caucasia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ankara 
Government during the War of Indepence as the representative of 
Ankara government in London Conference, Bozkurt asserts that, "we 
have to build Turkish independence. We must not refer the affairs of 
Turkish state to non-Turks. Only genuine Turks should manage the 
affairs of Turkish state."154 "We would not trust in anyone other than 
Turks."155
When he addressed his voters in Ödemiş in 1931, he explained why
he is a member of the RPP by pointing out that
I am from the Republican People's Party. Because this party restored 
the position of Turkish nation, which is in essence "efendi" 
(master), with the things it has done so far. My idea and opinion is 
this, which both the friend and the enemy should listen to: The 
master of this country is Turks. The non-Turks have only one right 
in the Turkish homeland, which is to be servant, to be slave. We 
are in the most free country in the world. They call it Turkey.156
Thus those who are not genuine Turks are implied to be Turks in 
citizenship only. Genuine Turks are considered to be Turks in language, 
culture, ideal and blood.
The term " Öz-Türk" (genuine Turk) is adopted by Atatürk too. In his 
speech to the artisans in Adana, for example, he elaborated the historical 
evolution of the Turkic character of Adana region and emphasised that 
the Turks are the "sahib-i aslî" (original owners) of this region. 
Therefore, he declared, "Armenians and so on, have no right over there. 
These fertile lands are the country of genuine Turks (koyu ve öz Türk 
m em leketi)."157
154Ibid., 353.
155Ibid., 354.
156See "Mahmut Esat Bey'in ödemiş Nutku" (The Ödemiş Speech 
of Mahmut Esat Bey), Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 19 September 1930, 3.
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The racial elements in the discourse of Atatürk may have not 
negatively influenced the foreign policy of Turkey. As it is seen, to be 
Turkish in the Republican Turkey incorporated Turkish ethnic 
hegemony and homogeneity around ethnic Turkishness and the motif of 
the real owner of the country (unsur-u aslî, sahib-i aslt). This speech is the 
clear indication of the fact that only genuine Turks could make use of the 
blessings of this land, and others could do so only when they were 
assimilated into Turkishness. in terms of language, culture and ideal.
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's opinion as regards the genuine Turkishness 
makes this hidden, racial/ethnic aspect of Kemalist nationalism apparent 
and certain. It is true that anti-semitism or a similar ideology or politics 
never dominated the Republican Turkey in official terms. Equally true is, 
however, that the decrease in the Christian population and the wave of 
the "Kurdish uprisings" were closely related with the exclusionary face of 
Kemalist nationalism in internal politics in ethnic terms. Despite 
exceptions which were connected with the party, state and capital, 
minorities were always seen as foreign elements not from us, and as 
"restricted citizens."157 58
The use of the term "öz-Türk" by Atatürk is not coincidental or 
conjunctural. In 1936, he observes, for example, that "In this moment, the 
leading big question that makes our nation busy for night and day is the 
destiny of Iskenderun-Antakya and its neighbourhoods, the real owners 
of which are genuine Turks (öz-Turk).”159
157"Adana Esnaflariyle Konuşma"(Talk with Adana Artisans), 
Söylev ve Demeçler II, 16 March 1923, 130. According to Mustafa Kemal, 
"This land was Turk in history, is Turk now, and would eternally 
remain so." Ibid. The fact that this speech was made in the predominantly 
religious period of the Kemalist nationalism shows that in different 
periods, different elements got predominantly determinant position 
while simultaneously involving other elements in secondary positions. 
In this regard, this study has a purely historical approach to the nature of 
Kemalist nationalism.
158Parla, Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi, 207-209.
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In his comparison of Kemalism with German National Socialism, 
Bozkurt argues that both are nationalist but German Nazism is racist 
while Kemalism is not racist. "Nevertheless" he asserts, "Atatürk said in 
his great Speech that 'do not believe in anyone other than the ones who 
carry your blood.' But this advice emerged in practice as unity in culture 
and language."159 60 In addition, National Socialism is imperialist while 
Kemalist regime considers such tendencies as crime.161 For the Turkish 
revolution recognises the right of independence for all nations, and 
accept the principle of national self-determination.162 The nationalism of 
Kemalism prescribes the priority of Turkish nation to every thing. Islamic 
and humanitarian concerns could only follow the national concerns 
behind.163
Last but not the least, according to Bozkurt, national socialism and 
fascism are the revised versions of the Kemalist regime.164 Because, 
"Kemalism is an authoritarian democracy the roots of which lie in the 
people. The Turkish nation resembles a pyramid. At the bottom there is 
people, at the top a head springing from the people, which we call chief. 
The chief takes its authority from people. And democracy is not 
something other than this."165
159"Beşinci Dönem İkinci Toplanma Yılını Açarken" (Opening the 
Second Meeting Year of the Fifth Period), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 1 
November 1936, 410.
160Bczkurt, Atatürk İhtilali, 300.
161Ibid.
162Ibid., 299.
163Ibid., 298.
164Ibid., 137. Yet, Bozkurt rejects, any similarity between Kemalist 
and fascist regimes because "fascism is a backward regime. It is the regime 
of the middle ages." See ibid., 301. This is a clear and sharp contradiction 
because he considers fascism to be a version of Kemalism as well.
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6. 7. 3. Afet İnan (1908-1985f  66
According to Afet İnan, Atatürk did not adopt racism. He always 
avoided to inculcate the theory of superior race. He only wanted to 
identify the factual situation when he demanded the determination of 
the racial attributes of Turkish nation via scientific methods. He 
considered all nations worth of respect. Nevertheless, he had the goal of 
the recognition of the real worth of the nation to which he belongs. This 
policy was called the national policy (milli siyaset).165 67
Taking the question of "what are the morphological and descriptive 
attributes of the present Anatolian people?" as the starting point, in her 
study Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi, 
İnan presents her "findings" as regards the short history of Turkey and 
Turkish race and tries to identify the racial attributes of the Turkish 
nation through anthropological approach. In order to confirm the claim
165Ibid. These observations are clear manifestations of what Parla 
calls the circular logic equating the chief with the nation and the nation 
with the chief, remembering the Rousseau's equation of the general will 
with the will of the "wise legislator" For the concept of circular logic, see 
Taha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün 
Nutuku (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: The Speech 
of Atatürk), vol.l (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991).
166Afet İnan was a professor of history and the adopted child of 
Mustafa Kemal. She was the first member of The Society for the Study of 
Turkish History and the author of pioneering works concerning the 
Turkish History Thesis. Her main concern was to reveal the continuity 
between Anatolian Peoples in racial terms and to prove their Turkishness 
as such. Her pioneering study in this regard was Türkiye Halkının 
Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi (Recherces sur les carateres 
Anthropologiques des population de la Turquie) (1939). Türk Irkının 
Ülkesi Olan Anadolu (The Land of Turkish Race, Dear Anatolia)(1941); 
Atatürk'ten Hatıralar (Memoirs from Atatürk)(1950); Atatürk Hakkında 
Hatıralar ve Belgeler (Memoirs and Documents About Atatürk) are 
among her other studies. See Türk A n sikloped isi (Turkish 
Encyclopaedia), vol. 20 (Ankara: MEB Basımevi, 1972), 121.
167İnan, M. Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım , 112.
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that the Turkish nation is the autoctonous people of Anatolian 
homeland (unsur-u aslî) and its real owner (sahib-i aslî), the 
determination of the racial continuity between peoples inhabiting 
Anatolia under different names throughout history and presently is 
considered to be the principal task.168
This study was conducted upon the directive of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk.169 It was a big field research covering 64.000 subjects in Anatolia 
and Thrace. Every index included 38 registers. In sum, there was 2,432,000 
registers. These indexes were pertaining to the descriptions of height, 
indices of skeleton, head and nose, and attributes related to the shapes of 
skin, hairs, eyes, nose and head profile.
The starting point of Inan’s thesis was to demonstrate that the 
brachisephalic European man, considered to be the founder of the 
European civilisation, came to Europe from Central Asia through the 
route of Anatolia. This man introduced Europe the cultivation of the 
land and domestication of animals in the Neolithic period. The 
provisions and domesticated animals he used show that this 
brachisephalic man who radically transformed Europe came from central- 
western Asia in the beginning of the Neolithic age. Without him, the 
Europe could not pass from the period of nomadic hunting to that of 
farming. This anthropological, morphological and descriptive similarities
168Afet inan, Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve
Türkiye Tarihi: Türk Irkının Vatanı Anadolu (64.000 Kişi Üzerinde 
Anket) [A Study on the Anthropological Characteristics of Turkish 
People and History of Turkey: The Homeland of Turkish Race, 
Anatolia(Survey Covering 64. 000 People)] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1947), preface.
169Ibid., 9.
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between this man and people lived in Anatolia throughout history 
demonstrate that both belong to the brachisephalic Arian race.170
The interest of Atatürk to archaeological and anthropological studies 
aiming to reveal the above-mentioned connection is described by the 
Swiss anthropologue Edward Pittard as follows: "The strong desire of 
Atatürk for better recognition of the origin of the Turkish nation to the 
extent it is possible encouraged the chief of the nation to be involved in 
ethnic and racial questions".171 İnan points out that Atatürk did not 
consider such anthropological studies only from the racial viewpoint, 
however. He also took into consideration the benefit of schools, factories, 
army and sports to be derived from these studies. Thus, for example, 
schoolboys would sit down in classrooms according to their size of 
skeleton, not to the size of their height, and sport teams be organised in 
accordance with anthropological rationality. The military divisions 
would be determined in the form of natural groups to maximise the 
productivity of soldiers through reducing wasted energy.172
The real inspiration behind Inan's this study is her reaction to the 
books of geography and history which considered the Turkish race among 
the yellow race, not because she deemed it inferior but because he did not 
believe it to be true.173 In order to show the high position of the Turkish 
race in the history, with the encouragement of Atatürk and the support of 
the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü (1931) and later Celal Bayar (1937), she
170Ibid., 7-9.
171Ibid., 10.
172Ibid.
173Ibid., 67.
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conducted such a large field survey in 1937.174 According to İnan, "this 
survey is one of the great works of the Atatürk period."175
Hesitating about if race is a physical feature or an attribute ascribed to 
people who have a common culture and language in her paper submitted 
in the First Turkish History Congress,176 İnan later concluded that a race 
is a human grouping came into existence with the overlapping of 
physical similarities and blood unity.177 Every man is under the impact of 
his distant grandfathers, i.e., his race, not only the hereditary influence of 
his parents. Human societies live under the guidance of their racial 
characters. Racial attributes denote the hereditary attributes in an human 
society. Nevertheless, customs and spiritual factors constitute the essence 
of a nation. It is this national spirit and unity that demonstrate the racial 
attributes during the course of history. A man is under the impact of 
certain ideas and feelings while he was born. This means the 
crystallisation of the spiritual power of that society. This state, although 
invisible, is in fact a powerful force guiding and governing that human 
group. Therefore, the study of psychological factors and the determination 
of anthropological characters which constitute the racial power make the 
positive explanations of civilisations in history possible, through 
examining the indexes of racial attributes over living and past skeletons, 
which İnan tried to do.178
174Ibid., 69.
175Ibid., 78.
176Afet (İnan), "Tarihten Evvel ve Tarih Fecrinde" (In Pre-History 
and Dawn of History), 40-41.
177Ibid., 62.
178Ibid., 61.
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In her survey, İnan tries to delineate by way of measurement and 
observation under which political names and what kind of cultures 
people inhabiting Anatolia has lived. Her conclusion is that the Turkish 
homeland was inhabited by a people coming from Central Asia in 
various periods and embracing the same racial attributes since the Bronze 
Age. The political appellations changed but the ethnic character, with 
minor differences, most of time remained the same.179 The richness of 
historical monuments inherited from the grandfathers attest to the high 
position of ancestors in the field of civilisation.
The historical continuity in racial terms between peoples inhabiting 
Anatolia throughout history and in the present refers to the racial unity 
of Anatolia. Therefore such names as Kurd or Laze are used in İnan's 
study as denoting two Turkish tribal ethnies rather than referring to the 
existence of non-Turkish ethnies. Because it is assumed that there is 
complete racial unity in Turkey.180
The racial attributes of the Turks are summarised by İnan as follows: 
Their height is longer than the average. They belong to the group of 
macro skeleton mostly. Majority is brachyseplatic and leptorrhinien. 
Their colours of eyes and hair are generally medium. The great majority 
as Turks belong to the white European race called Homo-Alpinus.181
179Ib;d., 56. Thus such ethnies as Hittites, Phirygians, Persians, 
Romans, Greeks, Seljukis and Ottomans inhabiting Anatolia in 
successive periods were all considered as Turkic peoples, separated from 
one another due to various political, economical and social reasons. 
According to inan, this point, i.e., the fact that all these ethnies belong to 
the same race is very important because, by quoting Camille Jullien, "the 
question of race, however it is resolved, is the most important question of 
the history of nations." See ibid., 58.
180Ibid., 181.
181For the racial attributes of Turks see inan, ibid., 178-86.
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The percentage of the brachysephalic types is the highest in the 
Central Anatolia and least in the Eastern Anatolia.182 The fact that 
Central Anatolia is the most homogeneous region in racial terms shows 
that this region is the racial center of Turkey. Other regions have been 
subject to more racial influences from outside. But even in western and 
eastern regions, the percentage of brachysephals is higher then that of 
dolichosephals, which is the evident proof of the fact that Turks have had 
a great capacity to assimilate. According to Inan, by choosing Ankara, a 
central Anatolian town, as the capital city of Turkey, as if Ataturk felt the 
racial unity in this region beforehand.183
6. 7. 4. Vasfi Ra§id Sevig (1887-1971)184
According to Vasfi Raçid Sevig, The Turkish Revolution is a 
revolution of being proud of the Turkish race and history. The great 
things could be achieved by great nations, and for the Turks this was so 
even in the disintegration period of the Ottoman Empire. The World 
civilisations owe much to the Turks' achievements in the course of 
history. As Atatürk observed, of whom Sevig claims that he sees 
everything truly, "A Turk is worth the world."185 The exchange of
182Ibid., 124; 127.
183Ibid., 134.
184Vasfi Raşid Sevig is one of the leading jurists of the Kemalist 
era. He was elected deputy in 1930 and 1934 legislative periods. Among 
his works are Ticaret Kanunu Şerhi (An Explanation of Trade Law), 3 
vols., 1934-36; Devletler Hususi Hukuku (International Private Law),
1937-42); Askerî Adalet (Military Justice), 2 vols., 1955-56. His lectures in 
the High Police Institute in 1938 which comprised his 2 volumes book 
Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Hukuku (The Constitutional Law) is one of the most 
important source in comprehending the racial-ethnicist character of 
Kemalist nationalism. For Sevig, see Türk Ansiklopedisi, vol. 28 (Ankara: 
MEB Basımevi, 1980), 475.
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population between Turkey and Greece(1923) and the voluntary 
abandonment of the rights by the minorities guaranteed in the Lausanne 
Treaty were decisive in securing racial and linguistic unity in Turkey, 
according to him.
Seviğ identifies the unity of people (halk birliği) and chiefship 
system as the fundamentals of the new Turkish political order. The unity 
of people constitutes the starting point of the political order. Every other 
element springs from the "unity of people" In this phrase there are two 
elements: 1. people; 2. unity.
1. P eop le: It was not possible for Atatürk to consider the Anatolian 
people as a legal construct only. Separatist Kurds and rebellious Greeks 
and Armenians as well as Muslims who were pro-Sultan-Caliph could 
not be considered within the boundary of the people. Therefore, the 
concept of people could not be a legal one. What was the mainstay of the 
integrity of people in intellectual and moral unity, then? Since the term 
"united people" was the manifestation of the union in language, culture 
and ideal, it expressed in the first place who felt themselves Turk. After 
purification of people by the forced exchange of Greek orthodoxes who 
did not consider themselves Turk and were not considered by Muslim 
Turks so, Mustafa Kemal still kept the racial/ethnic elements as a legal 
concept because for Atatürk, the concept of legality did not form a 
separate thing from the racial concept. The alien elements living in 
Anatolia could gain a position within the concept of legality as equally 
important as the unity in race provided that they united their all 
aspirations with the Turks. Until the attainment of this level of 
completion, not to increase the number of minorities, i.e., those who
i85yasfi Raşid Seviğ, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Esas Teşkilat Hukuku 
(The Constitutional Law of the Turkish Republic), vol. 1 (Ankara: Ulus 
Basımevi, 1930), 325-327.
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considered themselves different from Turks in terms of language, culture 
and ideal, and for that purpose, to accept the demands of non-Muslims to 
acquire Turkish citizenship only in exceptional situations constitutes the 
basic idea of Turkish internal politics. In Germany and Italy however, 
even Christian Jews were not included within the unity of people.186
According to Seviğ, people in Kemalism is a political unity defined 
around the unity in language, culture and ideal irregardless of religion 
and race. As a legal concept,187 the will to form a common political entity 
is as important as the blood unity in constituting the unity of the 
people.188 "We consider sufficient to feel sincere love with a deep feeling 
of fraternity and wish their prosperity and development."189
2. Unity: This concept, added to that of people, expresses the making 
of people as a monolithic unity. Unlike Germany which considers race to 
be the basis of this unity, Kemalism justifies it on the Roussoian notion 
of the collective conscious (ma'şerî vicdan). According to Atatürk, all 
societies absolutely have a collective conscious even if this has not been 
tangibly observed all the time, because it exists de facto . 190
The state of unity expresses two things: 1. the aggregation of the 
members of a nation; 2. the coalescence of members of a nation to form a 
monolithic existence. The first type of unity refers to the legal unity 
(hukuk birliği). This unity, as was the case in the late Ottoman periods, is 
a unity formed around laws by peoples of different languages, cultures
186Ibid., 201-203.
187Ibid., 4-5. (The concept of people in public law is not racial at all.) 
The Nazi Germany however, sees the. people not of their race as the 
second class citizens.
188Ibid., 204.
189Turk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti, Tarih IV, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
(History IV, The Turkish Republic) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934), 183.
190Seviğ, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Esas Teşkilat Hukuku , 204.
376
and aspirations. The Ottoman nation as a legal entity did not exhibit a 
monolithic unity. It expressed only an aggregation of citizens, a legal 
unity. The concrete embodiment of this legal unity between the subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire was the participation into elections. But neither 
being citizen nor being voters do render people into a monolithic union; 
both are personal/individual states. It stems from the fact that the state is 
a legal person and hence nation consists of individuals called subject or 
citizen. The article 88 of the 1924 Constitution expresses the state of legal 
unity. In such nations individuals have priority against states in the 
capacity of being citizen.191
The second kind of unity is the unity of people (halk birliği ). In this 
type of unity, individuals are coalesced into one another. Their thinking 
is not individually-oriented but socially oriented. Unity in aspiration 
encourages people to solidarity, co-operation, and hence forms an orderly 
integration. People have collective existence, devoid of individuality. 
They are geared toward the same ideal. This ideal is assumed to be 
penetrated into every individuals. The friendship in the shelter is the 
example of this type of unity. The partisans melting within the 
Republican People's Party, this political soldiership, is the example of the 
unity of people. Every person within the unity of people is the mainstay 
of the common aspirations of people.192
What can bind the legal unity to the unity in people? Can a people 
possessing legal unity also acquire unity in people? If so, how? Does the 
unity in people require the racial and religious unity, or only either of 
them? The religious unity was the trade mark of the Ottoman Empire. 
Nationalism, i.e., unity in language, culture and ideal is the trade mark of
191 Ibid., 205.
192Ibid.
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the Kemalist state. Seviğ acknowledges that great national causes remove 
the conflicts and differences and confers the appearance of unity in people 
to the society rallied around the national unity. All this, however, may 
necessitate the removal of democracy because democracy accepts 
differences of thought, belief and way of life which give rise to different 
political parties.193
Difficult causes could be win only through unity in people. The 
unity in people was the first thing Mustafa Kemal tried to create during 
the National Struggle. The party-state identification put into force since 
1936 is a step in the same direction. Germany could get rid of the chains of 
Versailles thanks to the strength it got through giving up the legal unity 
and making the unity in people the permanent state of German 
society.194
Seviğ evaluates Atatürk's saying that "The mighty you need flows in 
the noble blood in your veins" as expressing the fact that Atatürk do not 
refer to genius or science but to the character and will as the source of 
power.195
193Ibid., 206. Thus Seviğ quotes the sayings of Atatürk which puts 
emphasis on the notion of the collective national conscious: " The nation 
in any case would be successful if it pursues the common goal through 
common efforts." " What a nation need to have is the prevalence of the 
common will of the nation in its every member" " See Ibid.
194Ibid., 207.
195Ibid., 178-179. As regards to the unity in blood Atatürk asserts, 
"(Turkish nation) should not decline to well discern the essential 
substance in the blood, in the conscious of men whom she would bring 
up from among her breast and put into the ranks of government." Nutuk 
Il (The Speech II) (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1984),124; ibid., 179.
İsmet İnönü, the longest time prime minister of the Kemalist era, 
makes similar emphasis on the motifs of race and blood: "In my opinion 
heroism is the first condition to be in the first rank among nations. 
Heroism originates from the mighty that blood possesses at birth." 
(Speech in Gaziantep H alkevi, 26 September 1932); "Friends, the Turkish 
nation in her capability of being ruler (domination) and her authority 
which is natural is one of the greatest nations that history and the present
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6. 8. C oncluding R eflections
"Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları" (Civic 
Learnings and the Manuscripts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk)196 is a 
valuable source in terms of comprehending Atatürk's conception of 
nation and nationalism. Atatürk defines nation as "a political and social 
community composed of citizens tied to one another through language, 
culture and unity of ideal ."197 According to him, "the people of Turkey 
who founded the Republic of Turkey is called a Turkish nation."198 
Apparently, this definition excludes the Greek and Armenian minorities 
from the Turkish nation in that they were not among the co-founding 
peoples due to their armed collaboration with the occupying forces
world have ever seen. This capability is characteristics of Turkish 
nation." (Speech in Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi, 20 November 1932).
"In a period in which nations are very competitive and fierce, I 
repeat that we await from the friends who would be raised so as to rule 
the high and brilliant future of Turkey great services and very high 
attributes. You own these attributes, they are in your blood. For our 
nation is the greatest and most dignified nation."(Speech in Ankara 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1940). See Dr. Hikmet Tanyu, Atatürk ve Türk 
Milliyetçiliği (Atatürk and Turkish Nationalism) (Ankara: Orkun 
Yayınları, 1961), 46-47.
The Second Prime Minister of M. Kemal, Celal Bayar refers to the 
same point as follow: "Our great history demonstrates that our great 
nation has brought up the greatest men in every field of specialisation.
This blood of capability is in our veins." See "I. Bayar Hükümetinin 
Programı(8.11.1937)Hükümetler ve Programlan(1920-1960) (Governments 
and Their Programmes, 1920-1960), vol. 1 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi,
1988), 79.
196Afet İnan, Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları 
(Civics and the Handwritings of M. Kemal Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Yayınları, 1969). It was first appeared in 1930 and approved as a 
textbook for secondary schools. The book was written under the close scrutiny 
of Atatürk, and some parts were written by him, including section pertaining 
to nations and nationalism.
197Ibid., 18.
198Ibid.
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against the National Forces comprised by the Muslim ethnies of Anatolia 
and Rumelia during the War of Independence. 199
In his description of the origin of the Turks, Mustafa Kemal made 
his conception of the Turkish nation as a super family clear by pointing 
out that the physical dissimilarities observed within the Turkish 
community resulted from the intermingling of Turks with peoples of the 
"old World" Therefore, there is nothing unusual in the non­
resemblances of physical nature observed among the members of such an 
huge society; after all even the children of the same family may exhibit 
dissimilarities. 200
The morality of Turks is more or less akin to one another. The 
place of morality in the formation of nations is fundamental. Mustafa 
Kemal's conception of morality is pragmatic and utilitarian. 201 
Nationality is the criterion of what is moral. This morality is independent 
of and above individuals, and is the source of inspiration for the national 
man. As the expression of the common will (ma’şerî vicdan), morality is 
holy as such and immanent in society, which is considered to be national 
deity. He rejects the unity of religion as a constituting element of Turkish
199As Kohn observes, the secessionist nationalism of Anatolian- 
Rumelian Greeks was a major spark arousing the Turkish nationalism. 
See Kohn, Türk Milliyetçiligi, trans. 46. In fact the de-islamisation was 
the leitmotif of western Christian insult against the Ottoman Turkey. 
The Christian West never forgave the pushing back of the Crusades by 
Muslim Turks. See Salahi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction o f 
the Ottoman Empire (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Publications,
1993),343 and 434. Therefore, the major factor in the War of Independence 
was religious. Atatiirk's aforementioned definition draws the boundaries 
of Turkishness, by definition, from the religious viewpoint. The 
republican and racial boundaries of Turkishness to be drawn later would 
reincorporate non-Muslim minorities into Turkishness
201Ibid., 20.
200Inan, M edeni Bilgiler, 19-20.
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nationality and blames Islam to cause the weakening of national ties due 
to its universalist character. The greatness of Turkish nation is 
independent of religion, according to him.202
The natural and historical elements influential in the formation of 
Turkish nation, according to Mustafa Kemal, are unity in political 
existence, language, homeland, race and origin as well as historical and 
moral affinity. But all these factors may not be obtained in the formation 
of other nations. Each nation has to be treated separately in this respect. 
For example, contemporary French and English nations are the product of 
cross-breeding of various races. There are peoples who reject territory as a 
determining factor of national formation. 203
As regards the nature and boundary of Turkish national formation, 
Mustafa Kemal observes three concluding premises. 1. The existence of 
Turkish communities who share the same language, race and origin, and 
moral and historical affinity with the Turks of Turkey but live under 
different political units is only a painful memory for the Turkish nation; 
2. Within the present political and social community of Turkish nation 
there are citizens and co-nationals who have been subject to the 
inculcations of the ideas of Kurdishness, Circassianism, even Laze and 
Bosnian. Such appellations which are the product of the oppressive 
periods of history, did inflict only sorrow to Turkish people except for a 
few enemy instrument and stupid reactionaries. Because the members of 
this nation, like the general Turkish community, possess the same past, 
history, morality and law; 3. No one can view non-Muslim citizens as
202Ibid., 21.
203Ibid., 22.
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alien provided that they tie their fate and destiny to the Turkish 
nationality with their volition. 204
Nation as a cultural community is basic to his definition,205 the 
unfolding of which incorporating the three component of Turkish 
identity. Thus Mustafa Kemal rejects pan-Turkism and the existence of 
Muslim ethnies other than Turks. He has the desire of coopting 
minorities into Turkishness with the use of a particular rhetoric of 
Turkish national character through assimilation.
Apart from his particular definition of Turkishness, Mustafa 
Kemal gives also a general definition of a nation as a community that has 
a rich heritage of memoirs, and the will regarding the maintenance of the 
preservation of the historical heritage possessed, and is sincere in the 
common desire and consensus for living together.206 In this definition, 
the unity of race and origin is ignored due to the fact that he considers it 
as a non-universal element. But this is true for the general definition. 
The unity of race and origin is a primary, not secondary, element of 
Turkishness.207
He defines the principle of nationality as involving the possession 
of a particular national character, inborn or acquired, constituting a 
unique national organism and distinct but parallel efforts among nations
204Ibid., 23.
205Ibid., 24.
206Ibid.
207Therefore, özbudun's claim that Atatürk views race in 
secondary importance in the constitution of Turkish nation is without 
ground. See Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi 
Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu" (The Question of Citizenship 
and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the 
Republic), Unpublished Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996), 9-10.
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for national development.208 This definition overtly discards territorial 
expansionism but place emphasis on the inborn or acquired national 
character as the distinguishing marker of national self-hood.
It is evident that Kemalist racialism defining the Turks as a race of 
Central Asian origin cannot be reconciled with the religious and 
Republican definitions of Turkishness. Accordingly, from a purely 
theoretical viewpoint, someone who cannot prove his/her Central Asian 
origin cannot be accepted as Turk. Likewise, those who do not belong to 
the Muslims of Anatolia-Rumelia (religious criterion) or Turkish citizens 
who do not share the ideal of the Republic (republican criterion) cannot 
be considered Turk, although they are Turk according to the racial 
definition.
The main premises of the ethnicist conception of Kemalist 
nationalism can be summarised as follows: The Turkish race is the 
superior race and the father of the present European civilisation. All 
civilisations in history are formed either directly or indirectly by the 
Turkish race, or the races'who lived under Turkish domination and 
benefited from the supreme attributes of Turks. Language is the most 
vital feature of Turkish race. A genuine Turk necessarily speaks Turkish. 
The most distinguished example of the genuine Turkish race is Atatürk 
himself. During the presentation of his paper in the First History 
Congress (1932), Şevket Aziz (Kansu), a professor of anthropology, 
introduced to the Congress a blond parents and their son from the village 
of Bağlum located in the north of Ankara as the example of the genuine 
Turkish race and greeted the Ghazi with a great enthusiasm as the leader 
and concise embodiment of this perfect race. 209
208înan, M edeni B ilgiler  , ibid.
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A basic corollary of this summary is that all Turkish people is of 
Central Asian origin and therefore may be Turk in race as well as in terms 
of political ideal. It is evident that to consider all Anatolian ethnies as of 
Turkic origin do not have any scientific substance. In fact, Kemalist 
racialism is tautological and therefore in the final analysis nearly all 
peoples of the World are considered of Turkic origin, which makes 
Turkishness an empty and meaningless category. Ironically, however, if 
those Turks who speak Turkish and more loyal to Turkish customs are 
considered more Turkish, i.e., "öz Türk" (genuine/pure Turk) then the 
efforts to define the people of Turkey as one race fails. The very existence 
of race thesis denotes that Kemalist nationalism makes a distinction 
between Turkish citizens in terms of their ethnic origin, which can be 
expressed as "Everybody in Turkey is Turkish; but some is more 
Turkish."
According to Oran, there is "a fairly unstable and delicate 
boundary"209 10 between Kemalist nationalism and racism. Although the 
Kemalist regime never became racist in a systematic sense, it is 
"nonsense" to argue that Atatürk was not involved in the racist climate 
dominating Turkey during the 1930.211
Similarly, Parla points out that there is a "dark" face of Kemalist 
nationalism in domestic politics alongside its politico-legal and 
humanitarian dimension. This darkness embodies ethnic hegemony of 
the large ethnie (ethnic Turks) and oneness and sameness in ethnic
209See Şevket Aziz (Kansu), "Türkİerin Antropolojisi," in Birinci
Türk Tarih Kongresi, 277-78. For an account of Turkish race theory, see 
Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede 'Türk Milleti’ Kavramı," 135.
2nIbid., 158.
210Oran, A tatürk M illiyetçiliği, 157.
384
terms. It also involves an exclusionary dimension as regards minorities 
in Turkey. 212
As regards the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism, 
Özbudun observes that a political discourse might undergo changes and 
embody internal contradictions due to changing political conditions. This 
also happened to Kemalist nationalist discourse. Therefore, in a period 
when all central and eastern European regimes, except Czhekoslovakia, 
dominated by the racist doctrine, the reducing of the impact of racism into 
sporadic manifestations must be seen as temporary and secondary 
deviations of Kemalist nationalism, the dominant aspect of which is its 
legal and cultural component. The question, therefore, is not the racism 
of Kemalist nationalism but the monolithic construction of Turkish 
culture which go much beyond the limits of citizenship and loyalty to 
state in that it does not let the recognition of subcultures and their legal 
protection. 213
Özbudun's perspective well grasps the gist of the question. 
Nevertheless, the fact that racialism did not form the mainstream 
orientation of Kemalist nationalism may not lead to the conclusion that 
the racial/ethnic character of Kemalist nationalism was a transient 
component only.
After all, exclusionary policies need not be justified on racial 
grounds. Although in the final analysis, Kemalist nationalism was 
assimilationist and hence inclusionary, the preconditions of assimilation 
in practice yielded to discriminatory policies. Kemalist policies as regards 
the "non-existent" Muslim ethnies and non-Muslim minorities, and
212Parla, Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi, 207-211.
213Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi 
Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu,” 12.
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racial-based state policies, which would form the subject of the 
following chapter, well exemplify this point.
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CHAPTER VII
KEMALİST NATIONALISM IN ACTION: THE MAKING OF
THE ,fUNITY IN PEOPLE”
7.1. Introduction
Conceiving the securing of unity in people as its mainstay, 
Kemalist nationalism used racial motives as the constitutive elements of 
Turkish national identity. Together with its already formed secular 
credentials, Kemalist nationalism took on the form of an all-out 
blueprint for both public and private "conduct" of life. In this conception 
of unity as oneness, there was no room left for the visibility of anything 
diverged from the national ideal. To make this national state of "one 
mind, one heart" complete, Kemalist nationalism had to resolve two 
essential questions of fundamental importance challenging its ethno- 
secular credentials of national identity:
1. The resolution of the question of the so-called "Şark"(East);
2. Turkification of minorities.
Before dwelling upon how Kemalist nationalism coped with these 
issues, however, to demonstrate the manifestations of Kemalist 
racialism/ethnicism in state policies is necessary in order to better 
comprehend the particular national logic behind the way it approached to 
the question of eradicating all distinctive symbols of non-Turkish 
elements, be it Muslim or non-Muslim.
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7. 2. R acialism /Ethnicism  as a State Policy
Racism was an alien concept to the Muslim World. Racist practices 
of the West had no place in the Ottoman Empire. In the Republic, the 
same attitude was preserved to a great extent through the rejection of 
political pan-Turanism, which incorporated manifest racial elements. 
This anti-racist attitude did not undergo a radical change when the impact 
of Fascism and Nazism could become felt in Turkey in the 1930s.
Although racism did not become a systematic policy of state, it 
exerted important influences on various state policies. All these policies 
were mixed with Turkification policies, ostensibly, a counter position of 
racism. This paradoxical combination of racialism and Turkification will 
be inquired below.
Already, the racial themes in the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk 
were revealed. Also, it was shown that the theory of race constituted the 
backbone of official History and Language Theses. Therefore, in what 
follows, various manifestations of sporadic racialism as state policy will 
be searched out.
7.2.1. Racial Themes in Education
Racialism/ethnicism in the secular national education of the 1930s 
formed an important element of Kemalist nationalism.1
tu n ça y  makes this judgement by drawing upon Richard E. 
Maynas’ unpublished Ph.D. dissertation covering the curriculums of 
Turkish high schools in 1961. See Adras M. Kazamias, Education and the 
Quest for Modernity in Turkey (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966) 
221; cited by Mete Tunçay, Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin 
Kurulmast(1923-1931) (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey), 
2nd ed. (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 238. Kazamias stresses the 
monolithic character of Kemalist nationalism in its way of coverage in 
education on the ground that "to criticise the national heroes, the 
Kemalist ideology and nationalism is considered to be the refutation of 
Turkey itself and as a thing akin to treason". Kazamias, Ibid., 222; cited by 
Tunçay, ibid., 238.
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To begin with, charged by Mustafa Kemal with the task of working 
on Turkish history, Afet İnan, then an high school history teacher, 
endeavoured for the creation of a "civic" consciousness through the use 
of history, and hence, forge a new Turkish national identity2, which led to 
the emergence of Turkish History Thesis based on "inclusionary racism", 
i.e., the claiming of the Turkishness of all ethnies living in Turkey on 
racial grounds as the justification for the policies of Turkification.
Historiography was considered to be the most fertile ground for the 
use of nationalism as a base for political power. This can be followed 
through observing the transformations in the history textbooks of 1924- 
1932.
Used as a textbook in the third grade of secondary schools between 
1924 and 1929, Hamid and Muhsin's Türkiye Tarihi had an Ottoman- 
centred view. It stated that Turks lived in tribes before they became 
Muslims, the counter thesis of the later History Thesis, which put 
forward that Turks had state organisations before Islam. It did not incline 
to racial-ethnic elements for inculcating Turkish nationalism.3
The rupture from this view occurred when Türk Tarihinin Ana 
Hatları (The Main Lines of Turkish History)4 appeared. This book was 
written by authors which later formed the member of Türk Tarihini 
Tetkik Cemiyeti (TTTC ) (The Society for the Study of Turkish History) 
upon the directive of Mustafa Kemal. It was written with the view of 
using it as the history textbook in secondary schools but failed to be
2Büşra Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih. Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih 
Tezinin Oluşumu(1929-1937) [Power and History: The Formation of The 
Official History Thesis in Turkey (1929-1937)], 126-130.
3Ibid., 100-102.
4Afet (İnan) and et all. Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (The Main 
Lines of Turkish History) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930).
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registered so, because Mustafa Kemal did not consider it to be adequate for 
that purpose. The book embodied the core formulation of Turkish 
History Thesis as its main focus but did not have a systematic 
methodology. It assigned only 50 pages to the Ottoman history, while it 
assigned 100 pages to the Turkish roots of "non-Turkish" Anatolian 
civilisations. The purpose of the book was stated as to emphasise the 
greatness of Turks in the -World history and to reveal the secrets of 
"Turkish genius and character" by showing that "the national 
development of Turks is bounded to the deep racial roots".5 The book 
differed from the previous Ttirkiye Tarihi with its focus on the racial 
features of Turks. While the raise of Ottomans was explained with their 
affiliation with Turkishness, their breakdown was attached to their 
preference of Ottomanism to Turkishness. The establishment of a new 
state out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire was attested to the racial 
solidarity that the remaining Turks exhibited.6
The main formulation of the new conception of Turkish history 
came to the fore with the four volume book, Tarih (History). 7 Tarih was 
prepared as a textbook for high schools. It was entirely based on the *234
5Ersanlı-Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 105.
6Ibid., 102-107. The same theme repeated in the preface to the four 
volume history textbooks. See for example, "Birinci Basılışın 
Mukaddimesi" (Preface to the First Edition), Tarih IV, Tiirkiye 
Cumhuriyeti (History IV, Turkish Republic) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 
1934).
71. Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti (TTTC), Tarih I (First Ages, Pre­
history ) (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1931).
2. TTTC, Tarih II (Middle Ages) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933).
3. TTTC, Tarih III (Ottoman Turkish History in New and Recent Ages), 
(Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931).
4. TTTC, Tarih IV (Turkish Republic) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934).
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glorification of Turks as a "race" and emphasised that Turkish civilisation 
has been the mother of all other civilisations. What was important was 
the pre-Ottoman Turkish existence rather than the post-Islamic Ottoman 
times in the consolidation of the Turkish race throughout history. Thus, 
while the fourth volume dealing with the Turkish Republic, and other 
volumes included more than 400 pages each, the third volume covering 
Ottoman history was consisted of only 200 pages.
In History I, the study of human history is equated with the study of
the racial and linguistic features of human societies. The underlying
outlook as regards the universe, history and human societies were shaped
by the basic premises of the Darwinian theory of evolution. While race
was defined as a peculiarity owned by people of the same blood and
resembling physical features,8 Eugene Pittard's classification of races
according to the index of skull was preferred to Gobineau's taxonomy of
races based on colour.9 Turkish was considered as the most important
World language in the linguistic classification. It presented Turkish
nation as a "supreme race". The following statements reflect the notion
of the purity of Turkish race and its racial-cultural supremacy:
Turkish race, who has created the most important currents of the 
World, is a race who has protected its identity most. Nevertheless, 
she intermingled with other races in the countries and frontiers 
she conquested both in the periods of pre-history and history. But 
in most cases, the physical and manifest features of Turkish race 
remained unaltered, and hence the Turkish race has not lost her 
peculiarities.
....The Turkish race, who always exhibited a striking unity in 
history, is a big human community to be called nation (budun) 
today and was so in the past with her manifest physical features, 
common language and the culture transmitted with that language, 
and common historical memoirs. 10
*Tarih I, 18.
9Ibid, 16-17.
10Ibid., 20.
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On the contrary, Ottoman empire was presented as a "foreign state" 
which did not have any ties with Turks. A powerful pseudo-scientific 
link was established between the Turkish Republic and Central Asia 
while the Ottoman empire was considered to occupy no place in the 
history of Turkish nation. The core argument was that the historical 
successes of Turks were related to their practical and linguistic strength, 
and long-time tradition of state-forming. Racial features caused Chinese, 
Egyptian, Indians, Persians and Greeks to lag behind Turks due to the 
supreme cultural authority of Turks based on their solidarity around 
state, race and language.11
The pseudo-scientific inquiries about Turkish history did not 
remain limited to history textbooks. It was reflected in other textbooks, 
including biology. In secondary school textbook of Biyoloji ve İnsan 
Hayatı (Biology and Human Life),* 12 science of eugenics dealing with the 
racial improvement of human populations was assigned a separate title. 
The title of 182nd topic was "Irk Islahı" (the improvement of race). It 
began with the observation that "the idea of the improvement of race is a 
very old one" and defined it as "the science of studying factors that have 
the peculiarity of improving or degenerating the racial attributes of future 
generations in physical and spiritual terms, which are under social 
control."13
n Ersanli-Behar, ibid., 111.
u Biyoloji ve İnsan Hayatı II (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934). The 
book is the translation of Benjamin G. Gruenberg's Biology and Human 
Life. The 23rd section entitled "İnsanlar ve Arz" (Men and the Earth) that 
I refer to here is not included in the original and was added to it in the 
Turkish translation.
13Ibid., 316. This definition is in fact belong to the founder of the 
eugenics, Francis Galton.
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While it treated the heredity in human attributes under four 
genealogical trees,14 it emphasised the hereditary nature of "good 
descent" (iyi soy): "Valuable attributes and features in family are 
transmitted from generation to generation. When the genealogical trees 
of peoples who have distinguished positions in society thanks to their 
high virtues are studied, it is seen that these virtues are shared by many 
members of that family. Some families conferred society with scholars, 
some with politicians, some with artists from generation to 
generation".15 Regarding the "bad descent" (kötü soy), it pointed out that 
"most criminal types are defected with an hereditary mental illness or 
brought up in bad environments."16
The segregation of people with hereditary illnesses from society and
their sterilisation is considered as a desirable measure for an healthy
society17, which is the most characteristic policy suggestion of science of
eugenics. As regards the "control of the future," it stated:
The Turkish race of which we are proud to be a member has a 
distinguished position, among the. best, the healthiest, the most 
intelligent and the most capable races in the world. The duty of us 
all is to protect the essential attributes and virtues of Turkish race 
and to prove with our every manners that we are worthy of 
belonging to it. That is why it is one of our fundamental national 
duties to well protect ourselves, to avoid things harmful to our 
health, to make a principle of life for ourselves to live 
meritoriously in bodily and spiritually terms through applying 
biological information that we have learnt to our life. Because, the 
future of Turkey would depend on the Turkish generations of high 
value to be brought up in families to be formed in future by the 
young peoples living such a life today.18
14Ibid., 318.
15Ibid., 319.
16Ibid., 320
17Ibid., 321.
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The book accepts the thesis that spiritual attributes and emotional 
tendencies are subject to heredity like bodily features as a scientifically 
acknowledged fact on the grounds that spiritual and emotional attributes 
are the product of bodily existence, a widely-held materialistic 
assumption.18 9
7. 2. 2. Use o f Mythical-Legendary Motives in the Built-up o f Turkish 
Ethnicity
Use of legendary symbols in the official discourse is another aspect of 
the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism. Mustafa Kemal's 
reference to Ergenekon, the Turkish legends of appearance (türeyiş) is a 
clear reflection of the culturalisation of Turkish ethnicity.20 Likewise 
Mustafa Kemal was named Bozkurt (Grey Wolf) after a Turkish legendary 
figure. In the beginning, Bozkurt was seen as god by Turks. Parallel to 
socio-cultural evolution, Turks popularly believed that the great khan 
(Hakan)s were descended from the wolf. It was used as a symbol figure in 
the flag of Kök-Türks. Later it became a title given to the khans and 
commanders who saved the nation from dangers. Such legendary names
18Ibid., 321. Among the questions to be inquired as regards the 
subject of eugenics asked in the book, the question 9 is striking: " What 
are the high virtues of Turkish race? In terms of which virtues are the 
Turkish race superior to other nations? "Ibid., 323. For the eugenical 
manifestations in legislation, see, for example, Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu 
(Law of Physical Education), TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası, period 4, vol. 
18, 1 November 1938, 1160-1164. For the floor debates of the same law, see 
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period‘4, vol. 26, 29 June 1938, 484-492.
19Ibid., 318-19.
20"The Turkish nation who would make use of railways will be 
proud of reshowing its first artisanship in its origin, the work of 
blacksmith's profession." See "Malatya'da Bir Konuşma" (A Speech in 
Malatya), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II (The Speech and Statements 
of Atatürk, II) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu 
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 15 February 1931, 301.
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as Kurt, Kurtbay, Bozkurt, Asena, Börteçine, all meaning wolf, were 
coined for children. Atatürk readily accepted to be called Bozkurt.21 
Beginning with 1922, the Bozkurt figure was used on the stamps 22 It was 
also used on the first side of Turkish money.23
The emblem of Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Union of 
Turkish Students)24 was grey wolf and crescent. Over the hats of 
university students there was the figure of grey wolf. In many official 
buildings there were pictures of grey wolf. In the entrance gate of Ankara 
railway station there were two big grey wolves emblem. On the four sides 
of the base of Atatürk's statute in Ulus public square there were relieves 
of the grey wolf head. Boyscout organisation of primary schools were 
called "yavrukurt" (the young wolf).25 One of the marches of the time 
declared:
Bozkurtlara örnektir, dernektir gazimiz
Karanlıktan kurtulduk biz, aydınlığa azmimiz 26
21Tahsin Ünal, Türklüğün Sembolü Bozkurt (Grey Wolf: The 
Symbol of Turkishness) (Konya: Milli Ülkü Yayınları, 1977), 51-52.
22Türk Pulları Katalogu (The Catalogue of Turkish Stamps) 
(Ankara: Pul Tüccarları Demeği, 1983), 9-14; Ünal, ibid., 95.
23Ünal, Türklüğün Sembolü Bozkurt 97
24The only association that kept its separate, though nominal, 
existence after 1931 with the conclusive establishment of one-party-state.
25See "Bozkurt"(Grey Wolf), in Yeni Türk Ansiklopedisi, vol. 2, 
(Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1985), 483-485; Türk Ansiklopedisi, 
"Bozkurt", vol. 7 (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1956), 8-9.
26"Bozkurt Marşı"(The March of Grey Wolf), in Ethem Üngör, 
Türk Marşları (Turkish Marches) (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1965), 232. Marches were used as one of the main 
means of igniting popular emotions for goals conceived to be national in 
the Kemalist era. Many of them carried a strong emphasis on Turkish 
race. The following are some examples from the various marches of the 
period:
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8.2.3. Racial Tendencies in Laws
7. 2.3.1. The 1934 Law o f Family Names (Soyadi Kanunu)
Surnames point to the sense of kinship among members of a nation 
and therefore may be the principal marker of national identity. That is 
why, those who assume a new national identity often do that by 
changing their surname. As Connor observed, changes of surname may 
be forced on an ethnic minority as a means of assimilation because a 
surname can be a constant reminder that one's ancestry is distinct from 
that of the state's dominant group and that the consequent feeling of 
alienation can weaken the sense of loyalty to the state.27
"Yıldırımlar yaratan bir ırkın ahfadıyız 
Tufanları gösteren tarihlerin yadıyız."
[ Harb Okulu Mflrş/(The March of the War College) ,1928]
Ne mutlu Türk yaratıldım. .
Türk demek cesaret, doğruluk demek.
Tarihe ün saldı adım
Türk doğdum, hür doğdum zafer bana gerek."
[ From the march "Ne Mutlu Türk Yaratıldım,"(What a Happiness 
that I was Created as a Turk].
Türk genciyiz öğünelim kanımızla 
Ünümüze inanımızla 
(...)
Biz dört yanı kaplayan bir çağlayanız 
Oğuz hanın yüreğinde vuran kanız.
Yepyeni bir Ergenekon oldu yurtta 
Varol dedi buna, Bozkurt da.
( [ From "Gençlik Marşı"(The Youth March)]
Türküz bütün başlardan üstün olan başlarız.
Tarihten önce vardık, tarihten sonra varız.
[ From "Onuncu Yıl Marşı"(Tenth Year March)
27 A recent case of this was offered by the Bulgarian government 
which insisted that all Turks and other Muslim groups within Bulgaria 
legally adopt Bulgarian surnames. See Walker Connor, "The Nation and 
Its Myth," In Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed., Anthony D. Smith (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1992), 52-53.
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The statement of the reasons for the Bill of the Family 
Names (Soyadı Kanunu Layihası) emphasised that surname is a marker of 
national identity and considered the existence of family names as a sign of 
civilisation.28 During the floor debates, the most emphasised point was 
the consideration of family names as the conjuncture of Turkishness 
such that Ali Rıza Bey, a deputy from Kastamonu, asserted that "Our 
family name is Turk".29 The subject in the text of the law was expressed 
with such phrases as "every Turkish citizen" in the motion of 
government, and "every Turk" in the modified text of the Interior and 
Justice commissions.30
The Law made it compulsory for every Turk to have a family name 
and prohibited the use of surnames denoting to rank, official post, tribe 
and foreign race. The Regulation Concerning Family Names (Soyadı 
N izam nam esi) issued by the Council of Ministers31 stipulated that 
surnames denoting another nationality such as Arnavutoğlu, Kürdoğlu, 
expressing affiliation with another nationality e.g., Çerkeş Hasanoğlu, 
Boşnak İbrahimoğlu cannot be used. Likewise, such foreign tags as “yan, 
of, ef, viç, iç, is, dis, pulos, aki, zade, mahdumu, veled and bin" also are 
prohibited. Newly assumed surnames have to be taken from Turkish.32
28TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, Sequence No: 203.
29Nuri Bey, the deputy who presented the bill, also argued that 
religion and race no longer exerted influence on family names. Turks in 
Russia were a case in point. Ibid.
30TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, 16.06.1934, 202.
31”Soyadı Nizamnamesi" (The Regulation of the Family Names), 
Resmi Gazete, No: 2805, 20 December 1934.
32See ibid, articles 5, 7, and 8. For the evolution of the bill of family 
names before and after its legislation, see Mahmut Goloğlu, Tek Partili 
Cumhuriyet (One Party Republic) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1974), 130- 
132.
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The focus of the law was to strengthen the national integration 
through the eradication of differences reflected in the surnames, which 
claimed to be imaginary, not real.33 As a matter of fact, against the view 
that those who want to carry the surnames of foreign races must let to do 
so in order to distinguish their real tendencies,34 the Minister of Interior 
put emphasis on the importance of assimilation for securing national 
integration and called attention to the comprehensive assimilation 
capacity of the Turkish element.35
7.2.3.2. The 1938 Law o f Physical Education (Beden Terbiyesi 
Kanunu)
This law is an apparent embodiment of the official eugenical 
tendencies. It is devised for the regulation of games, gymnastics and 
sports activities which would secure the improvement of physical and 
moral capabilities of the citizens in accordance with national and 
revolutionary purposes under the total control of the state.36
The article 3 of the law stipulated that it is compulsory for the young 
to join (sport) clubs and attend physical education in their spare times. It 
considered the "obligation of physical education" as a national duty like 
the military obligation. Accordingly, it prescribed that in villages, towns, 
cities and separate districts except schools and military garrisons, which
33See the speech of Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior, TBMM  
Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, 21 June 1934, 246.
34See the speech of Refet Bey, a deputy from Bursa, on the article 3 
of the Law of Family Names. Ibid., 249.
35Ibid.
36See the first article of Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu (The Law of 
Physical Education), TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası, vol. 18, 1 November 
1938,1160.
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inhabit 50 and more people’who are of the age of obligation of physical 
education, clubs; in places inhabiting fewer than 50, sport groups would 
be set up. Factories, commercial firms and other organisations who have 
more than 500 staff have to set up gymnastic halls, sport spaces, 
swimming pools, and so on, and hire expert teachers of physical 
education upon the suggestion of the General Directorate of Physical 
Education and the decision of the Council of Ministers. (Art. 21)
During the floor debates of the law, the Minister of the Interior,
Şükrü Kaya, explained the rationale underlying the law. According to
him, physical education is an essential pillar of national education. Its
aim is to strengthen, to embellish body and prepare the youth for the life
struggle. Nevertheless, he .emphasised the importance of raising the
young as beneficial both for their nations and for all humanity. As was
the case in every other field, the republic has to take the physical
education and sport under control and discipline.37
In order not to be perished, we need to be powerful. And it was 
necessary for the state to govern this organisation (of physical 
education) to endure a firm and healthy life.38
Kaya pointed out that
every regime has its own type of citizen. The man of Kemalist 
regime is a man donated with a beautiful body, firm thinking, 
brevity and dignity. He defends his rights everywhere. He is merry 
and serious. It is this that we look for. The aimed goal of 
physical education is intellectual, moral and character education.39
He concludes his statement by blurring the line of distinction 
between public and private, a characteristic feature of one party rule: "We
37TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 26, 29 June 1938, 484.
38The speech of Dr. Osman Şevki Uludağ , a deputy from Konya, 
ibid., 487.
39TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 26, 29 June 1938, 484.
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want to see our people serious and dignified in their private as well as 
public life."40
7.3. K em alist N ationalism  and the So-called ’’Eastern Q uestion"
Kemalist nationalism tried to form a national society through the 
ideological as well as power apparatuses of the national state Yet, the 
success of the Kemalist ideological crusade to build the Turkish national 
identity through the history and language theses remained quite limited. 
This state of affairs made the use of the sheer military power 
unavoidable for national integration. This, in turn, proved to be 
counterproductive and gave rise to the emergence of ethnic protest 
movements, particularly Kurdish nationalism.
Kemalist centralising-unitarian nation and state making dealt an 
heavy blow to its goal of an ethnically homogeneous nation-state.41 
Kemalist nationalism could not preempt the formation of a Kurdish 
national consciousness due to the continuos wave of rebellions and its 
inability to incorporate the Kurdish populated regions into the national 
market. The rigidity of the Kemalist ideological crusade, which envisaged 
nation in the image of ethnie, led to the denial of Kurdish collective 
identity. The reactions caused by the Law of Settlement (1934) enhanced 
the crystallisation of a class of Kurdish nationalist intellectuals, the main 
bearers of national movements in general.42
4 0 I b i d .
41Baskm Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği. Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir 
İnceleme (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology). 
Ankara: Dost Kitabevi,1988), 175.
42lbid., 172-73.
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In the wake of the War of Independence, the new Turkey 
incorporated three major Muslim ethnic elements: Kurds, Circassians 
and Lazes. Circasians and L^zes, distinct from each other in ethnic origin 
and language, readily integrated with the larger Turkish community and 
the national market by relegating voluntarily their ethnic identity into 
the private realm with "full privacy". This was not the case with the 
Kurds.
Ethnic Kurds had a relative autonomy during the Ottoman Empire, 
and hence, they had their sense of distinction in terms of all ethnic 
markers, including sense of origin and language. They joined the 
National Struggle together with Turks against Armenians, "the common 
peril" Mustafa Kemal Pasha's policy of alliance including, among 
others, the Muslim ethnic groups was a major factor in that.43 It must be 
noted that the Declarations of the National Pact, and of Erzurum and 
Sivas Congresses recognised the racial, i.e., ethnic rights of all Muslim 
ethnies.44 Likewise, Mustafa Kemal referred to the same point in one of
43Ibid., 161.
44Given the activities of the Kurdish separatist movement led by 
Kürt Teali Cemiyeti (The Association of Kurdish Sublimation), Mustafa 
Kemal inserted into the secret and nonsigned fourth protocol of Amasya 
Talks(20-22 October 1919) an article prescribing "the termination of the 
activities of associations and the publication of newspapers bought by 
foreigners". This article 7 of the secret fourth protocol would secure the 
closing down of the Kürt Teali Cemiyeti and Kurdist magazines Jin and 
Kurdistan on the ground that they were under the management of the 
English. See Abdurrahman Arslan, Samsun'dan Lozan’a Mustafa Kemal 
ve Kürtler(1919-1923) [Mustafa Kemal and Kurds: From Samsun to 
Lausanne (1919-1923)] (Ankara: Doz Yayınlan, 1991), 91-105.
In fact the first article of the second protocol ratified in the Amasya 
Talks involved the prevention of the. evils intended ostensibly to be 
realised under the goal of "Kurdish independence" For this article and 
the five protocols -three of which ratified, and two unratified and secret- 
of the Amasya Talks, see Mahmut Goloğlu, Sivas Kongresi (The Sivas 
Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1969), 183-189.
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his speeches entitled "Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Öğeler Hakkında" 
(About The Elements Constituting the Turkish Nation).45 Apart from the 
"common peril", the saving of the caliphate from the captivity of the 
infidels was the last but not the least important factor in the joining of the 
Kurds into the National Struggle.46
The delegates representing the Ankara government in the 
Lausanne Conference declared that they represented both Turks and 
Kurds and pointed out that Kurds cannot be deemed as a minority 
because they were Muslim. 47 In short, Mustafa Kemal's position as
45According to Mustafa Kemal, "The nation we strive for its 
protection and defence does not naturally consist of only one element. It 
is composed of various Muslim elements." After repeating the relevant 
articles of the declarations of National Pact and of Erzurum and Sivas 
Congresses, he concludes: "The unity we are striving for is not that of 
only Turks , only Circassians but of the Islamic element incorporating 
all." See "Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Müslüman Öğeler Hakkında" 
(About Elements Comprising Turkish Nation), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve 
Demeçleri I (The Speechs and Statements of Atatürk, I) (Ankara: Atatürk 
Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 
1 May 1920, 74-75.
46Oran, ibid., 161. For Mustafa Kemal's views reflecting his pluralist 
position in ethnic terms see, among others, "Milli Mücadelede Kürtler" 
(Kurds in the National Struggle), Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve 
B eyan n am eleri V (Ataturk's Circular Letters, Telegrammes and 
Statements) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu 
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1991), 17 June 1919, 36-37; and "Kürtlerle
Türklerin Beraber Çalıştıkları Hakkında!' (About the Fact That Kurds and 
Turks Worked Together), ibid., 15. 09. 1919, 71. The latter telegram points 
to the Turkish-Kurdish fraternity and celebrates their co-struggle for the 
saving of the caliphate against "the enemy". Ibid.
47îsmet Pasha, the Turkish delegate in the Conference, stated that 
"the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly is the 
government of Kurds as much as that of Turks. Because the real and 
legitimate representatives of the Kurds entered the National Assembly." 
See Mahmut Goloğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 1923 (Turkish Republic 1923) 
(Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1971), 71. But the only Kurdish member of the 
delegation composed of six parliaments, Zülfü (Tigrel) Bey, the only 
Kurdish member from Diyarbekir, became all of a s u d d e n  "sick" when 
the Kurdish question was taken up in the Sub-commission of the
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regards the so-called "Kurdish question" was conjuncturally formed and 
essentially accomodationist during the period of 1919-1924.
The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I 
and the emergence of new Turkey gradually led to an era of intense 
mono-ethnic Turkish nationalism. The post-World War I Treaties of 
Sevr and Lausanne deepened the concern of Kemalist elites for the 
national survival (beka) and political integrity, which were expressed as 
the suppression of all non-Turkish ethnic identities, predominantly, of 
course, the eradication of Kurdish ethnic identity.48
The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 undermined the old Ottoman 
concept of the Muslim umma and allowed the Kemalist secular notion of 
a Turkish nation to emerge. Because Kurdish religious and tribal leaders 
had derived their authority from the twin institutions of the sultanate 
and caliphate, the abolition of these institutions removed the temporal 
and spiritual bases of their legitimacy, which led the Turkish republic to 
outlaw all public manifestations of Kurdish identity. 49
Conference for the Minorities and could not join these deliberations. 
The discussions over the criteria to be used in defining minorities, the 
religious criterion instead of language or descent criteria was finally 
accepted upon the insistence of the Turkish delegation, particularly that 
of Rıza Nur. See Goloğlu, ib id ., 23-24 For a view evaluating 
developments before and after the Lausanne Conference from the 
vantage point of the formation of a separate Kurdish state, see Othman 
Ali, "The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations," Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol. 33, No., 3, July 1997, 521-534. The view that the delegations 
of Ankara government represented both Turks and Kurds was also 
expressed in London Conference (26 February 1921) by Ankara delegation, 
Bekir Sami Bey. See Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası (1919-1923) (The Foreign 
Policy of Atatürk, 1919-1923), vol. 1 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981), 294.
48Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder, London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 81.
49Bruinessen observes that "In Turkey, after the great Kurdish 
nationalist revolts... a systematic policy aiming at détribalisation and 
assimilation of the Kurds was adopted. ...Everything that recalled a 
separate Kurdish identity was to be abolished: language, clothing, names."
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The caliphate and the institutions of folk Islam, i.e., sheikhs, 
tarikats and tekyes had all been the constitutive elements of Kurdishness. 
When it was abolished, the caliphate was still important in maintaining 
the unity of the remaining Muslim elements on Ottoman territory. As 
Mesut Yeğen aptly observed:
The Caliphate was an institution which guaranteed that the bond 
between the Ottoman political centre and the Muslim elements of 
the 'periphery' was to be a loose one, so as to tolerate the ethnic 
plurality of the 'periphery'. This was particularly important for the 
Kurds who for centuries enjoyed an autonomous administration. 
The removal of the caliphate in 1924, meant the substitution of this 
loose bond between the centre and the periphery with the tyranny 
of the centre imposed on the (ethnic, cultural, economic, 
administrative, political elements of) the periphery.50
The measures aiming at the eradication of the constitutive
elements of the Kurdish ethnonational identity by the use of all means of
ethnic homogenisation on the official plane severed the ties of ethnic
Kurds with the new Turkish national state and paved the way to a series
of rebellions, the most important of which were the revolt of Sheikh Said
of Piran, Ağri rebellion led by İhsan Nuri Pasha, a former officer in the
Ottoman army (1929-30) and Sheikh Sayyed Reza's rebellion in Dersim
(1937-38).51
See M. Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Skhaikh and State: On the Social 
and Political Organization o f Kurdistan (Utrecht-the Netherlands: 
Ryksuniversiteit, 1978), 242. In line with Bruinessen Entessar points out 
that "the repression following the revolt in Dersim was extensive. Entire 
villages were depopulated or massacred. The Turkish government sought 
to erase the memory of this bloody episode by replacing the name Dersim 
with Tunceli and putting the area under a total state of siege until 1950. 
The use of the words "Kurdistan" and "Kurds" was banned and 
references to them were removed from Turkish history books and 
publications". Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism , 87.
50Mesut Yeğen, "The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of 
Kurdish Identity," Middle Eastern Studies, 32:2(April 1996), 220.
51Ibid. For another view pertaining to the impact of the abolition of 
the caliphate on the so-called "Kurdish question", see Kazım Karabekir, 
Kürt Meselesi (The Kurdish Question) (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994),
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7.3.2. Policies o f Kurdish Ethnic Management
As elaborated in the preceding sections, the Kemalist regime 
overtly rejected religion in public realm and replaced it by the new 
etnosecular Turkish nationality. In this endeavour, it used race as the 
underlying framework of national integration by claiming the 
Turkishness of all Muslim ethnies. Accordingly, especially after the Law 
of the Restoration of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) (14 March 1925), the 
thesis which argued the Turkishness of all non-Turk Muslim ethnies was 
increasingly propagated. Thus one of the Kemalist writers observed: 
"There is no Kurdish race. The 95 percent of the tribes considered to be 
Kurdish and Arab is pure Turkish(öz-TürÂ:)".52 In this context, Lazes and
147-48. For these rebellions, see Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism , 
83-87. According to a book published by the Turkish General Staff, 18 
uprisings occurred in Turkey in the period 1924-1938, 17 of which were in 
the regions populated by the Kurds. See Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde 
Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938) (Uprisings in the Turkish Republic, 1924-1938) 
(Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1972). Among these uprisings, İhsan 
Nuri's rebellion was the first predominantly secular one led by a secular 
Kurdish organization "Khoybun" (Independence). See Entessar, ibid., 85.
52See Avni Ali Çandar, Doğu Anadolu'da Kürt Sanılan Türkler. 
Bir Kürt Irkı Yoktur. Kürt ve Arap Telakki Edilen Kabilelerin Yüzde 95'i 
Öz Türktür (Turks in the Eastern Anatolia whom Supposed to be Kurd. 
There is no Kurdish Race. The 95 Percent of the Tribes Supposed to be 
Kurd and Arab is the Genuine Turk) (Ankara, 1936); quoted by Mehmet 
Bayrak, ed. Açık-Gizli, Resmi-Gayr-ı Resmî Kürdoloji Belgeleri (Open- 
Secret, Official-non-Official Kurdology Documents) (Ankara: Özge 
Yayınları, 1994), 195-96. The same view is manifested in the speech of 
Şükrü Kaya, the Ministry of Interior, in Adana People's House in 9 March 
1937. Half of the audience in the auditorium was formed by the Arab 
Alevites living around Çukurova and Hatay. In this speech, Kaya 
pointed out that in the country there are citizens different in religion, 
though not in ideal. Therefore this state was not a matter of concern for 
him. But the state of races and citizens who are Turkish in race, history 
and culture but speak a foreign language under the impact of continuos 
interaction with foreigners and the sectarian causes is a matter of serious 
concern . Among these come Alevites in Çukurova. According to Kaya, 
due to their sect, these people have been excluded from the majority 
Turkish population. The history, however, testifies the pure Turkishness 
of Alevites in Hatay and Çukurova. Kaya blames the Empire for this state
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other non-Turk ethnies also were claimed to be Turk.53 On the occasion 
of his adoption of the honorary fellow citizenship of Diyarbakır, a 
province in the south-east, Atatürk well summarised this racial-ethnic 
position:
I am from an heroic comer of the Turkish country. Unfortunately, 
they call it the land of Bekir. But in essence, it was a Turkish land. 
Bekir later on had become the symbol for it. But we know what 
our genuine land is. Our land is the special halting place (konak) of 
Oghuz Turks, and we are the children of this high halting place. 
Since we halted here we have tried to point out what we are and 
we have been saying that the Turkish land is great, and only she is 
great on the face of the earth. It is the Turk who fill everywhere, 
and every side is illuminated by her face.
Those from Diyarbekir, Van, Erzurum, Trabzon, Istanbul, Thrace 
and Macedonia are all the children of one race and the veins of the 
same substance.54
of separateness. In order to remove these differences, the following 
decision was taken: "Completely special active teams would be 
established under the continuos and influential backing of our party and 
Peoples' Houses in order to elevate the Turks which speak a language 
other than their mother tongue, Turkish, into the civic and cultural 
position of their brothers who have spoken only Turkish language. " See 
"Alevi Türkler Kötü Bir Zihniyete Mahkum Edildi: Çukurovadaki 
Aleviler de Öz Türk Neslidir"(Alevite Turks have been Condemned into 
a Bad Mind: Alevites are the Genuine Turks), Tan, 10 March 1937, 1 and 
10. On the same issue, see also Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Türk Alevilerin 
Yarası" (The Wound of Turkish Alavites), Tan, 11 March 1937, 1 and 10.
53For example, a journalist of the time wrote that the only 
difference of Lazes from Turks is that they have a special language. See 
İhsan Ferit, "Karadeniz Halkı" (The Black Sea People) Cumhuriyet, 17. 01. 
1933. This claim was so generalised that even the Turkishness of Persians 
in race was declared by Atatürk on the occasion of his reception of the 
new Turkish ambassador to Tehran: "The rulers of the present Turkish 
republic is of the opinion that Turks are co-racial with the people of 
Iran..." See "Gazi Hazretleri Yeni Tahran Elçimize Pek Mühim Bir 
Beyanatta Bulundular" (Ghazi (Mustafa Kemal) made an Important 
Statement to Our New Ambassador to Tehran), Cumhuriyet, 26 August 
1930,1-2.
54Diyarbekir Gazetesi, 26 September 1932; also see Kadri Kemal Kop, 
Atatürk Diyarbakır’da (Atatürk in Diyarbakır), 4; quoted by Hamza 
Eroğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik" (Atatürk and Nationalism), in 
Atatürkçü Düşünce (Ankara: Atatürk Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi, 1992), 378-390.
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Thus the existence of Muslim ethnies namely, Kurds, Arabs and 
Circassians living within the frontiers of Turkey were rejected at the 
official level, and the pseudo-scientific Turkish History Thesis was forged 
in order to claim that they are Turk in terms of their ethnic origin. In 
practice, however, recognising their diverse ethnic origins, various ethnic 
management strategies were applied in order to Turkify them, ranging 
from forced deportation and settlement to forced assimilation, and 
sporadic manifestations of physical elimination.
Kemalist bureauratic-intellectual elites tried to put the existence of 
non-Turkish Muslim ethnies to the dustbin of history. For those who felt 
the need to belong to those ethnies had to be both Turk and feel as Turk 
in order to be a full citizen, i.e., not to be discriminated against by the 
state. A prominent Turkish poet, Yahya Kemal, had answered the 
question "Who is Turk?" as "Those who consider themselves to be so" 
According to the Turkish sociologist Mehmet Izzet, this answer was true 
but incomplete. It was not adequate for anybody to consider 
himself/herself as Turk. It was also necessary to be so in terms of the 
objective markers of Turkishness. 55This is why pseudo-scientific theses 
were developed as regards the ethnic Turkishness of Kurds, unlike 
citizens who belonged to minority groups. The Turkishness of the latter 
was a necessary consequence of their living within Turkish community, 
i.e., of the fact that they were citizens of the Turkish republic, and not 
more.
55Mehmet İzzet, M illiyet N azariyeleri ve M illi H ayat (Theories of
Nationalism and National Life) (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1981), 23.
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7. 3.1.1. Reconstitution o f Kurdishness
According to Yeğen, the Turkish state discourse does not conceal 
the exclusion of Kurdish identity; rather it enunciates it, though it does 
not literally spell out the Kurdishness of the "Kurdish question" In 
Turkish state discourse, the Kurdish question was identified with the 
components of the socio-political space wherein Kurdishness was 
constituted: the tension between the past(Islam) and the present (the 
republican regime); between tradition (tribal politics) and modernity 
(central republican politics); and between the political and economic 
resistance of periphery(smuggling and resistance to taxation and military 
recruitment) and the national integration (an integrated national market 
economy). Therefore, in the last analysis, the politics of Islam, the 
autonomous political structures of tradition, and the resistance of the 
'periphery' to an integrated national economy were all about Kurdish 
politics.56
Thus when the Kurdish question was identified with reactionary 
politics, tribal resistance and smuggling, the Turkish state was 
enunciating an attack on the social space wherein Kurdishness was 
constituted. In other words, the pressure on Islam, tribes and the 
periphery had the effect of excluding the possibility of Kurdish identity 
and the Turkish state discourse was the enunciation of this pressure.
Kemalist literature is full of texts which manifest the reconstitution 
of the Kurdish question as an epiphenomenon of the question of 
reactionary politics, of tribal resistance, and of regional backwardness. The 
constitutive components of Kemalist nationalism were thus the 
discourses of Turkish ethnicity, secularism and modernisation conceived 
as westernisation.
56Yeğen, "The Turkish'State Discourse,” 225-229.
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The name of the so-called "Kurdish question" in the Kemalist 
discourse is the question of reformation in the eastern provinces. 57 The 
"eastern question" is considered in the context of the problematic of 
progress and civilisation. The backward and reactionary character of the 
eastern provinces would be reformed through the introduction of the 
blessings of the republic, which would put an end to the tribal-reactionary 
character of the socio-economic structure there.
It must be noted that for the Kemalists, the so-called "Kurdish 
question" was first and foremost a question of law and order. According 
to the prime minister İnönü, the question was to suppress the successive 
revolts occurred in the eastern provinces and restore order, and not 
more .58
The civilising (temdin) mission was another intrinsic theme of the 
Kemalist discourse of the reconstitution of the "Kurdish question", 
expressed as the benefit to be derived from the blessings of the republic by 
"all the children of the fatherland".59 Following the Ağri Rebellion (1930), 
the semi-official newspaper Cumhuriyet described the rebels as follows:
These men who mix uncooked meat with some boiled and 
pounded wheat, and eat so do not have any difference from the 
savages and cannibals of Africa.60
57See "Şükrü Kaya'nm Dahiliye Vekaleti Bütçesi Üzerinde Yaptığı 
Konuşma"(The Speech of Şükrü Kaya on the Budget of the Ministry of 
Interior), Cumhuriyet, 28 June 1932.
58See İsmet İnönü H atıralar (Memoirs), vol.2. (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayınevi, 1987), 202-203 and 257-258.
59"Beşinci Dönem Dördüncü Toplantı Yılının Açılışında Atatürk 
Adına Başvekil Celal Bay ar Tarafından Okunan Söylev" (The Speech read 
by the Prime Minister Celal Bayar on Behalf of Atatürk in the Opening of 
the Fourth Meeting Year of the Fifth Period), Söylev ve Demeçler 1, 1 
November 1938, 424. This speech is full of references to Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk as "Şef" (the Chief).
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A journalist, Yusuf Mazhar, in a serial of articles entitled "Ararat
Eteklerinde," (On the Foots of the Mount Ağri) written after a field trip to
the region of the Ağri uprising observed that
Kurds are deceitful and devoid of any aesthetical and civilised 
tendencies. They have become a calamity over our race for 
centuries. These creatures do not really deserve civic rights.60 1
His condemnation of Kurds reveals a racist conception:
They(Kurds) are creatures who spread on the soil which they wrap 
like couch grass but inflict damage to the place they stand on.62 
These Kurds do not know grind grain in the mill. ... In them 
feelings of independence and freedom are totally absent and their 
spirit is stripped of self-respect.... They are not able to express their 
intentions and purposes with the simplest logical comparisons or 
ordinary examples.... I am of the opinion that it is not possible to 
eradicate the dark spirit, the rude feelings, the cruel tendencies in 
these Kurdish masses. To expect this from a long evolution will 
cause government to become busy with them by sometimes 
causing such uprisings or breaking down the order or robbing and 
lead people to continuously suffer.63
73.1.2. The Eastern Reform Reports (Şark Islahat Raporları)
Kemalist policies of Kurdish ethnic management have essentially 
an assimilationist (inclusionary racist) character. In order to secure 
assimilation(femsi/), Kemalists did not decline to pursue the policy of 
elimination via isolation, the indication of which being the policies of 
education and development applied in the east.
The aim of Kemalist policies as to Kurds is considered by Celal 
Bayar, Atatürk's prime minister after İnönü, to be a state secret 
transmitted from one mind to another only, not to be kept even in the
60Cumhuriyet, 13. 08. 1930, 1.
61Yusuf Mazhar, "Ararat Eteklerinde"(On the Foot of Ararat), 
Cumhuriyet, 18 August 1930, 3.
62Ibid., 19.08.1930, 3.
63Ibid., 20. 08.1930,3.
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most protected box" This "state secret" is transmitted from one 
government to another in the form of non-written, confidential state 
practices.64 Secret eastern reform reports are a case in point.
Following the Sheikh'Said rebellion, a serious need felt by the 
Kemalist government to resolve the "eastern question". With this 
purpose, various official reports were prepared, the most important of 
which were:
1. The report of Abdulhalik Renda, the Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Çankırı deputy, entitled "Ayaklanma Din Perdesi Altında 
Tamamiyle Milli Bir Harekettir" (The Rebellion is a National Action 
Under the Guise of Religion)(14 September 1341(1925): The report 
included observations regarding the population and ethnic situation of 
the region, the spiritual state of the populace living in the region and the 
drawbacks of the administrative organisation there, and suggested 
various reform measures incorporating assimilation and settlement 
policies to be applied under martial law. 65
2. The Report of Cemil (Uybadin), the Minister of Interior, entitled 
"Kürdistan Umumî Valilikle ve Müstemleke Usulü İdare Edilmelidir" 
(Kurdistan Should Be Ruled in a Colonial Manner Under General 
Governership)(1925): Uybadin proposed the policies of settlement and 
deportation for the Turkification of the region to be ruled colonially 
under an Inspectorate General.66
64Cited by Mustafa Remzi Bucak, Bir Kürt Aydınından İsmet 
İnönü'ye Mektup (Letter from a Kurdish Intellectual to İsmet İnönü) 
(Istanbul: Doz Yayınlan, 1991), 68.
65For the text of the report see Mehmet Bayrak, ed., Kürtler ve 
Ulusal Demokratik Mücadeleleri Üstüne Gizli Belgeler-Araştırmalar- 
Notlar (Secret Documents, Studies and Notes on Kurds and Their 
National Democratic Struggle) (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 1993), 452-466.
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3. The Report prepared by the Turkish General Staff (1925).6 7
The Prime Ministry formed a committee composed of the Minister 
of Interior Cemil (Uybadm), the Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat 
(Bozkurt), Çankırı deputy Abdulhalik (Renda), and the Second Chief of 
the Turkish General Staff Kazım (Orbay) in order to compile and prepare 
a report out of the three reports suggested. This committee, named "Şark 
Islahat Encümeni" (Eastern Reform Committee,) met in accordance with 
the confidential decision of the Council of Ministers 68 and prepared a 
reform report to be submitted to the Council of Ministers. The Report 
proposed, among others, that
• the eastern provinces' should be governed under martial law until 
the end of the application of the reform program;
• Turkey should be divided into five regions of Inspectorate General 
and the fifth one would incorporate the provinces Hakkari, Van, Muş, 
Bitlis, Siirt, Genç, Diyarbekir, Mardin- Urfa, Siverek, Elaziz, Dersim, 
Malatya, Ergani, Bayezit and the districts Pülümür, Kiğı, and Hınıs. The 
Inspectorate General would be responsible for carrying out the reform 
program;
• there would be no civil and military judge in the courts with 
native origin;
• the emmigrees from Caucasia and Balkan states and the people 
living in Rize, Trabzon and the north-eastern districts of Erzurum, i.e., 
Lazes and Georgians, if wish so, would be settled in the East and their 
expenses would be met by the government. The Kurds who occupied the
66Bayrak, Açık-Gizli, Resmî-Gayr-ı Resmî Kürdoloji Belgeleri , 256-
257.
67Ibid., 257.
68The number of the decision is 2536 and its date is 8 September 
1341(1925). Ibid., 258.
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lands left by the Armenians either would go back to their old residences 
or be deported to the West;
• no native people of Kurdish origin would be appointed to the 
governmental offices in the East, even of secondary importance;
• those who speak a language other than Turkish in government 
and municipal offices and other institutions and organisations, in 
shopping districts and bazaars in Malatya, Elaziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van, 
Muş, Urfa, Ergani, Hozat, Erciş, Adilcevaz, Ahlat, Palu, Çarsancak, 
Çemişkezek, Ovacık, Hısmmansur, Behisni, Arga, Hekimhan, Birecik 
and Çermik provinces and town centers would be punished for 
committing the crime of resisting against the orders of government and 
municipalities;
• in places which are originally Turkish but are on the eve of 
assimilating into Kurdishness, and in Siirt, Mardin and Savur the people 
of which speaking Arabic, the branches of Turkish Hearts and schools, 
particularly girl schools should be established. In the first place, Dersim 
must be saved from assimilating into Kurdishness by immediately 
establishing boarding primary schools;
• in the provinces western of Fırat river, Kurds should be prevented 
from speaking Kurdish and by attesting importance to girl schools, 
women should be secured to speak Turkish.69
According to Avni Doğan, the First Inspectorate General between 
1943 and 1946, these measures were either not applied or could not 
become successful. For example, the settlement of the eight thousand 
Balkan emigrants in the newly established 17 villages in Diyarbekir 
resulted in an heavy failure. Due to various reasons, out of eight
69For the whole text of the report, see Bayrak, Kürtler ve Ulusal 
Demokratik Mücadeleleri 481-489.
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thousand, remained only 3560 emigrants in 1943. Therefore, argues 
Doğan, there is an imminent need for a long-term plan of assimilation to 
be pursued steadfastly without, however, resorting any means of violence 
in that violence is counterproductive. 70
In fact, over time, all these suggestions without exception were put 
into practice with varying degrees of success. Among these measures, 
settlement and deportation policies and special regional governance are 
particularly important.
73.1.2.1. The Policy o f Settlement and Deportation
The policy of settlement refers essentially to the settlement of 
Caucasian and Balkan emigrants to the traditionally Kurdish regions.71 
The underlying legal framework of this policy was the Law of Settlement 
(İskan Kanunu), dated 10 June 1934.
The Law of Settlement72 is a law disclosing the racial/ethnic 
dimension of Kemalist nationalism expressed around the concepts of 
race, blood and descent. Its apparent aim is to secure the unity in 
"language, culture and blood" The trio of Kemalist nationalism, unity in 
"language, culture and ideal" for the first time turned into the motto of 
unity in "language, culture and blood" This law is the apparent 
confirmation of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's observation that Kemalist racism
70For the 1943 report of Avni Doğan entitled "K ü r t  
Raporu"(Kurdish Report), see Bayrak, Açık-Gizli, Resmî-Gayr-ı Resmî 
Kürdoloji Belgeleri , 233-270.
•
71See, for example, the observations of Yusuf Mazhar, "Ararat 
Eteklerinde," Cumhuriyet, 18 August 1930, 3.
72 "İskan Kanunu, ” Law No. 2510, published in Resmi Gazete, No: 
2633, 21 June 1935 .
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was expressed through the policies of language and culture with the 
addition of outright emphasis on the axis of "blood"
The law is basically a law of assimilation, taking "adherence to 
Turkish culture" and "speaking Turkish as mother tongue" starting 
points, geared particularly toward non-Turkish Muslim ethnies, namely 
Kurds and Arabs.73 Another point of emphasis in the law is the 
regulation of the conditions of the admission of emigrants into 
Turkishness which spells out the criteria of being of "Turkish descent" 
and devotee of "Turkish culture" for thé definition of emigrant .74
73The first and second articles stating the regions of settlement 
make the targeted groups evident. The first article authorises the Ministry 
of Interior for the organisation of the location of population with respect 
to adherence to Turkish culture in Turkey. Accordingly, the second article 
specifies three regions of settlement. The number one region of 
settlement is defined as places where the population with Turkish culture 
is desired to concentrate., i.e., South and East Anatolia. Number two 
region consists of places assigned for the population to be assimilated 
into Turkish culture, i.e., central and western Anatolia. The number 
three region includes places to be evacuated and prohibited for the 
settlement and residence for reasons of geography, health, economics, 
culture, military and discipline. During the floor debates on the law, Reşit 
Bey, a deputy from Gaziantep, demanded the clarification of these three 
regions. As a reply, Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, claimed that 
this is accounted for in the second article. Upon the deputies' insistence 
that there is no specification as to where those regions are, Mehmet Bey, a 
deputy from Kütahya, responded: "These regions are three: one is the 
prohibited military regions (referring to Number three region), the other 
is places excepting the East (referring to the number two region). The 
boundaries of these regions would be determined by the government 
through a map." See, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, period 4, vol. 23, 14 June 1934, 
147-148.
74The article 3 spells out: "Settled or nomad people and tribes of 
Turkish descent and settled people devoted to Turkish culture who want 
to settle in Turkey in person or in group are accepted with the directive of 
the Ministry of Interior in accordance with the provisions of this law. 
These people are called emigree (muhacir). Whom and the people of 
which countries would be considered as devoted to Turkish culture 
should be determined through the decision of the Council of Ministers." 
See TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası, vol. 13, 781. Thus the law introduced a 
distinction between "those who are of Turkish descent" and "those
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In this regard, İskan Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi (The Regulation 
Concerning Settlement Exemptions) brings different conditions for those 
who are from Turkish race and those who have allegiance to Turkish 
culture but are not of Turkish descent.75 Article 7 of the Law of 
Settlement makes the same distinction between those who are of Turkish 
race and other emigrants in terms of the conditions they have to fulfil in
devoted to Turkish culture." Thus, according to iskânlı ve Serbest 
Göçmen Kabulüne Dair Talimatname (The Regulation Concerning the 
Admission of the Settled or Free Emigrants), "Pomak and Muslims who 
are from the peoples of the countries seceded from the Ottoman Empire, 
and not having formed an independent state of their own, speaking 
Turkish and being non-nomad" were considered as belonging to 
"Turkish descent" See İlhan Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Metinler, 
Mahkeme Kararları) (Turkish Citizenship Law: Texts, Court Decisions) 
(Ankara, 1960), 159. This definition is the clear manifestation of the 
culturalisation of race. The acceptance of "Ottoman and Islamic" features 
as the criteria for the definition of "Turkish descent" reveals the inner 
flows of Kemalist nationalism which could not escape from the 
"imperative of the history". But during the floor discussions on the 
twelfth article, the term "soy" (descent) in the law was changed into "irk" 
(race) upon the claims that "soy" may denote familial past and hence may 
cause confusion. In accordance with the Turkish History Thesis, Hasan 
Reşit Bey, a deputy from Muş, considered emigrants to Turkey who may 
not be attached to Turkish culture as Turks in race, which in fact makes 
racial criterion irrelevant. See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, 14 June 1934, 
144-145.
75According to the article 3 of the Regulation, Turkish consulates 
could give emigrant visa without the prior consent of the Ministry of 
Interior to those who are from Turkish race which want to settle in 
Turkey without demanding any governmental aid. But those who have 
allegiance to Turkish culture but are not of Turkish descent cannot be 
given emigrant visa without taking the prior consent of the Ministry of 
Interior and identifying the place they would settle, even they undertake 
the burden of settlement by themselves without claiming any 
governmental aid. See iskân Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi, accepted by the 
Council of Ministers in 27.12.1934, and issued in the Resmi Gazete, 5 
January 1935. Also see Unat, Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku , 163. In fact, the 
article 16 of the Regulation confirms the Regulation Concerning the 
Admission of the Settled or Free Emigrants regarding the definition of 
whom and the peoples of which countries would be considered as being 
of Turkish descent, which reflects the same historical and religio-cultural 
considerations around which Turkish descent was defined. See, Ibid.
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order to be admitted to Turkish citizenship. Needless to say, the 
conditions of admission for emigrants who are considered to be of 
Turkish race are relatively less strict .76
The mentality underlying the Law of Settlement may be better 
grasped through examining the statement of the reasons of the law, the 
statement of the reasons of the Report of the Temporary Commission for 
the Law of Settlement and the floor debates.
The resettlement of the population with the aim of assimilation of 
non-Turkish elements into Turkishness emerges as the main goal of the 
law. In this context, to increase native population via the admission of 
emigrants from Turkish rqce as well as the concentration of native 
population in the territorially wide regions in order to strengthen the 
Turkish race, policy consequence of the belief in eugenics, are particularly 
emphasised in the statement of the reasons of the settlement law.77
The Report of the Temporary Commission for the Law of Settlement 
is extremely revealing in disclosing the intention of the law-makers. The 
report, resting on the pseudo-scientific premises of the Turkish History 
Thesis (1932), claims that in the historical march from the Central Asia 
toward the west of the Turkish race, one thing was kept absolutely intact: 
"to live as master!" (Efendi yaşamak). "This is vested in the pure and 
rooted nature of the Turkish race."78 Not to be captive of others and live 
under domination are considered to be the two essential attributes of the
76See article 7 of Iskan Kanunu (the Setlement Law), T B M M  
Kavanin Mecmuası, vol. 13, 21 June 1934, 782.
77TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Sequence No. (Sıra Sayısı) 189, vol. 23, 1-4.
78The Report of the Temporary Commission for the Law of 
Settlement, 27 May 1934, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Sequence No. 189, vol., 23,
5.
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Turkish race. The Turkish race is in the state of permanent movement in 
order to carry the light of civilisation to all the places she goes.79
According to the Report, The Turkish republic made an ideal for
herself to exalt Turks whom she considers to be the children of the same
race who are united in mind, heart and language. Therefore those who
remained aloof to Turkish culture should be forced to adopt it.
Because the Turkish Republic could not deem appropriate for them 
the Turkish citizenship and the use of the rights derived from that 
given that they have not had allegiance to the Turkish flag. That is 
why this law delineates the ways of melting such peoples in 
Turkish culture. In the Turkish Republic, the Turkishness of 
everybody who says that I am Turkish must be evident and open 
for the state.80
The state of those who make use of citizenship rights and appear as 
if they do not have Turkish feelings cannot be deemed appropriate by the 
state. This law aims to create a unity of fraternity and citizenship in the 
melting pot of the great Turkish self-hood.81
As to the article 11 of the law82, according to the Report, its purpose 
is to secure unity in "language, culture and blood" (dil, ekim, kan birligi)
79Ibid.
«Ibid., 8.
81 Ibid.
82The article 11 of the Law of Settlement reads: "A: It is prohibited 
for those whose mother tongues are not Turkish to collectively form new 
villages and wards, worker and artist groups or to restrict a village, ward, 
work or art to their co-racials only.
B: The Ministry of Interior, upon the decision of the Council of Ministers, 
have to take necessary measures for the cultural, military, political, social 
and disciplinary reasons about those who do not have allegiance to 
Turkish culture or those who have allegiance to Turkish culture but 
speak a language other than Turkish. Provided that it is not done 
wholesale, deportation to other places and dismissing from citizenship 
are included among these measures.
C: The number of foreigners who settled in towns and cities cannot 
exceed the ten percent of the whole population within the municipal
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in the country. The principal duty among the affairs of country is 
considered to be the provision of the unity in “language, culture, and 
blood" over and above everything.83 The repeated stress on the unity in 
language, culture and blood is striking.84
The law of settlement, which is considered to be one of the principal 
laws of the Kemalist revolution by Naşit Hakkı Bey, a deputy from 
Kütahya,85 according to the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, aims at 
civilising the internal social structure. It covers population policy, 
emigration, nomadic tribes (aşiret) and reform of agrarian relations of 
working (labour) and would make Turkey a country speaking with one 
language, thinking along the same lines and carrying the same feelings.86
Deportation was the other coin of the policy of forced settlement. 
The Sheikh Said rebellion led to the reorganisation of the region apart 
from the military and judicial measures taken. Also, persons and groups 
who thought to have the propensity to create trouble were deported 
elsewhere and in their place Turkish emigrants were settled. In 
accordance with the Art. 1 of the law entitled ”Bazı Eşhasın Şark
boundaries, and they cannot form separate wards." See TBMM Kavanin 
Mecmuası, vol. 13, 21.06.1934, 783.
83The Report of the Temporary Commission for the Law of 
Settlement, 27 May 1934, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Sequence No. 189, vol., 23, 
12. Such measures as the prohibition of the use of language in public 
places, and gradually, in private places as well, the prohibition of different 
dresses, folk songs, in short, everything denoting to the difference in 
those districts in which people who speak different languages, or have 
allegiance to other cultures are rejected by the commission on the ground 
that it may not suit to all districts in the same way and that the aim is to 
assimilate them into Turkishness, not to exclude. Ibid, 11.
84See, ibid., 19 and 20.
85See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, 07 June 1934, 67.
86TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 23, 14 June 1934, 140-141.
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Menatıkından Garp Vilayetlerine Nakillerine Dair Kanun"{ The Law 
Concerning the Transport of Certain Persons from the Eastern Districts to 
the Western Provinces), 87 1400 people and their families in addition to 
the family of 180 rebels and convicts of indictable offences in the eastern 
martial law region and the province of Bayezid were made subject to 
deportation. 88
The forced deportation of Kurds was essentially secured through 
the 1934 Law of Settlement and 1935 "Tunceli Vilayeti Hakkında 
Kanuri’iLaw Concerning Tunceli Province), however.
Due to the heavy burden the deportation placed on the state budget 
and the resistance of Kurds to assimilation into Turkishness and their 
capacity to assimilate the emigrants into Kurdishness caused the Kemalist 
government to stop the policy of deportation and settlement, however. 
This policy was not particular to non-Turkish Muslim ethnies. It also 
involved the non-Muslim minorities, particularly, Armenians, and Jews. 
Before the passing of the Law of Settlement, Armenians living in the 
rural areas of the Central Anatolia were made subject to deportation and 
forced to settle in Istanbul, the province thought to be the centre of 
concentration for the minorities.89 But the most important incidence in 
this regard was the deportation of the Thrace Jews to Istanbul.
87TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası, Law No. 1097, period 2, vol. 5, 19 
June 1927, 431-432; Resmi Gazete, No: 624, 4 July 1927.
88Tunçay, Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 173. For some news as 
regards the deportation of Kurdish families to the East after the Ağri 
rebellion of 1930, see Cumhuriyet, 31. 07. 1930; 16. 10.1931; 18. 11.1931 and 
16. 08. 1932. The goal of these deportations were expressed as "Turkey 
would be the country of the honest citizens free from mischief and 
gathered around a single system ." See Cumhuriyet, 31. 07. 1930.
89This deportation was peacefully and quietly realised. Only 
Armenians living in Roxbury in Massachusetts issued a protest and called 
the League of Nations to take preventive measures in 15 April 1934. See
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7.3.1.2.1. 1. A Case o f Forced Deportation: The 1934 Thrace Incident
The 1934 incident in Thrace was a clear consequence of the 
application of the Law of Settlement. According to the Article 2 of the law, 
those who did not adhere to the Turkish culture had to settle in the 
second region assigned for the population to be assimilated into Turkish 
culture. Accordingly, Armenians, Greeks and Jews could settle in the 
second region only. According to the paragraph A of the Article 11, those 
citizens whose mother tongues were not Turkish could not set up in the 
communion a village, a quarter, a group or association of workers or 
artisans. In other words, there would be no village, quarter or association 
of workers or artisans that are wholly composed of people whose native 
language was not Turkish. This meant that minorities' settlements in 
Izmir, Istanbul, Ankara and Thrace would be dissolved and dispersed.
According to the paragraph B of the same article, the Ministry of 
Interior were empowered to deport and resettle those citizens whose 
mother tongues were not Turkish due to cultural, political, military, 
social and security reasons. According to the third paragraph of the Article 
13, it was obligatory to deport and disperse those who did not belong to 
the Turkish race in separate villages and quarters in which they would 
remain in minority.
Prior to the legislation of this law, Italy’s fascist leader Benitto 
Mussolini had made a speech in 18 March 1934. In this speech, Mussolini 
identified Asia and Africa as regions of expansion for Italy and talked of 
the Mediterranean Sea as "mare nostrum" (our sea). This speech
the Report o f the US Ambassador to Ankara, Robert P. Skinner, 2 March 
1934, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs 
of Turkey, 1930-1944, from the US Ambassador Robert P. Skinner to US 
Foreign Ministry, 867.4016 Armenians/11; cited by Ayhan Aktar, "Trakya 
Yahudi Olaylarını 'Doğru' *Yorumlamâk" ((To Interpret Thrace Jewish 
Incidents 'Correctly'), Tarih ve Toplum, 155(November 1996), 52.
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conclusively convinced the Ankara government that Turkey is under a 
serious threat stemming from Italy. In fact, in the last decade of the 
Kemalist era, Italy emerged as the major threat to Turkey. Therefore, 
Turkey’s foreign policy choices reflected this threat of identification.
Upon this speech, the Ankara government took some measures in 
expectation of a war with Italy, which would make the Bosphorus region 
and Thrace a war place. Therefore, Thrace region was remilitarised and 
the Jews in Thrace were decided to be deported to Istanbul. The newly 
legislated Law of Settlement provided the government with a legal basis. 
The views which ascribe the purification of Thrace region from 
undesirable elements (Jews) to the impact of the wave of antisemitism 
originating from Nazi Germany has nothing to do with the reality. 90
90The following sources attest the expelling of Jews from Thrace in 
1934 to the impact of Nazi Antisemitism: Haluk Karabatak, "1934 Trakya 
Olayları ve Yahudiler" (The 1934 Thrace Incidents and the Jews), Tarih ve 
Toplum, 146 (February 1996), 4-16; Avner Levi, "1934 Trakya Yahudi 
Olayları ve Alınamayan Ders" (The 1934 Thrace Incidents and the 
Untaken Lesson), Tarih ve Toplum, 151(July 1996), 10-17; and Zafer 
Toprak, "1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin ve CHF'nin 
Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of the Government and RPP in the 
1934 Thrace Incidents), Toplumsal Tarih, 34(October 1996), 19-25. But 
Ayhan Aktar shows that the incident was related with the conflictuary 
character of Turkish-Italian relations in 1934 by drawing upon the report 
of the British ambassador to Ankara, Percy Loraine, dated 22 July 1934, 
which reveals that it was the Turkish government who decided to purify 
the Thrace region from the Jews and do that through incremental 
harrasments and commercial boycotts But this order was leaked by the 
local authorities and the resultant plunders, rapes and torture occurred. 
As a result, some 5000 Jews left their homes. For the text of the report, see 
Ayhan Aktar, "Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını 'Doğru' Yorumlamak," 49. 
Aktar definitely refuses the claim that the impact of Cevat Rifat 
Attilhan's pro-Nazi magazine Milli İnkılap (The National Revolution) 
caused the incidents in that in a country where the Ministry of Interior 
could go from Ankara to Kirklareli in two days by using governmental 
means, it is impossible that such a fortnightly magazine the circulation 
and form of distribution of which were not known could cause such pre­
planned massive events. See Aktar, ibid., 49-52.
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The government gave verbal commands to the local authorities for 
the gradual evacuation of the Jews from the region. But due to the idle 
talks of the local authorities, the command lost its secrecy, and under the 
initiative of the local party rulers and members of some sport clubs, the 
Jews became subject to the various forms of torture. In 21 June, some 
Jews were beaten and their houses were sacked in Çanakkale. In 24 June, 
the leading figures of the Jewish community in Çanakkale received threat 
letters. As a result, some 1500 Jews left Çanakkale and sought refuge in 
Istanbul. In 3 July, two leading representatives of the Jewish community, 
Mişon Ventura and God Franko met with president Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and complained of the situation.
In the same day, the Jews in Kirklareli were attacked. They left their 
houses and went to Istanbul via railway. In July 5, Prime Minister İnönü 
referred to the incidents in Thrace, stressed its anti-semitic character, and 
made clear that those who were responsible for the events would be 
penalised. In 6 July, the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, went to the 
region to investigate the incident. The mayor, the chief of police and the 
president of the Chamber of Commerce were arrested. The Council of 
Ministers made an official declaration condemning the incident .91
91See Ayın Tarihi, 8(August 1934), 52-54. For the chronology of 
events, see Aktar, "Trakya Yahudi Olayları," 46-47. The Kemalist press 
lent support to the official declaration. Yunus Nadi pointed to the fact 
that the executive power belongs to the government not to the crowds, 
but maintained that due to the usurious habits of the Jews, their 
insistence not to speak Turkish and the fact that the security concerns felt 
for a region which is demilitarised made the ground rape for the events. 
His style is apologetic. See Yunus Nadi, "Trakya Musevilerine Karşı 
Yapılan Hareket Hakkında"(About the Action Made Against Thrace 
Jews), Cumhuriyet , 16 July 1934. For another comment stressing the 
"outside roots" of the incident see, Sadri Etem, "Hükümetin 
Beyannamesi ve Yahudi Meselesi" (The Declaration of Government and 
the Jewish Question), Vakit, 18 July 1934. The official discourse reaffirmed 
its adherence to the protection of all the citizens without discrimination.
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Cevat Rifat Attilhan's racist and pro-Nazi magazine Milli İnkılap 
was closed by the decision of the Council of Ministers. 92 Probably, with a
m
view to rectify its international image so as not to be blamed as anti- 
semite, Turkey admitted a large number of Jewish professors escaping 
from Nazi Germany to Turkey.93
73 .1 .2 .2 . Politico-A dm inistrative Means: Special Regional
Governance
Special regional governance was based on a purely military 
rationale through the establishment of the First Inspectorate General in 
1927, as suggested in the secret Eastern Plan, and the continuos state of 
Marshall law.
First Inspectorate General: The System of the Inspectorate General 
(Birinci Umumi Müfettişlik)' that was suggested in the Eastern Reform 
Plan was introduced first in the East in 1927. Its restriction to the south­
eastern provinces for a long time was explained, by Şükrü Kaya, the 
Minister of Interior, after five years with the lack of money and 
personnel. 94 According to Kaya, the establishment of the First 
Inspectorate General was a matter related to the general administration
See the statement of Kazım (Orbay), the Speaker of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, to the newspaper Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 8 July 1934.
92Aym Tarihi, 8(August 1934), 8. The magazine Orkun published 
by the renown racist Nihal Atsız was also closed.
93Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics The Transition to a Multi-Party 
System (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 268. For the view of a 
German journalist residing in Turkey arguing that there is no question 
of race (minority) in Turkey, see Margaret Künkel, "Türkiye'de Ekalliyet 
Meselesi Yoktur!" (There is no Minority Question in Turkey), 
Cumhuriyet, 26 January 1937, 5.
94See Cumhuriyet, 26 June 1932.
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and the imperatives of security. 95 The provision of law and order in the 
East was the intended goal with the First Inspectorate General.
The First Inspectorate General included the 17 provinces of the 
East and South-East Anatolia. It was an undeclared state of martial law. 
The Law entitled Umumi MüfettişlikTeşkiline Dair Kanun, No. 1164, was 
legislated in 26 June 1927. It divided Turkey into five Inspectorates 
General. The system was akin to the provincial system. The main task of 
the Inspectorates General was to secure law and order in their spheres of 
responsibility. What prompted the law was the envisaged need for filling 
the authority vacuum emerged after the termination of the martial law 
in the region in 23 October 1927. Ibrahim Tali (Öngören) was appointed as 
the First General Inspector. Later on, with the consideration that this 
system is an administrative regulation that may be used in other regions, 
the first one named the First Inspectorate General.96 In fact, out of five 
Inspectorate General, the four did not come into existence and later were 
abolished; but the First Inspectorate General continued its existence until 
1947.97
In this region, all the municipalities were governed by the 
kaymakams (the local heads of bureaucracy) except for some provincial 
municipalities kept under the control of the political centre. In the 
western regions, however, I f  was the governors who were mayors. In fact,
95Ibid.
96Tunçay, Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 175. Apart from the 
General Inspectorate, an organisation of peasant militia was formed after 
1930 in the Eastern provinces. See "Şark Vilayetlerinde Milis Teşkilati" 
(The Organisation of Militia in the eastern Provinces),Cumhuriyet, 24. 
10.1930.
97Bayrak, Açık-Gizli, Resmî-Gayr-ı Resmî Kürdoloji Belgeleri, 258.
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the existence of the local administration was nominal. 98 9This distinction 
stemmed from the security concerns felt for the East.
Another example of the special regional governance was the law 
entitled "Tunceli Vilayetinin İdaresi Hakkında Kanun," 99 aimed at 
removing the tribal organisation in Dersim and put it under the personal 
rule of a governor-commander at the cost of violating the constitution 
with a civilising (temdin) and assimilationist (temsil) viewpoint. The 
Article 32 of the law read:
The governor-commander is authorised to postpone the
persecution about any person and to delay penalties. This
postponement and delaying do not stop the passing of prescription.
The Art. 33 stated that the sentences of capital punishment are 
executed provided that the governor-commander do not see any reason 
for delay" These two articles violated the articles 26 and 103 of the 1924 
constitution, however.100 Article 26 of the constitution put the right of 
the postponement of the persecution and execution or delay of the 
sentences of capital punishment under the jurisdiction of the Turkish
9
Grand National Assembly. The Art. 103 pointed out that any law 
violating the constitution was null. When expressed during the floor 
debates, these objections found no satisfactory answer.101 As stated in the 
statement of the reasons for the law, the law aimed to take the "poor"
98For news reporting that the municipalities of certain towns in 
the East would be assumed by kay m akam s, see C u m hu riyet, 17 
November 1930.
99Resmi Gazete , No: 3195, 02 January 1936. The law date was 25. 
December 1935 and its no. 2884 .
100Hüsnü Kitapçı, a deputy from Muğla, pointed to this violation. 
See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 7, 178.
101See the speech of Raif Karadeniz, deputy from Trabzon, Ibid., 
178-180.
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people of Dersim under the close scrutiny and protection of the 
government by eradicating the tribal ties and organisation. 102
The law authorised the governor-commander also with the power 
to deport anybody from the region under his command. The stages of 
persecution were completely subject to the administrative will. 
Moreover, the provisions of the law would be valid retrospectively, the 
violation of a basic tenet of the rule of law. 103
C ontinuos State of M artial Law : Immediately following the Sheikh 
Said rebellion, the state of martial law was declared by the Council of 
Ministers in 25 February 1925 in Elaziz, Genç, Muş, Ergani, Dersim, 
Diyarbekir, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Malatya, 
Kiğı and Hınıs.104The state 'of martial law in this region continued until 
the end of 1927 when the region was put under the administration of the 
First Inspectorate General, which was an undeclared state of martial law 
ended in 1947. Thus the south-eastern region was ruled through martial 
law during the whole one party period, an indication of the fact that 
Kemalist nationalism conceived the question of the "east" in purely law 
and order terms.
102See TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Sequence Number(Szra Sayısı) 58, 
vol. 7, 25 December 1935.
103See "Tunceli Kanunu Özeti"(The Summary of Tunceli Law), 
Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938) (Uprisings in the 
Turkish Republic, 1924-1938) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1972), 489- 
490. The law remained in force until 1946.
104See "Şark Vilayetlerinin Bir Kısmında (Elaziz, Genç, Muş, 
Ergani, Dersim, Diyarbekir, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, 
Hakkari, Malatya, Kiğı and Hınıs) İdare-i Örfiye İlanına Mütedair Karar" 
(The Decision As Regards the Declaration of Martial Law in Certain 
Eastern Provinces), No: 114, Resmi Gazete, No:85, 25 February 1925.
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7.3.1.3. Exclusionary Face o f Assimilation
As stated before, Eastern Reform Plan included many exclusionary 
measures, among which was the ban put on the employment of native 
people in state organisations in the south-east. Assimilationist policies 
took the form of coercive and exclusionary character when faced with 
resistance. In this regard, the position represented by the Marshall Fevzi 
Çakmak, the Chief of the General Staff who considered the "Kurdish 
question" purely as an issue of law and order which disrupted the 
national security, was the sharpest one.
Marshall's position prescribed the containment of the provinces 
populated predominantly by the ethnic Kurds in economic, cultural, 
educational as well as socio-political terms. Marshall prevented any kind 
of state investment in the East. No factory and road could be established 
there without his prior permission, and in no case this permission was 
given.105 This paranoid state of security led the Marshal to conclude that 
educational facilities would create a Kurdish class of intelligentsia who 
would bolster Kurdish separatism. That is why, despite the heavy 
emphasis of Kemalism on educational reform, the number of schools in 
the south-eastern provinces* was decreased as compared to the imperial 
period. 106
105See Cemal Madanoğlu, Anılar (Memoirs), vol.l (Istanbul: 
Çağdaş Yayınları, 1982), 135. Nearly all regions of Turkey embodied 
"forbidden zones" determined by the Marshall. That is why an iron-steel 
factory was built in Karabük, a non-coastal town, upon his insistence 
His concern of national security was of obsessive nature. See Falih Rifki 
Atay, Çankaya: Atatürk 'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar (Çankaya. 
From the Birth of Atatürk to His Death) (Istanbul, 1969), 209-210.
106Samet Ağaoğlu, Demokrat Partinin Yükseliş ve Düşüşü: Bir 
Soru (The Causes of the Rise and Fall of Democrat Party: A Question) 
(Istanbul, 1972), 159. A Kurdish nationalist politician notes that all the 
high schools inherited from the imperial period were closed down in 
1926 contrary to the Kemalist educational mobilisation. This policy was
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In one of his editorials in the daily Milliyet Mahmut Esat
Bozkurt pointed to this issue and argued that "to leave the people of the
south-east without education cannot be a characteristic of the Ghazi's
Turkey."107 Esat complained about the fact that such slanders among the
people of eastern and southern provinces were quite common. This
implied that the government was against the illumination of the Kurds
and the desire to leave them in darkness crystallised in the non-opening
of high schools, all of which being the indication of the intention of the
government to rule that region in a colonial manner. These forgeries
could not be true, according to Esat, because
the government does not have any secret and special policy for the 
people of that region. For the government, the Turkish homeland 
was a whole. To deal with the citizens differently did not fit to the
well clarified in the following words of Mustafa Necati, the Minister of 
Education of the time, addressed to Mardin deputy Necip Bey: " Would 
we erect the armed Kurds of today before our children as the literate 
intellectuals of tomorrow?" See Bucak, Bir Kürt Aydınından İsmet 
İnönü 'ye Mektup , 66. Bucak was a deputy of the ruling Democrat Party in 
the 1950-1960 decade. Likewise, the railway network in the South-Eastern 
Anatolia reflected more the understanding of chemin-de-guerre (route of 
war) rather than that of chem in-de-ferre  (railway). Ibid., 64. The 
following statement of İnönü made during the opening ceremony of the 
Sivas railway station is the manifest indication of this understanding of 
ethnic containment: "The need of the national state for chemin-de-ferre 
(railway) is a question of national unity, national defence and national 
politics. It is a question of the protection of the national independence, 
the product of the centuries." Therefore, according to İnönü, with the 
reach of railway to the eastern frontiers, no mischief could exert 
influence inside. He sees the "eastern question" as "a question the root of 
which being outside" His concluding remark reflects the Kemalist 
position of the notion of "Millet-i Hakime": "There is no majority in this 
country which can rightly claim a national existence other than Turkish 
nation and Turkish community." See Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 31 August 
1930,1-4.
107Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), "Şark we Cenup Vilayetlerimizi Hususi 
Bir İdareye mi Tabi Tutuyoruz?"(Are we Making Our East and South 
Provinces Subject to a Special Governance?), Milliyet, 21 December 1931, 
1.
429
mottoes of the republican rule. As a matter of fact, there was no
reason for such a route to follow.108
That was because all the people living in Turkey were assumed to 
belong to the Turkish race. Esat asserted that the republic willed and had 
to carry the Turkish culture to this region and therefore open new 
schools. But the budgetary constraints were the major drawback in the 
inability of meeting the need of mass schooling. 109
In fact, education was a basic means of Kemalist policy of 
assimilation. Evidently, there might be no reason to preempt the 
Kemalist regime to open new schools in the south-east through which 
the Kemalist indoctrination of the populace could be possible. But the 
fact was apparent: "According to the latest statistics the least developed 
districts in terms of education are Diyarbakır and Erzurum provinces."110
Nevertheless, the fear of the possibility of the backing of Kurdish 
separatism by raising the Kurdish nationalist consciousness through 
education prevented the schooling in the Kurdish populated areas. The 
secession of Albania from the Ottoman Empire was a tried example in 
view of the Kemalist elites.
An interesting indication of this exclusionary mind can be seen in 
the objection of Kazım Karabekir Pasha during the period of the National 
Struggle to the compulsory military recruitment of Kurds, a point also 
referred to in the Eastern Reform Plan, on the ground that this would 
provide Kurds with better training and equipment, and hence increase 
the Kurdish threat. The thing to be done, according to Karabekir, was the 
usual policies of assimilation, e.g., generalisation of schooling,
108Ibid.
109Ibid.
noCumhuriyet, 8 October 1930.
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establishment of new roads and factories, and rationalisation of the local 
bureaucracy. The containment of the Kurdish populated areas with the 
Turkish population lines circumfering these areas was Karabekir’s 
another suggestion for the solution of the so-called "Kurdish question," 
again conceived as a matter of security and backwardness.111 Therefore, 
in the Kemalist era, people recruitted from the south-eastern region for 
fulfilling their military obligation were kept unarmed and worked mostly 
in road construction.
Heavy taxes, such as road and land taxes, the inproportionality of 
government investments between the regions,112 and the patterns of 
primary consumption and investment goods constituted different faces of 
this exclusionary stance. 113
Sporadic instances of physical elimination were another dimension 
of the exclusionary stance. To illustrate, the Kemalist press was full of 
news and articles demanding the total annihilation of the populace in the 
region of rebellion after the Agri revolt. This demand covered the rebels
111 All these suggestions are stated in an investigation report 
submitted to the Ministry of Defence in 1923. See Karabekir, Kürt 
Meselesi , 46-49. Later, Karabekir's suggestions became official policies, 
such as the continuos inculcation of the Turkishness of the Kurds, the 
establishment of the First Inspectorate and the Law of Settlement(Iskan 
Kanunu). See ibid., 181. According to Karabekir, "Kurds are Hittites, the 
first residents of Anatolia" and hence Turkish. Ibid., 234.
112I already noted that Marshall Çakmak did not permit any 
economic investment in the Kurdish populated areas. To illustrate, the 
road investments in the three provinces of the west were much more 
than those in the 15 provinces of the east. See Dr. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, 
İhtiyat Kuvvet: Milliyet (Şark) (The Reserve Force: Nationality (The East) 
(Istanbul: Yol Yayınevi, 1979), 120-125. The book was written in 1933 when 
the author was in Elazığ prison due to his communist activism. 
Heckter's thesis of internal colonialism is overtly obtained in the 
economic development levels of the Kurdish populated regions of 
Turkey and the rest in the Kemalist period.
113Ibid., 110.
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as well as the people living in that region. Thus the semi-official daily, 
Cumhuriyet declared: "Four villages on the foot of Ağri joining the 
rebels were demolished."114 The communiqués issued by Salih Pasha, the 
commander of the forces suppressing the rebellion, incorporated such 
statements as "the complete annihilation of the reactionary rebels and the 
destruction of their houses, the extermination of the rebels such that no 
one could survive, etc."115
Mustafa Remzi Bucak, a Democrat Party deputy in the 1950-60
decade and Kurdish nationalist, argues that since the Kemalists could not
dare to do the operation of the total annihilation of Kurds overtly, they
used rebellions as proper occasions of achieving that. Kemalist policy in
the aftermath of the İhsan Nuri rebellion emphasised the mass
deportation of Kurdish villagers, the exiling of Kurdish sheikhs and
aghas, and the forceful recruitment of young Kurds into the Turkish
army. The government also pardoned acts of vigilantism against the
Kurds during this period of repression, and in some cases legally
sanctioned such behaviour. For example, Article 1 of Law No. 1850
entitled "İsyan Mıntıkasında İşlenen Efalin Suç Sayılmayacağı Hakkında
Kanun" (The Law Concerning the Non-Consideration as Crime of
Actions Committed in the Region of the Rebellion) read:
Murders and other actions committed individually or collectively, 
from the 20th of June 1930 to the 10th of December 1930, by the 
representatives of the state or the province, by the military or civil 
authorities, by the local authorities, by guards or militiamen, or any 
civilian having helped the above or acted on their behalf, during 
the pursuit and extermination of the revolts which broke out in 
Erciş, Zilan, Ağri Daği and the surrounding areas, including
n4Cumhuriyet, 15 July 1930.
115Cumhuriyet, 15 September 1930. In his visit to the region of 
military operation, Marshal Çakmak asks the commander Abdullah 
Pasha "Was it these poor people who fought you?" by pointing to the 
corps of children, women and the old. Bucak, ibid., 76.
432
Pülümür in Erzincan province and the area of First Inspectorate, 
will not be considered as crimes .116
The passage of this law was instrumental in the "pacification" of 
the area of the First Inspectorate, including the major Kurdish areas of 
Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Hakkari and Mardin. According to Bucak, the non­
application of a similar law in the other regions of rebellion like Yozgat, 
Konya and Menemen, and its restriction to the East is the sign of the 
policy of delimited elimination. 117
As exemplified by the Tunceli Law referred to above, the personal 
character of both crime and penalty was widely violated. The retainment 
of the family and relatives of a rebel or guilty in order to force the rebel 
or guilty to surrender was a usual practice.118
Overall, assimilation was the mainstream umbrella of the Kemalist 
ethnic management strategies. They involved, however, exclusionary 
and eliminatory faces as well, not as the ultimate goal, but as a means of 
attaining it. Among other means of Kemalist ethnic management 
strategies were population exchange and settlement policies. Such 
strategies as indigenezation and accomodation based on the formal 
recognition of the ethnic diversity of the state, acculturation,119 and, 
needless to say, genocide were not among the Kemalist options
116See the Law entitled "İsyan Mıntıkasında İşlenen Efalin Suç 
Sayılmayacağı Hakkında Kanun" (The Law Concerning the Non- 
Consideration as Crime of Actions Committed in the Region of the 
Rebellion), Resmi Gazete, No: 1859, 29 July 1931.
117Bucak, Bir Kürt Aydınından İsmet İnönü'ye Mektup, 77.
118Kıvılcımlı, İhtiyat Kuvvet: Milliyet, 149-151.
119The continous use of the Imperial money instead of the newly 
issued "banknotes" in the Republican period among the people of the 
East and Southeast, and the non-integration of this region into the 
national market, an obvious indication of which was smuggling, reveals
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7. 4. T urkification  of N on-M uslim s
Kemalist regime recognised the existence of non-Muslim 
minorities and determined its policy of assimilation accordingly. The use 
of citizenship rights by the minorities, the existence and rights of which 
were guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (1923), was linked to the 
condition of their embracement of Turkishness. Since religion was 
excluded from the definition of Turkishness, this was thought to be a 
possible project. Nevertheless because of the international umbrella of 
legal protection the minorities had, they were made subject only to 
assimilation policies aiming at Turkification in terms of language and 
ideal, still in violation of the Lausanne Treaty. That is why Turkification 
policies basically targeted the Jews conceived as having no clear- cut 
language and culture peculiar to themselves, unlike Greek and 
Armenian communities who owned their well-rooted languages and 
cultures as well as nation states of their coethnies outside the borders,
which made their Turkification very difficult in comparative terms.
T u rk ification  p olicies were a coro llary  of the
assimilationist(inclusionary) and ethnicist(exclusionary) character of 
Kemalist nationalism, the aim of which was "to make at any rate those
who live in this country Turk."120 Despite their assimilationist leaning,
that voluntary assimilation was out of question for the people in the said 
region during the Kemalist era. See ibid., 46-55.
120The Speech of ismet İnönü in the Turkish Hearts(1927); cited by 
Tekin Alp, Türkleştirme (Turkification) (Istanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 
1928), 7. Rasih Kaplan, a deputy from Antalya, describes the need for 
Turkification as follows in his oral question addressed to the Minister of 
Interior: "Some Turkish citizens do not speak Turkish language 
communally. There are masses in group in many places which do not 
speak Turkish language. For example, quarters are being formed in 
Ankara, which speaks Kurdish or Albanian. ... Will Turkish still not find 
its proper place in the center of the Republic? Friends, we must overtly 
express. The Spaniards expelled the Jews, we embraced them. They still 
however speak the language of the nation expelling them as their
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these policies were at the same time anti-minority and exclusionary
policies. They reflected the deep insecurity felt against non-Turks in every 
field of life such that according to the Law of Public Employees (Memurin 
Kanunu), a Turk married with a foreigner could not become a public 
employee.
Several measures, including laws, were introduced to assure the
forced Turkification, the most important aspect of which was the
generalisation of Turkish as the mother tongue because "to speak the
same mother tongue is to a great extent to think in the same way. The
ethnies who want to be genuinely Turkish have to embrace Turkish not
as official but as mother tongue."121 To be genuinely Turk meant to
embrace Turkish culture alongside the Turkish language as the mother
tongue. According to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
Those who say that I am from the Turkish nation, first and 
foremost, should speak Turkish. It is not true to believe in the 
loyalty of a person who does not speak Turkish but claim to adhere 
to Turkish culture and community.122
These words reveal the clear leitmotif behind the campaign 
"Citizens, speak Turkish!"
Turkification policies denoted the securing of the ethnic 
Turkification the coverage of which ranged from everyday language, 
education, industrial and commercial life to the public personnel regime, 
private law and population, settlement. Of course, the crystallisation of
national language but not that of the country embracing them. Is it not 
time to take measures for this situation?... citizens living together with us 
have to speak our language." See CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı 
Görüşmeleri Tutalgası (9-16 May 1935) (The Minutes of the Fourth 
General Congress of the Republican People's Party, 9-16 May 1935) 
(Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), 149.
121Tekin Alp, Türkleştirme, 54.
122Utkan Kocatürk, Atatürk’ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri (The Ideas 
and Thoughts of Atatürk) (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1984), 182.
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Kemalist nationalism as a political ideology, the adoption of this ideology 
by the majority of the ruling elites, the conduciveness of international 
conjuncture, and the Lausanne treaty were the determinants setting the 
limits of the application of these policies.
The Kemalist constitution of "us" incorporated non-Turkish 
Muslims provided that they speak Turkish as the mother tongue and, of 
course, adhere to the republican ideal. Since the Turkification of non- 
Muslims, particularly Greeks and Armenians, was structurally 
"impossible" due to essentially religious and historical reasons, 
Turkification policies pursued against them assumed an anti-minority, 
discriminatory, exclusionary character, and hence they intrinsically 
formed part of the "other" of the Kemalist regime. 123
Due to the religious-Islamic colouring that nationalism, a wholly 
secular ideology in its origin, had assumed in the non-secular Ottoman 
polity, Turkishness came to involve an Islamic nature as an intrinsic 
character. Therefore being Turkish came to mean necessarily to be 
Muslim. This state of affairs gave .an anti-Christian feature to the 
Kemalist nationalism in the republican period, which contradicted the 
secular credentials of the state and the institution of the citizenship of the 
Turkish republic. 124 The thing to be noted is that this Islamic colouring 
did not lead to any restriction on the part of the state against non- 
Muslims while in the republican period it did, which shows that it was
123Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 
'Türkleştirme' Politikaları"(Turkification Policies Applied in the First 
Years of the Republic), Tarih ve Toplum, 156(December 1996), 4.
124Etyen Mahcupyan, "Laik Kesim ve Bastırılmış Irkçılık"(Laıc 
Segment and Latent Racism), Yeni Yüzyıl, 16 June 1995, 14.
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not Islam but the Kemalist nationalist logic that caused non-Muslims to 
remain as "half-citizen" in the Kemalist one party period. 125
In this regard, Islam in fact assumed a dual function in the Kemalist 
Turkification zeal. While the absence of religion among the components 
of Turkish national identity made the assimilation of non-Muslim 
minorities into Turkishness easier, it played a preventive role in the 
Turkification of Muslim ethnies. It rendered difficult the accommodation 
of these ethnies into Turkishness, and in the case of Kurds, it led to the 
politicisation of Kurdish ethnicity and hence the emergence of Kurdish 
nationalist movements. 126
Despite the constitutional prescription of complete equality for all 
citizens, this equality was a formal one and applied intra-groups rather 
than intergroups, which was inspired by the well-established notion that 
Muslim equals Turk and vice versa. As Lewis pointed out, in 
comparative terms, despite the elevation of their legal status under the 
Republic, the participation of minorities in the public realm decreased. 
The fulfilment of the military obligation by the minorities as unarmed 
and uncommissioned, their almost complete disappearance in the civil 
service127 and political life128, and travel restrictions put for Greeks and
125Ibid.
126Tekin Alp argued that religious unity will make easier the 
Turkification of Kurds and other Muslim ethnies. See Tekin Alp, 
Türkleştirme , 40. But he forgets that Kemalist nationalism do not confer 
any recognition to religion among its credentials, which was crucial in its 
failure to assimilate Kurds.
127Unlike the late Ottoman times, there was no public employee 
belonging minority communities.
128Only in the elections of fifth legislative period held in 8 February 
1935, four Christians were elected as deputies, all of whom rejecting their 
ethnic distinctions. 1. Berk Türker (from Afyon): A Turkist Armenian 
banker; 2. Dr. Taptas Nikola(from Ankara): The Greek doctor signing the
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Armenians in Istanbul* 129 constituted some aspects of the Republican 
discrimination against the minorities.130 Although this was to some 
extent related with the self-isolation of the minorities from socio-cultural 
milieu of Turks, according to Lewis, "nationalist republic could offer 
little to those who either would not or could not join the dominant 
group."131 Religion continued to appear on identity cards and other 
official documents. In daily usage, the appellation Turk was restricted to
election platform by uttering that I am representing the Turkish 
nation, not a minority"; 3. îstamat Zihni özdamar(from Eskişehir): A 
lawyer who claimed that the origin of Greeks was Turkish. His election as 
deputy angered the Greeks ; 4. Abravaya MarmaralI (from Niğde): a Greek 
doctor and a close associate of Atatürk. See Goloğlu, Tek Partili 
Cumhuriyet (1931-1938), 115. Also see Süleyman Yeşilyurt, Atatürk, 
İnönü, M enderes, Gürsel Dönemlerinin Ermeni, Yahudi, Rum 
Milletvekilleri (The Armenian, Jewish and Greek Deputies of the Periods 
of Atatürk, İnönü, Menderes and Gürsel) (Ankara, 1995). Serbest Fırka 
showed candidates belonging to the minorities in the general municipal 
elections held in 6 October 1930 and faced severe criticisms from the pro- 
RPP press on the ground that the loyalty of minorities cannot be taken 
for granted. The reply of Fethi Okyar, the leader of Serbest Fırka (Free 
Party), was that The republic’s laws do not make any distinction between 
its citizens in term of race and religion. For the discussions around this 
issue, see Rıfat N. Bali, "1930 Yılı Belediye Seçimleri ve Serbest Fırkanın 
Azınlık Adayları" (The 1930 Municipal Elections and the Minority 
Candidates of the Free Party), Tarih ve Toplum, 167(November 1997), 25- 
34.
129"Günün Meraklı Meselesi: Yahudiler Niçin Rumlardan ve 
Ermenilerden Ziyade Gayrimemnun?" (The Curios Matter of the Day: 
Why are Jews More Unsatisfied than Greeks and Armenians?)Vakit, 17 
October, 1930; cited by Bali, "1930 Yılı Belediye Seçimleri ve Serbest 
Fırkanın Azınlık Adayları," 30.
130Education system too had its share from Turkification policies. 
Many Greek schools were closed down and the education in the schools 
remaining open was either rendered difficult by the lack of financial 
resources or had to be made mostly in Turkish language. Stephen P. 
Ladas, The Exchange o f Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), 192.
131Bernard Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 350.
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Muslims. Therefore minorities were known as Turkish citizens rather 
than Turks in accordance with the Art. 88 of the 1924 constitution.132
Non-Muslim minorities were faced with a variety of popular 
feelings. Hatred emerged in the last decade of the Empire reached its peak 
after the 1918 Armistice. Many Ottoman Christians made their gladness 
evident with the allied occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia. 
Some of them played an important role in attempts to dismember the 
Ottoman Empire. Their purpose involved the dissolution of the Empire 
to be replaced by the proxy Christian states, subservient to the big powers 
of the time, Britain and France.133 On the whole, the Ottoman Jews 
remained loyal, however. 134
After the War of Independence, as the memories of the occupation 
receded into the past, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims 
incrementally improved. Although the non-Muslim minorities gained 
equal status via citizenship with Muslim elements, they remained 
separate and distinct, extruded from the body of the nation. 135
7.4.1. Legal Turkification
Mustafa Kemal Pasha emphatically stated during the National 
Struggle that non-Muslims would enjoy the same rights with Muslim
132Ibid., 351. Minority hating was manifested in various ways. 
Members of minorities could serve only as privates, regardless of whether 
or not they met the requirements for commission. See Karpat, Turkey 
Politics, 258.
133Salahi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction o f the Ottoman 
Empire (Ankara: Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language 
and History Publications of Turkish Historical Society, 1993), 450-
51.
134Ibid., 452.
135Ibid., 452.
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citizens. 136The legal embodiment of this commitment reflected in the 
article 88 of the 1924 constitution, which provided for the complete 
equality of citizens without distinctions of race and religion.
In addition, the Lausanne Treaty guaranteeing the rights of 
minorities in Turkey had been accepted before the adoption of the 
constitution of the Turkish republic (23 July 1923). Section III of the 
Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923)137 between Turkey and the allied powers,
136See "Mütarekeden Meclisin Açılmasına Kadar Geçen Zaman 
Zarfında Cereyan Eden Siyasi Olaylar Hakkında" (About Political Events 
Occurred in the Period Between the Armistice and the Opening of the 
Assembly), Söylev ve Demeçler I, 24 April 1920, 31.
137The regulation of the rights of minorities in the Lausanne Treaty 
is full of protections as regards the civil rights. Articles 38 and 39 contain 
provisions guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Turkey as inhabitants 
of the country.
Article 38 reads: "The Turkish government undertakes to assure 
full and complete protection of life and liberty, to all inhabitants of 
Turkey without distinctions of birth, nationality, language, race or 
religion.
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether 
in public or in private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of 
which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. "
The guarantees given to the minorities as inhabitants of the 
country were the full and complete protection of life and liberty and 
equality before the law. Article 39, Paragraph II reads: "All the inhabitants 
of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law. " 
As national of their respective countries the minorities are guaranteed 
civil and political rights. Article 38 provides: "Turkish nationals 
belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and 
political rights as Muslims. Differences of religion, creed or confession 
shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the 
enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public 
employment, functions and honours or the exercise of professions and 
industries."
In all other minority treaties all citizens are given the right to enjoy 
equal civil and political rights; in the Lausanne Treaty these rights were 
given only to non-Muslim minorities. The minutes of the Conference 
show that this stipulation was due to the declaration of the Turkish 
delegation that Muslim minorities, i.e., Arabs and Kurds, were 
completely satisfied with their status in the Turkish system and were not 
demanding protection.
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i.e., Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and Serb-Croat-Slovene 
state, (articles 37 to 45), guaranteed the status and rights of the non- 
Muslim minorities remaining in Turkey and of the Muslim minority in 
Greece. Through the Lausanne Treaty, all judicial capitulations and 
privileges of minorities except those related to private law were removed, 
and all legal affairs of them were included within the general Turkish law 
system in agreement to the promise of Turkish delegation to prepare a
The rights accorded to the members of minorities grouped under the 
name of "Rights for the Maintenance of Distinct Character" were:
Free use o f language: The fourth and fifth paragraphs of art. 39 
guarantees this right as follows: "No restrictions shall be imposed on the 
free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, 
in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at 
public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, 
adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish 
speech for the oral use of their own language before the courts."
The right to instruction and education: The first paragraph of the 
article 41 provides for public instruction to minorities in their own 
language in the primary schools. Private instruction is provided with the 
stipulations of Art. 40.
Article 41 reads: As regards public instruction, the Turkish 
government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable 
proportion of non-Muslim nationals are resident, adequate facilities for 
ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the 
children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own 
language. The provision will not prevent the Turkish government from 
making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said 
schools.
Religious Freedoms: Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to non- 
Muslim minorities by Art. 43, which reads: "Turkish nationals belonging 
to non-Muslim minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act 
which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances and 
shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend 
courts of law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.”
For the articles 37-45 concerning the protection of minorities, see 
Yılmaz Altuğ, Minorities in Turkey (Istanbul: Extrait des Annales de la 
Faculté de Droit d'stanbul, 1957), 103-107; also see Reha Parla, ed., 
Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin Uluslararası Temelleri Lozan, 
Montrö (The International Foundations of Turkish Republic with 
Documents: Lausanne and Montro) (Lefkoşe, 1987), 10-13. It must be 
noted that Art. 37 prescribes that Turkey shall be obliged to recognise the 
articles 38-44 as a basic law, and no law, regulation and official act would 
violate these provisions. See,* Parla, ibid.> 10.
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new civil code relieved of Islamic influences. 138 The new civil code 
(Medenî Kanun), which came into force in 4 April 1926, ended the 
ancient legal system based on religious community laws. Through this 
code, the new regime was able to regulate the issues of the private law 
and secured the legal Turkification of minorities by incorporating them 
into the legal sphere of the power container of Kemalist nation-state.
The right of minorities to settle matters concerning family law and 
personal status according to their own customs was guaranteed by Art. 42 
and its application was put under special commissions "composed of 
representatives of the Turkish government and of representatives of each 
of the minorities concerned in equal number" It reads: "The Turkish 
government undertakes to take, as regards non-Muslim minorities, in so 
far as concerns their family'law or personal status, measures permitting 
the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those 
minorities."139
Upon the adoption of the Turkish civil code, the non-Muslim 
minorities were forced to renounce the special privileges of maintaining 
their own law on family and inheritance matters guaranteed by the 
article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty, and hence all international legal 
protections they held lost its pertinence.140 The legal Turkification was 
complete.
138See "Lozan Konferansı Hakkında Ankara'ya Avdet Etmiş 
Bulunan Konferans Azasından Trabzon Mebusu Hasan Saka Beyin 
İzahatı" (The Explanation of Hasan Saka Bey About the Lausanne 
Conference, Trabzon Deputy and Member of the Lausanne Delegation, 
Who Returned Ankara) TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, period 1, vol. 3, 1 
January 1923 (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1985), 1173.
139See Seha Meray, comp., Lozan Barış Konferansı-Tutanaklar, 
Belgeler (Lausanne Peace Conference-Minutes and Documents), 
vol. 2 (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yaymı, 1970), 13.
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7. 4. 2. Turkification o f State Bureaucracy
It is a well-known fact that non-Muslims faced no restriction in their 
entrance into public service in the Ottoman Empire after the Tanzimat 
period. They served in state bureaucracy in complete equality with their 
Muslim counterparts. Even the secessionist movements among the 
minorities did not change this state of equality of opportunity.140 41
In the one-party period dominated by the Kemalist nationalist logic, 
the recruitment of non-Muslims into public bureaucracy was stopped 
first in de facto , and later in de jure terms. According to the article 4 of 
the Law entitled "Memurin Kanunu" (Law of Public Employees), "to be 
Turk" was a precondition for becoming a public employee. 142 Given the 
crucial distinction between the identifications Turk and Turkish citizen, 
as explained before, to be Turkish citizen was not adequate to acquire the 
right to work as public employee. 143 This clause restricted to be public 
employee to the ethnic Turks or Muslim ethnies liable to Turkification, 
namely, Lazes, Circassians, Kurds with some reservations, etc. As such, 
this law was overtly exclusionary and ascriptive because regardless of 
merit, it closed the doors of state to the non-Muslim minorities as public 
employees owing to the fact that they cannot be Turkified in ethnic terms.
140Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 
'Türkleştirme' Politikaları" (Turkification Policies Applied in the First 
Years of the Republic),Tarih ve Toplum, 156(December 1996), 8-9. Also 
see Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 15.
141 Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' 
Politikaları," 10-11.
142TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası, Law No: 788, vol. 4, 509-521; Resmi 
Gazete, No: 336, 31 March 1926.
143This state of affair was changed by the article 48 of the "Devlet 
Memurları Kanunu" (The Law for Public Employees), Resmi Gazete, No: 
12056, 23 July 1965.
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A striking manifestation of the ethnicist conception of Kemalist 
nationalism as reflected in public notices was the conditions of admission 
stipulated for the public school and state bureaucracy. The first 
conclusion to be derived from these notices is the fact that racism, 
however unsystematic, founded a place for itself in state policies. Drawing 
upon the scrutiny of these notices issued between 1936-1938,1 categorised 
them in five groups:
1. Notices that did not mention the terms of nationality and 
citizenship.144 145
2. Notices that mentioned the term citizenship only: In a notice 
entitled " Sıhhat ve İçtim ai M uavenet Vekaletinden" , 145 after 
announcing that "the conditions of admission to the Boarding Medical 
Student Dormitory this year are as follows", it stipulates in the paragraph 
A that the presentation of national identity card (Nüfus Hüviyet 
Cüzdanı) which signifies his/her Turkish citizenship is a must. The 
same condition was set in the first article of the notice entitled " Bursa 
Tarım Okulu Talebe Kayıd ve Kabul Şartları".146 The common feature of 
these notices are that they are concerned with the admission of students 
to the schools attached to state ministries.
144See "Maliye Müfettiş Muavinliği İmtihanı" The Examination of 
the Assistant Financial Inspector), Cum huriyet, 22.06.1937, 9; and 
"İnhisarlar Umum Müdürlüğünden: İmtihanla Amir ve Memur 
Alınacaktır" (From the General Directory of Monopolies: Chiefs and 
Employees would be Recruited), Cumhuriyet, 23.07.1938, 6.
145Cumhuriyet,, 23.06.1937.
146Ibid., 7 July 1938. For other notices of the same kind, see "Sıhhat 
ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekaletinden: Çorum Leylî ve İstanbul Neharî 
Küçük Sıhhat Memurları •Mekteplerine Alınma Şartlan Şunlardır," 
Cumhuriyet, 15 July 1938; "T.C. Orman Umum Müdürlüğünden: Bursa 
ve Bolu Orman Mekteplerine Alınacak Talebenin Kayıd ve Kabul 
Şartlan," Cumhuriyet, 4 September 1938.
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3. Notices that mentioned only nationality: All of this category 
stipulated the condition of admission as to be Turk, a narrower category 
than that of the Turkish citizen.147
4. Notices that mentioned the terms race and descent.148
İsmet Tümtürk, a pan-Turkist and the child of a renown poet, 
Cenap Şehabettin, points out that at the time of Atatürk non-Turks in 
descent and blood were deprived of some rights by referring to the 
condition of being of pure Turkish descent (öz-Türk soyu) in the 
admission of students to the military schools. There were departments in 
the branches of Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (the General Security
147Here are some examples: "Avrupa'ya Talebe Gönderiliyor: 
Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Genel Müdürlüğünden," 
Cumhuriyet, 04 February 1937; "Kültür Bakanlığından: Ortaokullarda 
Türkçe, Tarih, Coğrafya, Riyaziye, Tabiiyye, Fransızca, Almanca ve 
İngilizce Öğretmeni Olmak İsteyenler İçin Bu Yıl Sınav Yapılacaktır," 
Cumhuriyet, 07 June 1937; "Hava Okulu Komutanlığından: Hava Okulu 
Gedikli Kısmına Girme Şartları Şunlardır: A. Türk Olacak," Cumhuriyet,
14 July 1937; "Milli Müdafaa Vekâleti Hava Müsteşarlığından: Hava 
Müsteşarlığında Göstereceği Yerde Çalıştırılmak Üzere 210-165 Lira 
Ücretle Bir Mimar Alınacaktır,"Cumhuriyet, 07 May 1938; "Sümerbank 
Umumî Müdürlüğünden: Lise ve Ticaret Mektepleri Mezunu (50) 
Memur Alınacaktır," Cumhuriyet, 07 May 1938; "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Merkez Bankasından: İstanbul Şubesi için Müsabaka ile 75 Lira Maaşlı 10 
Memur Alınacaktır," Cumhuriyet, ljuly 1938.
148In all the following notices , being of Turkish race or descent is 
stipulated as a main condition of admission, in some occasions together 
with the condition of being Turkish citizen: "Ankara Askerî Baytar 
Mektebine Talebe Kayıt v£ Kabulü," Cumhuriyet, 24 July 1937. The 
conditions of admission is to be of Turkish race as well as Turkish 
citizen. The notice of "Askerî Veteriner Okuluna Talebe Kayıt ve Kabulü" 
cites the same condition. Cumhuriyet, 2 July 1938. "Türk Kuşu Genel 
Direktörlüğünden: Türkkuşu Teşkilatında Motorlu ve Motorsuz 
Tayyareler Üzerinde Öğretmen Olarak Çalışmak Maksadıyla Yetiştirilecek
15 Gence İhtiyaç Vardır: Aranan Belli Başlı Şartlar Şunlardır: 1. Türk 
soylu olmak." This notice mentions only descent and ignores citizenship. 
Cumhuriyet, 06 July 1938.
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Directorate) which were responsible for identifying the bloods of the 
applicants if they were of pure Turkish descent.149
5. Notices that mentioned both nationality and citizenship.150 15
In the same period, private sector notices revealed the same 
confusion as regards the identification of the people it wanted to recruit. 
To illustrate, a notice was entitled " Türk Genci Aranıyor".151 In another
9
notice entitled "Daktilo Aranıyor", being Turk both in nationality and 
citizenship were the conditions to be met.152 Being Turk or Turkish 
citizen were the set conditions in an another notice entitled "Memur 
Aranıyor" .153
The language of these notices signifies the hesitant and confused 
character of the state of mind prevailed in the Kemalist era. Overall, the 
certain thing in all these notices is the Turkishness of the people in 
ethnic terms to be employed or admitted as student. To be Turkish citizen 
did not suffice for admission. It was also required to be Turkish in ethnic 
terms.
149"Dava Arkadaşları* Atsız'ı Anlatıyor" (His Friends Describes 
A tsız),Boğaziçi, 42(December 1985), 32. For the confirmation of the 
practice of "blood inspection", also see Kıvılcımlı, İhtiyat Kuvvet: 
Milliyeti Şark) ,41.
150See Cumhuriyet , 27 February 1937. For a notice of the same 
kind, see ibid., 12 July 1937.
151Cumhuriyet, 4 March 1937.
i52"Makine Ticaretiyle Meşgul Bir Ecnebi Müessesenin Türkçe 
Muhaberatta ve Makine ile Yazı İşlerinde İstihdam Edilmek Üzere Daimî 
ve Genç Bir Memur Alınacaktır,"Cumhuriyet, 1 October 1937.
153Cumhuriyet, 25 January 1938. In another notice entitled "Harb 
Akademisi Komutanlığından" (From the Commandership of War 
Academy), it was stipulated that "two men dactilographers who were 
Turkish citizen and Turkish" will be recruited, which meant that non- 
Muslim minorities who were Turkish citizen but not Turk could not 
apply. See ibid.
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7.4.3. Turkification o f Capital and Labour
Kemalist nationalist elites pursued the same line of policy with the 
Unionists as regards "milli iktisat (National economy). This policy 
crystallised as the Turkification of both capital and labour markets. It 
mainly covered foreign companies working in Turkey and their foreign 
and non-Muslim personnel. The aim of this policy was the 
nationalisation of the enterprises owned by foreign companies and the 
securing of the employment of Muslim Turkish citizens in these 
enterprises. Through practical and verbal measures, foreign companies 
were forced to ensure that at least 75% of their personnel to be composed 
of Muslim Turks.154 This distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
Turks, which would dramatically reemerge in 1942 with the practice of 
"Varlık Vergisi" (Wealth Tax), has an apparent discriminatory character, 
and ironically, despite the militant secularist discourse of Kemalist 
nationalism, it denotes the inherent definition of Turk as Muslim and 
equates nationalisation unavoidably with Muslimisation.
Another aspect of economic Turkification obliged all companies in 
Turkey to make all their transactions, contracts and communication in 
Turkish in accordance with the law entitled "İktisadi Müesseselerde 
Mecburi Türkçe Kullanılması Hakkında Kanun”( Law Concerning the 
Compulsory Use of Turkish in Economic Enterprises).155 They also have 
to keep their accounts and account books in Turkish. Foreign companies 
had to use Turkish in their communication with Turkish citizens and in
154For the various instances of the forced Turkification of the 
personnel composition of foreign companies in the one party period, see 
Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin îlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' 
Politikaları," 9-10.
155See TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası, Law No: 805, period 2, vol., 4, 
556; Resmi Gazete, No: 353, 22 April 1926.
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their official account books. This law was the replica of a similar law 
adopted during the rule of the Unionists. The aim was to force the 
employment of Muslim Turks in increasing numbers in foreign 
companies In Turkey, not the learning of Turkish by foreigners. 156
7.4.4. Generalisation o f Turkish and the Campaign "Citizens, Speak 
Turkish!"
Generalisation of Turkish was the most important policy measure 
of Turkification endeavour. In this regard, the year of 1928 was a year in 
which the movement of Tiirkification assumed a new momentum and 
came up with the demand of speaking Turkish in public places and 
ensuring the mother tongue of minorities and their names to be Turkish. 
The reception of the Latin alphabet (1928), the current of the purification 
of Turkish and the Law of Family Names(1934) were the political 
reflections of these demands.
The Kemalist press launched a discussion started in 1928, which 
reached its peak in 1937 and continued until the death of Atatürk, the 
epitomisation of which was the campaign "Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuşl" 
(Citizens, Speak Turkish!), targeting not only non-Muslim minorities but
also non-Turk Muslim ethnies, particularly Kurds.
Avram Galanti, a Turkish citizen of Jewish origin, published a study 
entitled Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş Yahut Türkçenin Tamimi Meselesi- 
Tarihi, İçtimai, Siyasi Tetkik (Citizen, Speak Turkish or the Question of
156Another aspect of economic Turkification was the exclusive 
allocation of certain crafts and professions to Turkish citizens, the aim of 
which was the exclusion of some 15 thousand Greek etablis from the 
economic sector and hence to force them to immigrate to Greece. See the 
law "Türkiye'de Türk Vatandaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler 
Hakkında Kanun"{Law Concerning the Crafts and Services Allocated to 
Turkish Citizens in Turkey), TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası, Law No: 2007, 
period 4, vol., 11, 11 June 1932, 537-538; Resmi Gazete, No: 2126, 16 June 
1932.
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the Generalisation of Turkish-An Historical, Social and Political Study) 
in 1928.157 *In this study he tried to discern and examine the historical,
social and political causes of why some non-Turkish elements speak 
Turkish while others do not speak and to demonstrate the ways and
means to be used for the generalisation of Turkish.158 The only way of 
linguistic assimilation, according to Galanti, was to make Turkish the 
language of instruction in all schools, including minority schools.159
The mother tongue of part of Greeks in Turkey was Turkish.160 
Likewise, nearly all Armenians could speak Turkish. Some of them spoke
only Turkish, while some were bilingual.161 The Jews in Turkey, 
however, spoke a "bad" Spanish.162 The efforts to generalise Turkish to 
minorities went back to the nineteenth century. The minorities tried to 
acquire the skill of speaking Turkish in order to better benefit from the 
new regime prescribed by the Tanzimat Edict.163
157Avram Galanti, Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş Yahut Türkçenin 
Tamimi Meselesi-Tarihi, İçtimai, Siyasi Tetkik (Citizen, Speak Turkish or 
the Question of the Generalisation of Turkish-An Historical, Social and 
Political Study)(Istanbul: Hüsn-ü Tabiat Matbaası, 1928). In the cover page, 
Galanti is introduced as "Professor of Istanbul University and Member of 
Portugal Academy of Science" In the Introduction, Galanti states that 
"The Student Association of Istanbul Law Faculty demanded from the 
people to speak Turkish by considering the question of the generalisation 
of Turkish and determined that demand with the motto "Citizen, Speak 
Turkish!" See Ibid., 3.
!58ibid., 3.
159Ibid., 8.
160Ibid., 15.
161Ibid., 26.
!62lbid., 35.
I63ibid„ 62.
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The generalisation of Turkish as a governmental policy began with
the reception of non-Muslim students in secondary schools in 1867.164 
The claim of Greece in 1894 to annex Yanya on the ground that its 
populace spoke Greek enhanced Turkification efforts. New regulations 
were devised involving the compulsory instruction of Turkish in the 
Christian schools.165 16In the period of the Society of Union and Progress
(CUP), in addition to the instruction of Turkish, some courses such as 
Turkish history and geography were required to be given in Turkish. This
state of affairs continued until the foundation of the republic.
In the republican period, taking Turkification of minorities as a 
national goal, the new regim.e added courses of social and natural sciences 
into the group of courses to be instructed in Turkish.166 According to 
Galanti, for the achievement of the goal of making Turkish to be spoken 
at home, Turkish must be made the medium of instruction in minority 
schools, and in general, minorities must be encouraged to join state
schools rather than schools of minorities.167
In the Kemalist crusade for the generalisation of Turkish, a secret
circular issued by the Ministry of Interior in 1930 deserves particular 
attention. The circular considered among the jurisdiction of the 
provincial governors to incorporate the "Turks with foreign dialects" into
I641bid., 63.
165Galanti cites the texts of two government reminders (tezkire) as 
an indication of this. Ibid., 64-65.
166Ibid., 65.
167Ibid., 65-66. Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (The National League of 
Turkish Students) actively involved in the encouragement of the policy 
of the generalisation of Turkish and even made a meeting with the 
purpose of warning the minorities as regards speaking Turkish. See 
Goloğlu, Tek Partili Cumhuriyet, 92-93.
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the Turkish community through making Turkish their mother tongue. 
The governors were obliged to find out the most feasible ways and means 
for achieving this purpose. The common points of such a policy should 
include the following:
•determination of the names and population of villages speaking 
foreign dialects;
•to disperse the population of such villages into Turkish villages;
• to prohibit the reestablishment of villages and quarters with 
foreign dialects;
•to recruit the officials in these places from among Turks who do 
not speak the dialects of those places;
•to demonstrate that to speak Turkish and to belong to pure 
Turkishness (som Türklük) is beneficial not only spiritually but also 
materially;
•to encourage Turkish girls to marry Turks who do not speak 
Turkish;
•to disapprove and blame their clothing, songs, dances, wedding 
feasts and other customs, markers of nationality and race, to Turkify the 
names of their individuals and families and never to call them as 
Bosnian, Circassian, Laze, Kurd, Abhazian, Georgian, Turkmen, Tatar, 
Pomak; to change the name of villages in that dialect; to force them to 
speak Turkish with one another and have them to accept Turkishness by 
heart. In short, to make their language, customs and wishes Turk and to 
tie them to Turkish history and destiny is an important national duty for
every Turk.168
16&"İskana Tabi Tutulanların ’Türkleştirilmesi' Uygulamasına 
İlişkin Gizli Genelge," (The Secret Circular As Regards the Turkification 
of Those Who were Settled)No: 1/28 , (Ankara, 1930); cited by Bayrak, 
Kürtler ve Ulusal Demokratik Mücadeleleri, 506-509.
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7.4.4.1. Generalisation o f Turkish and the Turkification o f the Jews 
Unlike Christian minorities, particularly Armenians, and Greeks, 
the Jews always remained loyal to the Ottoman state. During the First 
World War, they joined the Ottoman army and formed voluntary units 
from non-Ottoman Jews. They contributed to the war expenses. As a 
result, in the Eastern front, the Russian forces massacred Jews alongside 
Turks in 1915; the Greeks burned the Jewish quarter in Salonica in
1917.169
During the period of the Armistice (post-1918), the Jews wholly sided 
with the Ottoman state both at the personal level and in community. 
Some Jews even joined the armed struggle against the invading forces. 169 70 
Unlike the Greeks and Armenians, the Jews did not boycott the 1919 
general elections. In the 1923 election, the Jewish community supported 
the Kemalist candidates.171 Overall, they proved that they consider the 
places they lived in as their homeland. 172
Although the secular character of the republic led to an identity 
crisis in the religious Jewish community,173 the Jews were least harmed
169Çetin Yetkin, Türkiye'nin Devlet Yaşamında Yahudiler (The 
Jews in the State Life of Turkey) (Istanbul: Afa Yayınlan, 1992), 169.
170Ibid., 176-77.
171Ibid., 195.
172For the loyal position of the Jews in the late ottoman and early 
republican era, see Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction o f  the 
Ottoman Empire , 440-41.
173The prohibition of the teaching of the classical Hebrew, was a 
major blow to the Jewish community. See Moshe Sevilla-Sharon, 
Türkiye Yahudileri (The Jews of Turkey) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1992) 101-102.
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by the reactive Kemalist nationalism, and ironically they lent support to it 
as seen in the case of Tekin Alp (Moiz Cohen). 174
The inability or unwillingness of the Jews to speak Turkish properly 
led to the exclusion of the Jews from the body politics. The question of 
language was the major obstacle before the integration of the Jews with 
the larger society. In view of this, the Jewish intellectuals spent great 
effort to generalise the speaking of Turkish within the Jewish community 
and set up several associations, one of them being "Türkçe Konuşturma 
Birliği" founded in Muğla in 1931.175
In order to establish national integration, in the first place minorities 
had to be assimilated into Turkish creed, mind and language. According 
to Tekin A lp(1883-1961),176 Turkification was a vital task for 
strengthening the Turkish society and preserving the Turkish culture and
174Yetkin, Türkiye'nin Devlet Yaşamında Yahudiler , 241.
175 Ibid., 243.
176Tekin Alp is a renown pan-Turkist intellectual of Jewish origin. 
His Jewish name is Moiz Cohen. He was actively involved in the 
activities of the Society of Union and Progress (SUP)in Salonica between 
1908-1912. He participated in the currents of Pan-Turkism, New Life (Yeni 
Hayat) and New Language (Yeni Lisan) guided by Ziya Gökalp. During 
this period, he publicised his ideas of pan -Turkism. Upon the fall of 
Salonica(1912), he settled in Istanbul. Inspired by Ziya Gökalp, worked as 
a unionist journalist of Büyük Mecmua. He theorised on national 
economy (milli iktisat) and wrote in periodicals Türk Derneği and Türk 
Yurdu, published with the assistance of the cultural division of the SUP.
In 1914 he wrote a book in German entitled Türkısm us and  
Pantürkısmus, considered at the time to be the bible of contemporary 
Turkish nationalism by the French historian René Pinon. In 1928, he 
published a book entitled Türkleştirme (Turkificationinvolving the 
Turkification of all peoples living in Turkey. Last but not the least, he 
published the most important and single book on the new regime 
entitled Kemalizm, published simultaneously in Turkish and French. 
The Turkish edition enjoyed great favour in Turkey, while the French 
one gained wide appreciation in Europe and America. See Jacob M. 
Landau, Tekin Alp, Turkish Patriot 1883-1961 (Istanbul: Nederlands 
Historisch-Arcaheologisch Institut, 1984), 287-88.
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awareness.177 The period when Turks were a parasite in political terms 
and non-Muslims in economic terms came to an end. In the new period 
of Turkishness the parasitic state of minorities, i.e., their non­
assimilation could not be accepted. Now both the state of being reaya 
(tax-payers) and of parasitism are abolished. The aim of Turkification is to 
make Turk those citizens who are not Turk in terms of race and origin 
but possess the potential of transformation into a complementary part of 
national organism. 178
The policy of "persuasion and pleasing" is proved to be more 
influential for nationalisation rather than force and violence, according
to Tekin Alp.179 The Turkish revolution turning "Ottoman" into
"idealist Turk", "kadi" into "modern judge" and religious colleges and 
dervish lodges into "schools" is capable of making Turk those citizens
whose material and spiritual benefits are tied to the homeland through
the means of "persuasion and pleasing".180
According to Tekin Alp, the determination of what distinguishes
non-Turkish elements from the genuine Turks would reveal the 
methods to be used for national integration. In this regard, the removal of 
differences stemming from the components of culture, i.e., social 
environment, ethics, law, intellectual and aesthetical understanding, and 
scientific and economic considerations would ensure the unity of culture 
(hars), and hence national integration. The exclusion of religion from the 
make up of Turkishness resolved the question of religious distinction.
177Tekin Alp, Türkleştirme , 16.
178Ibid., 20.
179Ibid., 10-11.
180Ibid., 9.
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The remaining most important element was the generalisation of 
Turkish.181
Viewing assimilation of minorities into Turkishness as the only 
means of preventing the domination of majority over minority, Tekin 
Alp asserts that those citizens belonging to minority groups had to be 
Turk in creed and culture as they were so in legal terms. Apart from the 
very recent past, there was no obstacle before their assimilation, and this 
was inescapable for those who did not want to remain as alien in this
c o u n try .182 Tekin Alp refused race and origin as elements of 
Turkishness.183 He argued that anyone who declared himself Turk 
should be accepted as such.184
Tekin Alp set down the following ten imperatives for the 
Turkification of minorities by adopting the renown Jewish "ten 
commandments": 1. Turkify personal names! 2. Speak Turkish! 3. Pray (at 
least partly) in Turkish! 4. Turkify your schools! 5. Send your children to 
state schools! 6. Become involved in state affairs! 7. Mingle with Turks! 8. 
Uproot the spirit of separation! 9. Do your share for the national
economy! 10. Know your rights!185
Pointing to the difficulty of Turkifying the Christian minorities in
Turkey, particularly due to the bad memories of the recent past, the 
religious bigotry dominating especially the Christians living in south­
181Ibid., 52-53.
I821bidv 29-32.
183Ibid., 22-23. But he returned back to the theory of race in his book 
entitled Türk Ruhu (Turkish Spirit) published in 1944.
184Ibid., 25.
185Ibid., 65.
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eastern Anatolia and the adoption by the Greeks of the "megalo idea"{big 
ideal), Fuat Köprülü, a Turkist historian and politician, pointed out that 
the only minority group that can really be Turkified is the
Jew s.186Therefore the policy of Turkification during the Kemalist era 
basically targeted the Jewish community.
The decision of some municipalities in 1937 to ban the speaking of a 
language other than Turkish within their frontiers led to a public 
discussion in the newspaper Tan between the chief-editor Ahmet Emin 
Yalman and the chief rabbi of the Jewish Community, Marsel Franko, as 
regards the generalisation of Turkish and the Turkification of the Jews. 
The discussion revealed how part of the members of the "other" of 
Kemalist nationalism perceived the situation in which they lived.
In his editorial entitled "Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe”(Turkish in Public 
Places),187 Yalman pointed to the ban put on the use of languages other 
than Turkish in public places by several municipalities,188 and expressed
186Ibid., 87.
187Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe"(Turkish in 
the Public Places), Tan, 4 March 1937.
188See, for example, a news pointing out that no language other 
than Turkish would be allowed to be spoken in public places in Dörtyol 
town: "Dörtyol'da Türkçe'den Başka Lisan Konuşulmayacak" (No
Language will be Allowed to be Spoken Other than Turkish in the Town 
of Dörtyol), Son Posta, 23 September 1932. It must be remembered that 
part of the Dörtyol dwellers was composed of Arabic-speaking people. 
According to another news report, despite the fact that Mardin was a pure 
Turkish city, its people spoke Arabic in public places. To prevent this, the 
governor of the city banned to speak Arabic in public buildings. But in 
daily life Arabic still prevails. This unpleasant state should immediately 
be ended through various measures of punishment, according to the 
reporter. See "Uğraşılacak Bir Mesele: Türk Mardin Niçin Arapça 
Konuşuyor?"(A Matter to be Dealt With: Why Does Turkish Mardin 
Speak Arabic?)Cumhuriyet, 27 November 1937.
The two motions of Sabri Toprak, a deputy from Manisa, as regards 
the prohibition of migration of Jews to Turkey and penalising those who
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his support for this action, though this issue was not among the 
jurisdiction of municipalities. He asserted that emigrants to Turkey 
continue to use languages they used in the countries they left (Greek, 
Bosnian, Circassian, etc.), which disrupted the socio-political unity of the 
country, and therefore had to be prevented. However, the situation in 
Istanbul was strikingly different, according to Yalman.
The homogeniesation secured through population exchange could 
not be valid for Istanbul, a cosmopolitan commercial centre. The 
speaking of a language other than Turkish by those whose mother tongue 
were not Turkish concerned these people only. It was beneficial to discern 
who willed to integrate with the larger society and who wanted to remain 
as an alien entity. In this regard, the state of the Jews was unique. All over 
the world, the Jews spoke the language of the society in which they lived, 
except Turkey. It was normal therefore to consider this state as an 
anomaly. As regards Armenians and Greeks, there was nothing to do.
Instead of de facto individual interventions against those who did 
not speak Turkish in public places, the policy of carrot and stick should be
do not speak Turkish are refused in the Internal Affairs Commission 
(Dahiliye Encümeni) on the ground that the legislation as regards the 
exclusive use of Turkish was adequate and therefore there was no need 
for a new law. As to the other motion given by the same deputy in 1936 
demanding the prohibition of migration of Jews to Turkey the 
commission decided that this issue was related to the governmental 
authority and outside its jurisdiction. See "Türkçe Konuşma Teklifi 
Encümenlerde Reddedildi" (The Motion of Speaking Turkish was 
Rejected in the Commission), Cumhuriyet, 11 January 1938. As a matter 
of fact any legalisation of the compulsory use of Turkish in private life 
would necessarily violate the Lausanne Treaty. Knowing that, the 
Kemalist elites chose the way of implementing this policy through de 
facto administrative measures rather than legal means, an indication of 
political expediency on the part of Kemalist elites given that Kemalism is 
in fact a revolution by law. The rejection of the motion demanding the 
prohibition of migration of Jews to Turkey shows that Antisemitism 
never has found any recognition either in imperial or republican 
tradition.
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pursued. Accordingly, the means for the free teaching of Turkish should 
be made available and the learning of Turkish by non-Turk elements 
should be encouraged while those who did not comply should be 
condemned. 189
Yalman's article essentially dealt with the question of the 
assimilation (intibak) of the Jews in the context of the use of Turkish in 
public places. Marsel Franko, the chief rabbi of the Istanbul Jewish 
community, in his open letter to Yalman, discussed the instruments of 
the Jewish assimilation into Turkish culture.190 According to him, "the 
question of language was only one aspect of the cause of in tibak  
(assimilation)." "The essential thing was not to speak Turkish but to 
think and feel like Turk." There was no hindrance stemming from the 
state or the Jewish community before the assimilation of the Jews. 
Moreover, assimilation was a desirable thing for the Jews, because "these 
citizens whose spirits were suffering quietly due to the sense of spiritual 
exile were right in their expectations to reach spiritual citizenship by 
freeing themselves from half citizenship(yanm vatandaşlık), from being 
guest (misafirlik ) and from being Turk in terms of civil code only(kanun- 
ı medeni Türklüğü ). In order to attain this goal, intibak (assimilation) 
must be seen as a state policy involving no coercion whatsoever. Marcel 
expressed his expectation from the state as follows: "State should treat 
assimilated individuals as genuine Turks so that hesitating ones should
189A news in the same date pointed out that no order was given as 
regards the question of speaking with languages other than Turkish in 
public places in Istanbul. See "Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe İçin Henüz Emir 
Yok" (No Order Has been Issued Yet as to the Speaking of Turkish in 
Public Places), Tan, 04. 03. 1937.
190"Dil ve Kültür Davası. Musevi Cemaati Başkanı Diyor ki" (The 
Cause of Language and Culture: The Chief Rabbi of the Jewish 
Community Says That), Tan, 6 March 1937.
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understand that the right way, the way to salvation is the road leading to 
Turkishness."191
7.5. C oncluding R em arks
Turkey experienced • a severe experiment of socio-political 
engineering under Kemalist leadership throughout the lifetime of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the leader of the so-called "Turkish 
revolution" A new state and a new society, i.e., a nation-state was the 
end-product of this engineering process. All dissident claims to the public 
realm were suppressed, and when possible, eliminated. The maxim was
191 Ibid. In an interview with him upon the open letter of Marsel 
Franko, Tekin Alp criticises Franko on the ground that the Jews are not a 
minority. Because if they were viewed so, then the state cannot attempt 
to assimilate Jews given the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty 
concerning the protection of minorities as distinct entities. The Jews do 
not constitute a minority either in Turkey or elsewhere in the World 
because they do not have a separate language, a culture or an ideal 
peculiar to themselves. Therefore they cannot be included within the 
provisions of the Lausanne ’Treaty concerned. To apply thèse provisions 
to the Jews means to deprive them from having a language, a culture 
and an ideal, which cannot be the intention of the politicians who made 
the Lausanne Treaty See "Tekinalp: 'Türk Musevileri bir Azlık Değildir' 
Diyor"(Tekin Alp Says: Turkish Jews Are not a Minority), Tan, 9 March
1937,1 and 10.
Reader letters to Tan respecting Franko's letter reveals striking 
opinions. Hasip Özyurt, a lawyer, was of the opinion that Jews cannot be 
remoulded as genuine Turks because their selfhood was kneaded with 
Judaism and hence it was not possible for them to acquire genuine 
Turkish (öz Türk) feelings. Conversely, a retired captain stressed his 
belief in the possibility of the Turkification of the Jews and complained of 
the fact that whenever the issue of speaking Turkish came into agenda, 
the question of advancing by degrees were being put forward. Another 
reader, M. A. Coşar, shared the same view with the retired captain and 
asserted that " I saw such Jews in France and England that they were no 
different from a French and an English in terms of language, feeling and 
culture." See "Türkçeleşme işi Üzerinde Marsel Franko'ya Cevap"(Reply 
to Marsel Franko on the Matter of Speaking Turkish),Tan , 6 March 1937, 
2; and "Bay Franko'nun. Mektubu. Karşısında Okuyucularımızın 
Düşünceleri" (The Opinions of Our Readers upon the Letter of Mr. 
Franko), Tan , 11 March 1937, 5.
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that "Turkey is for Turks", because there were only Turks in Turkey. 
There was no such thing as "non-Turkish Muslim ethnies" As to non- 
Muslim Turkish citizens, they had to be Turk if they wanted to be "full 
citizens".
The Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, after returning from a travel to 
the eastern provinces in the end of 1932, made a speech in the Parliament. 
This speech concisely summarises Kemalist position as to the nature of 
Turkish national identity:
The order and security of the country, the trust of the citizens, 
the application of the laws as they are written,192 and the 
consideration of being warm and coalescent of the whole country 
on the Turkish nation, Turkish state is becoming year by year 
increasingly visible and powerful(cheers). This year I travelled in 
many places of the eastern provinces. The attachment of the 
citizens to Turkish nationality and Turkish state, and the power of 
Turkish state to apply the Turkish laws in every comer of the 
country are overtly striking the eyes. This country is Turkey. Turks 
living there, the Turkish patriotism and Turkish nationalism are 
effective and dominant in the administration of this country.
We do not demand anything abnormal from any person living 
in this country in order to be Turkish nationalist and Turkish 
citizen. It is adequate for acquiring all the rights springing from 
being a member of Turkish nationality to love being Turk and 
accept being Turk (Bravo, cheers). Legal state is this. In our internal 
face, our sincere opinion too is the same. (Voices of 'bravo', cheers). 
When I travelled in the East and the West, I did not allow the 
concern of loosing any rights that every Turk obtains for any citizen 
who considers himself as Turk and acknowledges so. I assured all 
that a citizen who accepts to be Turk by heart as a distinction to be 
proud of and working as such possesses all the reasons for 
acquiring every right like me, like my all rights.193
192In fact, a characteristic feature of the one party period is the 
discrepancy observed between what is written and what is applied, as it is 
seen in the case of Turkification policies.
193"lsmet Paşa Hazretlerinin Mühim Nutkunun Metni" (The text 
of the Important Speech of His Excellency, İsmet Pasha), Cumhuriyet, 21. 
11.1932.
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This position differentiates Turkish citizenship from Turkish 
nationality defined in the image of Turkish ethnie, from a civilising 
perspective.
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CONCLUSION
The primary goal of the Kemalist modernisation was "to reach and 
surpass the level of contemporary civilisation" through a monolithically 
conceived western model of development which was considered to be 
universally applicable regardless of the uniqueness of diverse cultural 
environments. The equation of modernisation with westernisation was 
in the final analysis an ideological preference of the western paradigm 
over "eastem"(read Islamic) way of life.
The "Euro-centric outlook" formulated by the Enlightenment 
thought assumed an inherent duality in the "development" trend of the 
East and the West. As such, the West is viewed to form part of the world 
history characterised by change and development, and the East 
unchanging, therefore the ahistorical part. This understanding portrayed 
western domination as a necessary stimulus to the "production" of 
change in the otherwise "inherently" stagnant East. This ahistorical mode 
of analysis describes the East and the West as contrasting ideal types: 
dynamic, rational, democratic West versus static, irrational, authoritarian 
East. This Euro-centric world-view finds its concrete expression in the 
nineteenth century orientalist tradition as regards the role of 
religion(Islam) in the "decline" of the Ottoman Empire. This decline was 
essentially ascribed to the flaws perceived to be inherent in the cultural 
environment that was predominantly Islamic in the incapability of the
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production of change, i.e., "weak historicity", as Nilüfer Göle put it, of 
the Ottoman polity.1
This conception of Islam as an obstacle to "development" was 
thoroughly in line with the assumptions of the Kemalist tradition. 
Kemalist secularism aimed at "liberating the individual from the 
'oppressive' constraints of Islam-as-culture in his own community, 
thereby creating "a new national man" 2 Relegation of Islam into the 
consciousness of the individual at least and its total privatisation with 
no socio-political visibility at most were the mainstay of Kemalist 
secularism. Despite the difficulties of applying secularism in a 
predominantly Muslim country, the overall view of political landscape 
in the Kemalist era was impressive in this regard. As Lewis observed, 
Turkey in those years resembled a "positivist mausoleum".3
Kemalist nationalism was the first example of national liberation 
movements. The attainment of political independence accompanied by 
socio-political and cultural westernisation, and the creation of a new, 
"unique" national identity in order to restore the damaged collective 
honour characterise this liberationist nationalism. In other words, 
political independence (the National Struggle and the promulgation of 
the Republic), modernisation (nation-state and secularising reforms), 
and a new collectivity of national form (the new, ethno-secularly defined 
Turkish man) have been translated into actuality by the Kemalist
1Nilüfer Göle,Mühendisler ve İdeoloji (Engineers and Ideology) 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınlan, 1986), 10.
2Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey" in Islam 
in the Political Process, ed., John L. Piscatory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 217.
3Bemard Lewis, Emergence o f Modern Turkey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 480.
463
nationalism. The potential crisis of collective identity on the part of 
Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites was expected to be resolved 
through the argument that all civilisations and languages are of Turkic 
origin, and that Turkey is a western country uniting the western and 
Turkic poles of identity in herself.
The most essential aspect of the Kemalist project of society has been 
the creation of a national community based on a common sense of 
"Turkishness" as the defining focus of individual loyalties out of a 
religious community. The socio-cultural aspect of Kemalist nationalism 
was based on the denial of socio-cultural and economic differentiation, 
stemming from religious, ethnic or class-based cleavages in line with the 
Kemalist vision of a society based on the positivist conceptualisation of 
modem science where the manifestations of religious life are confined to 
the privacy of the individual consciousness and populist social solidarity 
which rejected any division along ethnic or class lines. Given this, Levent 
Köker rightly concludes that although Kemalism could not be 
totalitarian in action, it was so in its vision of transforming society as a 
w hole4 prescribing the total eradication of the remainings of the 
Ottoman-Islamic past. What was important for the Kemalist elites was 
the securing of "unity in people".
By adopting a national policy (millî siyaset), Kemalist nationalism 
openly rejected the "three ways of policy", namely Ottomanism, pan- 
Islamism and pan-Turkism as a solution for saving the state. It embraced 
a well-defined territorialism imbued with ethnic elements of Turkic 
character, symbolised in the name of Turk This rejection of three "pan" 
systems reveals the non-expansionist, and strictly territorial nature of
4Levent Köker, M odernleşme., Kemalizm ve D em okrasi 
(Modernisation, Kemalism and Democracy) (Istanbul: iletişim, 1990), 112.
464
Kemalist nationalism. Accor'dingly, Kemalist nationalism preserved only 
a cultural interest with outside Turks, which contained no political 
implication.
This territorially defined nationalism was basically related to the 
foreign policy, however. Particularly, in its ethnicist conception, 
Kemalist nationalism embodied racial/ethnicist elements going well 
beyond the defensive nature of the "liberation nationalisms". Since the 
ethnic hegemony of Turks was considered given, the ethnicist face of 
Kemalist nationalism has had an understanding of national character as 
natural, fixed and superior rather than formed in socio-historical 
contingencies. In this context, ethno-secularism emerged as the bedrock of 
Kemalist nationalism.
There has been an intrinsic tension between the civic- 
territorial(legal-political) character of Kemalist nationalism and its 
ethnicist conception.5 This tension was not resolved conclusively, though 
one may say that the latter was instrumental and secondary in relation to 
the first in terms of the rationalist-civilisationist core of the teleological 
orientation of Kemalist nationalism prescribing "total westernisation".
In devising a new principle of social cohesion, Islam was 
thoroughly rejected in the Kemalist attempt at creating a Turkish 
national identity. The consciousness of the new Turkish man was to be 
rooted in positive science, i.e., western civilisation, a recurrent theme of 
Kemalist nationalism preaching science as the source of all valid 
knowledge and behaviour. This crude scientism led to the emergence of 
a "gap of romanticism" which brought about the increasing use of ethnic-
5Tanıl Bora,"Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Söylemleri: Melez Bir Dilin 
Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügati" (Nationalist Discourses in Turkey: The Thick 
and Untidy Vocabulary of an Hybrid Language).Birikim, 67(November
1994), 12.
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genealogical and racial themes in the 1930s, a sign of the recognition of 
the helplessness of radical rationalism in the building of the national 
identity
In the Kemalist search for delimiting the ethnic-genealogical 
boundary of Turkish national identity, race was used as a constitutive 
element. Kemalist nationalism was not racist, however. In the first place, 
there has been no means for making racism part of the official state 
ideology in Turkey. Racism needs an anthropological and philosophical 
tradition of thought to rest on in order to become a state policy. There was 
no racist intellectual tradition powerful enough to nurture such a policy 
in Turkey. Moreover, no overlapping existed between religious and racial 
distinctions in the Ottoman empire. No racist breakdown ever happened 
in the Empire.
Apart from all this, racism is a totalitarian ideology and requires a 
totalitarian state, which can be the case only in modern industrial 
societies. Technologically highly developed states can afford to be 
totalitarian. Ottoman Empire and Turkey were at the periphery of the 
world economic system and had all the characteristics of a "backward" 
agricultural society. Coupled with the shortage of a qualified population 
the new Turkey faced, the adoption of racism which required the 
elimination of the "foreign elements", emerges as an extremely non- 
rational option. In view of the diverse ethnic composition of the polity, 
Kemalists preferred assimilationism as the state policy instead of 
systematic racism, an apparent indication of incomplete totalitarianism.
Kemalist nationalism defined belonging to Turkish community on 
the basis of the equation of nation with ethnie. At this point, the 
argument that all Anatolian peoples are Turk served the purpose of 
widening the extent of ethnically defined "us". In fact, ethnicity is an
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inescapable necessity which resulted from the negation of religion as the 
focus of individual and collective allegiance. Therefore, in the definition 
of Kemalistically defined # Turkish national identity, ethnicity is a 
secondary determinant. The main determinant is militant secularism 
based on the radical rationalism of the Enlightenment
The consideration of race as the constitutive element of ethnic 
Turkish identity may be viewed as the recourse of the Republican cause to 
the racial leitmotif due to the need of sparking mass mobilisation and 
emotive content which remained empty with the exit of religion from 
the popular imagery. This need was a structural one. The open conflict of 
Kemalist nationalism with the elements of traditional popular identity 
confined the republican cause to the Kemalist nationalist elites. Hence, 
the political component of Kemalist nationalism could not become the 
focus of popular allegiance. The crystallisation of ethnic Turkish identity 
on the axis of race, on the other hand, made the conflict between official 
and civil realms total. Use of citizenship rights were automotically tied to 
the adoption of an ethnosecular Turkish identity. In a way, in Turkey of 
ethnosecularist Turks, everybody had to be the children of Bozkurt(Grey 
Wolf).
The equation of nation with ethnie led to the rejection of ethnic 
differences in that recognition of ethnic diversity meant by definition the 
recognition of different nations. Therefore everybody in Turkey, 
including non-Muslim minorities, had to be ethnically Turk at the cost of 
violating the Lausanne Treaty.
It may at first sight seem paradoxical that Kemalist nationalism, 
which considers "social race" as the constitutive element of ethnic 
identity, is more assimilationist than being exclusionary in its dealing 
with existing different ethnic identities. Of course, this does not mean
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that Kemalist nationalism does not possess an exclusionary dimension. 
The Turkish history thesis developed as part of the Kemalist nation 
building project may explain this seemingly paradoxical situation. This 
thesis assumed a kinship-based historical continuity between successive 
Anatolian peoples considered them all to be Turk. The suggested 
common denominator between these peoples assumed to be the racial 
continuity.
The ethnicist understanding of Kemalist nationalism turned 
nation-building process into an ethnic project determined by the notion 
of shared ancestry, and accordingly, tried to Turkify the self-proclaimed 
Turks, i.e., non-Turkish Muslim elements and non-Muslim minorities, 
in ethno-secular terms. This ethnosecular process of the delimitation of 
national identity identified cultural identity with ethnic identity. 
Ascription of pure Turkishness (oz Tiirk) to people whose mother tongue 
were Arabic or Kurdish clarifies this ethnocultural identification based 
on the notion of shared ancestry.
The components of the boundaries of Turkish national identity as 
determined by Kemalism is not thoroughly consistent with each other. It 
is evident that Kemalist racialism defining the Turks as a race of Central 
Asian origin cannot be reconciled with the religious and republican 
definitions of Turkishness. Accordingly, from a purely theoretical 
viewpoint, someone who cannot prove his/her Central Asian origin 
cannot be accepted as Turk. Likewise, those who do not belong to the 
Muslims of Anatolia-Rumelia (religious criterion) or Turkish citizens 
who do not share the ideal of the Republic (republican criterion) cannot 
be considered Turk, although they are Turk according to the racial 
definition.
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All in all, there has never been a one-to-one correspondence 
between Turkish citizenship and Turkish national identity. The existence 
of Muslim ethnies namely, Kurds, Arabs and Circassians living within 
the frontiers of Turkey were rejected at the official level. The pseudo­
scientific Turkish History Thesis was forged in order to claim that these 
ethnies are Turk in terms of their ethnic origin. In practice, however, 
recognising their diverse ethnic origins, various ethnic management 
strategies were applied in order to Turkify them, ranging from forced 
deportation and settlement to forced assimilation, and sporadic 
manifestations of physical elimination.
As to the Turkishness of the non-Muslim minorities, their 
Turkishness was a necessary consequence of their living within the 
Turkish community, i.e., of the fact that they were the citizens of the 
Turkish republic, and not more. Kemalist regime determined its policy 
of assimilation accordingly. The use of citizenship rights by the 
minorities, the existence and rights of which were guaranteed by the 
Lausanne Treaty (1923), *was linked to the condition of their 
embracement of Turkishness. Since religion was excluded from the 
definition of Turkishness, this was thought to be a possible project.
Nevertheless because of the international umbrella of legal 
protection the minorities had, apart from the policy of settlement, they 
were made subject to assimilation policies only aiming at Turkification in 
terms of language and ideal, still in violation of the Lausanne Treaty. 
That is why Turkification policies basically targeted the Jews conceived as 
having no clear- cut language and culture peculiar to themselves, unlike 
Greek and Armenian communities who owned their well-rooted 
languages and cultures as well as nation states of their co-ethnies outside
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the borders, which made their Turkification very difficult in comparative 
terms.
Thus, the Kemalist constitution of "us" incorporated the non- 
Turkish Muslims provided that they speak Turkish as the mother 
tongue and, of course, adhere to the republican ideal. Since the 
Turkification of non-Muslims, particularly Greeks and Armenians, was 
structurally "impossible" due to essentially religious and historical 
reasons, Turkification policies pursued against them assumed an anti­
minority, discriminatory, exclusionary character, and hence they 
intrinsically formed part of the "other" of the Kemalist regime.6
Nonetheless, Kemalist elites envisaged an ethno-secular society 
melted in Turkishness, not a society based on ethnic stratification, at the 
top of which being Turks, though there were some bureaucrats and
intellectuals who advocated this view among them.
Overall, the emergent Kemalist definition of Turkishness within 
the evolution of the parameters of Turkish national identity during the 
Kemalist era was that the complete, genuine, or pure Turk was the one 
who embraced the cause of the Republican ideal, devoted to Turkified 
western culture, spoke Turkish and descended from Turkish origin. 
Needless to say, the bond of citizenship was only officially acknowledged 
and had relevance only to the extent the aforementioned elements 
existed. Those who lacked any of the said parameters, i.e., politico- 
cultural and ethnic-racial ones, had to be compensated for. Consequently, 
the attainment of purity and strength of race, the adoption of Turkish not 
only as official language but also as the mother-tongue, devotion to the 
monolithically defined Turkish culture intermixed with the political 
ideal preached by the new Republic were the suggested "compensators."
6Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 
'Türkleştirme* Politikaları" (Turkification Policies Applied in the First 
Years of the Republic),Tarih ve Toplum 156(December 1996), 4.
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APPENDIX A
TÜRKLÜK, MÜSLÜMANLIK, OSMANLILIK
Times gazetesi son nüshalarından birinde, memleketimizin ah- 
val-i dâhiliyesinden bahsettiği sırada, Ramazanın hulülünü bir devre-i 
sükun gibi telakki ederek, ıslahat ve tecdidat hususunda takip ettiğimiz 
meslekin şimdiye kadar hasıl ettiği muvaffakiyetleri bir lisan-ı takdir ile 
yad eyliyor.
Türkiye ahval-i dâhiliyesinin, Türkiye remamdaran umurunun 
niyyet ve mesleklerini böyle hakkıyla anlaşılmış görmek, bizi pek ziyade 
memnun edecek bir haldir. Çünkü Avrupa'nın cidden medeni, hür, ali­
cenap ve bitaraf efkâr-ı umumiyesini kendi lehimize celb edebilmek için 
yegane muhtaç olduğumuz şey, kendimizi anlatmak, meslekimizin, 
âmilimizin mahiyeti hakkında alem-i medeniyete bir fikr-i sahih vere­
bilmektir. Fikrimizi, kalbimizi anladıktan sonra Avrupa'nın bizi sev­
memesi, bizi teşvik ve teşci etmemesi kabil değildir zannederiz.
İzaha lüzum bile görmeyiz ki, bahsettiğimiz efkar-ı umumiye ve 
Avrupa, şark ahvalini bir fikr-i mahsusa tab'an, kendi istedikleri şekilde 
görmek ve herkese o surette bildirmek meslekinde bulunan bazı alakada- 
ran değildir. Biz hüsn-i niyyet sahibi, münevver'ül fikir Avrupa efkar-ı 
umumiyesinden, yani alem-i medeniyetin ekseriyet-i azimesinden bah­
sediyoruz.
Times gazetesinin bir aralık hakkımızdaki mütalaatı bizi rencide 
edebilecek bir mahiyeti haiz iken , şimdi böyle hakgûyane bir şekil al­
ması, bittabi' nazar-ı dikkatte tutulacak bir vakıadır. Şu tahvil ve takdir 
lisanını ancak son aylarda gösterdiğimiz icraata ve fiiliyata medyunuz. 
Demek oluyor ki, alem-i medeniyyet ve insaniyetin celb-i muhabbetine 
ve bu suretle vatanımızın tezyid-i kuvvet ve temin-i istikbaline cidden 
hahişkâr isek, lakırdıyı, nazariyatı, mübahesatı biraz ihmal edelim, biraz 
işe bakalım. Memlekette göz ile görülebilir, maddeten kabil-i takdir yeni­
likler , iyilikler yapmak için çalışalım.
Kemal-i teessürle itiraf etmeliyiz ki, biz ciddi surette çalışmağa an­
cak 31 Mart ihtilal-i mürtecianesinden sonra başladık. Bugün tecdid ve 
terakki namına ortaya çıkarmaya başladığımız âsar, ancak dört-beş aylık 
bir gayretin mahsûlüdür. Meydanda maddi asar-ı teceddüt pek çok ol­
masa da hükümetin halinde, heyet-i mecmuasında................. görülen ye­
nilik ve iyilik cidden mucib-i memnuniyet bir terakki-i maneviye delalet 
eder. Çünkü bütün dünya görüyor ki, genç Türkiye günden güne kuvvet 
buluyor, Genç Türkiye’nin dine, vatana, namus ve haysiyete fevkalade 
irtibat-ı kavisi bulunması, sözünün eri olması, memletette rehber-i hare-
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ket olarak adalet ve müsavat esaslarından başka bir şey tanımaması, hak­
kımızda hiss-i emniyet uyandırıyor. Şu halde, hükümet adamlarımızdan 
başlayarak, en aciz bir fırkaya varıncaya kadar her hamiyyetli Osmanlıya 
terettüp eden vazife, bu hiss-i emniyeti arttıracak, kuvvetlendirecek 
yolda müttehiden çalışmak ve çalışırken yegane hatt-ı hareket olarak 
müsavat ve adalet esaslarından başka birşey tanımamaktır.
Hiçbir zaman akıldan çıkarmamalıdır ki, 10 Temmuzdan 31 Marta 
varıncaya kadar geçen zamanda, bizi faideli suretde çalışmaktan mene­
den sebeplerden en mühimi ittihatsızlık idi. Bugün, şimdi zihinlerimize 
ve sinirlerimize gelen sükun ve selamet ile o eski günleri düşünecek 
olursak, adeta bir kabus hayatı yaşamış olduğumuzu teslimde tereddüt 
etmeyiz. O yaşayış, çalışış değildi. Bir didinme, bir boğuşma idi ki, hergün 
geçtikçe tepindiğimiz yerde zemin alçalıyor ve ayaklarımızın altında bizi 
bütün mahv ve ifna edecek bir felaket uçurumu büyüyordu.
Bu gafletin, bu birbirimize düşmenin acısını kanlı bir surette çek­
tik. Fakat o felaket bize istikbal için bir ders teşkil edebilirse, yine bir 
nokta-i teselli bulunmuş sayılabilir.
Bu şehrin muhitinden, ikliminden midir, tarihin pek eski zaman­
larına doğru irca-i nazar edilse, şu köhne Bizans'ın havasını, hep kardeş 
olan vatandaşların iki fırkaya ayrılmış mübarızları tarafından izhar edi­
len nida-yı mücadalât ile meşbu' buluruz, Bizanslar, eski Rumlar, bize si­
yasi düşman fırkalara ayrılan bu şehrin, şu münazaalar neticesinde ne 
elim felaketlere, hatta ecnebi istilalarına uğramış olduğunu, acı tecrübe­
lerle nakl ve hikaye ederler.
Birçok asırlar sonra hâyat-ı siyasiyeye yeni doğan Osmanlılarm da 
eski Bizans münazaat-ı mühlikesini taklit edercesine dahili nifak ve mü- 
barezata girişmeleri, hakikaten ibretamiz bir tehlike idi. Cereyan-ı tarihi- 
yenin kanun-ı bîemanı, adeta istisna kabul etmez bir katiyet-i riyaziye ile 
gafilleri cezaya çarpar. İşte biz de bu dahili, bu bîlüzum gürültülerden, 
kardeş kardeşe açtığımız harbden mahv ve harabîye, ecnebi istilasına 
maruz bir hale gelivermiştik. Bir mucize Türkiye’yi kurtardı. Kalbimizde 
buna karşı bir vazife-i şükran hessediyorsak, vatanımız uğrunda fedakar­
lık etmek lüzumunu takdir eyliyorsak, bunu ufak tefek, bîesas, sırf şahsi 
ve azamet ve nahvet cereyanlarından mütevellit iğbirarlara esir olma­
mak, birbirimizi sevmek suretiyle ifa edelim. Unutmayalım ki, memle­
ketimiz bir takım sadmelere göğüs gerebilmek için kuvvetli bulunmağa 
muhtaçtır. Bu kuvveti ancak ittihad husule getirebilir. Memleketimizin 
her türlü tehlikeden masun kalacak surette takviyesi, sine-i vatanda an­
cak üç türlü bir ittihat küveti vücuda getirmekle kabil olacağını zannede­
riz. Arzu ettiğimiz ittihatlar bir kere Türk sıfatıyla, sonra İslam sıfatıyla, 
en nihayet Osmanlı sıfatıyla gittikçe büyümek, gittikçe daire-i nüfuzunu 
arttırmak ve gaye-i kemale varmak suretiyle vücuda gelebilir.
Memleketi mahv ve harabiyetten kurtaran İttihat ve Terakki 
Cemiyetinin gaye-i emeli olan bu ittihad-ı umumiye-i anasır ancak böyle 
sıkı, esaslı temeller üzerine kurulmak şartıyla ve senelerce gayretle, feda­
karlıkla çalışmak sayesinde kabil olabilecektir. Böyle olduğu halde ortaya 
"cemiyyet" ve "ahrar" namiyle, az kaldı ebedi olmak tehlikesini iktisab 
edebilecek bir münaferetin tohumları atılmıştı. Cemiyetin muhafaza-i
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Meşrutiyet ve temin-i selamet-i vatan cümleleri altında hülasa edilebile­
cek olan gaye-i maksudu bütün Türkleri, İslamları, gayr-ı müslimleri 
aynı nokta-i ittihat etrafında toplayabilecek ve aynı zamanda hiçbir ki- 
mesnenin kanaat-ı zatiye ve vicdaniyesini rencide etmeyecek dercede va­
si' iken, tefsirinde her taraftan vukua gelen kusurlar neticesinde bu geniş 
düstur pek dar gibi geldi. O zaman hüsn-ü niyyetlerinde, namuslarında 
fedakarlıklarında, hamiyyetlerinde zerre kadar tereddüt edilemeyecek va­
tandaşlar birbirlerine düşman vaziyeti aldılar. Bundan memlekette birkaç 
mürteci, birkaç entrikacı müstefid oluyordu. Fakat işin içine hissiyat o 
kadar karışmış idi ki, o gürültüde salim bir fikir ile muhakeme ederek 
bekleyen netice-i mühlike-yi temyiz edebilmek gayr-ı kabil idi. Fakat bu­
gün itidal-i dem ile, basiret ile işi muhakeme edip de bizim aramızdaki 
nifakın vatanı mahvetmekten başka bir netice tevlid etmeyeceğini gör­
meyecek olursak, bir hiyanet işlemiş oluruz.
Erimiş bir madde tebellür edebilmek için bir nokta-i istinat arar. 
Meşrutiyet ateşiyle eriyen bütün muhtelif kabiliyetlerin, milliyetlerin te­
bellürüne nokta-i istidat olacak anasır ise Türk unsurudur. Türk unsuru 
bu büyük vazife-i vataniyeyi ifa edebilmek için behemehal son derece 
müttehit ve müttefik olmağa mecburdur. Ttirkler kendi aralarında birbir­
lerine düşman-ı can gibi bir vaziyet-i mukabele alırlarsa diğer unsurları 
nasıl daire-i ittihada davet edebilirler! Memlekette cemiyet ve ahrar taraf­
tarı yoktur. Memlekette erbab-ı namus ve haysiyet, erbab-ı gayret ve ha­
miyet ile namussuzlar ve entrikacılar vardır. Emin olalım ki, bu ikinci 
kısmın miktarı pek mahduttur. Birinci sınıf, ekseriyet-i azimeyi teşkil 
eder. Fîüsn-i niyet ve namus ve hamiyet sahiplerinin birbirleriyle anlaş­
mamaları için ise hiçbir sebep tasavvur edilemez. Cemiyete mensup olup 
olmamak, bu bütün bütün başka bir meseledir. Bunu, selamet-i vatan 
uğrunda birleşmek meselesinde ortaya çıkarmayalım. Hepimizin ara­
sında namus, hamiyet, fedakarlık ve fikr-i terakki pek kuvvetli bir rabita- 
i ittihat vücuda getirebilir.
Türk olmak itibariyle böyle birleştiğimiz gibi, İslam olmak itibariyle 
de diğer vatandaşlarımız arasında ilelebed bozulması gayr-ı kabil bir rabı­
tanın, bir mecburiyet-i diniye olarak mevcut olduğunu düşünmeli ve 
birbirimizi daha iyi anlayarak bu rabıtayı sıklaştırmağa çalışmalıyız. Bu 
vazifemizi hakkıyla ifa edecek olursak, yalnız şarkta değil, bütün dün­
yada islamiyetin muhafaza ve i'la-yı şan ve şerefini temin etmiş oluruz.
Gayr-ı müslim vatandaşlarımıza, kardeşlerimize karşı olan vazi­
femizi de, aynı fikr-i hakkaniyet ve müsavat dairesinde, kemal-i samimi­
yet ile tatbik ve icra etmek bizim için bir borçtur. Muhtelif ırka, dine 
mensup olmak, bizi bir vatandaş sıfatıyla tesis-i rabıta-yı uhuvvete izhar- 
ı muvafakattan men etmez. Bilakis buna sevk eyler.
İşte bu üçüzlü ittihat, arzu ettiğimiz veçhile saha-i husule vasıl ol­
duğu gün, biz de gaye-i emelimize varmış olacağız. İhtimal ki, bu gaye 
henüz pek uzaktır. Fakat necip ve ulvi bir maksada vakf-ı hayat ederek 
şu mevcudiyet-i sefilemizi yükseltmeyecek olduktan sonra, yaşamanın 
ne zevk-i manevisi vardır?
Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Tanin , 16 September 1325(1909).
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APPENDIX B
MİLLET-İ HÂKİME
İngiltere'de Unionist Fırkasının vasıta-i neşr-i efkârı olup, ayda bir 
kere intişar eden ceraid-i siyasiye içinde pek ziyade haiz-i ehemmiyet ve 
ve itibar olan "Nasyonal Ruhu" Müdürü Sermaks cenaplarından bir 
mektup aldık. Bunda İngiliz ve Türk kavimlerinin kendi aralarını boz­
mak isteyenlerin meydana attıkları şayialara karşı müteyakkız bulunma­
ları lüzumundan bahsedildikten sonra, İngiltere'de idare-i meşruta-i 
Osmaniyeye karşı son derecede eser-i bahs ve ve irtibat mevcut olduğu ve 
bugün Türkiye hakkında kavaid-i adaletin icabat-ı dairesinde hareket 
edilmesini talip bulunan seyr-i edvarda Girit politikasına karşı umum 
İngiliz milletinin müttefikan ve müttehiden irae ettikleri eser-i tasvip ve 
müzaheretin, hiçbir mesele-i hâriciyede misli görülmemiş olduğu söy­
leniyor ve risalenin bazı makalatı hakkında Tanin'in bilhassa nazar-ı 
dikkati celb ediliyor.
Mecmuanın havi olduğu makalat-ı mühimmeden birkaçı, mem­
leketimize aittir. Bu mey anda "Türkiye'de Islahat Teşebbüsatı" ünvanı 
altındaki makalenin sonlarına doğru okuduğumuz satırlar, bugün bizi 
"millet-i hâkime" meselesi hakkında bazı mütalaatta bulunmağa sevk 
etti. Kendi mütalaalarımızı söylemeden evvel makalenin bazı fıkralarını 
nakledelim:
"Bugün Türkiye'nin maruz bulunacağı müşkilat-ı hâriciyeden bir­
çoğunda ittihaz edilecek meslek, Türkiye Hristiyanlarının takip edecek­
leri hatt-ı harekete bağlıdır. Türkiye’de yaşayan Hristiyanlar şunu anla­
malıdırlar ki, hürriyet, müsavat ve uhuvvet avazları, el-yevm 
Türkiye'de millet-i hâkimenin yalnız Sultan Osman ile birlikte memle­
keti zapt etmiş olan cengaverlerin evlat ve ahfadından ibaret bulunma­
sını ve Türk imparatorluğu payidar oldukça böyle olması lazım gelece­
ğini ihlal etmez.
Millet-i hâkime olan Türkler, bütün tebaları için cins ve mezhep 
hususunda hürriyet-i tamme bahş ve ita ve bunu taahhüt etmekle kendi 
mevcudiyet-i hayatiyelerini bile tehlikeye koymuşlardır. Türk parlamen­
tosunda Müslim unsurunun tefevvukunu arzu etmek, Türkler için pek 
muhik ve adilane bir emeldir ve Türkiye’nin saadet ve selameti için bi­
rinci derecede lazım olan müesserettandır.
Müslümanlar yeni parlamentoda kendi azalarının adetçe Hristiyan 
azalardan dûn olduğunu görecek olurlarsa, neticesi behemehal 
Meşrutiyet idaresinin sonu olur.
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Bu suretle tevvellüt edecek heyecan ve buhran üzerine Türkler, 
ehven-i şerri tercih kabilinden olmak üzere istibdad-ı idareye taraftar ke­
sileceklerdir. Sonra, Hristiyanlara karşı muamele-i hasmane gösteril­
meye başlanacak, bunun seyyiesiyle hem Türkler hem Hristiyanlar 
mahvolacaklardır.”
İngiltereli dostlarımızın şu dûr-endişane sözleri, gerek Müslim ge­
rek gayr-ı Müslim unsurlar tarafından kemal-i dikkatle nazar-ı ehemmi­
yete alınarak uzun uzun düşünülecek mesaildendir.
İstanbul'da anasır-ı Osmaniyenin muhadenet ve ittihadı, ne kadar 
kuvvetli ümitler beslersek besleyelim, bugün bir vakıa-i hakikiye şek­
linde binlerce misali delaili ile gözlerimizin önünde durduğu için, mu­
hakkak olarak biliyoruz ki, bu devletin bekasını Müslim unsuru kadar is­
teyen ve çalışan yoktur. Bugün şu devleti, kendisine yalnız Müslim un­
suru mal ediyor, "Benim hükümetim!" diyor. Anasır-ı saire az-çok hep 
bir emel arkasındadır. Bunlar muhtelif mahreklerde deveran eden ec- 
ram-ı semaviyeye benzer. Hepsi başka bir merkeze tabidir.
Eğer hüküm ve nüfuzu biz bugün anasır-ı gayr-ı Müslimeye tevdi 
edecek olursak, hiç şüphe yok ki, bunların icraat ve harekatında yegane 
rehber menfaat-ı Osmaniye endişesi olmayacaktır.
Demek oluyor ki, biz Müslim unsur, memleketin şu halinde haya­
tımızı kutarmak istersek, hüküm ve nüfuzu kendi elimizde tutmalıyız 
ve anasır-ı saireye bunu kaptırmamalıyız.
Şimdi Meşrutiyet hükümetini ilan ve kabul ettik. Medeni millet­
lere layık usul-i idare altında yaşayacağız. Binaenaleyh, "hüküm ve nü­
fuzu kendi elimizde tutalım" demek, "anasır-ı gayr-ı Müslimeyi kendi­
mizle müsavi addetmeyelim, onlara hukuk-u siyasiye vermeyelim, ca­
nımızın istediğini icra ederek, gayr-ı Müslimlerin haklarına tecavüz ede­
lim" manasıyla tefsir edilmemelidir. Mugayir-i hak ve adalet olan bu ha­
rekat, yirminci asr-ı medeniyede gayr-ı kabil-i tatbiktir. Bu hakikati takdir 
edemediğimiz için devletimizin birçok parçasını elimizden kaçırdık ve 
az kaldı mevcudiyetimizi de kaybediyorduk.
Meşrutiyet usulü ile idare olunan memleketimizde, hüküm ve 
nüfuz parlamentodadır. Parlamentoda hüküm ve nüfuz ise ekseriyetle 
temin edilir. Onun için bugün parlamentoda ekseriyeti kazanmak, 
Türkler için hayat ve memat meselesidir. Parlamentoda ekseriyeti ka­
zanmak da, intihabat kanununu işimize geldiği surette tatbik suretiyle is­
tihsal edilmez. Kanun haricinde en ufak bir hareketin vukuuna artık ce­
vaz veremeyiz. Onun için ekseriyeti, kanunun tecviz ettiği vesaite müra­
caatla kazanmalıdır.
Memalik-i Osmaniyede ekseriyet ahali-i Müslimede olduğu cihetle 
mebusanın ekseriyeti de Müslümanlarda bulunacağına emin yaşamak 
ve gözü bağlı durmak, sonra pek acı bir uyanma ile netice verir. Teessüfle 
görüyoruz ki Müslim unsura mensup çoğu, intihabatın ehemmiyetini 
takdir etmiyor, rey vermeğe gelmiyor. Rey verenler ittihat edemedikleri 
için, ellerinde bulunan iktidar ile mütenasip mebus çıkaramıyorlar. 
Namzetlerin takarrurunda müzakereler edilirken menafi-i ulviye-i va­
tan mülahazasıyla fedakârlıklar pek ihtiyar olunmuyor. Parlamentoda 
ekseriyet Müslim unsurda olsa bile, bunlardan menafi-i hakikiye-i va­
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tana muvafık icraat südur edebilmek için aralarında fırkalar vücut bul­
mamak, ırk mülahazaları meydan almamak iktiza eder. Böyle ufak tefek 
mübayenetler, "temin-i selamet-i vatan" endişesinden ibaret olan men- 
faat-ı müştereke karşısında zail olmak iktiza eder. Hakiki vatanperverlik 
birçok ahvalde fedakarlık kelimesiyle müteradiftir. Bugün uhde-i hayati- 
yemize düşen şu vazife-i vatanperveraneyi hakkıyla yapmayıp da birbi­
rimize düşecek olursak, o zaman İngiltereli dostlarımızın korktukları 
akibetin tahakkukundan biz de korkmalıyız.
Filhakika, parlamentoda gayr-ı Müslim unsurlar gerek adeden ve 
gerek adeden olmayıp da bizim aramızdaki tefrikaya nisbeten bize faik 
zuhur edecek olurlarsa ne yapacağız? Yapacakları kanunlar, kabil değil 
millet-i hâkimenin menfaatine olmayacaktır. Buna karşı ne yapacağız? 
Meclis-i Mebusan'ı mı dağıtacağız? Gelecek Meclis-i Mebusan'da, temini 
galebe edeceğimize neredert emin olacağız? Hem Meclis-i Mebusanı da­
ğıtmak tedbiri tehlikeli bir silaha benzer. Onun için pek nadir ahvalde, 
bir zaruret-i fevkaladeye mebni yapılmalıdır. Görülüyor ki, Müslim un­
sur için düşünülecek başlıca noktalar bunlardır. Bu fıkradan biraz evvel 
söylediğimiz veçhile, gayr-ı Müslim unsurlar da büyük bir hisse-i intibah 
alabilirler. Şimdiye kadar kendileri bu memlekette ne idiler?
Islahat fermanlarına, Tanzimat hatlarına rağmen, hukuk-u siyasiye 
nokta-i nazarından bir mahkum, bir hiç idiler. Vakıa, millet-i hâkime 
denilen Türkler kendilerine nisbetle daha ziyade esir bulunuyorlardı. 
Türklerin hiç hamisi olmadığı halde, akvam-ı Hristiyaniyenin arkasında 
koca bir Avrupa vardı ki, idare-i müstebidenin haysiyetsizliğinden isti­
fade ederek, her vesile ile umur-u dâhiliyemize müdahale ederdi.
Onun için Hristiyanlar mevkilerinin acılığını ihtimaldir ki, o ka­
dar hissetmiyorlardı. Bugün Genç Türkler, gayr-ı Müslim vatandaşlarına 
da Müslim unsuru kadar hukuk-u siyasiye temin ediyorlar. Kanun na­
zarında suret-i katiyede müsavat kaidesine riayet edilmesini, meslekleri­
nin birinci şerait-i cümlesinden olarak ileriye sürüyorlar.
Fakat gayr-ı Müslimler de Müslimler kadar hukuka nail olacaklar­
dır demek, acaba bu memleket, Rum memleketi yahut Ermeni memle­
keti yahut Bulgar memleketi olacak demek midir? Hayır, bu memleket 
Türk memleketi olacaktır. Osmanlı namı altında hepimiz birleşeceğiz. 
Fakat devletin şekli hiçbir zaman Türk milletinin menfaat-ı mahsusası 
haricinde tahavvüle uğramayacak, Müslim unsurun menafi-i hayatiyesi 
hilafında hareket olunamayacaktır.
Rum gazetelerinden biri, "madem ki Tanin hep birden şu vatan-ı 
müşterekin selametine çalışıcağız diyordu. O halde neden, Rumlardan 
fazla mebus çıkacak diye endişe ediyor?" sualini irad etmekde idi. Buna 
işte şimdi kendiliğinden cevap veriliyor. Çünkü bir Müslim unsurun 
menfaatinin diğer ellerde hakkıyla müdafaa edilemeyeceğini biliyoruz. 
Karşımızdaki unsurların da bize bu suretle mukabele edebilmeleri, yani 
Müslim unsurun da "gayr-ı Müslim unsurun menafiini muhafaza meş­
kuktür," yolunda söz söylemeleri yanlış olur. Muhafaza edilecek hukuk 
yalnız emniyet ve asayiş, adalet gibi hukuk-u zaruriyeden olsa idi, o za­
man hiç endişe etmeyebilirdik. Meclis-i Mebusan'da ekseriyet-i azime 
Rumlarda da, Ermenilerde de olsa, mahkemeler de Türklerin aleyhine
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hüküm verilsin, Türklere zulmedilsin şeklinde bir kanun yapılmaz. 
Fakat farzedelim ki, Osmanlı parlamentosunda ekseriyet-i mutlaka 
Rumlarda bulunsun ve Girit'in Yunanistan'a ilhakı meselesi müzake­
reye konulsun. Bunu tecavüz etmeyecek, hatta Yanya taraflarından da 
arazi terk etmeğe kalkmayacak Rum mebuslarının miktarı, insaf edilsin, 
acaba kaça baliğ olur? Ekseriyeti Bulgar mebuslardan müteşekkil bir 
Osmanlı parlamentosunun, Makedonya hakkında vereceği karar da 
şüphe götürmez zannederiz.
Bu memleketi Türkler zaptetti. Fethetmek için yaptıkları fedakar­
lıklar tarihin en hayretbahş sahifelerini, en parlak mefahirini teşkil eder. 
Su-i idareyle Türklerin kuvvetine halel gelince, memleketin büyük kıs­
mını ellerinden kaybettiler. Fakat geride kalan en ufak bir parçayı bile 
kanları pahasına hıfz eylediler. Türklerin el-yevm zîr-i idarelerinde bu­
lunan memalikde asırlardan beri devam etmiş hukuk-u tarihiyeleri, hu- 
kuk-u fatihaneleri var. Bu memleketi, anasır-ı gayr-ı Müslimenin hiçbi­
rinin menafi-i mahsusasına baziçe yapamazlar. Osmanlı namı altında ya­
şayan Musevilere, Ermenilere, Rumlara, Bulgarlara, hasılı bütün anasır-ı 
gayr-ı Müslimeye dahi müsavat, adalet, hürriyet kaideleri dairesinde 
muamele-i uhuvvetkârane gösterirler, fakat hiçbir zaman kendilerini 
unutmazlar. Osmanlılık namı altında memlekete muzır âmâl beslenme­
sine kail olamazlar. Bugün Müslim unsurla kardeş gibi geçinmek isteyen 
gayr-ı Müslim vatandaşlarımız, vicdanlarıyla evvela uzun bir hasbihalde 
bulunmalıdırlar. Türklüğü yıkacak, hükümetin rengini Türk ve Müslim 
hükümeti olmaktan çıkaracak emelleri, kalplerinden -eğer varsa- sil­
meye kendilerinde cesaret görmeli, ondan sonra bizim ağuş-u muhade- 
timize bila-havf ve endişe atılmalıdır. Bizden korkacakları yoktur. 
Yalnız, onlar bizi muhaleset-i kalbiyelerine inandırmalıdırlar. Çünkü ne 
denirse densin, memlekette millet-i hâkime Türklerdir ve Türkler ola­
caktır.
Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Tanin , 25 October 1324(1908).
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APPENDIX C
THE NATIONAL PACT
Translation of the Turkish text of the National Pact, as printed in 
the Proceedings of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Meb'usan) 
of the 17th February 1920.
The Members of the Ottoman chamber of Deputies recognize and 
affirm that the independence of the State and the future of the Nation 
can be assured by complete respect for the following principles, which 
represent the maximum of sacrifice which can be undrtaken in order to 
achieve a just and lasting peace, and thatthe continued existence of a 
stable Ottoman Sultanate and society is impossible outside of the said 
principles:
First Article— Inasmuchas it is necessary that the destinies of the porti­
ons of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an arab 
majority, and which on the conclusion of the armistice of the 30th 
October 1918 were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determi­
ned in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inha­
bitants, the whole of those parts whether within or outside the said ar­
mistice line which are inhabited by an Ottoman muslim majority, united 
in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect 
for each other’s racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form 
a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in 
ordinance.
Second Article— We accept that, in the case of the three Sanjaks which 
united themselves by a general vote to the mother country when they 
first were free, recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free popular 
vote.
Third Article— The determination of the juridical status of western 
Thrace also, which has been made dependet on the Turkish peace, must 
be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inha­
bitants in complete freedom.
Fourth Article— The security of the city of Constantinople, which is the 
seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the head­
quarters of the Ottoman Government, and of the Sea of Marmara must be 
protected f^om every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, wha-
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tever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments 
concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and 
traffic of the world, is valid.
Fifth Article— The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties conclu­
ded between the Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their 
associates shall be confirmed and assured by us- in reliance on the belief 
that the moslem minorities in neighboring countries also will have the 
benefit of the same rights.
Sixth Article— It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued 
existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete indepen­
dence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our develop­
ment, in order that our national and economic development should be 
renderedpossible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the 
form of a more up-to,date regular adminibtration.
For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our deve­
lopment in political, judicial, financial and other matters.
The conditions of settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not 
be contrary to these principles.
From Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth o f a Nation (London: 
Weidenfield and Nicolson,1964), 531-532; taken from Arnold J. Toynbee, 
The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London, 1922).
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APPENDIX D
TÜRK MİLLETİNİ TEŞKİL EDEN MÜSLÜMAN ÖĞELER
HAKKINDA
Efendiler, meselenin bir daha tekerrür etmemesi ricasıyla bir iki 
noktayı arzetmek isterim: Burada maksut olan ve Meclis-i âlinizi teşkil 
eden zevat yalnız Türk değildir, yalnız Çerkeş değildir, yalnız Kürt değil­
dir, yalnız Lâz değildir. Fakat hepsinden mürekkep anasır-ı islamiyedir, 
samimi bir mecmuadır. Binaenaleyh bu heyet-i âliyenin temsil ettiği, 
hukukunu, hayatını, şeref ve şanını kurtarmak için azmettiğimiz emel­
ler, yalnız bir unsur-u İslama münhasır değildir. Anasır-ı İslamiyeden 
mürekkep bir kütleye aittir. Bunun böyle olduğunu hepimiz biliriz.. Hep 
kabul ettiğimiz esaslardan birisi ve belki birincisi olan, hudut meselesi 
tayin ve tesbit edilirken, hudud-u millimiz İskenderun'un cenubundan 
geçer, şarka doğru uzanarak Musul'u, Süleymaniye'yi, Kerkük'ü ihtiva 
eder, işte hudud-u millimiz budur dedik! Halbuki Kerkük şimalinde 
Türk olduğu gibi Kürt de vardır. Biz onları tefrik etmedik. Binaenaleyh 
muhafaza ve müdafaasıyla iştigal ettiğimiz millet bittabi bir unsurdan 
ibaret değildir. Muhtelif anasır-ı islamiyeden mürekkeptir. Bu mecmuayı 
teşkil eden herbir unsur-u İslam, bizim kardeşimiz ve menafii tama- 
miyle müşterek olan vatandaşımızdır ve yine kabul ettiğimiz esasatın ilk 
satırlarında bu muhtelif anasır-ı islamiye ki: Vatandaştırlar, yekdiğerine 
karşı hürmet-i mütekabile ile riayetkârdırlar ve yekdiğerinin her türlü 
hukukuna, ırkî, İçtimaî, coğrafî hukukuna daima riayetkâr olduğunu 
tekrar ve teyid ettik ve cümlemiz bugün samimiyetle kabul ettik. 
Binaenaleyh menafiimiz müşterektir. Tahsiline azmettiğimiz vahdet, 
yalnız Türk, yalnız Çerkeş değil hepsinden memzuç bir unsur-u islamdır. 
Bunun böyle telakkisini ve su-i tefehhümata meydan verilmemesini rica 
ediyorum (alkışlar).
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçler I, Mayıs 1920, 74-75.
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APPENDIXE
TÜRK MİLLETİNİN MÜTALAASI
Din birliğinin de bir millet teşkilinde müessir olduğunu söyle­
yenler vardır. Fakat biz, bizim gözümüz önündeki Türk milleti tablo­
sunda bunun aksini görmekteyiz.
Türkler İslam dinini kabul etmeden evvel de büyük bir millet idi. 
Bu dini kabul ettikten sonra, bu din, ne Arapların, ne aynı dinde bulu­
nan Acemlerin ve ne de vesairenin Türklerle birleşip bir millet teşkil 
etmelerine tesir etmedi. Bilakis, Türk milletinin milli bağlarını gevşetti; 
milli hislerini, milli heyecanını uyuşturdu. Bu pek tabii idi. Çünkü 
Muhammed'in kurduğu dinin gayesi, bütün milliyetlerin fevkinde, şa­
mil bir ümmet siyaseti idi.
Millet neye derler? Bugün Türk Cumhuriyetini kurmuş olan 
Türk milleti'ni mütalaa ederken bulduğumuz şartları tekrar gözden geçi­
relim:
a) Siyasi varlığımızın haricinde, başka ellerde, başka siyasi zümre­
lerle, isteyerek veya istemeyerek teşrik-i mukadderat etmiş, bizimle dil, 
ırk, menşe birliğine malik ve hatta yakın uzak tarih ve ahlak yakınlığı 
görülen Türk cemaatleri vardır. Tarihin bir hadisesinin neticesi olan bu 
hal, Türk milleti için elim bir hatıradır, fakat Türk milletinin tarihen ve 
ilmen teşekkülündeki asaleti, tesanüdü asla haleldar edemez.
b) Bugünkü Türk milleti siyasi ve içtimai camiası içinde kendile­
rine Kürtlük fikri, Çerkeslik fikri, ve hatta Lazlık fikri veya Boşnaklık 
fikri propaganda edilmek istenmiş vatandaş ve millettaşlarımız vardır. 
Fakat mazinin istibdat devirleri mahsulü olan bu yanlış tevsimler, birkaç 
düşman aleti, mürteci beyinsizden maada hiçbir millet ferdi üzerinde te- 
ellümden başka bir tesir hasıl edememiştir. Çünkü, bu millet efradı da 
umum Türk camiası gibi aynı müşterek maziye, tarihe, ahlaka, hukuka 
sahip bulunuyorlar.
c) Bugün içimizde bulunan Hristiyan, Musevi vatandaşlar, mu­
kadderat ve talihlerini Türk milliyetine vicdani arzularıyla raptettikten 
sonra kendilerine yan gözle yabancı nazariyle bakılmak, medeni Türk 
milletinin asil ahlakından beklenebilir mi?...
Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları
(Civics and Handwritings of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1969), 21-23.
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APPENDIX F
NOTICES AS REGARDS THE CONDITION OF 
ADMISSION TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Avnıpaya talebe 
gönderiliyor
Maden Tetkik ve Aram a Ensti­
tüsü Genel Direktörlüğünden:
Müsabaka günleri uzatılmıştır.
Talihlerin dikkat nazarlarına
1 — <20* Maden mühendisi re « 1 0 b Jeolog yetiştirmek üzere mu*
«»kaka ile Avrupa?» «30» talebe tahsil« gönderilecektir. İsteklile­
rin aşağıdaki şartlan kat* olmazı lazımdır.
A — Türk olmak»
B —  Maden ocaldannda çalışabilecek kabiliyette ve sıhhati tam 
olmak «Sıhhî muayene Aakarada yapılacaktır.»
C — Lise mezunu olup (raıo ct, almanca, İngilizce dillerinden 
birisini okuyup yazabilmek,
D — Yaşı 16 den aşağı ve 25 ten yukan olmamak.
2 — Maden mühendisliği için müsabaka imtihanı 26 şubat 1937 
ve Jeologluk için 2 mart 1937 günlerinde Ankarada M. T. A. Ensti­
tüsünde yapılacaktır*
Açılacak müsabaka imtihanlarında kazanmış olmakla beraber 
gönderilecek talebelerin İhraz ettikleri derece iti berile Maden mü­
hendisliği Sçin «20» ve Jeologluk »çın «10» arasında bulunmak şarttır.
3 — Maden mühendisliği için imtihan: Hesab, hendese, cebir, 
toihamk, fizik, kimya ve yukarıda yazılı dillerden birinden,
4 — Jeologluk İçin imtihan: Riyaziye «Hendese, cebir», hayvanat, 
nebatat, jeoloji, fizik, kimya ve yukarıda yazılı dillerden birinden 
yapılacaktır.
5 — Tahsile gönderilecek olanlar, İleride tahsil müddetleri kadar 
mecburi hizmete tiki olduklarından, ha hususta mükellefiyetlerini 
tev si etmek üzere bir taahhütname verecekler ve bunan için de 
muteber kefil göstereceklerdir.
6 — Maden mühendisliği için:
Son müracaat 20 şubat 937 cumartesi öğleye kadar.
Sıhhî muayene 26 şubat 937 cama,
İmtihan 27 şubat 937 cumartesi
Jeologluk için: Son müracaat 27 şubat 937 cumartesi oğlejc- 
kadar.
Sıhhî muayene I mart 937 pazartesi, 
hatibin 2  mart 937 salı 
tünleri olarak tesblt edilmiştir.
Talihlerin nüfus hüviyet cüzdanını, hüsnühal varakasını, mekteb 
fehadfftniHmîıı! veya bunların tasdikli birer suretlerini 4 Sofa fo - 
y  dilekçelerini ana müracaat tarihlerine kadar Ankarada M.
J  A ^  Enstitüsü Genel Direktörlüğüne göndermeleri ve sıhhi maaye- 
M eri İçin de tayin edilmiş elan günlerde öğleden evvel Bay Hazan 
ApartmssmndsVi Enstitü Dairesinde buhraıuaJan ilân olunur.
«89» (318)
Cumhuriyet, 4 February 1937, 9.
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Sıhhat ve İçtimaî
Muavenet Vekâletinden:
Bo yıl Leyli Tıb Talebe Yurduna alınarak talebenin kaba! cırtlan  
fonlardır:
1 —  a) P .C H , stnıf için: Tam devreli liselerden veya Um derteealade 
oUojbı Kültür Bakanlığınca tasdik edflmif mektebimden pddjri ve iyf dere­
cede meran otat*» »kufiktk veya bakalorya totO nıaa verm!* olmak, 
b > Diter «u flar için: Bulunduğu saufı İyi derece Üe geçsnif almak, 
t  —  İatekîflertn 9ü eylül 193? tarihine kadar doğradın doğruya Sıhhat 
re İçtimai Muavenet Vekâletine müracaat eylemeleri v» dflekçeterPe birlikte 
Difıdıki evrakı tamamen döndürmeleri İlamdır.
A ) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti teha atından olduğunu bildiren nüfus hüviyet cür* 
dam aslı.
B ) Mekteb çehadetnamesinln asit (İmtihanlarını tamamen bitirdikleri haki« 
fehadetnamelerinln tasdik mttamdtecl ım ksüy olanlar mekteb müdür­
lüğünün • ayn) samanda mezuniyet kncnfaıl de gösteren • fotoğraflı 
ve resmî mühürlü bir vasUcanm göndereceklerdir.)
C ) Okudukları snektebSerden atam * hüsnühal varaka«
D ) Mütehassislan tam bir hastane heyetinden, hanim* ürneğiae uygun 
ve üstünde tasdikli fotoğrafı bulunan bir sıhhat raporu. (Bu raporu has­
tane baftıbiblikkri' zarflıyarak üstünü mühüriiyecek ve İstekli tamim* 
dan mühürlü sarf halinde olarak gönderilecektir.)
îfbu muayeneler : Ankara, Snru, Erzurum, Diyarbddr, Haydarpaşa
Kümüne hastaneleri, İstanbul Çocuk hastanesi; tamir, Bursa. Konya, 
Adana, Sanvun Memleket hastanelerinde yapılacak ve buralarda mua­
yene olunmak için bu hastanelerin bulunduğu vfiâyetlertn Sıhhat vt İç­
timai Muavenet Müdürlüklerine İstektiler bizzat müracaat edeceklerdir. 
£ )  Örneği aşağıda gösterilen noterlikçe tasdikli bîr Uahhfid aenedl (Bu ae* 
ned istekli tarafından aynen tanzim ve İmza cdftecek ve altı, örneğinde 
görüldüğü veçhile, kefili tarafından keza aynen re tamamen yazılarak 
İmzalanacaktır.)
F ) t i  X  < boyunda dört tane fotoğraf.
3 —  Yaslan yirmi İkiyi geçkin bulunanlar ve Turdda okumağa ve fle - 
ride mecburi hizmetlerini yapmağa engel olacak bir hastalığı ve aması olan­
lar kabul edilmezler.
4 —  İsteklilerin gönderdiği dilekçe ve vesflnlanıı. Vekâletçe, atadığı
adreslerine bildirileceği gib! bunlara göre kabul edilip edilmedikleri de ge­
ne adreslerine ayrıca bildirilecektir. (3397)
TAAHHÜT) SENEDİ ÖKKEfit
Leylî Tıb Talebe Yurduna kabul edilerek herhangi bir Tıb fakültesin - 
den tabib olarak çıktığımda. 2000 sarılı kanun mucibince. Yurdda geçirdiğim 
zsmtmn «tatiller de dahil« Üçte İkisi kadar bir müddetle Sıhhat ve İçtima! 
Muavenet Vekâletinin lüzum göreceği mahallerde hizmet ifasını kabul et - 
n*edlğim veya kabul edip de muayyen müddeti bitirmeden hizmeti terkey * 
kdigim takdirde Yurdda benim için aarfolunan paranın tid katmı Ödemeği 
ve tıb tah*ttinl terkettiğım veya sıhhi sebebi er dışmda Fakülteden daimî 
olarak çıkarıldığım veyahud Yurdde bir seneden az bir müddet kalarak ter» 
keylediğira takdirde benim İçin sarfedilmlf olan parayı tamamen Ödemeği 
ve bu taahhüd senedi mucibince benden istenilecek paralar İçin ödemek 
mecburiyetinde olduğum tarihten itibaren % 9 fili yürütülmesin! ve 2000 
sayılı kanunun diğer cezai hükümlerinin de hakkımda tatbikini kabul ve 
taahhüd eylerim.
Sarih İkametgâh adresi
Yukarıda adres ve hüviyeti yanlı — _ ......... İn bu taaKhüdname muri -
bince faizi!« birlikte ödemek mecburiyetinde bulunduğu her d m  yılı İçin 
üç yüz Ura olmak üzere bütün tahsil müddeti İçin ceman 1600 liraya, ve Üti 
katım ödemek mecburiyeti hasıl olduğu takdirde 3JOO liraya kadar parayı
bordu.................. Ue birlikte müteselati kefU ve müşterek müteselsil borçlu
sıfatüe ¿diyeceğim.
Kefilin adres)
Cumhuriyet, 23 June 1937, 8.
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Hava Okulu Komutanlığından:
Hava ûfcaHan talimatının $6 n a maddesinde yanlı şartlın haiz istek * 
lüen
Dilek kâğıdı ve vesOolsrfte Umunuz başlangıcından ağustos sonuna ka­
dar okula başvururlar. Okulun bulunduğu yerin dtftnd* bubmanlar dQek kİ* 
ğıdlanle verikaiınzu posta Üe okula gönderirler ve alacaklara karşılığa göre 
hareket ederler.
Madde 86 —  Hava okulu gedikli kanuna girme şartlan şunlardır:
A —  Türk olacak,
B —  Orta mekteb «llae sekizinci amil» tıhaflini bitirmiş en az 27 ve en 
çok 20 ymşmda ohnak,
C —  Sıhhi vaziyeti uçuculukta ve uçuş işlerinde kullanılmağa elverişli 
olduğuna dair mütehassislan tamam olan bir hastanede sıhhat heyeti raporu 
«dmak. Boy 1,65 ten aşağı olmıyacakttr.
Dışanda bulunulan
Bulundukları yerin askerlik şubesine müracaatle muayeneye gönderi • 
lirler. Tam teşkilâtlı sıhhi heyet bulunan yerlerde o yerin en büyük kuman* 
danına müracaatle muayeneye gönderilirler«
D —  Ahlâkı sağlam olduğuna ve hiçbir surette suçlu ve mahkûm olma* 
öığmı dair bulunduğu yerin Emniyet Müdürlüğünden veya polis âmİrtiğin - 
den tasdikli vesika göstermek.
E  —  Mektebe alınarak okuyucular, gedikli erbaşlar bakkmdakf 2505 sa­
yılı kanun mucibince muamele göreceklerini, mektebi bitirdiklerinde 12 yıl 
müddetle bav» gedikli erbaş olarak vazife göreceklerini tıahhüd etmek.
F  —  Mektebce yapılacak seçme İmtihanda kazanmak.
H —* İstekli adedi çok veya imtihanım kazananlar aimacak miktardan 
fazla olursa banlan» içinden riyaziye bilgiler! daha iyi ve yaban» dil bilen­
ler yenlenlr. Hava mektehleri okuyuculara Askeri liseler okuyuculara gibi ye- 
dirilir ve giydirilir. Kitab ve diğer ders İçfo lâzım olanlar parasız veril ir.
V —  Hava okullarına kabul edilenlerden birind smrfı muvaffakiyetle 
bitirenler ansındın, kabiliyetlerine göre, uçucu, makinist, telriz. fotoğrafçı 
atış ve bombardıminciliği ayrılırlar. (4056)
Cumhuriyet, 14 July 1937, 9.
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Ankara Askerî Baytar Mektebine 
Talebe Kayıd ve Kabulü
1 —  Aftkamda Askerî Baytar okuluna bu yû sivil tan devreli liseler - 
den 1837 de pek İyi ve iyi derecede nenin olan «e olgunluk famtihanUrcu 
vermiş olmak şartile talebe kabul edilecektir. İsteklilerin ıtaftrfaH vaari ve 
şartlan haiz olması Uzımdtr.
A —  Türktoe Cumhuriyeti tebaasından ve Türk ırkından olmak.
B ^  \ 5 n r ~  21 olmak.----------- --------------------------------------------
C —  Beden teşekkülleri ve sıhhati orduda ve her iklimde faal hizmete 
müsaid olmak (dil rekiketi olanlar alınmaz).
D ~  Kusursuz, vazı. tanr, ahlik ve seciye sahibi olmak.
E — Aüessra* hiçbir fena hal ve şöhreti olmamak (zabrta vesikası).
2 —  İsteklilerin müracaat istidalarına fa vesikaların bağlanma» lisandır:
A—  Nüfus cüzdanı veya musaddak sureti
B — Sıhhati hakkında tam teşekküllü askerî hastane raporu ve a$t 
kâğıdı.
C — Lise mezuniyet ve olgunluk fehadetnamesi veya tasdikli sureti
2> — Okula alındığı takdirde askerî kanun, nizam ve talimatları kabul 
ettiği hakkında velisinin ve kendisinin noterlikten tasdikli taahhöd senedi.
E —  Saralı, uyurken gezen, sidikli, bayılma yy marazı çnynnmıya müp­
telâ abradığı hakkında velilerinin noterlikten tasdiki! taahhüdnamesi (hu 
gibi hastalıklardan birüe okula girmezden evvel malul oldukları sonradan 
anlaşılanlar okuldan çıkarılır ve bu müddete aid hükümet masrafı velilerine 
ödettirilir.)
3 —  İstekliler bu) undu klan malullerdeki askerlik şubelerine istida ile 
müracaat edecekler ve şubelerce 2 ne» maddede bildirilen evrakı ikmal etti­
rildikten sonra tstanbul ve yakını {Herden İsteklilerin Haydarpaşa Askeri 
Baytar Tatbikat Okulu Direktörlüğüne. Ankara ve ona yakm iller i*tekbik­
rinin de Ankarada Ziraat Enstitüsü Baytar Fakültesi Askerî Talebe Amir­
liğine gönderilecektir.
4 —  Müracaat müddeti eylülün ilk haftasına kadardır. Ondan sor.ra 
kabul edilmez.
$ — Kabul duhul imtihanına bağlı değildir. Şehadetname derecelerin* 
ve müracaat sırasına göredir. İstekli adedi tamam olunca kavid işleri it* • 
panır ve kabul edilenlere müracaat ettikleri Askerlik şubelerile tebligat v*. 
pılır. (453İ)
Cumhuriyet, 24 July 1937, 8.
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Harb Akademisi Komutanlığından:
Hava Harb Akademisi için 8C ilâ 100 lira ücretli iki erkek daktilo alı­
nacaktır.
Şartlar:
1 —  Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tebaasından ve Türk olmak.
2 —- ü ter yıpncan yukarl fltoıimık?"
3 —  En ıx orta tahsüi bltirmij olmak.
4 — Çabuk ve iyi daktilo edebilmek ve daktilo imtihanında muvaffak olmak. 
9 —  Sb «a Od yıl hizmet taahhüt etmek, bir yabana dil bilenler tercih edi­
lecektir.
İsteklilerin İidndkisım sonuna kadar Yıldızda Harb Akademisi Komu­
tanlığına mûracaıtlerj (332)
Cumhuriyet, 25 January 1938, 8.
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Askerî Veteriner Okuluna Talebe 
Kayıd ve Kabulü
1 —  Ankarada Askeri Veteriner okuluna bu yıl tam devreli devlet si* 
vü liselerinden 1938 dr pek İyi derecede mezun olan ve cigunluk imli - 
hanlarım vermiş olan aşağıda yazılı vasıf ve şeraiti halı 30, 35 talebe 
alınacaktır.
A —  Türkivc Cumhuriyeti tebaasından ve Türk j r kmdan olmak.
B  —  Yaşı yircıi bîr yaşını aşmış o imim ak:
C __Beden ve teşekkülleri ve sıhhati orduya ve her iklimde hizmete
elverişli olmak « Dil re kik eti olanlar alınmaz » .
D —  Kusursuz vaz'ı tavır, ahlâk ve seciye sahibi olmak.
E —  Ailesinin hiç bir İcra  hnli ve fena şöhreti olmamak.
m Zabıta vesika» * ,  « ordu mensubu ve devlet mcmurUrile cmekiile- 
rin çocukları İçin vesika aranmaz ►.
2  _İsteklilerin müracaat istidalarına şu vesikaların bağlanması lâ­
zımdır :
A ; Nüfus cüzdanı veya musaddak sureti « Kabulde aslının İbran 
şarttır»
B : Sıhhab hakkında tam teşekküllü Askeri hastane fotoğraflı raporu 
ve aşı kâğıdı.
C : T mezuniyet ve olgunluk şehıdetnamesi veya tasdikli sureti 
« kabulde asi mm ibrazı şarttır * .
D : Okula alındığı takdirde halen m eri ve bundan böyle çıkacak ka­
sım, nizam ve talimatnameleri kabul ettiği baklanda velisinin ve kendisi* 
nin noterlikten tasdikli taahhüd senedi
E : Sar’ah. uyurken gezen, sidikli, bayılma ve marazi çırpınmaya müp­
telâ olmadığı hakkında noterlikten tasdikli taahhûdnaraesi bu gibi hasta­
lıklardan birüe okula girmezden evvel malûl oldukları sonradan anlaş! - 
lanlar okuldan çıkarılırlar ve bu müddete aiö hükümet masrafı velilerine 
ödettirilir.
3 -r- İstekliler bulundukları yerlerdeki Askerlik şubesine istida İje mü­
racaat edecekler ve şubelerce 2 nci maddedeki evrakı ikmal ettirildikten 
sonra İstanbul ve civarından olanlar m Haydarpaşa Askeri Veteriner Tatbi­
kat Okulu Müdürlüğüne, Ankara ve civar yerlerdddîerin Ankra Fakültesi 
Askeri Talebe Amirliğine gönderilecektir.
4 —  Müracaat müddeti: Eylülün on besine kadardır.
3  ——• Kshnl duhul imtihanına tâbi değildir. Şehadetname derecelerine 
vem öracaat serasma göredir, istekli adedi tamam olunca kayıd işleri kapa. 
* ı jc 0 »  kabul edilenlere müracaat ettikleri Askerlik şubelerile tebligat ya-
« M * X 4132)
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T. C. Orman Umum
Müdürlüğünden:
Bursa ve Bolu Orman Mekteblerine 
Alınacak Talebenin Kayıd ve Kabul Şartlan
Bu sene Bursa ve Bolu Orman mekteblerine müsabaka ile parssa: ya­
tılı ellişer talebe alınacaktır. Mekteblerin tahsil müddetleri üç senedir. 
Mezunlan (Orman Mühendis Muavini) unvanüe meslekte kullanılırlar. 
İsteklilerden aşağıda yazılı şartlar aranır:
1 -~jprV iy» rıııthıtT*Y^-A^->tnrian ylmslr
2 — ¿0 den yukarı olmamak,
3 —  Sağlık durumu normal derecede, yani dit göz, kulak ve vücu-, 
dunda ¿rıza ve noksanlık bulunmamak, am ali re  dağlık yerlerde yürüyüp, 
gezmeğe hayvana binmeğe bünye teşekkûütı müsaid ve dayanıklı
4 —  İyi ahlâklı, hüsnühal sahibi ve geçmiş mahkûmiyeti olmamak.
5 —  Orta mektebi bitirmiş bulunmak,
5 —  Bu şartlan haiz olanlar Bursa re  Boluda Mektcb Müdürlükle­
rine, diğer yerler için 7 inci maddede isimlen yazılı Orman Başmühendis- 
İlklerine verecekleri dilekçelere:
A —  Nüfus cüzdanı, asıl veya tasdikli sureti,
B  —  Üçüncü maddede yazılı sağlık durumlarını bildiren tam teşek - 
küllü hastanelerden veya bu hastanelerin bulunmadıkları yerlerde Hükü­
met doktorlarından alacakları tasdikli raporu ( Um teşekküllü hastane 
olrrjyan yerlerden kabul edilecek istekilerio kavı dian imtihanı kazandık- 
dan sonra mektepçe yaptınlacak muayene neticesine kadar esaslandmlmaz 
ve bu muayenede yazılı evsaf kendisinde bulunmıyanlır mektebe alınmaz.)
C —  Çiçek aşısı vesikası,
D —  Dördüncü maddedeki yazıya gere Belediye veya Polis merkezleri 
tarafından tanzim ve tasdik edüecek hüsnühal mazbatası.
E —  Orta mekteb şehadetnamesinin asıl veya Usdikii örneği.
F  —  6 X 9  ob’adında 6 fotoğraf, 
bağlanmalıdır.
7 —  Müsabaka imtihanına gireceklerin namzetlik kayıdîan 15 ağutos 
1938 tarihinden başlıyarak 15 eylül 1938 akşamma kadar Bursa ve Bolu için 
Orman mekteblerinde, diğer yerler İçin Ankara, İstanbul, Edime, İzmir, 
Antalya, Adana, Diyarbakır, Elâzığ, Kars, Trabzon, Samsun Kastamonu, 
Konya. Eskişehir Orman Başmühendisliklerinde yapılacaktır.
Noksan evrak getiren ve gönderenlere müracaat etmemiş oazarÜe bakılır.
S —-  İmtihan 16 eylül 1938 cuma günü Bursa ve Bolu Orman mek- 
teblerile 7 İnci maddede isimleri yazılı vilâyetlerde aaat 14 ilâ 18 e kadar 
devam etmek üzere orta mektebi erde okutulan riyaziye ve bioloji ders- 
lerirden yapılacaktır.
Muayyen gün ve saatte İmtihanda bulunmıyaclar müsabaka harici 
bıraktır.
9 —  Yukarıda yanlı şartlan haiz olanlar, müsabaka imtihanı netice­
sinde muvaffak olarak mektebe almdıklan takdirde tahsil esnasında mek­
tebi terkcfüklcri veya bitirdikten sonra tayin olusduklan vazifeye gitme­
dikleri halde mektebin yapmış olduğu masrafları ödeyeceklerine oan ken­
dilerine verilecek nümü neye göre noterlikten tasdikli bir taahhüd senedi 
▼ereceklerdir. Bu senedi getİrmİyenİerin mektebe devamlarına müsaade 
edilmez.
İG —  imtihan r c A,-^sİ Bursa Orman Mektebi Müdürlüğü tarafından 
30 eylül 1938 tarihinde Ulus. Cumhuriyet, Tan. Akşam, Son Posta gazete­
leri le ilân edilecek ve ayrıca imtihan yapılacak vilâyetlere de bildirile­
cektir. (5242)
Cumhuriyet, 4 September 1938, 10.
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Türkkuşu Genel Direktörlüğünden:
Türkkuşu teşkilâtında n*otörlü ve motörsüz tayyareler Üzerinde öğret, 
men olarak çalışmak mıkıadiie yetiştirilecek 15 sence ihtiyaç verdir. 
Annen bellS başta fertler şunlardır:
3 —  Sağlık durumu tayyareci almağa elverişli olmak
4 —  Boyu 1.58 den aşağı otanamab
5  m »  tS * * *  M anim  ffflm u n  Ifil1 rfnt| OİmsV
8 —  En az 18. en çok 23 yaşnata olmak
7 —  İki veaSka fotoğrafı İbraz etmek
Öğretmen namzedi olmak özere atanacak ¿enderden Türkkuşu teşki- 
'Ittsndm uçuculuk öğrenmiş bulunan pttokefilük B veya C bröveleri«» işe 
başladıkları tarihten, hiç uçmamış bulunanlara da plânörcülük B brövesi 
aldıktan tarihten İtibaren nizamname mucibince yatmak, yemek ve giyim 
masrafları Türkkuşuna atat olmak Üzere ayda lise 10 tahsilini görmüşlere 
2S, liseyi bitirmiş olanlara 80 lira ücret verilecektir.
Gelecek seneler içinde uçuculuk kudretlerinin artış derecelerine göre 
göreceklri zamlar husus! bir talimatla tsbJt edilmiş bulunmaktadır. Türk- 
kuşuna bu suretle seçileceklerin öğretmen muavini oluncaya kadar, nor­
mal olarak beş sene evlenmemeyi ve hususi bir taahhödnameyi İmza ede­
rek TÜrkkuşunun vereceği vazifeleri on sene müddetle görmeği kabul ve 
teahhÜd etmesi şarttır.
Bu hususlar bıkkında fazla tafsilât almak İstiyenler Türkkuşu Talim 
Terbiye Bürosu Direktörlüğüne doğrudan doğruya şubeden veya yazı ile 
müracaat edebilirler.
Kayıd muamelesin» Cumhuriyet Bayramına kadar devam olunacağın» 
.dan müracaıtlerin bu tarihe kadar yapılman tarttır. (6184)
Cumhuriyet, 6 September 1938, 8.
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